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FOREWORD
Sidney Jones
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)
In these eight meticulously researched case studies, Rizal Panggabean, 
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and their colleagues illuminate two critical issues in 
post-Soeharto Indonesia: the prevalence of religious conflict and the 
institutional weaknesses of the police. Both are common problems 
in new multicultural democracies. Tackling them together helps un-
derscore the complexities of both. 
The institutes involved in this study (PUSAD Paramadina and 
MPRK UGM) have developed a formidable reputation for work on 
religious conflict, combining rigorous research with practical advo-
cacy, looking for lessons that might be learned to manage such con-
flicts more effectively and prevent violence in the future. They start 
from a commitment to tolerance and pluralism and to democracy 
as a political system that should allow both to flourish. What they 
have found, however, is that in some areas of Indonesia, democracy 
can add complications: intolerant civil society organizations using 
freedom of expression to incite hatred of religious “deviants” and 
elected officials afraid to antagonize key constituencies or eager to 
use religious issues as a way of garnering votes.1 
1The role of local elections in exacerbating religious conflict is the subject 
of another superb study, covering some of the same conflicts as those 
vii
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Thus, when sectarian conflicts or disputes over the construction 
of minority houses of worship erupt, multiple interests quickly be-
come involved, going far beyond the contending parties and mak-
ing resolution more difficult. Enter the police, enforcers of the law 
in democratic Indonesia. They are perhaps the most vilified actors 
in government with a reputation for corruption and abuse, although 
good officers in positions of authority can sometimes transcend the 
institutional culture. Depending on when they decide to move and 
what actions they take, police can fuel or cool a conflict.
It is sobering to realize that one of the “success” stories of polic-
ing in this volume involves attacks on the Ahmadiyah community 
in Manis Lor, Kuningan in 2007 and 2010 where:
 the police took no preventive action as the problem escalated be-
fore 2007 (the best they could do was put up a banner saying “We 
are all brothers”);
 they were powerless to prevent the local government from clos-
ing three mosques or a mob from gathering on 18 December 
2007 and vandalizing two of the mosques and eight Ahmadiyah 
homes as well as wounding seven people;
 while they charged six men with violence, prosecutors only asked 
for two months sentences and the judges gave them less;
 tensions steadily escalated again in June-July 2010 even though 
the police had full were in touch with all sides;
 the police chief accompanied the municipal police in the closing 
of an Ahmadiyah mosque and four smaller prayerhouses, in co-
ordination with the local government despite the fact that these 
actions violated a 2008 decree;
analysed here, by a partner institution at Gajah Mada University. See Moh. 
Iqbal Ahnaf, Samsul Maarif, Budy Asyari-Afwan and Muhammad Afdillah, 
Politik Lokal dan Konflik Keagamaan: Pilkada dan Struktur Kesempatan Politik 
dalam Konflik Keagamaan di Sampang, Bekasi dan Kupang (Yogyakarta: Center 
for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies/CRCS, Sekolah Pascasarjana, 
Universitas Gadjah Mada, [February] 2015).
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 in the midst of rising tensions, police were powerless to prevent 
a meeting of hardline groups on 29 July 2010 attended by over 
1,000 individuals mobilized by text message and bent on vio-
lence;
 despite deploying hundreds of troops and using tear gas, po-
lice were powerless to prevent the mob arming itself with bricks, 
rocks and sharp objects, wounding five people and damaging 
more homes; and
 no one was arrested.
If this is successful policing, it makes one realize how low the bar 
is set. In this case, the police chief is seen to have performed well in 
2010 because she realized the potential for violence, mustered enough 
officers to confront it, and had non-lethal means — teargas — on hand 
to control the mob. No one in the Ahmadiyah community had to be 
relocated, and no further violence in Manis Lor has taken place. The 
last is important, although how much this is due to policing and 
how much to other factors is a question. 
The fact remains that no effective preventive or deterrent mea-
sures were in place before the 29 July meeting. In the lead-up to the 
mob incitement, the police seem to have been reduced to the role of 
message-carriers, urging the Ahmadiyah to accede to some of the 
demands of the hardliners, and urging the hardliners to avoid vi-
olence. Neither effort at “persuasion” was ever going to work: the 
police toolkit of possible responses to violence has to be much more 
sophisticated. In this case, at least the key police actors at the district 
level were well-intentioned men who were genuinely trying to ful-
fill their duty to protect.
The obstacles to improving policing, not just of religious conflict 
but of any disputes likely to produce an angry crowd, are many. The 
police themselves cited several. They had no instructions on how 
to handle the case from their superiors or the central government, 
and in an institution that remains highly centralized, local police 
often fear to act without orders. The relevant laws were unclear and 
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contradictory. The local ulama council insisted that the Ahmadiyah 
were guilty of blasphemy under a 1965 law; the 2008 decree suggest-
ed they could worship as long they did not proselytize. The police 
had enough human rights training to understand they could not 
force anyone to renounce his or her beliefs, but they were also clear-
ly reluctant to take on the mob and the mob’s political backers. The 
latter included the district head and many members of the district 
council who had turned banning the Ahmadiyah into a campaign 
promise. Once the mob had massed, the police were afraid of taking 
any action that might lead them to be accused of human rights vio-
lations. One reason they did not arrest anyone was that they knew 
no one would be willing to testify against the hardline provocateurs 
for fear of retribution. (Witness protection in Indonesia is in its in-
fancy.)
Beyond the obstacles that were specific to Manis Lor, there are 
broader issues that hamper good policing. Institutionally there are 
no incentives to building a genuine community policing program. 
Having good relations with the community does not produce pro-
motions. There are no useful or enforceable procedures for handling 
social conflict; a disastrous attempt to produce one for handling “an-
archy” in October 2010 (Protap No.1/X/2010) ended up amounting 
to orders to shoot on site. There are no guidelines on hate speech, 
and an understandable reluctance in the civil society community 
to countenance any measure that could be seen as returning to the 
provisions of the criminal code used during the Soeharto days to 
punish dissent — including provisions on incitement and spread-
ing hatred. Police and other officials, when faced with a conflict, 
often have a tendency to fall back on trying to negotiate a middle 
way, even when one side is clearly in the wrong. Enforcing the law 
and defending constitutional principles such as freedom of religion 
sometimes become secondary.
The recommendations to the police at the end of this volume are 
common-sense lessons from both the “successes” and failures this 
book describes. In the call for better training, better intelligence, 
Foreword xi
more interaction with the community, and respect for due process, 
they echo many of the calls for police reform that have been made in 
Indonesia, mostly without much success, since Soeharto fell. Many 
of the lessons learned are similar to those noted in a very different 
context by the former chief of police in Papua, Inspector General 
Tito Karnavian, in his book Guardian over the Land of the Cender-
awasih.2 The problem is that local police officers cannot themselves 
bring about change — or at least, they may be able to improve prac-
tices for the duration of their tenure but assignments to district and 
provincial commands tend to be short and improvements rarely 
survive the departure of the reformer. 
It is striking to see in these eight case studies, as an earlier study 
by the same group,3 how much effective policing depends on in-
dividual leadership, rather than any institutional imperative. For 
reforms to have a chance of being implemented, they have to come 
from the top, making the choice of national police commander by 
the president absolutely critical. Unless proven commitment to re-
form, professionalism and incorruptibility are demanded at the top, 
the obstacles toward effective policing of religious conflicts, and all 
other conflicts, are likely to continue.
There is hope for change, however, and it lies in the socially en-
gaged academics who produced this study. The spirit of intellectual 
inquiry paired with an ongoing commitment to reform is very much 
alive, and this book is proof. 
September 2015
2Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Bhayangkara di Bumi Cenderawasih (Jakarta: 
ISPI Strategic Series, 2014).
3Ihsan Ali-Fauzi et al., Kontroversi Gereja di Jakarta (Yogyakarta: Center 
for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies/CRCS, Sekolah Pascasarjana, 
Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2011). The book was translated into English as 
Disputed Churches in Jakarta, tr. Rebecca Lunnon (Jakarta: Center for the 
Study of Religion and Democracy, Paramadina Foundation, 2014). The 
electronic files of both books are available online at PUSAD Paramadina’s 
website: http://www.paramadina-pusad.or.id
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PREFACE TO THE 
ENGLISH EDITION
The translation of this book into English is something we did not 
plan for. When the design for the research was formulated in mid-
2012, one of the objectives was to provide a good material on policing 
religious conflicts in Indonesia, based on a research, to be used in 
workshops attended by the police and civil society leaders — includ-
ing religious leaders. The results of the research was published in 
early 2014. Later that year, an abridged version of the book was pub-
lished, intended as a source of case studies for workshop on policing 
religious conflicts in the country. 
Workshops for police has been a focus of the Master Program 
in Peace and Conflict Resolution (Magister Perdamaian dan Reso-
lusi Konflik, MPRK), Gadjah Mada University. From 2005 to 2009, 
MPRK organized workshops in 25 provinces of Indonesia, funded 
by the New Zealand Aid. These workshops, with the duration that 
varied from one to two weeks, focus on particular subjects such as 
intergroup relations, nonviolent intervention, and community po-
licing. From 2009, Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy 
(Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi, PUSAD) in cooperation with 
MPRK and the Asia Foundation, organized a new series of work-
shop using a different strategy, by inviting the police and civil so-
ciety leaders to come to a two-day workshop convened in several 
cities in Java and Bali.
These workshops become an excellent place for the police and 
civil society leaders to share experience and exchange ideas. At the 
xiii
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high point of the workshops, the two sides exchange some fixed 
ideas. Members of the community, according to the police, do not 
obey the law or do not cooperate with the police in maintaining law 
and order, especially when it comes to issues that divide the com-
munity such as religious and sectarian issues. When members of the 
community do not comply with the law, or what the police ask them 
to do, conflicts will escalate and the police force need to intervene. 
One senior police officer said in one of the workshops that religious 
conflict is a fireball thrown to the police, as if nothing the police 
could do to prevent the fireball from erupting. 
The police, according to the community leaders, gave weak or 
belated responses to incidents of religious conflict. Occasionally, the 
police passively watching such incidents; sometimes the police take 
sides in the conflict instead of enforcing the law. The community 
leaders, in other words, think the police are doing many things 
wrong, as if nothing the religious leaders could do to maintain 
calm and reduce tension in the community — through consultation, 
dialogue or negotiation to prevent violence from taking place. 
To move beyond this situation of “the police said and the com-
munity said,” we need to learn from the actual policing of religious 
conflict. Unfortunately for us, there were no good materials on the 
real policing of religious conflicts – on how the community and the 
police were able to reduce tension and prevent violence, and on how 
the police, the community, and the local government cooperate in 
policing religious conflict or on how they failed to do so. Despite the 
increasing attention given by human rights institutions, for exam-
ple, on how the police deal with conflicts related to religious free-
dom, incidents of religious violence remain rare. In addition, reports 
on the role of the police in dealing with religious violence are based 
on individual cases when and where violence took place. 
Therefore, we decided to design a research that look into cases 
of success and failure of policing religious disputes, and we pair 
cases according to this criteria. We select polarizing issues in many 
communities, namely sectarian disputes and conflicts over places 
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of worships, and cast a wider perspective of policing, involving 
many actors such as the police, the local government, civil society 
organization, the conflicting parties, the media, and public opinion. 
Since we did not have enough baseline information, case selection 
became a complicated issue. We finally decided to focus on eight 
cases based on stories and discussions during the workshops. 
The translation of the book into English, we hope, will spread the 
results of the research. It will contribute to the studies of policing in 
Indonesia in general, which often times missing in many publica-
tions on policing studies. 
We would like to express our sincere thanks and appreciation to 
Sandra Hamid from the Asia foundation for supporting the research, 
Natalia Laskowska for translating the book into English, and for 
Sidney Jones for writing the foreword for the English edition.*** 
Jakarta, August 20, 2015
Rizal Panggabean
Ihsan Ali-Fauzi
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PREFACE TO THE 
INDONESIAN EDITION
There is good news and bad news about the recent developments in 
the management of religious life in the post-New Order Indonesia. 
The incidents of collective inter-religious violence such as those 
which took place in Ambon, South Maluku, and Poso (Central 
Sulawesi) declined remarkably ten years ago. More recently, 
however, reports have been indicating the rise of inter-religious 
conflicts, especially over the places of worship, as well as intra-
religious (sectarian) conflicts within Islam, particularly in relation to 
the Ahmadiyya and Shi‘a communities.
Although often discussed, very rarely these problems have 
been reviewed in terms of policing. This is quite unfortunate 
because since the separation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI) and the 
Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, 
POLRI) in 1999, the police has been gradually taking over the major 
role of maintaining security and public order. 
This is what prompted the Center for the Study of Religion 
and Democracy (Pusat Studi Agama dan Demokrasi, PUSAD), 
the Paramadina Foundation, to carry out a research on the subject 
of religious conflicts policing in the post-Suharto Indonesia. The 
present book is based on research undertaken between January 2012 
and September 2013.
Many persons contributed to the completion of this research, 
acting both as individuals and on behalf of institutions. Without 
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their help it would be difficult to imagine the completion of the 
research and the publication.
We wish to express our gratitude first of all to the interviewees: 
members of the police, local political leaders, religious leaders and 
leaders of the mass organizations, executives of the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (Majlis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), the Forum for 
Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, FKUB), 
and all others who agreed to be interviewed. The information 
they provided was most valuable, without which we would find it 
impossible to answer our research questions. 
We also would like to thank our field assistants: Muhammad 
Afdillah, Reynold Uran, Krist Ngga’a, Muhammad Soleh Dahlan, 
and Syafaat Mohamad. Their familiarities with the fields has 
ensured the efficiency of our fieldwork. Indirectly, we are also 
indebted to the institutions and individuals from the Commission 
for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Komisi untuk Orang 
Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, KontraS) and the Legal Aid 
Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) in Jakarta; Magister 
Program in Peace and Conflict Resolution (Magister Perdamaian 
dan Resolusi Konflik, MPRK), and the Center for Religious and 
Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), both at the Gadjah Mada University 
in Yogyakarta; as well as the Center for Marginalized Communities 
Studies (CMARS) in Surabaya.
Many thanks to Greg Fealy, Sidney Jones, Zainal Abidin Bagir, 
Haris Azhar, and Asfinawati. Their inputs, at various stages of this 
work, helped us to sharpen our research questions.
Finally, our utmost appreciation goes to Sandra Hamid and 
other colleagues from The Asia Foundation, Jakarta office, who not 
only provided the financial assistance for the research but also the 
intellectual and moral support for our efforts in finding creative 
solutions to the problems, which at times made us frustrated.
Jakarta, 25 December 2013
The Authors
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1
STUDYING POLICING OF 
RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA
This book originated from the research on policing of religious con-
flicts in the post-New Order Indonesia. We specify two types of re-
ligious conflicts in this study that have been on the rise in recent 
years: (1) the intra-religious or sectarian conflicts caused by the an-
ti-Ahmadi and anti-Shi‘a attitudes, and (2) the inter-religious con-
flicts over the places of worship. 
Our research asks two main questions. First, why  policing of 
sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship has been 
effective in some cases but has not been so in others? Second, what 
explains the variation of policing success and failure in these con-
flicts? 
The research examined three main sets of variables that can ex-
plain the variation in policing. First, we examined the effect of struc-
tural variables such as legal and procedural frameworks used by 
the police, the character of the local police organization, the resourc-
es and culture of policing, local politics, and the pressure of public 
opinion. Second, we explore knowledge-related variables including 
police personnel’s understanding of the legal and procedural frame-
work, the understanding of conflict issues, and the perception of the 
3
Introduction4
conflicts faced. Finally, we explore the impact of variation in level 
and types of interaction between the conflicting sides and between 
the parties to the conflict and the police. 
This chapter discusses the need for the research (and the book), 
shows by how far the problem has been discussed in the existing 
literature; and describes how this research was designed and carried 
out. Towards the end of this chapter we describe the organization of 
our research and findings in this book.
The Need to Study Policing of Religious Conflicts 
Some of the developments in the management of religious life 
in the post-New Order Indonesia have been encouraging, some not 
at all. The incidents of collective inter-religious violence such as 
those which took place in Ambon, South Maluku and Poso (Cen-
tral Sulawesi) declined remarkably ten years ago. However, reports 
are indicating the rise of inter-religious conflicts, especially over the 
places of worship – their construction, their use, their location, etc. 
According to the organizations monitoring human rights, including 
religious freedom, there has been a rise in intra-religious sectarian 
conflicts, most of which are in relation to the Ahmadi and Shi‘a com-
munities.
The question is, in the middle of it all, how does the Indonesian 
National Police (Polri) play its role? This question needs to be asked, 
because since its separation from the Armed Forces of the Republic 
of Indonesia in 1999, Polri has been gradually taking over the major 
role of maintaining security and public order. This issue is explic-
itly stated in the Act No. 2/2002 about the National Police, Article 
13, that the principal task of the police is to maintain security and 
public order; enforce the law; and provide protection and service to 
the public. 
Substantial evidence indicates the failure of the police in re-
sponding to conflicts related to places of worship and in handling 
sectarian violence. Because of the sensitivity surrounding religious 
conflicts, the police often do not dare to act decisively against the 
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parties which clearly violate the rights of other groups to exercise 
their freedom of belief, or they submit to the pressure of the domi-
nant social groups (Asfinawati et al. 2008; Kontras 2012a; ICG 2008 
and 2012). Although police’s underperformance in such conflicts 
is well recorded, its spatial variations must still be reviewed and 
analysed further because examples of effective policing have also 
emerged (Ali-Fauzi et al. 2009b).
This research was driven by an assumption that performance 
of the police in dealing with religious conflicts, as well as with all 
other matters, cannot be viewed in isolation from the surrounding 
political and institutional context. The failure or success of polic-
ing must be situated within existing structures of opportunities and 
constraints that influence it. 
First of all, the police is a state apparatus to uphold the consti-
tution and take orders from political leaders. As stated by Lipsky, 
“Police may be ‘conceived’ as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ who ‘rep-
resent’ government to people” (Lipsky 1980, quoted by della Porta 
& Reiter 1998: 1). Therefore, the failure of the police to manage reli-
gious conflicts must also be seen as the inability or unwillingness of 
the state in dealing with the problem. This is reflected in the availa-
bility or absence of legal frameworks, legislation which guarantees 
religious freedom and which regulates how the state agencies and 
authorities, including the police, should act in order to protect that 
freedom. It is also reflected in the actual support for decisive and 
appropriate policing which comes from the authorities – executive, 
legislative, and judicial – and the political elites. 
In terms of the society, the success or failure of policing must also 
be seen from the extent to which the elites and the members of the 
society, as well as the mass media, are supporting decisive and prop-
er policing. To use the words of Schneider, “Police forces mirror the 
societies in which they are embedded” (2008: 138). In the context of 
handling religious conflicts in Indonesia, the police operates amidst 
challenges which include: the decreasing appreciation of the princi-
ple Bhinneka Tunggal Ika which until now has been considered the 
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symbol of diversity and tolerance (Muhtadi 2011; Salim HS 2011); 
the existence of hard-line organizations which undermine the au-
thority of the state (Wilson 2008; Hadiwinata 2009; Jones 2013); and 
the problems related to Indonesia’s democracy which, for example 
during elections, provide the space to “sell” religion for political ad-
vantage (ICG 2008; Bush 2008; Hamid 2012).
The performance of policing must also be seen in the context of 
roles played by religious leaders and organizations in supporting or 
inhibiting the implementation of police tasks. Thus far, they seem 
to be unwilling to decisively oppose the actions that restrain and 
violate the principle of religious freedom despite its protection be-
ing fully guaranteed by the constitution. More alarming  yet are the 
situations when religious leaders either openly or covertly support 
or condone the above actions (see, for instance, Bruinessen 2013 and 
Ricklefs 2012). A comparative example can be given here with re-
gard to their attitudes in opposing terrorism: terrorist violence is 
denounced, but the violence pertaining to sectarian conflicts and 
conflicts over places of worship is not. Leaders of mass Islamic or-
ganizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah 
openly oppose terrorism as incompatible with Islam, the Indonesian 
Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) has issued a fatwa 
forbidding terrorism. However, this kind of steadiness and courage 
is not present when conflicts break out over places of worship or 
when incidents of sectarian violence take place (Ichwan 2013).
How comprehensive has been the study of policing of religious 
conflicts in Indonesia? Until now the number of studies is very lim-
ited. Moreover, existing studies have tend to focus only on religious 
conflicts or only on the reforms of the police forces in the post-New 
Order Indonesia not so much on the intersection of policing and 
religious conflicts. 
Studies or general reports concerning religious conflicts have 
been undertaken by institutions which monitor human rights in 
Indonesia, particularly in reference to religious freedom. These 
include the Wahid Institute, Setara Institute, Center for Religious 
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and Cross-Cultural Studies (Gadjah Mada University) and Human 
Rights Watch (for the most recent reports from these institutions see 
Cholil 2013; Naipospos 2013; Azhari 2012; and HRW 2013). Similar 
studies have also been carried out by others that employ various 
perspectives, such as human rights, state regulations, social regula-
tions, and the majority-minority relations. For example Salim (2011) 
examines the conflicts over places of worship in case studies of two 
churches, Indonesian Christian Church (Gereja Kristen Indonesia, 
GKI) Yasmin, in Bogor, and Parish (Paroki) St. Joannes Baptista in 
Parung. He describes in detail the chronology of the two cases and 
discusses the role of the government, the Interfaith Harmony Forum 
(Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama, FKUB), and the society in the 
conflict resolution. The study carried out by Crouch (2010) examines 
how the Joint Ministerial Regulation (Peraturan Bersama Menteri, 
PBM), issued in 2006 in order to fix the previous legislation, rais-
es new problems related to the construction and use of places of 
worship. It also shows how the clauses of the regulation have been 
utilized by certain groups to inhibit the construction of new places 
of worship or renovation of the already existing ones. 
Other works related to the conflicts over places of worship men-
tion the role of the police, but only briefly. For example Asfinawati 
et al. (2008) assess the incidents of conflicts related to the Christian 
places of worship in several places in Indonesia, especially in the 
West Java, and highlights the failure of the police to protect the reli-
gious freedom of minority groups. Meanwhile, the study of Ali-Fau-
zi et al. (2011) reviews several cases of conflicts involving churches 
in Jakarta and surrounding areas, some of these conflicts have been 
settled but some other, including those related to the role of police, 
are ongoing.
Elsewhere, in Panggabean and Ali-Fauzi (2011) and in Ali-Fauzi 
et al. (2012), although briefly, the conflicts over places of worship 
are already discussed and located in the context of the protection 
of religious freedom. Highlighted as well is the role played by two 
sectors, namely the state – especially the police – and the civil socie-
Introduction8
ty, in protecting religious freedom in Indonesia. Although not based 
on systematic empirical studies, both books emphasize that in order 
to maintain peace and freedom of religion effective police action is 
needed and that the police should collaborate with the civil society 
organizations. 
In addition to the conflicts related to places of worship, the ex-
isting studies on religious conflicts in Indonesia also cover sectari-
an conflicts, that is conflicts involving different sects within a par-
ticular religion, especially Islam. The most often observed by the 
institutions monitoring religious freedom and increasingly frequent 
among them have been the incidents of attacks against the Ahmadi 
and lately also against the Shi‘a communities (Cholil 2013; Naipos-
pos 2013; Azhari 2012; and HRW 2013).
Apart from general reports also in-depth studies have been 
carried out. For example, not long after the government issued 
the Joint Decree (Surat Keputusan Bersama, SKB) on 9 June 2008, 
which “froze” the activities of Ahmadiyya, the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) studied and reported on how the SKB came out due 
to long-term controversies with regard to the existence of Jemaat 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia). 
According to ICG (2008: 1), “This joint decree reveals how the radi-
cal elements which did not receive much support in Indonesian pol-
itics, have managed to create contacts within the government and to 
apply the standard advocacy techniques of the civil society in order 
to influence the government policy.” Other studies discuss the sit-
uation of Ahmadiyya on the local level. Hakim (2005), for example, 
examines the attack on Ahmadis in East Lombok which occurred 
in September 2002. According to him, the Muslim group which as-
saulted the Ahmadis considered them as deviating from the path of 
Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah. In addition to this, the Ahmadis were also 
accused of being aggressive in their proselytizing, and of causing 
anger in the society.
Attacks on the Ahmadi community,  have also occurred in 
other parts of the island, beside the eastern part of Lombok, as 
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well as in some locations on West Java, especially in Manir Lor, 
Kuningan. An outstanding study is available in Asfinawati et al. 
(2008), where several cases of attacks against Ahmadiyya in West 
Java were investigated. According to this investigation, there was 
a certain pattern behind the attacks, including the fatwa issued 
by the ulama whereby Ahmadiyya was deemed a heretical sect; 
the presence of Muslim thugs who would press on the govern-
ment to ban the sect; and the apparent failures of the police in 
taking a firm action to protect the minority religious groups. The 
authors of the study insisted that in order to guarantee religious 
freedom, the police must act decisively to protect this freedom, 
the government must protect the victims (also the persons dis-
placed by conflicts), and the laws regarding religious freedom 
must be reformed. 
Assyaukanie (2009) examines the relationship between the fat-
was issued by the highest religious authorities, such as MUI, and 
the incidents of sectarian violence in Indonesia. According to this 
study, the fatwas in several places sparked violence and intolerance 
against certain religious sects and also brought extensive implica-
tions on religious life in Indonesia by being institutionalized into the 
existing religious social networks through the Muhammadiyah and 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) among others. The study, however, does not 
answer why the same fatwas did not lead to violence in different 
regions.
Other studies highlight the aspects of legislation which result in 
suspending the right of citizens to freedom of religion or belief. One 
of the tasks of the House of Representatives (DPR) is to formulate 
and produce laws that protect and guarantee religious freedom. A 
study by the Setara Institute concluded that so far there have been 
no operational rules which would translate the provisions concern-
ing religious freedom stipulated by the 1945 Constitution. There-
fore, the new Bill of the Guarantees of Freedom of Religion/Belief 
(RUU Jaminan Kebebasan Beragama/Berkeyakinan – under delib-
eration in the House of Representatives, 2009-2014) is expected to be 
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a bill that is not discriminatory and segregative like the Bill of 2003 
(Hasani et al. 2011: 53-64; see also Crouch 2013).
Apart from the above mentioned, a number of special in-depth 
studies were conducted on the effect of the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on 
blasphemy, which is regarded as one of the “culprits” in the acts of 
violence against minority religious groups (see especially Crouch 
2012, Bagir 2013; and Sihombing 2012). A study was also carried 
out to analyse why the attempts of various circles to request that 
the above Act be reviewed by the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah 
Konstitusi, MK) ended in failure. According to Margiyono et al., 
the failure was caused by three factors: (1) the Court’s decision was 
based on the socio-political considerations and influenced by pres-
sure from the majority group; (2) the conservative perspective of 
judges; and (3) the judges of the Constitutional Court did not take 
into account the sociological and anthropological diversity of the 
Indonesian society (Margiyono et al. 2010: 109-112).
The above discussion shows that in the studies on sectarian con-
flicts and conflicts over places of worship, not enough attention has 
yet been given to the role of the police in dealing with these con-
flicts. The same conclusion can we draw from the general trend of 
police studies in the post-Reformasi era. This is evident for example 
in the very informative and interesting study of ICG (2012) titled 
“The Deadly Cost of Poor Policing,” which is based on three cas-
es of public outrage against the police members in Buol (Central 
Sulawesi), Kampar (Riau), and Jeneponto (South Sulawesi). In this 
study the ICG evaluated the community policing (polmas) program 
which is very close to the issue of religious conflicts within the soci-
ety, and which the police themselves consider an “essential pillar” 
and a “flagship” of the police reform agenda. According to the ICG, 
the implementation of the Police Regulation (Perkap) which sets the 
community policing was not optimal because the willingness of the 
police to learn the new and important issues was relatively low. The 
ICG quoted a police general who said that police officers were “too 
lazy to read the manual and they would say they have never seen it 
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if asked, because in fact [they] do not care” (ICG 2012: 6). In addition 
to this, there are no mandatory classes on community policing in the 
26 State Police Schools in Indonesia (ICG 2012: 7). 
Another and more recent study on police reform by Widodo 
Umar (2009) also does not discuss religious conflicts, despite the 
fact that the argument is clearly associated with this problem. 
He criticizes that Polri is directly under the president and that 
it is a working partner of the committees of the House of Repre-
sentatives, which opens the possibility of political intervention 
from policy makers and threatens the autonomy of the police. 
He also criticizes the policy of developing the district units into a 
“pyramid-flat”, which makes regional police a “fully integrated 
umbrella”, as this can slow down the process of making impor-
tant decisions. He also suggests that these changes contradict the 
spirit of democracy which is for strengthening the policy of de-
centralization (Umar 2009: 4).
In the scarcity of research on the subject, the study and ad-
vocacy of the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of 
Violence (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Ke-
kerasan, Kontras) on the role of the police is a breakthrough. In 
2012, Kontras (2012a) published the results of their monitoring 
report on the role of the police in protecting the rights to religion, 
belief, and worship of minority groups in Jakarta, West Java and 
Banten. The monitoring was carried out during August and Sep-
tember 2011, with a focus on the case of the Ahmadiyya commu-
nities in Manis Lor, Kebayoran Lama, Cikeusik, and the Christian 
communities of Batak Christian Protestant Church (Huria Kris-
ten Batak Protestan, HKBP) in Ciketing and GKI Yasmin. Kon-
tras concluded that the police were often hesitant and indecisive 
in guarding the principles of the constitution and human rights 
when they faced pressure from the majority groups and ambig-
uous legal policies. The police were also seen as not prioritising 
the early detection mechanisms and lacked the strategy in deal-
ing with the hate speech and hate crimes. 
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Kontras underlined the inconsistencies between the police ac-
tion with regard to the use of its internal instruments in the field. 
Kontras observed that there were many police instruments which 
provided a strong basis for the protection of minority groups, such 
as the Police Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on principles and standards 
of human rights in executing the tasks of the National Police or the 
Police Regulation No. 7 of 2008 on the basic guidelines and imple-
mentation of community policing strategy. 
The Kontras report provides data and insights that are useful for 
analysis of policing of religious conflicts. Although still focused on 
major cases, their report offered a balanced review of the variations 
in police performance: where it successfully managed to minimize 
turbulences as it was seen in Manis Lor and Kebayoran Lama, but 
also where it was unsuccessful as in the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in 
Cikeusik, the case of HKBP in Ciketing and of the GKI Yasmin. 
As a follow-up to the monitoring report, Kontras published 
guidelines for the police for protection of rights of religious mi-
norities (Kontras 2012b). The handbook is intended for the police 
personnel in order to give them insight into the matters pertaining 
to freedom of belief, religion, and worship from the human rights 
perspective. Protection of human rights discussed in that book is 
not only derived from the universal principles such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but also from the Indo-
nesian constitution and policies and norms of the police institution 
itself.
The Kontras manual is important for strengthening the capacity 
of the police in the field of protection of belief, religion, and worship. 
Beside the various guarantees of the rights, a number of insights 
which the police be made aware of, are also discussed: functions 
and principles of ideal policing; the practice of policing in Indonesia 
with regard to the right to belief, religion and worship; forms of re-
strictions of religious beliefs; symbols of hatred and how to counter 
them; the use of repression for containing violence in the name of 
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religion etc. The manual shows that the norms and the law to de-
fend the minority beliefs and religious groups already exist and are 
firmly embedded in the Indonesian context in general and specifi-
cally institutionalised for the police. 
The question is why, in spite of all that, the police are often hesi-
tant to carry out their duties to protect the right of religious groups 
to their beliefs and worship? Let us hope it does not signal that at a 
certain level there are limitations to the human rights perspective. 
The fact that the police officers know the principles of human rights 
in the constitution and the norms of the police institution does not 
necessarily mean that they are willing or able to enforce them. Put 
differently, there is no direct and automatic relationship between 
one’s knowledge and one’s actual behaviour. There are other factors 
that determine whether a person is willing or able to perform in 
accordance with the obligations which are already known to her or 
him.
The research we present here sought to cover the issues which 
were not discussed in the studies mentioned above. Therefore, we 
not only focused on the police knowledge with regard to the prin-
ciples and norms of human rights, although this aspect is certainly 
very important, but also on the overall context that plays an impor-
tant role in the policing of religious conflicts. This research takes 
a closer look at  the positive cases, the “lessons learned” that can 
become examples to be applied elsewhere. Such cases include the 
policing of the anti-Shi‘a conflict in Bangil and the anti-Ahmadiyya 
conflict in Manis Lor, which have often been overlooked in the re-
ports of policing performance.
Religious Conflicts and Policing of Religious Conflicts: 
Concepts and Definitions
Before proceeding further, there are two main concepts in the 
research underlying this book which need to be explained in detail, 
namely: (1) religious conflicts; and (2) policing of religious conflicts. 
A brief discussion regarding both of them is presented below.
Introduction14
Religious Conflicts
By “religious conflicts” we mean “hostilities involving val-
ues, claims, and identities based on religious issues or issues that 
are framed in religious slogans or expressions” (Alam 2009: 155; 
Ali-Fauzi, Alam, dan Panggabean 2009: 9). Religious conflicts are 
divided into two major categories, the inter-religious conflicts and 
the intra-religious conflicts. In this research, inter-religious conflicts 
are limited to the conflicts over places of worship. For intra-religious 
conflicts, or sectarian conflicts, we restricted the analysis to the sec-
tarian conflicts among Muslims.
Conflicts over construction of places of worship encompass sev-
eral conflict issues and factors, such as the Joint Ministerial Reg-
ulation (PBM) on the construction of places of worship, and the 
mechanisms of intimidation. Identity politics constitutes one of the 
larger social contexts of this conflict. Meanwhile, sectarian conflicts 
include religious particularisms based on a religious doctrine, the 
majority-minority relations, religious legal opinions or fatwas, thug-
gery, and intimidation against particular sects.
Sectarian conflicts and the conflicts over places of worship can 
assume the shape of (1) bilateral collision, when two groups clash 
in an open conflict, (2) unilateral attack, when one group attacks 
another group, and (3) open unrest that covers the entire city and 
involves more parties. The clashes could involve a religious group 
versus another religious group, or a religious group versus the se-
curity forces such as the police and civil guards (police belonging 
to the local government). Attacks can occur against one person or 
a group of people, against property or places of worship belonging 
to a group of people, and against the governmental institutions or 
property. 
In sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship, attacks 
may assume one or more of the multiple forms of violence, such as 
intimidation, sweeping, expulsion, hostage-taking, kidnapping, de-
tention, torture, torture until death, murder, shooting, confiscation, 
sealing, destruction, damage accompanied by looting or burning (of 
Studying Policing of Religious Conflicts in Indonesia 15
the particular group’s places of worship or real estate), or bombing. 
In this study we also sought to assess the various aspects of in-
volvement of the security apparatus in the incidents of religious 
conflicts. These aspects include: presence of the security forces, tim-
ing of their presence, factions or unit of the security forces involved, 
and the forms of action undertaken by them. Actions of security 
forces can be divided into several kinds: leaving the crowd alone, 
overseeing or guarding the crowd, calming down the crowd, dis-
solving/dispersing the crowd, arrests and other actions allowed by 
the law enforcement. 
Policing of Religious Conflicts
In this research on policing of religious conflicts we adopt and 
adapt the model developed by della Porta and Rieter (1998) in order 
to understand why the police handling of the events of protest or 
conflict vary in different times and places. The definition they used 
for policing of protests is here adapted as “policing of religious con-
flicts” understood as “actions which are carried out by the police in 
dealing with an incident or incidents of religious conflicts.”1
In accordance with the della Porta and Rieter’s model, a number 
of factors can be listed as having an important influence on the way 
the police handles incidents of religious conflicts, the effect of which 
is understood to be working at two levels. At the first level, policing 
is influenced by (a) the institutional character of police, (b) political 
culture and professional culture of the police forces, (c) the configu-
rations of the political power, (d) public opinion, and (e) the police 
interaction with the actors in the conflict. All these influences are 
then filtered at the second level, through the (f) police knowledge, 
which is defined as the police perception of the external reality af-
fecting the policing of conflicts in the field. 
1The term “policing” has lately been used more often as it is perceived 
as more neutral than the term “repression” which is applied to the actors 
of conflicts or protests, or the term “law enforcement” which is applied to 
the authorities facing the public or protesters. However, the meanings of 
these terms are similar.
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Factors at work in the first level are referred to as the “structure 
of opportunities and constraints”, both political and cultural, whose 
influence on the action of policing in the field is facilitated or medi-
ated by the police knowledge which is at work on the second level. 
Put in an illustration, figure 1 shows the relationship of structure, 
knowledge and police action:
Figure 1
The Relationship of Structure, Knowledge and Police Action
1.  Structure of Opportunities and Constraints
The structure of opportunities and constraints affecting the exist-
ing policing measures has both the relatively stable features as well 
as volatile ones. The stability refers to (1) the design of the police 
institution and (2) the structure of the police culture. The volatility 
refers to (1) the configuration of power, (2) public opinion, and (3) 
the interactions between the police and the parties to the conflict. 
One of the relatively stable components of the structure of op-
portunities and constraints is the institutional character of the police 
which is influenced by (1) the legal framework (including legisla-
tion which governs constitutional rights, including religious free-
dom, the police obligation to protect this freedom, and so on) and 
the organizational structure of the police; (2) the character of the 
police organization, especially in relation to three factors: the degree 
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of centralization, the level of accountability, and the level of milita-
rization. Apart from the institutional variables, cultural structure is 
also a relatively stable one. Cultural structure refers to the political 
culture, especially the idea of the state and constitutional rights, as 
well as the professional culture of the police. 
The unstable structure of opportunities and constraints refers to 
the power configuration that determines the position or policy of 
policing. For example, in the comparative study an Italy and Ger-
many, della Porta (1995) showed that the policing of protests was 
“softer” and more tolerant when government strongholds were 
held by the left-wing, while under the reign of the right-wing camps 
“harsher” strategies of policing protests were selected. 
The position of the government and its actual policy is also in-
fluenced by the pressure of public opinion such as political parties, 
interest groups, civil society organizations, and – in case of religious 
conflicts – also by religious groups or religious organizations. The 
public opinion associated with policing is usually split into two 
camps: the one which wants the government to use “harsher” polic-
ing strategies, called by della Porta and Rieter, the “law enforcement 
coalition”, and the one which wants the government to take a “soft-
er” strategy, the “civil rights coalition.” 
In the context of policing in Indonesia, such polarization is more 
appropriately used in cases of non-religious conflicts. The camp 
called the “civil rights coalition” is often criticising “harsh” polic-
ing strategies, and instead demands “softer” policing in handling 
of non-religious conflicts such as land disputes, industrial conflicts, 
etc. However, in the context of policing religious conflicts, the po-
larization takes a different shape. Since the religious conflicts gen-
erally entail violations of religious freedom and violence against re-
ligious minorities, law enforcement demands are voiced usually by 
the “civil rights coalition” which emphasises the right to freedom 
of religion. Their opposition here, that is the camp which is more 
likely to defend the religious rights of the majority, perhaps can be 
referred to as “majoritarian” camp. 
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In the interaction between the public opinion and the position or 
policy of the government, della Porta and Rieter put the media as a 
third party, which to some extent plays the role of the “majoritarian” 
camp’s spokesperson and at other times positions itself as a spokes-
person for the “civil rights coalition” camp. The media can also act 
on the basis of “its own logic.” 
The important thing to be discussed with regard to the role of 
media is the media bias in creating certain frames of the events of 
conflict or protests. Their bias can be caused by the ideological posi-
tion, personal bias (of a journalist or editor), or the pragmatic-com-
mercial interests. 
Another factor affecting the policing is the interaction between 
the police and the actors involved in the conflict. The effects of this 
interaction can influence policing strategies towards specific events 
or the long-term policing strategies. The influence on latter is re-
ferred to by della Porta and Rieter as “elephant’s memory” in the 
sense that the history of the interaction between the police and par-
ties to the conflict constitutes an important element affecting the 
current policing practices. An example of influence on the policing 
strategy in specific events can be the situation whereby a protest or 
a rally is seen by the police as having exceeded the given deadlines 
which prompts them to change the policing strategy from persua-
sion to harsher tactics such as dispersing or arresting the demon-
strators.2 An example of influence on the long-term interaction be-
tween the police and protesters or parties to the conflict is when the 
police unit becomes no longer capable of handling certain types of 
protests and conflicts and the police has to form a special unit to 
address them. 
2Quoting Monjardet (1990), della Porta and Reiter mention that 
there are at least three mechanisms in police intervention that result 
in escalation: (1) the dialectic of centralization and autonomy in police 
units; (2) the difficulty to coordinate different groups; and (3) uncertainty 
about the purpose of the intervention (della Porta and Rieter 1998: 21).
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2. The Police Knowledge
As it was already mentioned earlier, the police knowledge is 
their perception of their roles and of the external reality they face. 
Della Porta and Reiter (1998) suggest several reasons why the 
term “knowledge” is more appropriate than the term “impres-
sion”. 
First, this issue is related to the “great discretion” owned by the 
individual police officers. Although the police is equipped with a 
number of rules and guidelines for action, during the intervention 
the police officers generally act on the basis of “their assessment of 
the situation,” and only then on the basis of “rules and regulations.” 
Thus, the police officer’s perception of external reality is not subor-
dinate to the written rules and regulations, but it is of equal impor-
tance for carrying out her or his duties. 
Second, the use of the term “knowledge” is considered more 
appropriate because it is related to the vast and deep knowledge 
required for the policing. The police cannot simply act on the basis 
of their impressions, stereotypes or prejudices, but should have in-
depth knowledge of the situation they are addressing. 
Third, the use of the term “knowledge” is also related to the 
quality of interconnection between the perception and the exter-
nal reality. For example, the police make a distinction between 
“non-professional demonstrators” and “professional demonstra-
tors.” This distinction was born from the processes involving in-
stitutional pressure, orders of the superiors, as well as past expe-
riences. It was also influenced by the media, public opinion, and 
reflection upon the media coverage of the demonstrations. By 
“knowledge” della Porta and Rieter mean that the police knowl-
edge is what Berger and Luckman (1966) named as “social con-
struction of reality.” 
The relationship of all the above factors in influencing the polic-
ing activities, as well as variables relevant for determining the style 
of policing, can be schemed in the following illustration:
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Figure 2
A Model to Explain the Style of Policing
Available StrategiesInstitutions
Police Department 
and Power
Law Enforcement 
Coalition
Public Opinion
Police Knowledge
Policing Activities
Government
Coalition of Civil 
Rights Protection
Police Culture
Actors in 
Conflict
Variables and Indicators in Policing of Religious Conflicts
A brief discussion on a number of variables explored in our re-
search is given below in order to highlight the structure of the fol-
lowing chapters. 
1. Incident of conflict
The incidents of conflict will be described by the following indi-
cators: the date of the incident, the location of the incident, the is-
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sue of conflict (sectarian/place of worship), the form of the incident 
(peaceful protest/assault/demolition), chronology of the incident, 
trigger factors, the actors involved in the conflict, tools/weapons 
used, the impact of violence inflicted (fatalities/ material loss), and 
whether the incident was a new conflict or a recurrence of an old 
one. 
2. Policing activities
Policing activities will be described according to their phase 
(preemptive, prevention, mitigation, post-conflict) and will cover 
the following aspects: the function of intelligence (intel), commu-
nity affairs (binmas), community relations (humas), crowd control 
(dalmas), and criminal investigation (reskrim), resources deployed 
(units, number, level), type of action (persuasion, repression, protec-
tion of targets or victims); and the timing of policing. 
3.  Police knowledge
Police knowledge refers to the following aspects: (1) police 
knowledge and understanding of the legal and procedural frame-
works of policing religious conflicts; (2) police understanding of the 
issue of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship; (3) 
perception and police assessment of the level of threat/disruption 
of public order.
4.  Legal and procedural framework of policing and institutional 
character of the National Police
The legal and procedural framework of policing is explored 
through the review of: (1) the legal framework related to religious 
issues (regulations on places of worship, abuse of religion/blasphe-
my, and the role of the police in the protecting human rights/reli-
gious freedom/religious minorities); (2) procedural framework of 
policing as outlined in a number of regulations (Police Chief Regu-
lation, Standard Operating Procedures) which set the functions and 
mechanisms of collecting information (pulbaket) and crowd control 
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(dalmas); and (3) the institutional character of police reflected in a 
number of regulations on the organization and administration of 
the National Police on the level of police stations, district or regional 
police commands (polres and polda). 
5. Police culture
The police culture in this research refers to: (1) culture of the 
members of the police in terms of their perceptions of democracy, 
human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance; and (2) the profes-
sional culture of the police in terms of their perception of the role of 
the police in a democratic system, as well as their stereotypes and 
prejudices towards the parties to the conflict (both the attackers and 
the victims).
6.  Local politics
Local politics is understood as: (1) local policies (as stated in the 
regional or , gubernatorial regulations, etc.) on the regulations re-
garding construction of places of worship; and (2) the attitudes of 
elites at the local level of governance (local government, local par-
liament) towards the emerging conflict issues. 
7.  Public opinion 
Public opinion is understood as the views or attitudes of reli-
gious leaders or religious organizations, FKUB, activists of NGOs, 
and the media coverage regarding: (1) the occurring sectarian con-
flicts and conflicts over places of worship; and (2) the action of po-
licing sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship carried 
out by the police. 
8.  Interaction between the police and the parties to the conflict
There are two kinds of interactions between the police and the ac-
tors involved in the conflict: (1) the actions and interventions of the po-
lice in the sectarian conflict and conflicts over places of worship; and 
(2) the action taken against the warring parties. These interactions take 
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place before the occurrence of conflict/violence, upon its occurrence, 
and after it had occurred. Police represents the power of the state in 
enforcing the law and maintaining order before, during, and after the 
incidents of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship.
Cases Selection and Data Sources
To understand the variations in policing of religious conflicts, 
this research uses a comparative perspective with the following 
case-selection method:
1. Sets of eight cases are studied. This amount allows us to give an 
in-depth and comparative analysis of the problem of religious 
conflicts policing. 
2. The eight cases are divided into two groups based on the infor-
mation available before the thorough research was carried out. 
These two groups cover: four cases in which the conflict escalat-
ed into violence (failed policing), and four cases in which conflict 
could be managed with the result that there was no outbreak of 
violence (successful policing).
3. Of the four cases in which the conflicts did not escalate into vi-
olence, as specified above, two involved a sectarian conflict and 
two other a conflict over places of worship. The same pattern 
was applied to the four cases of conflicts which escalated into 
violence. 
4. In each case, the research focused on the role played by the police 
and took into account the factors which shaped it. 
With these four selection criteria the research examined and 
compared the policing of the anti-Ahmadiyya sectarian conflicts in 
Manis Lor (Kuningan) and Cikeusik (Pandeglang); the anti-Shi‘a 
sectarian conflict in Bangil (Pasuruan) and Sampang (Madura); in-
ter-religious conflicts related to the churches in Bekasi (HKBP Fil-
adelfia) and Bogor (GKI Yasmin); and inter-religious conflicts relat-
ed to the construction of prayer rooms (musala)/mosques in Batu-
plat (Kupang) and Wolobheto (Ende).
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We relied on various sources, particularly our interviews with 
leaders and members of the local police forces, local government 
officials, members of the elite and of local civil society organizations 
such as FKUB and MUI, religious leaders and youth. We also used 
the documents related to the conflict events, most of which were 
unpublished materials such as protocols of meetings, police inves-
tigation reports (Berita Acara Pemeriksaan, BAP), and many others. 
We also took advantage of the mass media coverage, slides of pres-
entations delivered on various occasions, as well as video documen-
tations, some of which were uploaded and made public and some 
were not. For the purpose of comparison, we have also examined 
reports on religion-related conflicts, governmental regulations relat-
ed to the subject, and other relevant studies.
To make our descriptions and analyses easier to read, most of 
the above sources are introduced directly and concisely in the body 
text, with successive references to the names of the authors, years 
of publication and – if necessary – the page number (for example, 
Kontras 2012: 13). Sources obtained from the interviews are also 
mentioned in this way, with the name or initials – if there were ob-
jections to providing the full name – and the date of the interview. 
Sources to which reference requires more space – media coverage or 
unpublished materials like investigation reports – are mentioned in 
footnotes.
Structure of the Book 
The book is divided into four major parts which together consti-
tute eleven chapters. After the “Introduction” in Part I, Part II con-
tains descriptions and analyses of cases of sectarian conflicts, in four 
chapters: chapter 2 and 3 on the anti-Ahmadiyya conflicts in Manis 
Lor (Kuningan) and Cikeusik (Pandeglang); and chapter 4 and 5 on 
the anti-Shi‘a conflicts in Sampang (Madura) and Bangil (Pasuruan). 
In Part III, we present the research findings regarding the cases 
of inter-religious conflicts associated with the construction of places 
of worship – churches, mosques or prayer rooms. It consists of four 
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chapters: chapter 6 and 7 on the conflicts related to HKBP Filadelfia 
(Bekasi) and GKI Yasmin (Bogor); and chapters 8 and 9 related to the 
prayer rooms/mosques Nur Musafir (Kupang) and Abdurrahman 
(Ende). 
Finally, in Part IV we present the conclusions and recommen-
dations based on this study. Chapter 10 contains a synthesis of the 
research findings on all of the above cases, while in chapter 11 we 
present a number of recommendations for the conflicted parties, po-
lice, government (especially local governments), FKUB, civil society 
organizations, and the media. 
In the appendix, we describe our research instruments. These 
include the list of questions we asked in the interviews, which is 
meant to serve as an illustration for the reader of how the two main 
questions of this research were fractioned to the more technical and 
detailed ones.***
Introduction26
Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia 27
27
PART II
POLICING OF SECTARIAN CONFLICTS
Policing Religious Conflicts in Indonesia28
The Case of Anti-Ahmadiyya in Manis Lor, Kuningan 29
2
THE CASE OF ANTI-AHMADIYYA 
IN MANIS LOR, KUNINGAN
Foreword
The conflict involving the Ahmadis and their opponents in Man-
is Lor village, Jalaksana district, Kuningan regency, West Java, has 
a fairly long history. The last event, which took place in 2010, has 
repeated the pattern present in the previous conflicts. 
Having learnt from the past experiences and having first ap-
plied the measures of persuasion and negotiation, in 2010, the 
police exerted a greater force. Police action in this case provides 
an important lesson that the police can act decisively in spite of 
the strong majority pressure against the Ahmadiyya community. 
Limitations, obstacles and challenges faced by the police must 
continue to be addressed as they give no excuse to the police 
to resist from acting firmly against the perpetrators of violence. 
When the police acted decisively, as it did in Manis Lor in 2007 
and 2010, violence was halted. 
This chapter highlights the above events and the way the police 
carried out their duties to prevent the conflict from escalating into 
violence. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section 
gives a general picture of Kuningan regency and Manis Lor village, 
29
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts30
especially in terms of religion. In the second section, we will review 
the short history of the Manis Lor Ahmadiyya conflict until the 2010 
incident. The third section examines the police handling of the con-
flict with all its strengths and shortcomings. The chapter ends with 
conclusions and recommendations.
A Glimpse at Religious Demography in Manis Lor
Kuningan regency is located in the eastern part of West Java and 
borders with Central Java. Its location as a connecting hub between 
the East Priangan, Cirebon region, and Central Java makes it very 
strategic. Kuningan can be accessed via Majalengka and Ciamis 
from the west and south or through Cirebon from the north. The 
Manis Lor village in Jalaksana district is situated in the middle of 
the highway connecting Cirebon and Kuningan. 
According to the 2010 census, Kuningan regency was inhabited 
by 1,037,558 people (Central Statistical Office data — BPS Kabupat-
en Kuningan 2010: 6), who lived in 32 districts, 15 administrative 
villages, and 361 villages. As indicated by the same census, Manis 
Lor village was populated by 4,133 persons of the total 45,257 inhab-
itants of the Jalaksana district (BPS Kabupaten Kuningan 2010: 7). In 
2010, the population of Kuningan based on their religious affiliation 
was as follows: Islam, 1,003,709; Catholicism, 7,094; Protestantism, 
1,711; Buddhism, 375; Hinduism, 28; and “other”, 4 people.1
There are no exact figures on the number of Ahmadiyya follow-
ers in Kuningan. But various sources mention that there are more 
than 3000 people. This number is roughly equal to the estimation 
given by the Ahmadis of Manis Lor themselves. Since the majori-
ty of the village inhabitants are Ahmadis, the village head office in 
Manis Lor is almost always held by a member of Ahmadiyya. 
There appear to be no significant occupational or socio-economic 
differences between the Ahmadis and non-Ahmadis in Manis Lor. 
1Ministry of Religious Affairs, Kuningan Regency, quoted in Kuningan dalam An-
gka (2011): 75-76.
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Only in terms of residence, Ahmadi settlements are more concen-
trated in the western part of the village (next to the Cirebon high-
way), while the non-Ahmadi (and anti-Ahmadi) community lives 
mostly in the eastern part of the village or around the village’s main 
mosque, Al-Huda. 
In everyday activities such as farming and trade, the Ahmadi 
and non-Ahmadi residents of Manis Lor interact normally. But in 
matters of worship, the Ahmadi community has its own traditions, 
one of which does not allow them to pray in a congregation with 
non-Ahmadis. This urges them to have their own places of worship.2 
The Ahmadi community of Manis Lor runs one mosque and 
seven musala. The mosque, An-Nur, has a mission house next to it, 
which is inhabited by the Ahmadi missionaries. In the neighbour-
hood, there is a junior high school, Amal Bhakti, managed mostly 
by Ahmadis. During the last ten years, the mosque and the musala 
of Ahmadis have often been the targets of mobs or were sealed by 
the local government.
Anti-Ahmadi Conflict in Manis Lor
The Ahmadiyya teachings were introduced to Manis Lor in 1954, 
by an Ahmadi missionary H. Bashari Hasan who was well received 
by the local residents. The Manis Lor village head back then, Bening, 
and the village secretary, Soekrono, were among the first persons to 
join Ahmadiyya. The number of Ahmadis in Manis Lor continued 
to increase and soon almost the entire village joined the Ahmadi 
congregation. Because of its strategic role, on 20 February 1956, the 
central branch of the Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia (JAI) in 
Kuningan regency was inaugurated in Manis Lor. 
The spread of Ahmadi teachings in Manis Lor was not without 
obstacles and challenges. Kontras (2012a: 7) reports that in 1954, 
Bening spent five days in police custody at the insistence of Manis 
2See the letter of Jemaat Ahmadiyya Indonesia, Manis Lor branch No. 005/JAI/
III/2011 15 March 2011, regarding imam and khatib during Friday prayers.
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Lor clerics who accused him of causing damage to Islam and di-
viding the society. Kontras also mentions the occurrence of physical 
assaults against the Manis Lor Ahmadis in 1976, but details are not 
given.
Beyond that, however, for quite a long time, there was no re-
cord of tensions or conflicts with regard to the presence of Ah-
madis in Manis Lor. On the contrary, Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi 
residents cooperated well in various social activities. This was 
confirmed by Mustafa, vice-chairman of the JAI Kuningan (in-
terview, 20 February 2013). According to him, prior to 2002, “The 
Ahmadi community was perfectly safe. In the social and commu-
nity affairs, residents were united and joined together to build 
the village hall and village mosque.” At that time, the public was 
not as busy as it is now with the pro-contra discourse on the issue 
of Ahmadiyya. 
Conflict Escalation, 2002-2007
The long peace in Manis Lor was disturbed in 2002.3 The village 
head, Yusuf Ahmadi, who at the same time is one of the Ahmadiyya 
Manis Lor leaders, claims (interview, 18 February 2013) that the at-
mosphere began to change after a seminar which was held by the 
Institute for Research and Islamic Studies (LPPI) on 11 August 2002, 
in Jakarta. In the seminar, which was also attended by a number of 
Muslim leaders from Kuningan (including Manis Lor), it was stated 
that Ahmadiyya was misguided and ought to be disbanded. Since 
then, banners denouncing Ahmadiyya began to pop up along the 
main road of Manis Lor.
A month after the seminar, on 14 September 2002, a number of 
Muslim leaders, who were facilitated by the MUI Kuningan, met 
to urge the local government to disband the Ahmadiyya congre-
gation in Manis Lor. Their demands were put into a written state-
3According to several sources, this began even earlier with destruction of the 
mosque during Ramadan 2001(1422 H).
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ment on behalf of the MUI Kuningan and forwarded to various 
governmental institutions of the district, provincial and national 
level.4
Meanwhile, at the local level, the tensions continued. Their shape 
varied from banners with insults like “Infidel/Deviant Ahmadis” to 
destruction of At-Taqwa and Al-Hidayah Musala and a number of 
houses belonging to the Ahmadi community on 24 October 2002. 
The perpetrators are known to be residents of the village and of the 
villages neighbouring Manis Lor. One of the groups which aggres-
sively challenges the presence of Ahmadiyya is the Youth of Masjid 
Al-Huda (Remaja Masjid Al-Huda, RUDAL) in Manis Lor.5
Due to various pressures against Ahmadiyya, the district gov-
ernment approached the Ahmadis and the RUDAL. On 3 November 
2002, ahead of Ramadan 1423 H, the Kuningan government issued 
a Joint Decree (SKB) on the prohibition of the teachings and activ-
ities of the Ahmadiyya (Kontras 2012a: 7). This decree was signed 
by the Kuningan regent, H. Arifin Setiamihardja, local government 
officials (members of the Regional Leaders Consultation or Musp-
ida), chairman of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) 
Kuningan regency, MUI Kuningan, as well as a number of Kunin-
gan Islamic organizations and Islamic boarding schools leaders.6
The issuing of the SKB was followed by numerous assaults 
against Ahmadis and their property in Manis Lor, the earliest of 
which took place on 10 November 2002 (the 5 of Ramadan 1423 
4See letter No. 72/MUI-Kab/IX/2002 dated 18 September 2002.
5Musala At-Taqwa and Al-Hidayah are located in the eastern part of the village 
which is predominantly non-Ahmadi (Mustafa, vice-chairman of the JAI Manis Lor, 
interview, 20 February 2013).
6The SKB was issued before the regent (bupati) election in 2003, in which the then 
regent Arifin Setiamihardja wanted to run again. The parties who signed the decree 
were the Kuningan regent, leadership of Kuningan DPRD, chief prosecutor of Kunin-
gan, District Military Command 0615, Kuningan police chief, Secretariat of Kuningan 
Regency, chairman of the FKPP Kuningan, MUI Kuningan chairman, chairman of the 
Muhammadiyah Kuningan, NU Kuningan chairman, DPC GUPPI, DPD Nahdlatul 
Anwar, Anti-Vice Movement (Gerakan Anti Maksiat, GAMAS), Muslim Association 
(Persatuan Umat Islam, PUI), Robithah Ma’ahid Islamiyah, MDI, Islamic University 
Al-Ihya, and Thoriqoh Idaroh Syu’biyah.
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H), a week after the release of the SKB. The assaults and acts of 
vandalism were occurring also throughout December 2002, Janu-
ary 2003, until the end of December 2003. Three musalas and more 
than 30 homes of the Ahmadi community were damaged. Yusuf 
Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) tells that some of the per-
petrators were reported, even caught and handed over directly 
to the police, but the cases were never followed up and violence 
continued.
Pressure against the Ahmadis was reinforced by the govern-
ment discrimination through the coordinating team of the Mon-
itoring of the Mystical Beliefs in the Society (PAKEM). In their 
report, PAKEM issued a statement that “Ahmadiyya Community 
of Indonesia, Manis Lor branch, is not Islamic” and it “does not 
want to accept the decree of 2002.” PAKEM requested the author-
ities to “take up more repressive actions in accordance with the 
recommended steps.” What is meant by “repressive actions” here 
is to probe the Ahmadis considered to be violating the decree 
(this part was addressed to the Kuningan police), to not regis-
ter Ahmadi marriages (addressed to the Kuningan office of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs), and to not issue national identity 
cards to the followers of Ahmadiyya (addressed to the head of 
Jalaksana sub-district).7
A few months later, in February 2003, due to the objections of 
Ahmadis, general directorate of the Kesbangpol (Agency for Protec-
tion of National Unity, Politics, and Public) of the Interior Ministry 
requested that the decree was withdrawn as it was based on the 
signatures of the leaders of organizations and religious schools, and 
thus was not a legal document.8 However, the measures under-
7PAKEM team letter dated 23 December 2002, No. B-460/0.2.22/ Dsp.5/12/2002 
to Kuningan police, No. B-461/0.2.22/ Dsp.5/12/2002 to Kuningan office of the Min-
istry of Religious Affairs, and No. B-462/0.2.22/Dsp.5/12/2002 to the head of Jalak-
sana sub-district.
9Letter of the general directorate of the Kesbangpol No. 450/104/2003 dated 25 
February 2003 to Kuningan regent.
The Case of Anti-Ahmadiyya in Manis Lor, Kuningan 35
taken earlier by the government through the PAKEM and based 
on the SKB decree were never annulled and intimidation against 
Ahmadiyya continued.
Realising the weak legal basis of the document, on 20 Decem-
ber 2004, the Kuningan local government re-issued a similar de-
cree. As the previous SKB, the second one also contained prohibi-
tion against the teachings and activities of Ahmadiyya in Kunin-
gan, with an additional command of supervision and guidance 
to the relevant agencies. The difference was that the second decree 
was signed only by the government: the regent, H. Aang Hamid 
Suganda (elected in 2003); the chief prosecutor, M. Syaeful; and the 
head of the Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Drs. 
H. MA. Syarifuddin.9
On 30 July 2005, after the release of the second decree, the gov-
ernment through the municipal police closed the An-Nur Mosque, 
seven of the Ahmadiyya musalas, as well as the community meeting 
and mission houses. Ahmadiyya filed a lawsuit related to the SKB to 
the State Administrative Court, but it was dismissed as a case which 
was not under the court’s jurisdiction. For several months, the con-
gregation meetings and prayers were carried out at private houses. 
When the atmosphere gradually calmed down, Ahmadis re-opened 
their mosque and prayer rooms in mid-2006.
Until the end of November 2007, there was no reaction from the 
anti-Ahmadiyya parties, but soon the Muslim Component of Kunin-
gan Regency (Komponen Muslim Kabupaten Kuningan, KOMPAK) 
sent a letter to the board of JAI Manis Lor, in which they demanded 
the JAI members to stop claiming that they were Muslims, to stop 
their activities, and to dismantle all of their activity sites. If the de-
mands were not met within 15 days, the KOMPAK declared they 
were “ready to fight and halt the Ahmadiyya in accordance with the 
9See the decree signed by the Kuningan regent, Kuningan chief prosecutor, 
and head of the Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs No. 451.7/
KEP.58-Pem.Um/2004, No. KEP-857/0.2.22/ Dsp.5/12/2004 and No. Kd.10.08/6/
ST.03/1471/2004, dated 20 December 2004.
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instructions of the SKB, and with help of the units of Islamic jihad 
movement.”10
In addition to the letter, they also spread threats through banners 
mounted around the Manis Lor village. For example, RUDAL de-
clared that “Ahmadis are clearly deviant and misleading. The blood 
of Ahmadiyya is halal (religion), the blood of Ahmadiyya is haram 
(country).”11 Banner of KOMPAK read “When the action of bureau-
cracy is barren, the jihad action comes. Avoid anarchy, make sure the 
Ahmadiyya is finished. Ahmadiyya be miserable in this world, be in 
hell in the hereafter.” At the entrance to the Manis Lor village a large 
banner was installed with the SKB and the statement of Anti-Ahma-
di Movement (Gerakan Anti Ahmadiyyah, GERAH) that read: “Ah-
madiyya is absolutely not Islam. Its teachings are heretical and they 
destroy Islam. A Muslim Who Supports Ahmadiyya = Apostate.” 
Later the Kuningan police also put up a banner underneath, which 
read, “We are all brothers, avoid violence and vigilantism.” 
When the atmosphere was increasingly tense, the Muspida and 
Muspika met both sides to find a solution. Shortly afterwards, on 
13 December 2007, the Kuningan local government ordered munic-
ipal police to shut down three places of worship and a meeting hall 
10Letter of KOMPAK No. 01/KM.KK/XI/2007 dated 19 November 2007 was also 
forwarded to Muspida Kuningan and Muspika Jalaksana. It contained provocative 
statements such as: “Muslims who do not suppress Ahmadiyya sin every day”; “Ha-
lal is the blood of followers, supporters and defenders of Ahmadiyya”; and “More 
fortunate is a Muslim who dies in prison and goes to paradise than a Muslim who 
dies outside prison / at home and who is not certain he would enter paradise later.” 
The letter was signed by representatives of GERAH Manis Lor, chairman of RUDAL 
Manis Lor, caretaker of Al-Muttaq Madrasah in Manis Lor, chairman of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood Forum (Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah, FUI) Kuningan, chairman of 
the Bima Suci Pencak Silat Association (IPS) Kuningan, chairman of the Islamic De-
fenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) Kuningan, chairman of the Laskar Jihad 
in Kuningan, chairman of the Gabungan Inisiatif Barisan Anak Siliwangi (GIBAS) 
Kuningan, chairman of the Kuningan People’s Front (Barisan Rakyat Kuningan, 
BARAK), chairman of the Anti-Vice Movement (Gerakan Anti Maksiat, GAMAS) 
Kuningan, as well as a number of religious scholars and Islamic boarding schools 
leaders of Kuningan.
11Which broadly means: the blood of Ahmadis can be shed (allowed, despite the 
fact that bloodshed is forbidden in Islam); the blood of Ahmadis is unclean (to be in 
the country).
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belonging to the Ahmadi community.12 After negotiating with Ah-
madis and under the pressure of KOMPAK, which already gathered 
a crowd, the municipal police eventually closed down the An-Nur 
Mosque and At-Takwa and Al-Hidayah Musala. 
On 18 December 2007, various organizations under the Asso-
ciation of Indonesian Muslims (Gabungan Umat Islam Indonesia, 
GUII) which found that closing of the Ahmadiyya places of worship 
was not enough, deployed about 700 people to Manis Lor. Their tar-
get was the An-Nur Mosque. Ahmadis at the site, mostly women, 
were already sitting on the road and praying together. Since the at-
tackers could not break through police barricades and were several 
times driven away with tear gas, they entered through the small 
alleys and targeted the musalas. Besides ransacking At-Taqwa and 
Al-Hidayah Musala, they also destroyed eight houses belonging to 
Ahmadis and injured seven Ahmadi residents who were trying to 
protect the prayer rooms.13
The December 2007 incident marked the expansion of the an-
ti-Ahmadiyya movement in terms of its scope and identity of the 
actors. Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) mentioned that 
while earlier opposition arrived from Kuningan, since 2007 it was 
also drawn from outside the regency, whereas the local opposition 
in Manis Lor weakened. The opposing groups involved were not 
only of Islamic background, but also regional ones such as GIBAS 
or sports organizations such as Ikatan Pencak Silat (IPS) Bima Suci.
More than that, the incident also marked a change in the atti-
tude of the police against the perpetrators. First, the police exerted 
its power and curbed the mob, even though it failed to anticipate 
the violent acts of individuals who then entered the village through 
sideway alleys. Second, after the incident the police captured the 
12Warrant No. 300/4778/POL.PP./2007 signed by the vice-regent of Kuningan, 
Aan Suharso.
13Detailed chronology of December 2007 events can be seen in the narrative of 
Muhammad Kodim, “Selasa yang Nestapa di Manis Lor,” http://isamujahid.word-
press.com/manislor-menangis (accessed 18 October 2012).
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perpetrators and followed up their cases until conviction. In this 
event, six defendants were sentenced to one month and 25 days in 
jail, minus time spent in arrest — five days less than the two months 
demanded by the prosecutor. The verdict was almost equal to the 
period of their detention before the trial, so they were free shortly 
after the court decision was handed down.14
Although he was not satisfied with the court ruling, Yusuf Ah-
madi (interview, 18 February 2013) acknowledged that in this event 
“the police dared to take severe measures.” This was unprecedent-
ed as previous reports of Ahmadis who were subjected to violence 
were never processed by the police on the grounds of absence of 
evidence and witnesses. 
Amid all its limitations, the police through its decisive action 
during the 2007 incident has succeeded in curtailing the conflict. 
Destruction and persecution, which previously often took place, 
immediately stopped. Commenting on this, one of the members of 
the police (interview, 19 February 2013) stated, “maybe people are 
afraid of being imprisoned.” 
After the joint decree (SKB) was issued in 2008, Ahmadis reo-
pened their mosque and musalas. Intimidating banners including 
the SKB banner of Kuningan regent was removed. Until the tensions 
and mass mobilization of 2010, Manis Lor was experiencing a peri-
od of calm.
July 2010 Incident: Repeating Patterns
The 2010 incident, like the previous one, began with the de-
mands of Islamic organizations to close the places of worship 
of the Ahmadis in Manis Lor. They voiced their demands during 
demonstration on 2 March 2010 and in meetings on 1 and 14 June 
2010 (Kontras 2012a: 10). The 14 June 2010 meeting was attended 
by the MUI, officials from Muspida, religious scholars and leaders 
14During the trial hundreds of activists of Islamic organizations held a solidari-
ty action in front of the court. See http://news.liputan6.com/ read/154907/terdak-
wa-perusakan-masjid-Ahmadiyyah-divonis-bersalah (accessed 18 October 2012).
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of organizations. The signs of crowd mobilization were detected by 
the Kuningan district police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, who on 17 June 
passed the information to the Ahmadi community.
As a follow-up to the meeting, the MUI Kuningan composed a 
letter of recommendation to the regent for closing down the Ahmadi 
facilities.15 When the local government informed the Ahmadis about 
this plan, the community immediately rejected it. Nevertheless, on 
25 July 2010, the regent issued a sealing warrant. In the letter, he 
mentioned the grounds for closing were provided by organizations, 
religious scholars and the MUI leaders. Unabatedly, the regent or-
dered the municipal police to seal eight places of Ahmadi worship 
and community activities.16
The sealing of An-Nur Mosque was carried out on 26 July 2010. 
The head of Kuningan municipal police, Indra Purwanto, assisted 
by the Kuningan district police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, approached 
the Ahmadi community to submit the sealing plan and inform of the 
possibility of an anti-Ahmadi mobilization. The Ahmadis rejected 
the plan and called for a dialogue to avoid clashes. Police chief, Yoy-
oh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013) immediately coordinated 
with the regent and the local leaders. Dialogue was scheduled on 
the evening the same day in Kuningan parliament building, but it 
failed after the representative of the Ahmadis, Deden Sujana, told he 
was unable to attend.17
The sealing efforts were made again two days later, on 28 July 
2010, around 06:30 am. Accompanied by the Kuningan district po-
lice, the municipal police sealed the mosque and four musalas with-
out awaiting approval of the Ahmadis. The Ahmadis removed the 
bar and seals that have been installed and pelted municipal police 
15This MUI Kuningan recommendation letter to the regent, dated 24 June 2010, 
No. 38/MUI-kab/VI/2010, was also signed by the leaders of the Kuningan branches 
of Nahdlatul Ulama, DMI, GARIS, Persis, Muhammadiyah, FKPP, GAMAS, and PUI.
16Kuningan regent’s decree No. 451.2/2065/SAT.POL.PP dated 25 July 2010, was 
signed by the Kuningan regent, Aang Hamid Suganda. See also Kontras (2012a: 8).
17Notification of absence was submitted in written form. See Kontras 2012a: 8-10 
& 33 or Setara 2010: 7.
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officers with stones. Sealing efforts finally stopped (Kontras 2012a: 
8; see also Setara 2010: 7).
This triggered the organizations which earlier intended to mobi-
lize the masses to Manis Lor village. After the failed sealing, on 29 
July 2010, police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February, 2013) 
received a notification letter of istigasah at Al-Huda Mosque, Manis 
Lor. The news of istigasah was widely reported in the local media. 
One member of the police intelligence (interview, 19 February 2013) 
said that during that time provocation and calls for mobilization 
were circulated via SMS (short message service) and phone calls to 
the religious scholars and citizens of Kuningan. 
Jalaksana sub-district police chief, Rudi Rahmat (interview, 21 
February 2013), estimated that the crowd present at istigasah on 29 
July 2010, was between 1,000 to 1,500 people. Aside from Kuningan, 
the masses arrived from Region III of West Java and Priangan. Ac-
cording to the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February 
2013), the masses arrived from Cirebon, Tasikmalaya, Garut, and 
Cianjur. Organizations involved included the Indonesian Mujahi-
din Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) Cirebon, GAMAS, 
Anti-Apostasy and Deviant Sects Movement (Gerakan Anti Pemur-
tadan dan Alirat Sesat, GAPAS), FPI, FUI, Wali City Communication 
Forum (Forum Silaturahmi Kota Wali, Foskawal) Cirebon, Reform-
ist Islam Movement (Gerakan Reformis Islam, GARIS) and Siluman 
Troops (Pasukan Siluman, Silaturahmi Antar Umat Manusia) (see 
Hasani & Naipospos 2010; Setara Institute 2010: 130; and Kontras 
2012a: 9). 
During the istigasah, leaders of organizations, madrasas, and 
kiais, took turns in delivering speeches, some of which contained 
provocation to carry out attacks against Ahmadis. Kuningan Re-
gent, Aang Hamid Suganda, and police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, were 
present and appealed that no acts of violence be committed.18 Un-
18Police video documentation, “Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010).wmv”.
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satisfied with this appeal, around 11:00 am the mob began to move 
towards An-Nur Mosque. Meanwhile, the Ahmadi residents were 
already preparing to defend the mosque. They collected stones and 
put used-tires in the middle of the road. The West Java police mobile 
brigade and the Kuningan police were on standby where the two 
parties stood against each other. To avoid recurrence of 2007 events, 
policemen guarded all alleys leading to the Ahmadi musalas in Man-
is Lor (Jalaksana police head Rudi Rahmat, interview, 21 February 
2013). Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, personally lead her officers at 
the location. 
The anti-Ahmadi mob kept on pushing until the confrontation 
with authorities was inevitable. They pelted officers with stones and 
were answered with tear gas. The police barricade eventually col-
lapsed. Both parties then engaged in a stone pelting war, but there 
was no close-range or direct physical clash. Crowd members who 
faced the Ahmadis were seen waving hard and sharp objects such 
as stones, wooden beams and sword. The clashes subsided after 
the noon prayer time. The police then gathered strength and finally 
managed to disperse the crowd.19
Five people were wounded in the incident, all from pelted stones: 
one member of Ahmadiyya, one officer from the Cirebon mobile bri-
gade, and three from the anti-Ahmadiyya mob. Meanwhile, a num-
ber of houses belonging to the Ahmadi community were damaged 
after being hit by stones (Kontras 2012a: 8-10). No perpetrators were 
arrested or prosecuted, but the Jalaksana police head, Rudi Rahmat, 
mentions (interview, 21 February 2013) that after the events, the po-
lice chief, Yoyoh, had summoned a number of organizations’ lead-
ers and warned them that she would not hesitate to arrest anyone 
who commits criminal acts.
Since then (and until this report was concluded), there was no 
more incident of a large-scale conflict involving mob mobilization 
19Police video documentation, “Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010).wmv”. See 
also Kontras 2012a: 33.
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts42
and large numbers of police troops. However, it does not mean that 
there is no conflict potential. Discriminatory policies against the Ah-
madis are still occurring; these include demands to remove religion 
column in electronic identity cards (E-KTP) of Ahmadis, the rejec-
tion to register their marriages and to arrange hajj pilgrimage for 
them, or refusals to build their school libraries.
Series of incidents in Manis Lor reveal a repeating pattern. Stages 
of protests, demands, threats, sealing, opening the seals and mob 
mobilization could be found in almost every case. Some of them co-
incided with periods or events such as (the fasting month of) Ram-
adan, village head elections or regent elections. What distinguishes 
each conflict from the previous ones was the level of escalation, from 
local conflicts in the village, then beyond the district, then beyond 
the regency. In this case, the Kuningan police managed to learn from 
the previous experiences.
Dynamics of Policing the anti-Ahmadiyya Conflict in Manis Lor
Because of its long history and recurrence, the anti-Ahmadiyya 
conflict has been a major concern of the Kuningan police. This sec-
tion will review how the police handled the conflict in 2010, with 
all the knowledge, culture and legal-procedural framework it had. 
In relation to policing activities, we will also discuss the local pol-
itics, public opinion, and the police interaction with the parties to 
the conflict.
Policing Activities
A month before the events of 29 July 2010, the Kuningan police 
has detected potential security threats. Police attended the meeting 
in June 2010 when a number of organizations urged the Kuningan 
government to curb the activities of Ahmadiyya. Police chief, Yoy-
oh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013), even received information 
from the anti-Ahmadi group itself in form of a notification letter 
on the planned istigasah at Al-Huda Mosque, Manis Lor (see also 
Kontras 2012a: 30). Aware of the possibility of mass mobilization 
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from outside Kuningan, the police intelligence (interview, 19 Febru-
ary 2013) carried out a cross-regional coordination to estimate the 
mob size.
Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, claimed she always coordinated 
with the local police. In each report on the situation she sent, she al-
ways asked for a back-up from police stations in the region and par-
ticularly the mobile brigade detachment C of Cirebon. According to 
her, the police swiftly responded to reports and provided assistance. 
West Java police chief, Sutarman, during his visit to the Kuningan 
police on 28 July 2010, also declared that his side would act decisive-
ly against anyone who causes destruction or persecution.20
Since 26 July, the police in Manis Lor was already on alert during 
the sealing attempt. It was recorded that 250 officers of Kuningan 
police were assisted by the mobile brigade unit of West Java police 
and one platoon of the district military command (Kodim) while the 
Office of Highway (Dishub) Kuningan were on standby in Manis 
Lor.21 All were under the directions of police chief Yoyoh (Rudi Rah-
mat, interview, 19 February 2013).
Apart from exerting power, the police applied preventive and 
persuasive measures towards parties to the conflict. Kontras report-
ed that Nur Rohim, secretary of JAI Manis Lor, was several times 
visited by police who requested that clashes be avoided (Kontras 
2012a: 31). Persuasion was also made towards the anti-Ahmadi or-
ganizations, since the meeting in June 2010 until the istigasah of 29 
July 2010, when the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, urged thousands 
of members of Islamic organizations not to commit any unlawful 
acts.22
20“Kapolda Jamin Keamanan Kuningan,” Radar Cirebon, 29 July 2010, http:// 
radarcirebon.com/2010/07/29/kapolda-jamin-keamanan-kuningan/ (accessed 15 
October 2012).
21“Pengamanan Rencana Penyegelan Tempat ibadat Ahmadiyyah,” Polres Kun-
ingan, 27 July 2010, http://polreskuningan.wordpress.com/2010/07/27/ (accessed 
15 October 2012).
22Police video documentation “Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010). wmv.” See 
also “Hujan Batu Warnai Penyerangan Jemaat Ahmadiyyah di Kuningan,” Tempo 
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts44
When persuasion attempts did not work, the crowd control po-
lice (Dalmas) of Kuningan and the mobile brigade unit of West Java 
police tried to anticipate the events. They formed barricades on the 
main road towards the village of Manis Lor, while other members 
of the police guarded each gangway which lead to the Ahmadi set-
tlements (Rudi Rahmat, interview, 19 February 2013). Additional 
groups of the Kuningan crowd control police and one unit of Cire-
bon police mobile brigade were brought in after the anti- Ahmadi-
yyah mob forced the barricade (Kontras 2012a: 32).
Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013), said 
that at the time of istigasah on 29 July 2010, the number of police 
officers at the site was approximately 900. After supports came, the 
total number of police on alert in Manis Lor reached about 1,500 
officers, 700 of whom came from the Kuningan police. The rest 
were from the West Java police forces and from the districts around 
Kuningan. This number was more or less the same as the size of 
anti-Ahmadi mob which arrived to Manis Lor.23
The response to the police strength and action at the time varied. 
Nur Rohim, secretary general of JAI Manis Lor, as quoted by Kon-
tras, said that the police could not handle the situation and actually 
pressed the Ahmadis (Kontras 2012a: 31). Meanwhile, according to 
Yusuf Ahmadi and Mustofa, leaders of JAI Manis Lor (interviews, 
18 and 20 February 2013), the police personnel were adequately rele-
gated. Yusuf Ahmadi even considers it the largest troop deployment 
in West Java. Deden Sujana, who in the event acted as JAI Manis Lor 
Interaktif, 28 July 2010, http://www.tempo.co/read/ news/2010/07/28/178266946/
Hujan-Batu-Warnai-Penyegelan-Masjid-Ahmadiyyah-di-Manis-Lor (accessed 14 Oc-
tober 2011).
23Police video documentation “Antisipasi Ahmadiyyah (30-07-2010).wmv.” Po-
lice chief specifies which units were brought to Manis Lor, namely 600 members of 
Kuningan police, five companies of Kuningan police mobile brigades, one company 
of West Java crowd control police, two platoons of Cirebon district crowd control po-
lice, one platoon of Cirebon city crowd control police, and one platoon of Majalengka 
district crowd control police. The video also shows that a number of district military 
command members were also on standby, but only in the outer ring.
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spokesman (personal conversation, 24 March 2013), agreed that the 
police performed well.24
Video documentation and various other sources indicate that the 
police carried out their duties, ranging from persuasion to repres-
sive efforts such as dispersing the mob with tear gas.25 Such repres-
sive measures in religious conflicts are usually the last resource and 
are avoided since they can endanger the police officers (I Nyoman 
Oka, head of community affairs unit, Kuningan district police, inter-
view, 19 February 2013). In many cases, the police prefer easier steps 
like evacuating the human targets of conflicts.
Evacuation or relocation of Ahmadis has never been an issue in 
Kuningan. Ahmadis of Manis Lor number thousands and, accord-
ing to a member of police intelligence, they could not be evacuated 
(interview, 19 February 2013). Would evacuation be chosen had the 
Ahmadi community in Manis Lor been smaller? According to the 
police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013), even in 
the case of evacuation, the police must keep on securing the situa-
tion and cannot let it out of hands. “Secured must be persons and 
also their possessions.” 
Police Knowledge
Principles and provisions regarding the protection of minorities 
and human rights are stated in the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 
of 2009. All members of the police whom we interviewed admitted 
they did not know the regulation in detail. In general, however, they 
acknowledged that violence and human rights violations will not be 
tolerated. They also agreed that in the present era of democracy the 
human rights issues must be properly addressed. 
Declarations given by the provincial and district police chiefs in 
the mass media made it quite clear that they would protect human 
24Quoted from https://twitter.com/dedensujana/status/315651732833181696 (ac-
cessed 24 March 2013).
25Police video documentation, “Ahmadiyyah Kuningan (29-07-2010). wmv.” See 
also Kontras 2012: 31-33.
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rights, including freedom of religion and belief, and that they would 
crack down on offenders. The provincial police chief, for example, 
warned that he would not let the strong oppress the weak.26 Mean-
while Yoyoh Indayah, district police chief, stated that she would 
give protection to all citizens who need it, regardless of their belief 
(Kontras 2012a: 34). 
Yoyoh Indayah admitted (discussion, 6 February 2013) that her 
non-partisan attitude is often misunderstood by those who oppose 
Ahmadis. In a meeting, someone once accused her of “spoiling the 
Ahmadiyya.” She immediately denied and provided the following 
explanation:
I have never spoiled anyone. My obligation is to protect and save all citizens. 
There is no provision for me to spoil you or the Ahmadis. Anyone who becomes 
the target of aggression, clashes and so on — they will be protected. The Ah-
madis are protected because there have been indications of threat to their safety. 
Therefore, we are on alert in the Ahmadi settlement of Manis Lor. If we secure 
other places, it means nothing. This is similar to other issues such as workers’ 
demonstrations or demonstrations concerning fuel prices.
She added,
Police are in the middle. If a notification comes to the police that there are mob 
activities going to occur at the local government’s site, I will conduct a pacifica-
tion at the targeted place (regardless of my personal views on the workers’ or 
fuel issues). Similarly, as it was in case of your house. There were people who did 
not like you and wanted to crash your place. But I was able to halt them, so this 
did not happen.27
Yoyoh Indayah (interview, 6 February 2013) took an effort to 
make the principle of neutrality and non-partisanship also upheld 
by her officers: “I always voice it [the principle of neutrality] among 
the police staff during morning meetings. Our job is to protect and 
save all citizens, whoever they are. They are all God’s people. All 
26“Kapolda Jamin Keamanan Kuningan,” Radar Cirebon, 29 July 2010, http://
radarcirebon.com/2010/07/29/kapolda-jamin-keamanan-kuningan/ (accessed 15 
October 2012).
27Yoyoh Indayah did not specify the name of the person, the place or date of this 
talk.
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have the right to life. We stick to the Law No. 2 (2002), according to 
which our duty is to protect, defend and save all citizens.” 
In line with Yoyoh Indayah, I Nyoman Oka (interview, 19 Febru-
ary 2013) stated that it was not under the police authority to deter-
mine whether beliefs held by a person or a group of persons were 
right or wrong. This, according to him, was a matter in which the 
police ought to coordinate with other government agencies such as 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
Meanwhile, the police chief of Jalaksana (interview, 21 February 
2013) said that the police could not forbid anyone from abandoning 
her or his faith, as it would be against the principle of human rights. 
It can be concluded that in religious conflicts the police knows how 
to act in a neutral way, and its functions are limited to security as-
pects only.
The problem lies in many confusing governmental rules, rang-
ing from the regional SKBs, through the SKB of the ministers, up 
to the level of legislation. For example, the Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 
was mentioned in a blog post of the Kuningan police in which a 
text from the Radar Cirebon newspaper was quoted. The quotation 
contained the words of the then head of MUI, H. Hafidin Achmad, 
who claimed that “the positive law regarding desecration of Islamic 
teachings is already clearly stated in the Act No. 1/PNPS/1965.” 
Hence his party denied the accusation that they have acted against 
human rights principle; more so, they accused that those “parties 
who support the Ahmadiyya have not fully learnt the human rights 
legislation.”28
Personal attitudes of the police members towards Ahmadis were 
diverse. Kuningan police intelligence officer (interview, 19 February 
2013) shared the observations he made while he stayed together with 
the Ahmadi community. He did not find the “deviant teachings” of 
28Polres Kuningan, “Ajak Kembali ke Ajaran yang Benar,” 13 June 2008, http:// 
polreskuningan.wordpress.com/2008/06/13/ajak-kembali-ke-ajaran-yang-benar 
(accessed 15 October 2012).
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which Ahmadis were accused: “Ahmadiyya claims [it belongs to] 
Islam. Its azan is the same. Its holy book is the Qur’an. When asked 
about Tazkirah, [they] also would not know. It is difficult to prove. 
But people ask a lot. We only anticipate.”
According to another source from the Kuningan police (inter-
view, 19 February 2013), Ahmadiyya “is not the real Islam. [...] as a 
Muslim I know it violates Islam. Islam is not actually like this.”
When personal beliefs were confronted with the human rights 
principles, an informant from Jalaksana police (interview, 21 Febru-
ary 2013) stated: “As a Muslim, I know [Ahmadiyya] does wrong. 
Islam actually is not like this. But prohibiting people from believing 
is difficult and it is not allowed. Moreover, there are human rights 
principles.” He then continued that acts of violence were not al-
lowed, while at the same time referring to the tradition of the Proph-
et Muhammad that suggests the urgency to prevent bad deeds.
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
In the attack of 2010, the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah, adhered to 
the general principles of Law No. 2 of 2002 on the police force of the 
Republic of Indonesia. She underlined article 13 on the main tasks 
of the police and Article 14 (1), in particular point (e) on maintaining 
order and ensuring public safety, and point (i) on protecting life, 
body, property, community, and environment from disturbances 
and disasters, which includes providing aid and relief whilst up-
holding the human rights. She also remained attached to article 15, 
according to which in conducting its duties, the police has the au-
thority to help in resolving disputes which may disturb the public 
order.29
Kuningan police relied on these rules to prevent the conflict from 
escalating into violence. I Nyoman Oka, head of community affairs 
unit, Kuningan district police (interview, 19 February 2013), stated 
that in July 2010, the conflict in Manis Lor already entered preven-
29Yoyoh Indayah’s presentation slides (discussion, 6 February 2013).
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tive stage. That was why the police deployed a larger number of 
troops. 
Such measures were not undertaken without challenges. A mem-
ber of the district police (interview, 19 February 2013) observed that 
the number of Kuningan police was only 700 officers while ideally 
it should be 1400. Meanwhile, the number of officers in Jalaksana 
who oversee two sub-districts and 25 villages, was as well still far 
from enough — only 21 persons while it should be 96 (Rudi Rahmat, 
interview, 21 February 2013).
Since in the security operation of July 2010, thousands of officers 
were deployed for several days, the operation funds became another 
problem. Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013) 
mentioned that the costs of security operation in July 2010 exceeded 
the police operational budget. But according to her that should not 
be a reason to weaken the security: “Just take the first step, other 
matters come later. Just do not take it lightly. If possible, make the 
number of officers double the mob. If there is a shortage [in funds] 
we report to the provincial police. If they cannot [help], we would 
report to the headquarters [of the Indonesian National Police].”
In order to deal with the limited funds, the police received help 
from the Kuningan government. As for the consumption of her per-
sonnel, Yoyoh Indayah had to indebt to some surrounding restau-
rants, “Thank God, people trust us — and luckily, there were also 
our members who owned restaurants.” Everything was later paid 
back in instalments from the operations budget (Yoyoh Indayah, in-
terview, 6 February 2013).
Another obstacle which was noted by the members of Kuningan 
police whom we interviewed was the lack of clarity in government 
regulations regarding Ahmadiyya. A member of Kuningan police 
intelligence (interview 19 February 2013) said that recurrence of con-
flict is due to the lack of clear directions from the central govern-
ment. According to him, the existing regulations were still unfixed 
and could easily be utilized by certain parties, either for political or 
other advantage.
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Police chief, Yoyoh Indayah (discussion, 6 February 2013), con-
siders differences in interpretation of religious issues a normal thing. 
According to her, the police role is to secure that these differences do 
not lead to clashes. Police also undertakes socialization activities in 
the communities, so that they would not be easily provoked. Affairs 
of belief, the police leaves to the MUI and Bakorpakem. In her view, 
the police does not need special rules for handling religious con-
flicts: “It is just the same, no additional rules are needed, for there 
would just be rules with no application. What matters is that the 
SOP is clarified. Thankfully, we now have the Law No. 7 on han-
dling conflicts.”
In the midst of a variety of obstacles and challenges, Kuningan 
police prevented a violent conflict. When asked why elsewhere the 
police were not able to prevent violence, sub-district police chief, 
Rudi Rahmat (interview, 21 February 2013), refused to comment. He 
only mentioned that in Kuningan, coordination between the district 
and sub-district police went well, the public was handled well, intel-
ligence and leadership did not underestimate the conflict potential, 
and police was on alert since long ago. Another police officer (in-
terview, 19 February 2013), said that “each region is different. Here 
prevention works better and we didn’t want to lose control. Also 
here the potential of the slightest disturbances was reported.”
Police Culture 
Statements given by the Kuningan police members whom we 
interviewed about democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and 
tolerance, showed a mixed picture. According to most of them the 
police were required to respect the principles of human rights in the 
measures they took, but the human rights were also one of the limits 
(making them hesitate) to their action. A member of the Kuningan 
police intelligence (interview, 19 February 2013) complained:
Previously, during interrogations, the police could hit [the suspect] and so on. 
Police are now more cautious: if people do not like [us], they complain in court, 
and the police can get hit instead. [When] a small thing happens [we are accused] 
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of violating human rights. [This is the case] although many police colleagues 
were victims [and] no one intervened. In Poso nobody intervene. And we are 
also human beings, we have the right to live, to be healthy. In the course of events 
of July 2010, police were victims, some were hospitalized. No one exposed this 
issue. If civilians get scratched, reporters will arrive. But it doesn’t matter, that’s 
[our] job, we are used to it.
Apart from the human rights issues, religious issues also made 
the police particularly careful. They perceived religious conflicts as 
more sensitive than other. Bripka Lukman (interview, 19 February 
2013) observed that “compared to other conflicts, SARA conflicts are 
more difficult.” To him other kinds of commotion (non-religious) 
can be settled at once. But the impact of SARA conflicts is so big that 
it needs special handling. He gave the example of 1996 events in 
Situbondo, where from a small outbreak the conflict spread every-
where. 
Precautions are made by the police to avoid repressive measures 
in religious issues. This is seen in the words of I Nyoman Oka, head 
of community affairs unit, Kuningan district police (interview, 19 
February 2013): 
Personally, I prefer the actions which secure the entire group, 
to prevent escalation. Police was beaten because both sides were 
against the police. Otherwise we would be accused of acting against 
human rights. The problem was not yet resolved but the police 
[action] was already protested against. Repressive measures were 
avoided. Evidence and witnesses are needed to arrest people. There 
is a presumption of innocence. If the police makes a wrong step, a 
pre-trial suit can be filed [against the police]. Therefore, the major 
concern should be in pre-emptive activities, even if a needle falls 
down, the police should know it. 
Due to this the Kuningan police sought to be as close as possible 
with the public. Oka mentioned (interview, 19 February 2013), that 
the Kuningan district police was organizing, in cooperation with the 
MUI and the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a program called “Da’i 
Kamtibmas” (“Preachers of Kamtibmas”). Every Thursday, preach-
ers in each sub-district took turns in delivering speeches. The par-
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ticipants were members of the police and civil servants. Usually, the 
event started with yasinan (the reading of a part of the Koran called 
“Surah Yasin”, asking forgiveness on behalf of the ill and deceased) 
and was closed with donations for orphans.30
The police organized “counselling” sessions to both the anti-Ah-
madiyya groups and the Ahmadiyya itself. A member of the Jalak-
sana police said (interview, 21 February 2013), “Ahmadiyya indeed 
violates the religion, they commit a sin. But this [Indonesia] is the 
state with a law, and [anti-Ahmadiyya] organizations cannot do what-
ever they want. This is why we provide counselling to both parties.”
Some members of the police still seem to have stereotypes or prej-
udices against the Ahmadis. From the police officers interviewed, 
we sometimes heard expressions like: “The Ahmadis are good at 
making arguments,” or “Ahmadiyya is troublesome, but still needs 
to be protected.”
One can say that religious views of the police are not much differ-
ent from the views shared by the majority of the society. But the job 
and the circumstances require them to protect the Ahmadis. One of 
the police sources even said that he was doing it with a heavy heart 
(interview, 19 February 2013): “It is not that we let the Ahmadiyya 
freely carry out their activities. We can only prevent. But the regent 
alone cannot, doesn’t dare [to do anything], because of the central 
authorities. Governor only issued an instruction, but it has not been 
applied. They keep on performing their activities.”
Local Politics
It is the duty of police to secure government policies which ide-
ally are drafted for the social benefit. Yet not rarely these policies 
30Another spiritual activities of the Kuningan police is reading of the asma al-hus-
na (99 beautiful names of God in Islam) during the morning assemblies. See “Shol-
awatan di Masjid Al Aman Polres Kuningan,” 7 February 2011, http:// polreskun-
ingan. wordpress.com/category/sejuta-kawan/ (accessed 20 October 2012), and 
“Pengajian Kamisan dan Asmaul Husna,” 9 February 2009, http://polreskuningan.
wordpress.com/2009/01/09/pengajian-kamis-an-dan- asmaul-husna/ (accessed 20 
October 2012).
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have caused controversies within the society. In case of Ahmadiyya, 
Yusuf Ahmadi (interview, 18 February 2013) argued that the gov-
ernment policies were laden with political interests. According to 
him this could be seen from the SKB being issued right before the 
local election in 2003. Or in the 2008 election campaign, for exam-
ple, Kuningan regent candidate, Aang Hamid Suganda, promised to 
close down the places of Ahmadiyya’s activity (Bagir et al. 2011: 45).
Political moments such as the timing of regional or local elections 
bring about further risk to be exploited by “selling” the Ahmadiyya 
issue. One respondent from JAI Manis Lor (interview, 18 February 
2013) suspected that the tension turned higher because “there was 
a party who demanded ‘annual bonus’ (tunjangan hari raya, THR), 
but they didn’t get it. The orientation is not the faith anymore, but 
money.” No further explanation was given on what was meant by 
“annual bonus” and who were the parties who filed it.
The local parliament’s attitude in this case is not much different 
from that of the regent and Muspida. On 26 July 2010, the parliament 
held a meeting with the regent and the local government officials 
in the main assembly room. When the atmosphere became tense, it 
was decided that the parliament together with organizations, local 
government and the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical 
Beliefs in Society (Bakorpakem) would go to Jakarta to request clar-
ification from the ministers and the president. They also agreed to 
form a special team which would report the results of monitoring 
the Ahmadiyya Kuningan to the minister and the president.31 One 
of the local parliament’s member, Nana Rusdiana, is the chairperson 
of BARAK which keenly airs anti-Ahmadiyya slogans.
The Kuningan office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs also 
could not do much. As noted earlier, in 2005, the ministry along with 
the regent and the chief prosecutor of Kuningan signed the SKB. 
Muhammad Nurdin, the shari’a administrator at the Kuningan of-
31“Desa Manis Lor Masih Tegang,” Radar Cirebon, 28 July 2010, http://radarcire-
bon.com/2010/07/28/desa-manis-lor-masih-tegang/ (accessed 15 October 2012).
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fice of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 21 February 2013) 
claimed that it was only providing “counselling” to the Ahmadis. 
The ministry has a list of Ahmadis who “returned to Islam.” Nur-
din also admitted that the ministry was still upholding the ban on 
recording the marriages of the Ahmadi citizens.
The Kuningan’s local government policies related to Ahmadiyya 
make the police task of safeguarding peace in the area more difficult. 
Due to the SKB, several times during the sealing of the Ahmadiyya 
places of worship, the police was confronted by both parties, the 
Ahmadis and those who opposed them. Yoyoh Indayah, (interview, 
6 February 2013) complained that she often had to act on her own as 
the Kuningan police chief, for the duties of other agencies were not 
set on motion. The reason was the lack of “fuel” (budget).
Public Opinion
Government policies related to Ahmadiyya in Kuningan have 
been heavily influenced by the MUI, FKUB, religious scholars and 
leaders of several organizations. MUI Kuningan, in accordance with 
the fatwa of the MUI headquarters, also issued a fatwa rendering 
Ahmadiyya “deviationist and misleading.” In addition to issuing a 
fatwa, MUI with religious scholars and leaders of Islamic organiza-
tions submitted to the regent a list of recommendations for sealing 
of the Ahmadi assets. For the MUI Kuningan, “sealing is a small 
step and a wise policy to remind the Ahmadiyya to follow the points 
of SKB.”32 The MUI acknowledged that it would not be responsible 
for the Islamic organizations which might take their own steps if the 
sealing attempts fail.33
It seems, however, that the MUI was responsible. KH Achidin 
Noor, the vice-chairman of MUI Kuningan and the head of FKUB 
32MUI’s recommendation letter No. 38/MUI.Kab/VII/2010. See also the mon-
itoring report of Komnas HAM at http://www.komnasham.go.id/pemantauan- 
dan-penyelidikan/298-penyegelan-masjid- Ahmadiyyah-di-ManisLor (accessed on 
15 October 2010).
33“Desa Manis Lor Masih Tegang,” Radar Cirebon, 28 July 2010, http://radarcire-
bon.com/2010/07/28/desa-manis-lor-masih-tegang/ (accessed 15 October 2012).
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Kuningan, (interview, 19 February 2013) stated that when six per-
sons arrested by the police were taken to the court, there was an 
indirect advocacy of the MUI. Achidin did not explain the events 
in detail and only mentioned that the MUI was taken as an expert 
witness in the case. But from the number six, we know that this was 
related to the attack of 2007. He said:
We communicated with the judge so that no new problems would occur after 
the verdict. There was a deal and it was completed, no excess to follow. The MUI 
is sometimes pulled by organizations to follow but it does not. If you want a 
demonstration and so on, do it at your own responsibility, report to the police. 
If anything happens later the MUI will defend you. But if the MUI joins, who 
would be defending [the other organizations]?
For Eman Sulaeman, secretary of the FPI Kuningan (interview, 
20 February 2013), “MUI is like a parent.” MUI is always asked for 
the opinion if there is a motion: “The head of the MUI said that if 
now there is evil and immorality, [we] leave it to you. If help is need-
ed, just tell. They never follow, because they are old. They are our 
teachers. We cannot be in conflict with them.”
Because many of the MUI members sit in the FKUB, the issue 
of “deviationist and misleading groups” became the major con-
cern of FKUB Kuningan along with the matter of “illegal places 
of worship.” FKUB Kuningan consists of 17 members, one Catho-
lic, one Protestant, one Buddhist, one Confucian, and 13 Muslim, 
one of whom comes from the organization GARIS. According 
to Achidin (interview, 19 February 19 2013) since its establish-
ment, the FKUB Kuningan has never issued a recommendation 
for establishment of places of worship. But several times it gave 
warnings related to “illegal places of worship” and “cults.” With 
regard to Ahmadiyya, Achidin stated that other religious groups 
should not intervene because this is an internal affair of Mus-
lims.34
34Proceedings of the FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs meeting at Wis-
ma Permata, 18 November 2010.
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The standpoints of the large Muslim organizations such as Mu-
hammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are virtually indistin-
guishable from the MUI. The local chairmen of the Nahdlatul Ul-
ama and Muhammadiyah signed the SKB of 2002 and the MUI’s 
recommendations to the Kuningan regent in 2010.
The NU Kuningan chairman, KH. Mahmud Solehudin, even 
delivered a speech during the istigasah on 29 July 2010.35 However, 
the attitude of the younger generation within the two organizations 
is different. The Muhammadiyah Young Intellectuals Network (Ja-
ringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah, JIMM), for example, is 
more concerned about the Ahmadiyya and together with other in-
stitutions it supported the Ahmadis in the 2007 event.
Both the local and the national mass media are not helping much, 
in this case, on the contrary, they sometimes even heated up the at-
mosphere. The online media such as mediaumat.com for example 
published news titled “Ahmadiyya triggers conflict in Manis Lor.”36 
The national media, on the other hand, once came with a headline 
“Ahmadis in amok.”37 Yet there are also media such as the Radar 
Cirebon and Tempo which are relatively neutral and also report on 
the measures taken by the police.
The bigger social organizations sided with the attackers or even 
became attackers themselves. But there were quite a few non-gov-
ernmental institutions which stood with the Ahmadiyya. Already 
during the events of 2002, the Ahmadiyya was in touch with the 
Inter-religious Cooperation Network (Jaringan Kerja Antar Umat 
Beragama, Jakatarub), based in West Java. 
35See MUI’s recommendation letter No. 38/MUI.Kab/VII/2010. See also “Pe-
nutupan Tempat Ibadat Ahmadiyyah Kembali Ricuh,” Pikiran Rakyat, 29 July 2010, 
http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/node/118828 (accessed 15 October 2012).
36“Ahmadiyyah Picu Konflik Manis Lor,” Mediaumat, 21 October 2010, http://
mediaumat.com/fokus/1989-42- Ahmadiyyah-picu-konflik-manis-lor.html (ac-
cessed 15 October 2012).
37“Ricuh Penyegelan: Jemaat Ahmadiyyah Mengamuk,” Metrotvnews, http:// 
metrotvnews.com/index.php/metromain/newsvideo/2010/07/28/110025 
(acces sed 15 October 2012).
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In 2007, more advocacy groups were involved and they went 
straight to Manis Lor. Some of them, such as the Legal Aid Institute 
(Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH) Bandung, Desantara Depok, Fah-
mina Cirebon, PBHI Bandung, and JIMM, associated in the Working 
Group for Religious Freedom Monitoring and Advocacy (Jaringan 
Kerja Pemantauan dan Advokasi Kebebasan Beragama dan Ber-
keyakinan). Beside them, also the National Alliance for Freedom of 
Religion and Belief (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Berag-
ama dan Berkeyakinan, AKKBB) has sent a letter to the Kuningan 
police chief to demand action against threats expressed in the letter 
of the Komponen Muslim Kuningan. 
In the midst of public pressure, the police chief of Jalaksana re-
mains confident. He believes that not all Muslims want to fight and 
attack. According to him (interview, 21 February 2013), if all Mus-
lims wanted to fight, the number of people who came to Manis Lor 
would be millions. “Not all Muslims hate the Ahmadiyya. The proof 
is in the 2010 event, when only around 1500 people came to demon-
strate against them. When we talk about the Muslim community, 
which Muslim community do we mean? There are millions of Mus-
lims.” Nevertheless, he stays on alert and does not underestimate 
the slightest security threats.
Jalaksana police chief, Rudi Rahmat (interview, 21 February 
2013), adds that his party is close to and listens to the views of the 
anti-Ahmadi forces. However, the police under the Kuningan police 
chief sticks to the rules. Messages which she delivers to the anti-Ah-
madiyya group are clear and explicit:
In the 2010 confrontation, some of the policemen were wounded. After that, the 
chief, Mrs. Yoyoh, immediately took a stand, and I believe this is why she suc-
ceeded. She summoned all the organizations to the police station, the FPI, GIBAS, 
GAMAS, and others, to give them an ultimatum. She said something like: “If 
anything happens, I know you are the ones whom I will arrest. You can protest, 
but do not use violence. Persecution and murder is a violation of law. If you 
have a problem, consult it with us and the local government.” From then until 
now there have no longer been physical clashes, only complaints with regard to 
issues like the construction of school libraries and [Ahmadiyya] group activities 
in Manis Lor.
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Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict
This rigorousness made the police chief, Yoyoh Indayah not 
very popular among the FPI. According to Eman Sulaeman, one 
of the FPI Kuningan leaders, the current police chief is better than 
Yoyoh Indayah with regard to matter of Ahmadiyya. Sulaeman 
said “a woman and a man can have the same rank, but men’s and 
women’s way of thinking is different. Women are highly emo-
tional. Men make more mature decisions, while women are la-
bile” (interview 20 February 2013). The current police chief, thus 
far, does not have any record of handling large-scale conflicts, 
like those of 2007 and 2010. 
But the FPI is close with the district police and always informs 
the police on where it should crack down on “immorality.” Eman 
Sulaeman, admitted that in case of gambling and immorality, the 
police was reliable. It was only the case of Ahmadiyya where, ac-
cording to him, the police have not been successful. But he added 
that the FPI could understand the police as there were many ob-
stacles to disbanding Ahmadiyya in Kuningan. According to him, 
the central government could not disband it, let alone the regency 
(interview, 20 February 2013).
A member of the Kuningan police intelligence (interview, 19 Feb-
ruary 2013) confirmed that the police remained close with the FPI 
in order to maintain a safe and conducive atmosphere in Kuningan. 
This closeness, he claimed, was useful to reduce the possibility of a 
conflict bursting into violence which would cause many casualties. 
The police chief of Jalaksana (interview, 21 February 2013), observed 
that if the police relationship with people was good, if anyone tried 
to do strange things, they would first feel ashamed towards the 
police. Meanwhile, for Eman Sulaeman, the partnership with the 
police was for “forbidding the evil and immorality” (interview, 20 
February 2013). 
The police can indeed reduce violence, but not without sacri-
fices. For example, before the end of Ramadan holidays in 2012, 
rumours were circulating that the Ahmadiyya would hold a 
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meeting at a national level. Jalaksana police chief immediately 
checked the location and found tents installed for the halal bi halal 
celebration. He then requested, upon the order from the district 
police chief, that the tents were taken down and the celebration 
were held quietly outside Kuningan. Ahmadiyya removed the 
tents (interview, 21 February 2013). Tension was indeed avoided, 
but at the cost of Ahmadis.
Other costs include anxiety experienced by the Ahmadis of Man-
is Lor. After the events of 2007 and 2010, the police very swiftly de-
ploys its personnel to Manis Lor, in case of any potential tension. 
The police were continuously on alert to the point when Yusuf Ah-
madi (interview, 18 February 2013) asked them not to be on stand-by 
in the village as this caused a general anxiety. Yusuf Ahmadi asked 
that the police troops and equipment be on alert at the police sta-
tion especially its location was not so far from the village of Manis 
Lor. This was different from the previous years when Ahmadiyya 
painstakingly tried to draw the attention of the police and their pro-
tection.
Conclusions
Ahmadiyya-related sectarian conflict in Manis Lor has a fairly 
long history. Smaller grievances occurred upon the establishment 
of the community in Manis Lor in the 1950s, and under the New 
Order, in the 1980s, when the MUI issued a fatwa on Ahmadiyya. 
But later, the times were peaceful for the Ahmadi community. Un-
til 2001. The conflict which initially involved actors from across the 
sub-district, expanded beyond it. The anti-Ahmadi groups resorted 
to persecution, acts of vandalism, and arson in Manis Lor and its 
neighbourhood. 
The 2007 events mark two important developments in the Manis 
Lor conflict. Apart from involving a wider group of actors, territory 
and background-wise, the events of 2007 also marked a change in 
police attitude which was shown by decisiveness in capturing and 
bringing to the court the six attackers who were later sentenced to 
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one month and 25 days in jail. Even though the Ahmadiyya was not 
satisfied with the sentence, this action proved to produce a deter-
ring effect on the perpetrators. The acts of vandalism immediately 
stopped.
The 2010 events repeated the pattern seen in the previous con-
flicts, from the protests, through demands, threats, sealing, assault, 
and so on. Having learnt from the past experience, the police exerted 
greater force. Entrance of the attackers through small alleys which 
happened in 2007, was anticipated in 2010 when the police person-
nel was deployed to guard all entrances to the village of Manis Lor. 
Clashes were avoided and injuries minimized. No one was prose-
cuted after this event, but after the incident, the police chief warned 
several organizations that police would not hesitate to take action if 
they commit unlawful acts.
By the time this report was completed at the end of 2013, the 2010 
incident was the last conflict involving a massive police pacification. 
But this does not mean that the conflict potential is no longer there. 
Discriminatory policies against the Ahmadis are still being made. 
By the time this text was written, the Ahmadis received no clarifi-
cation with regard to their electronic identity cards (E-KTP), they 
still found it difficult to register marriages and to perform the hajj 
pilgrimage.
The police action in Manis Lor provided an important lesson that 
the police could act decisively, despite the strong pressure from the 
majority group. Limitations, obstacles and challenges faced by the 
police, although they still must be addressed, did not become an 
excuse for the police to not act firmly against the perpetrators of vi-
olence. Firm action against violence in Manis Lor in 2007 and 2010, 
has proven to halt violence. Having learnt from the experiences in 
other places, the police in Manis Lor recognised that relocation of 
potential victims was not a solution.
If the police could learn from its mistakes, the government 
should too. Sealing the places of worship, as it was practiced 
since 2002, has proven not to ease tensions. Government budget 
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constraints provide no excuse to let things out of hands. Insti-
tutions such as FKUB and Ministry of Religious Affairs are cer-
tainly not “fire-fighters” who should only get involved when the 
conflicts escalate.
Finally, the police must be strengthened and must receive sup-
port to be able to carry out their duties without submitting to 
the pressure of majority. NGOs advocating religious freedom and 
protection of human rights should not be defeated by intolerant 
organizations such as the FPI in their access to the police. Police 
officers who excel in managing religious conflicts should be ap-
preciated in order to become an example for the police in other 
areas.***
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THE CASE OF ANTI-AHMADIYYA 
IN CIKEUSIK, PANDEGLANG
Foreword
On 6 February 2011, Cikeusik, a sub-district of Pandeglang, Banten, 
suddenly appeared in the limelight and received the coverage of 
both the national and international media. It all began with a mass 
rejection of the Ahmadi community in Kampung Peundeuy of Um-
bulan village, Cikeusik, which was led by Ismail Suparman. The po-
lice had known from the beginning about the existing tensions, 
but it failed to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. 
Three members of Ahmadiyya lost their lives, many others were 
injured.
Inappropriate policing strategy, poorly run intelligence, and 
lack of trust between the conflicted parties and the police capa-
bility to deal with conflicts, were important factors contributing 
to the outbreak of violence. Moreover, the minimal support from 
the society, religious leaders, as well as the government officials, 
made the policing action in the Cikeusik conflict even more dif-
ficult.
This chapter presents an outline, review and analysis of the po-
licing of the anti-Ahmadi conflict in Cikeusik. The chapter is divid-
63
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ed into five sections. Following the introduction, the second part 
describes the general demographic background of the Cikeusik dis-
trict and the Pandeglang regency. The third part briefly discusses 
the history of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, the beginnings of the con-
flict, anti-Ahmadi mobilization, and the incident of violence on 6 
February 2011. The fourth part discusses the dynamics of conflict 
policing seen in terms of policing activities, police knowledge, le-
gal-procedural frameworks of policing, the institutional character of 
the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the po-
lice interaction with the parties to the conflict. Finally, the fifth part 
provides conclusions and discussion on the causes of the policing 
failure in Cikeusik, as well as some important lessons that should be 
learnt in order to improve the policing of sectarian conflicts. 
A Glimpse at Religious Demography of 
Cikeusik and Pandeglang 
Pandeglang is located in the southwest part of Banten province. 
It borders with Serang district from the north, Lebak district from 
the east, the Indian Ocean from the south, and the Sunda Strait from 
the west. The total area of Pandeglang equals to 274,689.91 hectares 
or 2,747 km2, and is divided into 35 districts, 322 villages and 13 
administrative villages.1
In 2010, based on the May 2010 census, Pandeglang was inhabited 
by 1,149,610 people. In terms of religion, there were 1,154,375 Muslims, 
2,344 Protestants, 258 Catholics, 2,353 Buddhists, and 1,552 Hindus. 
It appears clear from these data that the Pandeglang is dominated 
by Muslims. This is also clear from the number of places of prayer: 
mosques, 1,730; musala, 2,246; three Protestant churches; and one 
Buddhist temple (Kementrian Agama Propinsi Banten 2010).
There is no exact data on the number of Ahmadis in Pande-
glang, but two districts of Pandeglang, Cisata and Cikeusik, are 
1Kabupaten Pandeglang, Gambaran Umum, http://www.pandeglangkab.go.id 
(accessed 5 April 2013).
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often associated with JAI. Until recently, there were about four 
Ahmadi families in Cisata. In Cikeusik there were 25 followers of 
Ahmadiyya, but all of them have moved after the violent incident 
which took place on 6 February 2011 (Yusuf Baihaki, treasurer 
of MUI Pandeglang, member of FKUB Pandeglang, interview, 11 
February 2013).
Cikeusik borders with Lebak regency in the east, Angsana and Mun-
jul districts in the north, Cibaliung and Cibatu districts in the west, and 
the Java Sea in south. Cikeusik consists of fourteen villages, one of 
them Umbulan, where the anti-Ahmadi violence broke out (Yayan 
Sofyan, Cikeusik secretary, interview, 14 February 2013).
Most of the Cikeusik inhabitants are farmers. In the 1950s, many 
residents of Cikeusik came from Cirebon, West Java. This migration 
resulted in ethnic mix of local residents (Sundanese of Banten) and 
Cirebon natives. In terms of religion, the majority of the population 
is Muslim. Almost every village in Cikeusik has an Islamic boarding 
school (pesantren); in Cikeusik, there are about ten of them (Yayan 
Sofyan, interview, 14 February 2013).
Anti-Ahmadiyya Conflict in Cikeusik
The Ahmadiyya presence in Cikeusik is connected to the JAI 
branch in Rangkasbitung regency, Banten, which was established in 
July 1958. From this branch grew new ones like Cilegon and Serang 
branchs. The important figure in the spread of Ahmadi teachings in 
Banten was Basiumawijaya.
Around 1989, the Ahmadi dakwah in Banten was led by Khairu-
din Barus. Through the Tablig Committee of Banten (Komite Tablig 
Banten, KTB) which he initiated, each branch of Ahmadiyya in 
Banten established a mission. One of the KTB missionary goals was 
Cikeusik, which was under the Jemaat Kebayoran mission. In the 
1990s, Khairudin and members of the Jamaat Kebayoran preached 
in Cikeusik (Rahman 2013: 10-17). Below is how one villager from 
the Umbulan village (R, interview, 28 February 2013) described his 
experience of being invited by Khairudin to join Ahmadiyya:
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Around 1991, Khairudin Barus invited me and other people to come by bus to 
visit the Ahmadiyya centre in Parung. One of those who joined the group was 
Matori, father of Suparman, the present chairman of the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik. 
Some of those who went with us maybe already knew, while others, including 
me, did not know the purpose of our visit to Parung. There we were all intro-
duced to the teachings of Ahmadiyya. Some of us earlier knew about the Ahmad-
is, some, me included, did not. I knew that Khairudin Barus was a rich farmer, 
not an Ahmadi preacher. Once introduced to the teachings, we were all invited 
to join Ahmadiyya. Some residents wanted to and were initiated, some were not 
ready, including me and Matori.
In 1992, Suparman joined the Ahmadiyya community, although 
earlier he opposed it. As a student of the well-known Mathlaul An-
war Religious High School, he even once disputed with Khairudin. 
But later he became interested in Ahmadiyya and was initiated as 
its member. After that he decided to study at Mubarak [Ahmadiyya] 
Campus in Bogor. Later, together with Khairudin he introduced Ah-
madiyya to Cikeusik (Rahman 2013: 19).
The presence of Ahmadiyya had not been without resistance 
from the local religious leaders. Around 1992, some of them and vil-
lage officials accused Suparman of disrupting security and reported 
him to Cikeusik District Military Command (Koramil). Suparman 
was asked to stop his missionary activities, but he ignored the re-
quest and had several times argued about religion with the Koramil 
soldiers.
According to one version, on one evening five soldiers came to 
Suparman’s house and asked him to stop his dakwah. Since he re-
fused, they beat him in front of the lodge near the Cibaliung bridge 
(Rahman 2013: 20-21). After that incident Khairudin decided to 
suspend the dakwah activities. He invited Suparman to move to Ja-
karta and placed him at the Mubarok Campus in Bogor. In 1994, 
he brought Suparman to preach in the Philippines (Rahman 2013: 
22). Since then some people in Cikeusik left Ahmadiyya, some re-
mained, but they kept inviting new members (R, resident of Umbul-
an village, interview, 28 February 2013). 
In 2005, Suparman returned to Indonesia, but not to Cikeusik. 
From 2005 to 2009, he was active in the Balikpapan branch of Ah-
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madiyya in Jakarta. Although he was in Jakarta, he would often come 
to visit his parents in Cikeusik. Only recently, in August 2009, he 
was officially appointed as a mubalig (missionary) for Cikeusik and 
the surrounding areas (Rahman 2013: 22). According to AS (member 
of Ahmadiyya, interview, 11 May 2013), in April 2010, Suparman 
settled in a house in Peundeuy neighbourhood of Umbul an, Cike-
usik. The house was the center of Ahmadiyya activities and was of-
ten referred to as a mission house.
Suparman’s reactivation of JAI in Cikeusik was faced with op-
position which even increased after he moved to the mission house:
Suparman’s activity in that house enraged the local clerics. To prevent unwanted 
things from happening, several times I approached him and asked him to pray 
together with other residents. I often reminded Suparman not to perform Friday 
prayers at that house and to just go outside. Whenever I said that, there was just 
arguing. Suparman was good at religious disputes (A, secretary of Umbulan vil-
lage, interview, 14 February 2013).
The clerics were more and more angry when a rumor spread that 
Suparman wanted to build the largest Ahmadi place of mission in 
Indonesia. Another rumor had it that Suparman also encouraged 
people to join Ahmadiyya through material rewards. This worried 
the ulama, because most of the people in Cikeusik were poor (R, res-
ident of Umbulan, interview, 28 February 2013). One of the Ahmadi-
yya Cikeusik members (AS, interview, 11 May 2013) denies this. He 
also denied that Ahmadiyya Cikeusik was a closed community. Ac-
cording to him they mingled with the locals and were involved in 
community activities and voluntary work. The village chief was try-
ing to resolve the conflict. However, rather than doing it in a neutral 
way, he only deepened the anti-Ahmadi tensions by asking Supar-
man to disband the Ahmadiyya community and by provoking other 
residents to do the same.
In April 2010, for example, Johar, the village chief, delivered a 
speech during a village celebration where he told people to stop 
calling him “chief Johar” if he was proven unable to disband Ah-
madiyya. On another occasion and in different place, he said that 
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Ahmadiyya must be disbanded because it was already ruining the 
society.2 Commenting on the attitude and involvement of the vil-
lage chief, the Umbulan village secretary (interview, 14 February 
2013) said: “As a government official the chief should be neutral, 
non-partisan. But since it is a political office, [he] is subject to major-
ity pressure. Chief Johar was often reprimanded by the anti-Ahmadi 
group: when are you going to disband the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, 
chief Johar?”
Anti-Ahmadiyya provocations were also made during sermons. 
One cleric from Umbulan, who at the same time was the Chairman 
of the MUI Cikeusik, said that he always reminded people not to 
follow the teachings of Ahmadiyya as they were deviationist and 
misleading. He also indicated that Ahmadis were apostates since (as 
he claimed) their teachings did not recognize Muhammad as the last 
prophet but Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and that Tazkirah was their holy 
book. According to him, the Ahmadi teachings deviated from the 
Sunna which was already adopted by the society (AM, interview, 
27 February 2013). In addition to these, one of the residents remem-
bered (R, interview, 28 February 2013) his experience: “I’ve once 
come to [listen to] a sermon in one of the districts of Pandeglang. It 
was about the apostasy of Ahmadis. The speaker said the blood of 
Ahmadis was lawful to be shed.”
In August 2010, Suparman was called personally by the Um-
bulan village chief to whom he arrived accompanied by Atep Su-
ratep. The one hour meeting did not bring any results. Suparman 
explained he was an Ahmadi missionary and Atep Suratep was his 
secretary. The village chief asked Suparman to leave Ahmadiyya. 
But the request was rejected.3 
Having failed in intimidating Suparman, the village chief even-
tually had local authorities involved in his efforts to disband Ah-
2Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suparman atas Perkara Pidana Peng-
hasutan” (Serang: Banten police, 24 February 2011), p. 4.
3Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Johar atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyo-
kan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Banten police, 22 February 2011), p. 6.
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madiyya. This began in September 2010, when the chief officially 
called Suparman to the village office. The meeting was attended by 
Suparman, the village chief and a few officials from Cikeusik vil-
lage. The chief again recommended that Suparman should leave 
Ahmadiyya. But Suparman still refused.
In the same month, the village reported the issue to the Cikeusik 
district. In consequence, both Suparman and Atep were summoned 
to the district office.4 Suparman several times met the district offi-
cials and was asked to leave Ahmadiyya. He refused.
According to the village secretary (interview, 14 February 2013) 
the grounds for Suparman’s refusal was the fact that JAI was a legal 
entity recognized by the government. Suparman even showed evi-
dence of this in the meetings. Suparman also believed that the Ah-
madi teachings were not “deviationist” and “misleading” as alleged 
by the MUI and the local clerics. Suparman often argued with them 
to prove that Ahmadiyya belonged to Islam. 
Around October 2010, the district officials decided to contact Co-
ordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor-
pakem) in Pandeglang. The Bakorpakem held a meeting with Su-
parman at the Cikeusik district office. The meeting was also attend-
ed by the village chief, district secretary, MUI Pandeglang and Cike-
usik, and the local ulama. Like in the previous meetings, Suparman 
was asked to leave Ahmadiyya, which he again refused.5
Attempts to press the JAI Cikeusik were also made by other par-
ties. At the College of Social and Political Sciences (Sekolah Tinggi 
Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, STISIP) in Banten Raya, Pandeglang, 
a group of students from Cikeusik demanded that Atep Suratep, a 
member of the academic community, was removed from the cam-
pus. If their demands were not met, they threatened to leave the 
campus themselves (ABD, Cikeusik resident, interview, 14 February 
2013).
4Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Johar,” p. 6.
5Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Johar,” p. 6.
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Around November 2010, Kiai Muhamad with a group of 15 
people formed the Cikeusik Muslim Movement (Gerakan Muslim 
Cikeusik, GMC) and demonstrated against Ahmadiyya at the Cike-
usik police headquarters. This initiative originated from the Majelis 
Ta’lim in Kampung Cikareo, Cikawaris village.6 In the same month, 
leaflets accusing Ahmadis of “misguidance” were distributed by the 
GMC.
A meeting between Suparman and the anti-Ahmadiyya group 
was again held on 18 November 2010. Since the situation in Cike-
usik was tense, the meeting took place at the office of the State Pros-
ecutor (Kejaksaan Negeri, Kejari) in Pandeglang. Suparman, Atep 
and some other members of Ahmadiyya (Deden Sujana, Hasan Bas-
ri, Dade Sulaiman and a few more) arrived at the prosecutor’s office, 
but only Suparman and Atep were allowed into the meeting room. 
During the meeting, Suparman was asked to sign a statement con-
taining: (a) suspension of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik; (b) declaration of 
participating more in activities of the local community; (c) person-
al resignation. Suparman again rejected the demand and made his 
own statement which contained: (a) readiness to obey the 2008 SKB 
of three ministers; and (b) readiness to participate in community’s 
social affairs. His statement was eventually accepted.7
Although the decision was already made, the parties who want-
ed Suparman out of Ahmadiyya — the Umbulan Village Chief and 
the MUI Cikeusik — were not satisfied with it. To them the agree-
ment still allowed the existence of Ahmadis in Cikeusik, while they 
wanted the community to be disbanded and Suparman with his 
followers to repent. If Suparman did not want to repent he had to 
leave Cikeusik (interview, AM, Chairman of the MUI Cikeusik, 27 
February 2013).
6Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Hasanudin atas Perkara Pidana Pen-
geroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Banten police, 7 February 2011), pp. 1-5. 
See also Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Usep Sugandi atas Perkara Pidana 
Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 11 February 2011), pp. 1-4.
7Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suparman,” hal. 5.
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Ultimately, they decided to discuss the decision with the resi-
dents of Cikeusik. They also asked that K.H. Ujang Muhamad 
Arif joined to help overcome the Cikeusik Ahmadis.8 Besides be-
ing a charismatic and influential cleric in Pandeglang and Rangkas 
Bitung, K.H. Ujang was also known for having played a major role 
in dissolution of several movements which were perceived as devi-
ationist in Cibitung district, Pandeglang.9
K.H. Ujang was first reached in mid-January 2011. At that time, 
Sofwan, a teacher at Madrasah Tsanawiyah (MTS) Hunibera, Cik-
eruh Wetan, met Kiai Baghawi, the second secretary of MUI Cike-
usik. He asked Baghawi to get in touch with K.H. Ujang, and invited 
him as a speaker at the tablig akbar event in Ranca Senang. They 
aimed at pressuring Suparman. Baghawi contacted K.H. Ujang who 
expressed his readiness, even though the date of the event was not 
yet settled awaiting confirmation from the Cikeusik community.10
K.H. Ujang tried to receive support by sending text messages 
(SMS) to several kiais. From mid-January till 27, he sent the follow-
ing messages: “Asl., Tolong dikompakeun ulama, kiai, santri, jawara, 
masyarakat untuk ngagempur Ahmadiyah di Cikeusik. Upami aya sms ti 
abdi supaya turun sebarkeun (K.H Ujang Cgls).”11 Translation of this 
message from Sundanese would more or less be: “Asl., Please unite 
the ulama, kiai, students, jawara, and public to destroy the Ahmadis 
in Cikeusik. If there is an SMS from me, share it (K.H. Ujang Cigeu-
lis).”
Having contacted K.H. Ujang, Sofwan immediately gathered 
community leaders, among them Kiai Muhamad, the leader of the 
GMC. The meeting resulted in an agreement that the tablig akbar 
8Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Johar,” pp. 7-8.
9Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Tersangka KH. Ujang Muhamad Arif bin 
Abuya Surya atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: 
Polda Banten, 17 February 2011), p. 2.
1Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Sofwan,” p. 3.
11Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, “Tersangka KH. Ujang Muhamad Arif bin 
Abuya Surya atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: 
Polda Banten, 16 February 2011), p. 5.
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would be held on 6 February 2011, at 9:00 am. Then Sofwan updated 
K.H. Ujang on the results of the meeting. Two days later K.H. Ujang 
told Sofwan to focus the event on the crux of the matter, namely 
dissolution [of Ahmadi]12 with the mass mobilization and without 
the tablig akbar. Sofwan agreed.13
When Sodikin, a Pandeglang trader, told Kiai Babay of the plans 
to disband the Ahmadiyya, they started to invite more and more 
actors from outside Cikeusik. Kiai Babay was a young kiai of the 
Pagelaran district in Pandeglang, well known in Cikeusik and an as-
sociate of K.H. Ujang. On 27 January 2011, at 8:00 pm, Sodikin came 
to the house Kiai Babay. During the meeting Sodikin proposed to 
contact Idris, a jawara (a local strongman) from Mandalawangi dis-
trict, Pandeglang. Soon Idris, along with Roy came to the house of 
Kiai Babay. Then the four of them spoke about the plans to disband 
Ahmadiyya.14
On 28 January 2011, K.H. Ujang again sent an SMS to the kiais, 
students and the members of community. Its contents was: “Assal-
amualikum, an invitation to the kiais, ulama, students, and commu-
nity to dissolve Ahmadiyya of Cikeusik on Sunday, 6 February/3 
Maulud (K.H. Ujang Cgls). Spread! Do not send to the police.” Most 
of the people who received it decided to follow the SMS invitation. 
Thus, K.H. Ujang estimated that the crowd would be about a thou-
sand people.15
The SMS was forwarded by those who received it either in the 
same form or slightly modified. Umbulan village resident (R, inter-
view, 28 February 2013) recounts:
12No mention on the way (peaceful or violent) in which the dissolution would be 
carried out. Police Investigation Report (BAP) III, “Tersangka KH. Ujang Muhamad 
Arif bin Abuya Surya atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” 
(Serang: Banten police, 5 March 2011), p. 2.
13Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Sofwan,” p. 3.
14Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Saksi Ahmad Bai Mahdi alias Kiyai Babay 
atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 21 
February 2011), pp. 6-7.
15 Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Tersangka KH. Ujang,” p. 5-6.
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I received the SMS about dissolution of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik from a friend, from 
a local kiai and from an unknown number. Because I agree with the dissolution 
of Ahmadiyya I forwarded it to some numbers on my cell phone. I even bought 
new [SIM] cards to pass it further. I sent this text in the same and in a different 
format. In the different one, for example, I added that if you do not want Ahmad-
is in Pandeglang, then you have to come to the event of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik dis-
solution on Sunday, 6 February 2011. Almost the entire community of Cikeusik 
received the text messages and they also spread them.
K.H. Ujang also requested support from the FPI member in Pon-
tang, Serang, Ustad T.B. Sidiq. Earlier he met with Kiai Sobri, the 
Secretary General of the FPI, during the maulid (birth of the Prophet 
Muhammad) celebration in Cibulakan. During that meeting, he in-
formed Sobri that on Sunday, 6 February 2011, at 9:00 or 10:00 am, 
dissolution of Ahmadiyya would be carried out.16
On 29 January, Kiai Babay invited Idris to his house. Idris came 
together with Pandi, Pai and Roy. They discussed the dissolution 
plan and on the same day decided to meet AA aka Deden. At AA’s 
home they met another thirty people. They agreed that the residents 
of Panimbang, Pagelaran, and Menes (all in Pandeglang) should also 
be asked to gather on 6 February 2011, at 6:30 am in Panimbang.17
Plans to disband Ahmadiyya eventually reached the Ahmadis. 
On 2 February 2011, Atep Suratep informed the police, the military, 
and the local office of Kesbang. On 4 February 2011, Atep informed 
Hasan Basri (Ahmadi missionary, Banten), Dade Sulaiman (main 
administrator of Ahmadiyya Rangkas Bitung and Cikeusik), and 
Suparman.18
On 4 February 2011, Kiai Babay again invited Idris to his house. 
K.H. Ujang and Sodikin were also present. During the meeting they 
decided that dissolution of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik would be made on 
16Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Tersangka KH. Ujang,” p. 3.
17Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Tersangka Idris atas Perkara Pidana Pen-
geroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 17 February 2011), p. 3.
18While informing his colleagues, Atep Suratep did not use the word “disso-
lution” but “assault” on Ahmadiyya Cikeusik. Police Investigation Report (BAP), 
“Saksi Atep Suratep atas Perkara Pidana Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 24 
February 2011), p. 6.
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behalf of the Pandeglang society and that to distinguish themselves 
from the Ahmadis they would wear blue ribbons. Later on the same 
day they went to AA’s house to notify him on the outcome of the 
meeting.19
The very socially respected position of kiais, reinforced by a huge 
number of religious schools, especially in Cikeusik, allowed to mo-
bilize support for the action to dissolve the Ahmadiyya. Nearing 
that day, K.H. Ujang divided duties among the kiais and chose the 
rallying point. Crowds approaching from Cibaliung, Labuan, Man-
dalawangi, Cimanggu Cibitung, and Sumur would gather at Bab-
akan Mosque under K.H. Ujang, Kiai Pei, Kiai Nahwan, and Kiai 
Babay. Crowds from Munjul and Cikeusik would gather at Cangkore 
under Kiai Baghowi, Sofwan and Umbulan village chief. Crowds 
from Malimping and Cisemut would meet at Umbulan T-junction 
and would be lead by Ustad Endang.20
On 5 February 2011, at 3:00 am, the Cikeusik police chief and 
military commander came to Suparman’s house to deliver a sum-
mons to Cikeusik police headquarters to clarify Suparman’s wife’s, 
Haina Toang Aquino, immigration status. Due to this, Suparman 
with his wife, their child and Atep Suratep until 10:00 am were held 
at the Cikeusik police station. Afterwards they were shifted to the 
Pandeglang police headquarters. While there, Suparman informed 
Mulyadi and Tarno, members of the Ahmadyya Cikeusik about the 
planned assault and told them to evacuate all valuable items.21 On 
the same day, around 4:30 pm, Idris with his friends arrived to Kiai 
Babay’s house in order to leave together for the Ahmadiyya Cike-
usik site.22
In the evening, at 8:00 pm, one of the Ahmadis informed Deden 
Sujana that Suparman remained at the Pandeglang police, so there 
19Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, Saksi Ahmad Bai Mahdi alias Kiyai Babay 
atas Perkara Pidana Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 18 
February 2011), p. 3.
20Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, “Tersangka K.H. Ujang,” p. 7.
21Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suparman,” p. 4.
22Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Tersangka Idris,” p. 3.
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was no one in the mission house at that time. Upon receiving this in-
formation, Deden decided to go to Cikeusik and to see Suparman.23 
At 10:00 pm, he called two Ahmadis, Danang and Maulana, to ac-
company him.24 Not long after, a few more Ahmadis from Jakarta, 
Roni Pasaroni, Bebi, Arif Rahman Hakim, Warsono, and Irwan fol-
lowed Deden. Other Ahmadis from Bogor (Candra, Masihudin, Fer-
dias) and Serang (Arif Rahman Ahmadi, Alfi, Yus Asaf, Afif, Yudi) 
came along. On two cars, seventeen of them went to Cikeusik.25
On 6 February 2011, around 7:00 am, K.H. Ujang together with 
T.B. Sidiq, Sodikin and a few more people were heading to one of 
the meeting points, Babakan Mosque in Cibaliung.26 The group led 
by Kiai Babay, Idris and AA was also coming there.27 A crowd of 
hundreds gathered and blue ribbons were distributed. By cars and 
motorbikes they all together went to another meeting point, the 
Cangkore Mosque.28
At the same time Deden Sujana’s group arrived at Suparman’s 
house. They were greeted by the Ahmadis who arrived there earlier. 
Introducing themselves to the hosts, Deden said they came upon the 
instruction of the National Amir, but this information they should 
keep to themselves. He also said that Suparman’s house needed to 
be protected and that he would be in the front while others would po-
sition themselves in accordance with their skills. He also urged that 
unless in an emergency situation, they should not leave the house.29
23Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Tersangka H. Ir. Deden Sujana atas Perkara 
Pidana Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 17 February 2011), p. 4.
24Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Danang atas Perkara Pidana Peng-
hasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 3 March 2011), p. 2. See also Police Investigation 
Report (BAP), “Tersangka H. Ir. Deden Sujana,” p. 4.
25The Jakarta group went to Cikeusik after Deden called Bebi. The Bogor group 
went to Cikeusik after Roni Pasroni called Tubagus Candra. The Serang group fol-
lowed after Imron Saleh, an Ahmadi from Serang, summoned them. See more in 
Rahman 2013: 30-32.
26Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, “Tersangka KH. Ujang,” p. 5.
27Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Tersangka Idris,” p. 4.
28Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Saksi Ahmad Bai Mahdi,” p. 3.
29Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Arif Rahman Ahmadi atas Perkara 
Pidana Penghasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 8 March 2011), p. 6.
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The arrival of the group was noticed by the local residents. One 
of them (R, interview, 28 February 2013) recalled:
On Sunday morning, around 7:00 am, I saw two cars at Suparman’s house. I 
felt anxious as on that day Ahmadiyya was to be disbanded and Suparman was 
already at the police station, but there were some guests arriving at his house. 
Fearing that something bad might happen, I evacuated my family members. I 
met Suprapto, Babinmas of Umbulan village, Cikeusik district. I told him that 
there were guests at Suparman’s house who arrived on two cars.
Upon receiving this information, Suprapto called the chief of 
Umbulan village, Johar. They later arrived at Suparman’s house and 
asked the Ahmadis to leave the building as there was a mob on the 
way to the place. Their advice was not followed.30 Soon afterwards 
Suprapto with Hasan, chief of the criminal investigation (Reskrim) 
unit of Cikeusik district police, arrived at Suparman’s house to meet 
Deden. Hasan also informed Deden about the situation in Cikeusik 
and ordered him to leave the house. But Deden decided to stay.31
Around 10:00 am, a crowd of hundreds arrived at the Cangkore 
Mosque and Umbulan T-junction. When K.H Ujang’s group reached 
the Cangkore Mosque, they were thousands. Soon an instruction 
was given: “Come forward... attack, Ahmadis have already defied 
the police order to go away.” Around 10:30 am, Kiai Babay ordered 
the crowd to approach Suparman’s house which was a few hundred 
meters away from the Cangkore Mosque.32
When the attackers reached Suparman’s house, Idris and some 
of his friends were in the front. They started to shout “kafir” and 
ordered the police to step aside. The police managed to block them 
in the courtyard, but the barrier broke. One person from the group 
threw rocks on the house, others came closer shouting words like 
“Disband and get rid of Ahmadiyya in Pandeglang.”33
30Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suprapto atas Perkara Pidana Peng-
hasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 14 February 2011), p. 3.
31Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Saksi Hasanudin atas Perkara Pidana 
Penghasutan” (Serang: Banten police, 14 February 2011), p. 3.
32Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Tersangka Idris,” p. 4.
33Parts of these events were documented in a video titled “Anti-Ahmadiyah: 
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A few of the Ahmadis went out of the house. Deden Sujana hit 
Idris. Later a group of people attacked Deden, someone hit him with 
a rock. Several Ahmadis were involved in the fight, bamboo sticks 
and stones were used by both sides. Deden and another person 
managed to push Idris and his companions away from the court-
yard. Idris and his group took out machetes and ordered the crowd 
waiting on Cibaliung bridge to attack. The mob approached Supar-
man’s house and started pelting it.34
Since they were greatly outnumbered by the attackers, Ahmadis 
were unable to hold and began to move away from Suparman’s house. 
The mob was chasing those who were trying to save themselves.
Behind the house the mob was beating Deden and a few other 
Ahmadis with knives, sticks and beams.35 One of the Umbulan vil-
lage residents (R, interview, 28 February 2013) who witnessed this, 
narrated the following:
The strength of the anti-Ahmadi mob multiplied when over a thousand people 
came from the side of Ranca Senang Mosque, Cikeusik. The crowd became twice 
as big, there were altogether two-three thousand people. The mob was even more 
angered when it heard that Sarta, Umbulan resident, was slashed by a person as-
sumed to be from Ahmadiyya. The mob pelted Suparman’s house, destroyed the 
roof and parabola, damaged and burnt two cars and one motorbike belonging 
to Ahmadis. Some of the Ahmadis run to the Cibaliung river, those who could 
not swim were caught by the mob. They were beaten with knives, sticks and 
stones. Later they were brought to the crowd around Suparman’s house. There 
they were again kicked and beaten with knives, sticks and stones.
Not all Ahmadis were battered by the mob. According to one of 
the Umbulan village officials (D, interview, 27 February 2013), some 
managed to escape: 
Those Ahmadis who did not run to the river, got away. Others were taken by 
village officers to the Cikeusik district [office]. The mob run to and made sweep-
ing from house to house. Ahmadis who were brought to the district office were 
almost caught in the mob amok. Fortunately, the police made a swift evacuation.
Violence in Cikeusik, Banten, Indonesia,” http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=iL-
b9VSI9BCw (accessed 12 November 2012).
34Watch the video “Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik.”
35Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Tersangka H. Ir. Deden Sujana,” p. 5.
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts78
One of the Ahmadis who survived (Y, interview, 22 December 
2013) said that he run to the Cibaliung river and for several hours 
hid in the bushes. He managed to run to the fields when the mob 
left the river bank. Soon a small child approached and told to him 
to hide in the house of an Ahmadi resident who was not yet evac-
uated. On the next day, he came back in trauma to Serang, using 
public transportation. On the way almost every passenger was talk-
ing about the incident. According to him, some of the passengers 
mentioned that those who committed violence were paid.
Three Ahmadis were killed in the incident (Roni Pasaroni, War-
sono, and Tubagus Candra), others were wounded. All members 
of the JAI were expelled from Cikeusik. The anti-Ahmadi mob also 
threatened to kill Suparman if he came back. Ahmadis were allowed 
to stay in Cikeusik under condition that they leave Ahmadiyya (R, 
Umbulan village resident, interview, 28 February 2011). The houses 
and fields belonging to the JAI were abandoned (A, Umbulan vil-
lage official, interview, 14 February 2011). Later Ahmadis also expe-
rienced difficulties with administration. One of them from Cikeusik 
(AS, interview, 11 May 2013) admitted it was difficult to obtain the 
relocation letter since the village officials were unwilling to process 
it.
Dynamics of Policing the anti-Ahmadiyya Conflict in Cikeusik
Policing Activities
The police already knew of the tensions around Ahmadiyya. 
Cikeusik district police received a report on Suparman’s activities 
at the mission house and knew that some of the local residents did 
not accept it. In the beginning, the police carried out supervision, 
persuasion, and approached the conflicted parties: 
Before Suparman activated the JAI Cikeusik, Ahmadis prayed with other resi-
dents in the nearby mosque. But when Suparman became active and used his 
house as a place of worship, some of the residents started to complain. In order 
that the situation remained safe, the Cikeusik police often visited Suparman and 
reminded him to mix more in religious affairs with the local residents. With [join-
ing in] other activities, for example communal work, the Ahmadis had no prob-
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lem. The police also reminded the residents who opposed Suparman’s religious 
activities, to resist from vigilantism (A, chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district 
police, interview, 16 February 2013).
Police also monitored the conflict escalation by following the ex-
change between Ahmadis and the anti-Ahmadi group during the 
meetings at the district office and the office of the state prosecutor in 
Pandeglang. On the meeting at the state prosecutor’s, on 18 Novem-
ber 2010, in Pandeglang, the chief of intelligence unit of Pandeglang 
police gave a briefing on the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Reli-
gious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs No. 8 of 2006 (Work-
ing Meeting of the House of Representatives, 2011) regarding the 
development of religious harmony. The Cikeusik police chief also 
shared the results of the meeting in a speech to Cikeusik residents, 
whom he urged to remain patient and calm in addressing the matter 
of Ahmadiyya.36
However, the police appeal was disregarded by the anti-Ahmadi 
group. They planned to dissolve Ahmadiyya without the govern-
ment involvement, but through mobilizing masses. They did not 
report their plans to the police. 
When the police eventually learnt about the dissolution plans, 
the measures it took included intelligence reviews, coordination 
with police units, and means of persuasion to impede those plans. 
On 1 January 2011, chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police 
made a report (No. Pol: R/LI-01/II/2011/PULBAKET), containing 
information on the plans of dissolving Ahmadiyya Cikeusik by the 
local religious and community leaders.37
On 2 January 2011, the police chief called the intelligence 
and ordered that the Development Board for Security and Order 
36Police Investigation Report, “Saksi Johar,” p. 7.
37Deputy Chief of Banten Police, “Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang Tanggal 6 Februari 2011,” slides presented at the workshop on “Pen-
anggulangan Tindakan Anarki: Penanganan Konflik Sosial oleh Polri Sesuai dengan 
Prinsip dan Standar HAM,” organized by Ditbangpes Sespimti Polri, in cooperation 
with Yayasan Lembaga Hukum Indonesia and The Asia Foundation, Lembang, 28 
November 2013.
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(Babinkantibmas) appealed to the residents to avoid actions yield-
ing disorder.38
Upon these instructions, the intelligence approached kiais and 
members of the community to seek information. According to the 
intelligence chief of Cikeusik police (interview, 16 February 2013), 
almost all kiais and residents encountered received the SMS call for 
dissolution of Ahmadiyya. However, according to him, these per-
sons were not certain whether they would attend it or not. He also 
made a special report for the Pandeglang police on the situation in 
Cikeusik.
On 3 February 2011, the police intelligence unit issued a special 
information about the plans to disband Ahmadiyya. It also con-
tained a description of the situation of Ahmadis in Cikeusik who, 
according to the village chief, were still safe (Working Meeting of 
the House of Representatives, 2011). On the same day, around 10:00 
am, the Pandeglang police intelligence disguised as students called 
Kiai Muhamad to ask if indeed there were plans of dissolution. Kiai 
Muhamad confirmed that the dissolution would take place but he 
was still waiting for support. The local police had banned it in order 
to keep Cikeusik safe, yet Kiai Muhamad rejected the ban because 
he considered Ahmadiyya deviationist.39
On 4 February 2011, between 08:00 am and 12:00 pm, the Pande-
glang police held the monthly display on operation (GO) which was 
attended by the section chiefs, unit chiefs, and district chiefs of the 
Pandeglang police. Discussed were the information regarding the 
plans of dissolution of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik and the security meas-
ures for the inauguration of Pandeglang regent and vice-regent. Be-
tween 3:00 and 8:00 pm, at the district military command (Kodim 
0601), the Pandeglang police organised a meeting with Muspida on 
38Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Mad Supur atas Perkara Pidana Peng-
hasutan” (Serang: Polda Banten, 14 February 2011), pp. 2-5.
39Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Yayat Supriyatna atas Perkara Pidana 
Pengeroyokan dan atau Penghasutan” (Serang: Banten police, 13 Februari 2011), pp. 
3-4.
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the coordination of handling the Cikeusik conflict. The meeting was 
attended by Pandeglang police chief, the prosecutor, Dandim 0601, 
Kodim 0601 intelligence, chief of police intelligence, criminal inves-
tigation unit chief, and official of Kesbang Linmas Pandeglang. In 
the meeting it was decided that Suparman and Atep Suratep must 
be quickly evacuated.40
For the police evacuation was the easiest of preventive measures 
since deployment of police forces would not necessarily guarantee 
that violence could be avoided. Protection of life is the priority and 
as long as evacuation can be done, it would be done (chief of op-
erations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013). The 
aim of evacuation was also to ease the conflict which was escalat-
ing towards disturbances of security and public order, and because 
the police failed to convince the anti-Ahmadi group to resist from 
their dissolution attempts. Police also did not know the size of the 
crowd which would arrive. At some point the police even conclud-
ed the dissolution attempts would not happen because there was 
not enough support.41
Since the police assumed the dissolution plan was targeted at 
Suparman and Atep Suratep, to evacuate the two of them became 
the priority (chief of police intelligence, Cikeusik, interview, 16 Feb-
ruary 2013). The police assumed that if they were evacuated, the 
dissolution attempt would not take place or even if it would, the 
number of participants should not be great. Upon such calculations, 
the number of police officers deployed to the site was adjusted to 
the task — safeguarding Suparman’s house.
The evacuation was easily carried out. The police feared violat-
ing the rights if the evacuation had to be forced if Suparman and 
Atep Suratep refused to be evacuated upon the reasons presented to 
40Deputy Chief of Banten Police, “Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
41“Tujuh Polisi Divonis Tak Disiplin Terkait Bentrokan Cikeusik,” Republika, 
28 February 2011, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/breaking-news/ huku-
m/11/02/28/166575-tujuh-polisi-divonis-tak-disiplin-terkait-bentrokan-cikeusik 
(accessed 12 November 2012).
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them. Therefore, following the advice of Cikeusik intelligence unit, 
the police called Suparman’s wife with regard to her immigration 
status. The evacuation strategy ensured that Suparman and Atep 
Suratep would follow her to Cikeusik police headquarters (chief of 
police intelligence, Cikeusik, interview, 16 February 2013).
On 5 February 2011, at 03:00 am, the police carried out the 
evacuation by issuing summons to Suparman’s wife. Around 
10:00 am, they were moved to Pandeglang police headquarters. 
Earlier, around 08:00 am, Suparman told Atep to make a written 
request for protection to the Cikeusik police. Although written, 
the letter did not receive delivery confirmation. When Suparman 
arrived at Pandeglang police headquarters, the police explained: 
“Mr Suparman, don’t make prejudgements against us. You and 
your family are taken into security because tomorrow there will 
be an attack. Rather than life, better that property is sacrificed as 
it can be regained.”42
The police also informed the kiais that Suparman was already 
at Pandeglang police station (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik 
district police, interview, 16 February 2013). This, however, did not 
discourage them from their plans to dissolve Ahmadiyya. Feeling 
that the process of Suparman’s evacuation went smoothly, the po-
lice decreased the level of vigilance and assumed that the situation 
was conducive and that the masses would not turn up or if they did, 
they would come in lesser numbers.43
Perhaps the police was contented with the success in evacuat-
ing Suparman and Atep as with this action they had prioritized life 
over possessions. However, for Supaman and Atep this had lowered 
their trust in police commitment to protect citizens. Their lack of 
trust was reinforced by the absence of police to protect their homes 
when they were taken away. Therefore, they contacted other Ah-
madis to come and keep Suparman’s house safe.
42Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suparman,” p. 4.
43Deputy Chief of Banten Police, “Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
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Concerns of the Ahmadis over Suparman’s house were not with-
out a reason. They were caused not only by the lack of trust in the 
police, but also the frequent destruction of Ahmadi assets elsewhere 
and the general nonreaction of the security apparatus. Ahmadis 
who arrived to Cikeusik did not want the community possessions 
to be destroyed (WR, JAI missionary, interview, 22 December 2013).
Although Suparman was already evacuated and the police let 
the kiais know of it, they still tried to protect the house. On 5 Feb-
ruary 2011, around 12:00 am, Yayat Supriyatna with a team from 
Kominda reached the house of K.H. Ujang to inquire about the dis-
solution plans. They received an information that the plans would 
be carried out but only by the members of Cikeusik community. The 
police tried to convince K.H. Ujang to cancel the mobilization, but 
he refused.44
On 6 February 2011, at 03:00 am, Pandeglang police chief lead 
a ceremony at Pandeglang police headquarters on the pacification 
of the mob. Around 4:00 am, 33 members of Sabhara Polres Pan-
deglang unit (including 26 members of Dalmas, head of Sabhara, 
head of Turjawali, PS. Kanit I Dalmas, PS. Kasubnit I Dalmas, two 
vehicles of Dalmas, and one vehicle of Kasat) were deployed to Su-
parman’s house.45 Around 7:00 am, Suprapto, one of the criminal 
investigators, was also on the way to the house.46 At the same time, 
the Cikeusik police chief sent 18 officers to Suparman’s house. The 
police chief urged to evacuate the Ahmadis in case they were at the 
house.47
The police predictions regarding the situation on the day of the 
planned dissolution proved to be wrong. Evacuation had no effect. 
The anti-Ahmadi mob was approaching Cikeusik, gathering at the 
meeting point selected by K.H. Ujang. The expected 300 people who 
44Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Yayat Supriyatna,” pp. 3-4.
45Chief of Pandeglang regency police, “Lampiran Sprin Kapolres Pandeglang No: 
Sprin/286/II/2011” (Pandeglang: 4 February 2011).
46Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suprapto,” p. 3.
47Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Mad Supur,” p. 5
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would only come from Cikeusik,48 turned out to be thousands com-
ing from both Cikeusik and outside.
The mobilization was far beyond the predictions when the pres-
ence of the JAI group was noticed at Suparman’s house just ahead 
of the anti-Ahmadi gathering. Suprapto who earlier went to Supar-
man’s house knew of the Ahmadi group from Rasna, Suparman’s 
neighbour. His advice that they leave the house was not followed.49 
Suprapto finally reported the matter to the head of criminal inves-
tigations.
Soon, around 9:30 am, Hasan, the head of criminal investiga-
tions, approached the group in Suparman’s house. The following is 
the transcript from their (Hasan, Deden, and other Ahmadis) meet-
ing, obtained from the thesis of Rahman (2013: 43-46) and from the 
widely circulated video documentation:
Hasan (H): The point is this... We’re only anticipating as there’s a rumor that a 
few groups want to come here. My advice is that, yeah... I’m just hoping it 
[clash] won’t happen, that there won’t be casualties, nor material loss. 
Deden (D): I happen to be the head of Ahmadiyya National Security and I want-
ed to take a look at this location as I heard a group of people who wished to 
destroy the public order, wanted to ransack this house. They come under the 
guise of religious organizations and have some obscure intentions. We, the 
Ahmadis, as you know, when did we ever make any noise...? While they, you 
see, are shouting “Allahu akbar” while throwing stones, shouting “Allahu 
akbar” while setting fire.
H:  Talking of God, talking of God while rioting.
D:  So as the head of security, I arrived to check the situation, because we heard 
that Ahmadis here were abused, and that there was a conspiracy of organi-
zations disguised as religious ones with some village officials. What’s the 
problem? Why do they have to hate the Ahmadis? If they don’t want dia-
logue… but don’t burn, don’t curse, don’t expel, don’t pelt with stones. This 
is a country with law. Let the law be equally enforced. Moreover, there is the 
SKB of ministers, religious issues are the matter of the central government, 
not the local ones. [Here] it seems the village chief is involved, so is Muspika. 
Come on, this is not allowed. Suppose a tiger wants to attack Mr. Parman 
[Suparman], then you don’t shoot Mr. Parman but chase away the tiger.
H:  Speaking of Muspika... on Sunday there was a sermon session, we have ban-
ished them. Even them the GMC has indoctrinated, giving Muspika the goal 
48Deputy Chief of Banten Police, “Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
49Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Suprapto,” p. 3.
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to disband [Ahmadiyya] within one month, although it can’t be so... Finally, 
we held meetings with Mr. Parman, with the village officials, up to the dis-
trict level, four times it was, if I’m not mistaken. We even reported it to the 
Muspida, also Muspida has played their role here. We do not take sides, we 
are neither pro-Ahmadiyya nor pro-GMC. We, Kamtibmas and Harkamtib-
mas are the police. [We] hope nothing serious happens, like bloodshed, etc. 
The point is, what the GMC wanted was that Ahmadis mingled more with us 
[the community]. The most striking was that Mr. Suparman’s family didn’t 
want to pray on Fridays in the mosque with the congregation. It’s okay [if 
they don’t] on other days, but not on Friday.
D:  So, Sir, if we’re talking about faith… 
H:  Right...
D:  There are dozens of groups in the Islamic world, so in matters of faith, let’s 
have a dialogue, there are different interpretations. Like Shi‘as and Sunnis, 
bombing each other’s mosques. A mosque is bombed, next day another will 
be. Aren’t we ashamed of it, Sir? Is Indonesia really going to go this way? 
H:  This is being done by irresponsible people.
D:  That is why I’d be grateful if you could stand for all the groups. Because we 
are tired of lawlessness.
H:  We too don’t know which [group] is the most correct one [in matters of faith].
D:  So our arrival here is just to check, we have absolutely no intention of re-
venge. But if they start beating us, it’s impossible to remain silent. If we’re 
beaten, our cars are burned, should we be silent?
H:50 Well, Sir, I have monitored Cibaliung and Cigeulis. There are some peo-
ple coming on motorcycles and cars, we are anticipating so that they don’t 
precede us. We, the police, including Dalmas were deployed here, prediction 
was that when they see so many of us, they’d resign. This is anticipation, but 
we don’t know... fine if a few people come, but if hundreds or thousands? We 
are also humans, if it’s possible, yes, we’ll hold, but if not, then what can be 
done. For example, as for me, I will stay here, God knows if our heads were 
thrown by stones. Yes, humans, there’s little good in us, but a lot of evil. So 
we’ll see the situation, if it becomes dangerous, it’s better to escape. 
D:  But if you cannot, Sir, just let it. Let there be clashes. Won’t it be exciting? 
Well, are we expected to remain silent? So if indeed...
 Other Ahmadis: We are ready, every day we’ve been...
H:  I definitely hope this is not going to happen.
D:  But if you see that police can’t hold it, just let it, at worst there’ll be a blood-
bath. This is gonna be exciting, no?
After this, the head of criminal investigations left Suparman’s 
house and at the very same moment all police troops from Pande-
glang and Cikeusik arrived to the location. There were 59 police 
officers at the spot. The head of criminal investigations immediate-
50From this part, the dialogue can be followed in the video “Dialog Polisi dan 
Jemaat Ahmadiyah Sebelum Tragedi Cikeusik,” http://www. youtube.com/
watch?v=Ojex2RC1kY8 (accessed 12 November 2012).
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ly reported to the district police chief, chief of intelligence and the 
head of Samapta on Deden’s group.51 Police at the location began to 
watch the area around Suparman’s house and the bridge on Ciba-
liung river. Two Dalmas vehicles were also on standby in front of 
Suparman’s house, until one of them was moved to the bridge.52 The 
police also had secured a lance found at Suparman’s house (chief 
of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 15 February 
2013).
At the crucial moment, the most authorized person, the police 
chief of Pandeglang, was not present. This made the strategy of 
handling the conflict unclear. Information about the conflict and the 
dissolution also was not fully conveyed to the leadership, neither 
at the Pandeglang regency, nor at the Banten province level. Conse-
quently, there was no instruction from the leadership on how to deal 
with the unexpected situation.53 Due to this the stationing troops 
also were not well-directed.
Eventually, the district police chief decided to approach Deden. 
Yet this attempt failed as the anti-Ahmadi mob had crossed the 
bridge54 and forced evacuation was not possible as the police feared 
to be accused of rights violation. Dalmas troops on the bridge man-
aged to block the crowd, but the mob started to attack and curse 
them for protecting the Ahmadis. The police barricade was pene-
trated by the crowd which soon reached Suparman’s house (chief 
of intelligence unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 16 February 
2013).
The anti-Ahmadi mob which entered the yard of Suparman’s 
house was stopped by the Cikeusik police chief and a few other po-
lice officers. The police asked them to refrain, but the mob forced its 
51Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Mad Supur,” p. 3.
52Video “Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik.”
53“Polda Banten akui tak dapat Informasi Lengkap,” http://www.hukum on-
line.com/berita/baca/lt4d58ed8dd9b72/kapolda-banten-akui-tak-dapat-informa-
si-lengkap (accessed 12 November 2012).
54Police Investigation Report (BAP), “Saksi Mad Supur,” p. 3.
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way to Suparman’s house. When the fight broke out, police tried to 
intervene. As it did not succeed, the police left the scene when the 
anti-Ahmadi mob and the Ahmadis started to pelt each other with 
rocks.55
When the mob battered the Ahmadis and destroyed Suparman’s 
house, the police came back to the location.56 The police did not ap-
ply means of repression, but only evacuated the injured victims as 
they feared the mob would attack the police instead (Kadit III In-
telkam Polda Banten, interview, 23 May 2013).
Some of the Ahmadis who tried to escape were brought to the 
district office. Police later evacuated them.57 In such situation forced 
evacuation is what the police can do as the priority is protection of 
life (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 Feb-
ruary 2013).
According to police, there were no omissions in dealing with the 
conflict in Cikeusik. They have done as much as possible to mini-
mize the number of casualties and protected them with the Dalmas 
vehicle. The victims who died were the Ahmadis who ran to the 
river and the police did not know that any of them were attacked. 
The number of officers was limited and there were even less of them 
since they went to accompany the surviving victims. Police had to 
intervene when the bodies of dead victims were squashed. The po-
lice car was full of survivors and the police was trying to find anoth-
er vehicle to transport the bodies. Apart from carrying out the evac-
uation, the police was recording the incident with mobile phones in 
order to identify the perpetrators of violence (chief of intelligence 
unit, Cikeusik district police, interview, 16 February 2013).
Police forces from Banten were deployed to assist the personnel 
at the location. They consisted of 68 members of sabhara, nine of 
intelkam, 10 of reskrim , 100 of mobile brigade, eight of dokkes (doc-
55Video “Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik.”
56Video “Anti-Ahmadiyah: Violence in Cikeusik.”
57Police Investigation Report (BAP) II, “Saksi Hasanudin,” p. 4.
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tors and health), 13 of propam (profession and security). In addition 
to that, 30 members of Dalmas Cilegon, and 35 members of Dalmas 
Lebak were also deployed. Later, Banten police also deployed addi-
tional powers — 75 Brimob officers to identify and cope with wit-
nesses and perpetrators, and to collect evidence after the incident of 
violence.58
But when exactly were the Banten police forces deployed? In this 
research we came across discrepant data. Komnas HAM (National 
Commission for Human Rights) informs that around 9:30 am, 155 
troops from Banten police were brought as a follow up to the Pan-
denglang police chief’s report on the increasing anti-Ahmadi mass-
es approaching Suparman’s house. Pandeglang police chief who 
was then still on the way to Cikeusik, requested assistance through 
a phone call (Komnas HAM 2011: 64). But according to other infor-
mation, at 11:20 am, Banten police chief coordinated on a mobile phone 
with the Pandeglang police chief and ordered Karoops to back up the 
Pandeglang police with the personnel of Banten police. Then Karoops 
informed the chief of operations to come to Cikeusik as soon as possi-
ble. At 11:30 am, the Banten police chief, chief of Sabhara, chief of Re-
skrim, and the head of mobile brigade headed towards Cikeusik.59
Regardless of the above time difference in the arrival of support, 
one fact is indisputable: they arrived too late. It took about eight 
hours to reach Cikeusik from Serang. Why the troops were not de-
ployed well in advance? Because, according to police, when Supar-
man was at the police station, the police chief assumed the situation 
was under control. This assumption proved to be wrong. The situ-
ation changed when the anti-Ahmadi masses arrived in numbers 
far beyond the estimates. Apart from this, 17 Ahmadis arrived from 
outside of Cikeusik and did not want to be evacuated (Kadit III In-
telkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).
58Deputy Chief of Banten Police, “Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
59Deputy Chief of Banten Police, “Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
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In consequence, the Banten police specified four subject mat-
ters of legal proceedings: (a) enforcing punishment with regard to 
Government Regulation No. 2 of 2003 upon officers who acted with 
negligence while on duty; (b) enforcing punishment with regard to 
Police Regulation No. 7 of 2006 on the police code of ethics; (c) en-
forcing punishment upon police officers who committed criminal 
violations in handling the Cikeusik conflict; (d) enforcing punish-
ment upon the civilians who committed criminal acts. The police 
also set as suspects three non-Ahmadi residents and one member of 
Ahmadiyya (Komnas HAM 2011: 76-78).
Police Knowledge
Since the fall of the New Order, the democratic forms of policing 
have been contained in regulations, for example in the Police Chief 
Regulation No. 8 of 2009. The regulation includes the matter of im-
plementation of the principles and standards of human rights in 
the duties of Indonesian police. To what extent did the police know 
these and other rules? 
One of the police informants said he did not know of this regula-
tion. Yet he stated that the police adhered to the principles of human 
rights and the presumption of innocence, and equality before the 
law. He also added, “even the best regulations are situational; it’s 
easy to make regulations, but implementing them is not, results are 
polemical” (chief of intelligence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 
13 February 2013).
Another informant revealed he did not know anything about 
the 2009 regulation. Yet he asserted that “in handling of ethno-reli-
gious conflicts, human rights principles must be upheld, regardless 
of one’s beliefs. That Ahmadis are misguided gives no right to kill 
them. The police has its duties and principles” (chief of operations 
unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013).
To what extent does the police know the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on 
abuse of religion and/or blasphemy (which has often been referred 
to by the anti-Ahmadi party to justify their actions)? The police who 
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was handling the Cikeusik case generally did not know this law. 
But when asked about the blasphemy and abuse of religion, one 
informant said that the teachings of Ahmadiyya were an example of 
blasphemy, because, he said, Ahmadis believed that Mirza Ghulam 
Ahmad was a prophet and Tazkirah was their holy scripture (Kadit 
III Intelkam Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).
According to the police, the sectarian conflict broke out since the 
local community was not happy with the presence of Ahmadis in 
Kampung Peundeuy of Umbulan village in Cikeusik.60 Apart from 
this, a group of kiais believed that Suparman did not obey the agree-
ment he signed earlier. The conflict erupted because both the Ah-
madis and the anti-Ahmadi group differently interpreted the 2008 
SKB of the three ministers. For the Ahmadis the SKB did not ban 
the presence of Ahmadiyya, while for their opponents it prohibited 
both its activities and existence (chief of intelligence unit, Pande-
glang police, interview, 13 February 2013).
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
The police action was inappropriate in dealing with the conflict 
in Cikeusik. The police did not apply the existing legal instruments 
and the internal police instruments. Police officers did not adhere to 
the regulations such as the Police Chief Regulation No. 16 of 2006 
on guidelines of controlling masses, the Police Chief Regulation No. 
1 of 2009 on the use of force, and Fixed Procedure No. 1 of 2010 on 
prevention of disorder.61
Nevertheless, on 4 February 2011, the police chief of Pandeglang, 
Alex Fauzi Rasad, issued an order to 33 officers of Sabhara/ Dalmas 
(order Sprin/286/II/2011) to protect the house and property of Su-
parman.62 On 5 February 2011, the district police chief also issued an 
60Police Investigation Report (BAP) I, “Saksi Hasanudin,” pp. 2-5.
61Deputy Chief of Banten Police,“Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
62Pandeglang district police chief, “Surat Perintah Nomor: Sprin/286/ II/2011” 
(Pandeglang: 4 February 2011).
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order (Sprin/02/II/2011) to 18 police officers to protect Suparman’s 
house.63
In dealing with the Cikeusik conflict, the police was avoiding law 
enforcement; instead, it focused on communication with the parties 
to the conflict. The police also saw the conflict through the lens of 
existing regulations (Kadit III Intelkam Polda Banten, interview, 23 
May 2013). Yet, at the end, when the conflict escalated to violence, 
the police enforced the law in settling the issue.
According to the police, the conflict regarding Ahmadiyya could 
not be handled through dialogue and consultations, since both the 
Ahmadis and their opponents firmly stuck to their respective views. 
The solution would be in government regulations, however the ex-
isting ones were not explicit enough. The SKB of three ministers can 
be variously interpreted by the conflicting parties. The police is only 
authorized to maintain security and order, and to oversee the exist-
ing regulations (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, inter-
view, 13 February 2013).
Police Culture
An informant whom we asked about democracy, human rights, 
and tolerance, said he did not understand those things. However, he 
added that the police nowadays could not act arbitrarily. Every citi-
zen has an equal right to protection. He also said that the role of the 
police was to maintain security and order by operating in a neutral 
manner (chief of intelligence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 15 
February 2013).
One of the police informants admitted that conflicts involving 
religion were more sensitive and needed to be handled very careful-
ly. In case of mishandling, the police could be punished by the state 
and public (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 
2013). Despite this, the conflict in Cikeusik was handled like any 
other conflict where applied should be the measures of pre-emptive 
63Cikeusik sub-district police chief, “Surat Perintah Nomor: Sprin/02/ II/2011” 
(Cikeusik: 5 February 2011).
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approach, prevention, repression, law enforcement and restoration. 
All these except for repression were employed by the police in the 
Cikeusik conflict (chief of operations unit, Pandeglang police, inter-
view, 13 February 2013).
The kiais who opposed the presence of Ahmadis in Cikeusik 
claimed that they defended the Sunni community. To what extent 
was the police influenced by this declaration? One of the police in-
formants admitted that he was a Sunni. However, as a policeman, he 
said, he ought to act in a neutral way. If a majority group suppress-
es a minority, the police would subject them to existing rules. The 
function of the police is to maintain order in accordance with the 
rules, not to determine whether beliefs are right or wrong (Kadit III 
Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).
Is it possible that in the city known as a city of “a thousand re-
ligious scholars” and “a million santris” can exist groups who are 
considered heretical? Police informant perceived this as “very un-
likely”. It is not easy to find in Pandeglang community leaders or 
ulama whose views are not narrow. If a minority wants to live in Pan-
deglang, they must carry out their religious activities outside Pande-
glang. If not, they could be expelled like Ahmadis and the followers 
of Ustad Juned whose teachings included skipping Friday prayers 
(Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).
Local Politics 
The conflict in Cikeusik became a political commodity during 
Pandeglang local elections in 2010. In his campaign, one of the can-
didates for the regent’s office promised that if elected, he would dis-
band the Ahmadi community in Cikeusik. He also added that he 
was the only candidate capable of doing this (member of Ahmadi-
yya Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 2013).
Apart from this, during Umbulan village chief election, all candi-
dates promised to disband Ahmadiyya. Later, after the win, the cho-
sen candidate, Johar, continued to provoke the dissolution of Ah-
madiyya (member of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 2013).
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Pronouncements of the local governments with regard to the at-
tack on Ahmadiyya were also very partisan. In line with the views 
of the anti-Ahmadi kiais, the governor of Banten, Ratu Atut Chosi-
yah, expressed her hopes that Ahmadis would return to the true 
teachings of Islam.64 She and the regent of Pandenglang have even 
issued bans on Ahmadiyya.65
Public Opinion
The dynamics of the conflict in Cikeusik and its relation to the at-
titude of administrations cannot be separated from the public opin-
ion. The public opinion with regard to Ahmadiyya was shaped by 
the MUI, Islamic organisations (NU, Muhammadiyah etc.), anti-Ah-
madi groups, NGOs, and mass-media.
The attitude of MUI Cikeusik towards Ahmadis was not differ-
ent from the central MUI which saw them as “misguided and de-
viationist”. MUI Cikeusik was also trying to persuade Suparman 
and his community to abandon their beliefs. Apart from this, the 
MUI Cikeusik also called the local residents not to follow the teach-
ings of Ahmadiyya. The appeal of the MUI Cikeusik to disband the 
Ahmadiyya was also conveyed to the local community leaders and 
ulama (MUI Cikeusik chairman, interview, 27 February 2013).
With regard to religious affairs, the police informant admitted 
they often requested the feedback from the MUI (chief of intelli-
gence unit, Pandeglang police, interview, 13 February 2013). Anoth-
er informant said that although the MUI was the main reference for 
dealing with conflicts related to Ahmadiyya, the police acted in a 
neutral way to protect all Indonesian citizens (chief of intelligence 
64“Gubernur: Semoga Jemaah Ahmadiyah Insaf,” kompas.com, http://nasional.
kompas.com/read/2011/02/07/22074364/Gubernur.Semoga.Jemaah.Ahmadiyah.
Insaf (access 15 October 2012).
65See Banten governor’s ordinance No. 5 of 2011, “Larangan Aktivitas Penga-
nut, Anggota, dan/atau Anggota Pengurus Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) di 
Wilayah Propinsi Banten” (Serang: Banten governor, 1 March 2011). See also Pande-
glang regent’s ordinance No. 5 of 2011, “Larangan Aktivitas Ahmadiyah di Kabupat-
en Pandeglang” (Pandeglang: Pandeglang regent, 21 February 2011).
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unit, Cikeusik police, interview, 15 February 2013). The MUI is con-
sidered an institution authorized to determine whether a belief is 
right or wrong, since it comprises ulama who know the matters of re-
ligion (Kadit III Intelkam of Banten police, interview, 23 May 2013).
Beside the MUI Cikeusik, FKUB Pandeglang was also influential 
in the conflict over the presence of Ahmadiyya. FKUB Pandeglang 
cooperated with the MUI, the prosecutor and the Pandeglang police 
in providing “guidance” to the members of Ahmadiyya in the re-
gion by, for example, carrying out a religious dialogue (FKUB mem-
ber, interview, 11 February 2013).
Although in institutional terms the NU was not involved in the at-
tacks against the Cikeusik Ahmadis, some of the NU ulama followed 
K.H. Ujang’s call to dissolve Ahmadiyya. NU was involved more in 
“handling the Ahmadiyya case” in Kampung Cisereh of Cisata district. 
There, NU collaborated with the MUI in counselling attempts to make 
the members of Ahmadiyya repent (Komnas HAM 2011: 62-63).
However, not all ulama in Cikeusik agreed with the dissolution. 
One of them, who is also the son of MUI Pandeglang chairman, ad-
mitted that he did not agree with the attempts to dissolve Ahmadi-
yya, especially by means of violence. “The matters of faith are pri-
vate; one is not entitled to interfere with other people’s beliefs”, he 
said (interview, 14 February 2013). Unfortunately, such voices were 
not audible when the conflict started. The Cikeusik community 
heard much more about alleged deviations and the need to disband 
the Ahmadiyya Cikeusik.
In the beginnings of the conflict there was no media coverage. Yet 
it became huge when the conflict escalated into violence. The media 
reporting was polarized, some referred to the anti-Ahmadi incident 
as “clashes”, some as “attack”.66 Each had grounds: for example 
“clashes” were based on the fact that both sides used violence.
66Andreas Harsono, “Indonesia’s Religious Violence: The Reluctance of Report-
ers to Tell the Story,” http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/16/ indonesia-s-reli-
gious-violence-reluctance-reporters-tell-story (accessed 15 October 2013).
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Different ways of reporting the incident had an impact on the 
attitudes of both the public and the administration. For example, 
when it was reported as “clashes”, the public would view it as in-
evitable since both parties to the conflict used violence. The term 
“clashes” was also employed during the court proceedings in the 
Cikeusik case.
Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict
The conflict over the presence of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik was 
occurring repeatedly between 1992 and 2011. The mass mobilization 
of 2011, however, was unprecedented. According to the Ahmadis 
recurrence of the conflict was due to resentments of some parties 
within the public and the government over the presence of Ahmadi-
yya in Cikeusik (member of Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, interview, 11 May 
2013).
There is no definite information about the police handling of the 
Ahmadiyya-related conflict in 1992. But at the beginnings of the 
2011 conflict, the police were able to inhibit it when the mobilization 
took place under the banner of GMC lead by Kiai Muhammad. At 
the time, the police has at least successfully channelled the GMC’s 
demand through a forum at Muspida, which resulted in a written 
agreement of both conflicting parties. When the conflict began to 
involve the masses from outside Cikeusik, that is when the anti-Ah-
madi mobilization was led by K.H. Ujang on 6 February 2011, the 
police was only able to secure Suparman, his wife, child and Atep 
Suratep, and failed to impede the mobilization which led to the 
deaths of three Ahmadis.
Police basically followed the development of the conflict, they 
were always involved in the meetings related to Ahmadiyya. An 
informant from the MUI mentioned that when the MUI met the lo-
cal ulama to discuss Ahmadiyya Cikeusik, the police were there as 
well (AM, interview, 27 February 2013). In addition to following the 
MUI meetings, the police also meet and coordinated with the local 
authorities to discuss the issue of Ahmadiyya, for example through 
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the Muspika and Muspida (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik po-
lice, interview, 15 February 2013).
According to Ahmadis, the police action was very inadequate. 
They claimed the police tended to side with the anti-Ahmadi group, 
which was proven by the police failure to prevent violence. Short-
age in personnel could not be considered the reason. Even the police 
who were guarding the scene were not serious in blocking the mob. 
Ahmadis also said that the police evacuated the victims only after 
the latter were battered (member of Ahmadi Cikeusik, interview, 11 
May 2013).
But the disappointment over police performance was also ex-
pressed by the anti-Ahmadi group. One of the Umbulan village res-
idents who confessed he agreed with the dissolution of Ahmadiyya, 
said the police were too concerned about the Ahmadis. The police 
even banned the dissolution plan, and that was why the ulama did 
not inform them about it (R, interview, 28 February 2013).
The main actors behind the mass mobilization against Ahmadi-
yya were the ulama, the Umbulan village chief, jawara and students 
of religious schools, who occupy upper positions in the Cikeusik 
social stratification. They used their influence to garner support and 
mass mobilization for the incident of 6 February 2011. The police 
had already known some of them personally, especially those from 
the GMC (chief of intelligence unit, Cikeusik police, interview, 13 
February 2013). However, there were no institutional relations be-
tween the police and the anti-Ahmadi group in Cikeusik.
Law enforcement efforts were undertaken by the police after the 
incident. Police arrested several people and examined witnesses. 
After that, all the police files were transferred to the Banten High 
Court. The court found several members of the anti-Ahmadi move-
ment guilty: K.H. Ujang Muhamad Arif (6 months imprisonment), 
Kiai Endang (6 months imprisonment), K.H. Muhamad Munir (6 
months imprisonment), Idris (5 months and 15 days imprisonment), 
Muhamad (6 months imprisonment), Ujang (6 months imprison-
ment), Saad Baharudin (6 months imprisonment), Adam Damini 
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(6 months imprisonment), Yusuf Abidin (6 months imprisonment), 
Yusri (6 months imprisonment), Muhamad Rohidin (6 months im-
prisonment), and Dani (3 months imprisonment and court fee of 
IDR 2,000). From the Ahmadiyya side the court sentenced Deden 
Sujana to 6 months in prison minus the arrest period. The police also 
cracked down on its own members who did not perform their du-
ties properly, for example by degrading them, delaying promotions 
and even by taking some into custody.67
Conclusions
The anti-Ahmadiyya violence in Cikeusik is an example of failed 
policing of sectarian conflicts. Failure does not indicate that the po-
lice did not work, because the police made preemptive and preven-
tive efforts before the incident took place. The failure resulted from 
inappropriate policing strategy which even did not follow the basic 
regulations such as the Police Chief Regulation No. 9 of 2008 on han-
dling demonstrations, the Police Chief Regulation No. 16 of 2006 on 
guidelines of controlling masses, the Police Chief Regulation No. 1 
of 2009 on the use of force, and the Fixed Procedure No. 1 of 2010 on 
prevention of disorder.
When the conflict surfaced, the police already knew it was a 
threat to order and security. The police chose to communicate with 
Ahmadiyya and the anti-Ahmadi group for the sake of not letting, 
to borrow the police language, the AG (Ancaman Gangguan, “threat 
of disturbance”) turn into the GN (Gangguan Nyata, “real distur-
bance”). Police urged the warring parties to maintain order and se-
curity, and not to breach the law. The police also approached both 
parties and facilitated a dialogue between them. But efforts still did 
not impede the conflict.
The police knew that the anti-Ahmadi group was going to carry 
out their dissolution plan unilaterally, without reporting it to the 
67Deputy Chief of Banten Police,“Kajian Penanganan Kejadian di Cikeusik Kab. 
Pandeglang.”
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police or other government representatives. Anticipating this, the 
police chose to maintain communication with them, as it did in the 
beginnings of the conflict. The police intelligence gathered informa-
tion, called and approached the leaders of the anti-Ahmadi group in 
order to convince them to cancel the dissolution plans. But here the 
police failed. It also failed in estimating the number of the group’s 
supporters. 
The indecisive police persuasion allowed the opponents of Ah-
madiyya to carry out the dissolution. When the mob was approach-
ing, there were no explicit warnings or threats from the side of the 
police. According to the Police Chief Regulation No. 9 of 2008 on 
handling demonstrations, the police could use force to stop the dis-
solution activities, as they were not reported and the participants 
did not follow police advice. It could be that the police were afraid 
to face the anti-Ahmadi mob and became overly cautious.
That situation made the police choose a different strategy while 
dealing with the Ahmadiyya. Police decided to evacuate the key 
Ahmadiyya Cikeusik figures, Suparman and Atep Suratep. The suc-
cessful evacuation influenced the police estimates with regard to the 
dissolution plans, they assumed the anti-Ahmadi masses would not 
show up, or if they did, the numbers would not be huge since Su-
parman was already absent. These predictions affected the number 
and tasks of the police personnel deployed. Only 59 officers were 
assigned to protect Suparman’s house and evacuate the members of 
Ahmadiyya Cikeusik who could still be at the site.
The police apparently was not aware that the parties to the con-
flict did not trust in its ability to handle it. To the anti-Ahmadi group 
Suparman’s evacuation did not guarantee that he would “repent” 
or that Ahmadiyya Cikeusik would be disbanded. Dissolution was 
still carried out and with a huge mass mobilization. On the other 
hand, to the Ahmadis, the police in its attempts to protect Supar-
man’s house did not guarantee it would remain undamaged. The 
Ahmadis from Cikeusik and from outside were requested to guard 
the house which was a JAI asset. 
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Policing strategies were not the best and the lack of trust towards 
the police resulted in wrong predictions regarding the planned dis-
solution. Warring parties ultimately chose their own ways of resolv-
ing the conflict. The conflict escalated into violence. In accordance 
with the Police Chief Regulation No. 1 of 2009 on the use of force, 
and the Fixed Procedure No. 1 of 2010 on prevention of disorder, 
the police could use repression to prevent the escalation. Fearing 
attacks from the anti-Ahmadi mob, the police only evacuated the 
casualties and gave a verbal warning to the masses.
Policing action on the day of dissolution was also far from ade-
quate because the police chiefs, in this case the police chief of Pan-
deglang and the police chief of Banten province, were not present 
at the location. The absence of leadership made it unclear who and 
how should take responsibility for handling the conflict. In addi-
tion, the information about the conflict and dissolution was not fully 
conveyed to the leadership. Consequently, there were no instruc-
tions on how to deal with the situation when it exceeded the police 
expectations. It also resulted in inaccurate stationing of troops, not 
in line with the Police Chief Regulation No. 16 of 2006 on guidelines 
of controlling masses.
Policing action in Cikeusik did not run properly also because 
of external influences of religious leaders and local government 
officials. The religious and community leaders of anti-Ahmadiyya 
views together with the Umbulan village chief provoked and mo-
bilized citizens to disband the group. In fact, they gave false infor-
mation to the police regarding the dissolution plans. Although there 
were leaders and officials who opposed the plans to disband Ah-
madiyya, their voices were not heard since the public opinion was 
more inclined to the anti-Ahmadi sentiments. The police was left 
alone and increasingly burdened by the conflict. 
The model of policing in Cikeusik could not be used in dealing 
with sectarian conflicts in other places. Even if the police predic-
tions with regard to the dissolution were correct, the evacuation of 
the targeted group would not necessarily impede the conflict. Evac-
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uation strategy in Cikeusik showed that it did not guarantee the 
conflict would not escalate into violence. Evacuation is not a neutral 
strategy for conflict resolution and is insensitive to the guarantees of 
religious freedom and protection from fear.
In order to prevent the Cikeusik incident from occurring again, 
the police must take several steps. First, it has to build public trust. 
The police must convince the public that it maintains the order and 
security in accordance with the principle of neutrality and existing 
law. The police must also convince the members of the society that 
without their cooperation in dealing with conflicts it is impossible to 
keep peace and security.
Second, the police should improve the procedures of handling 
sectarian conflicts, both on the pre-emptive and preventive levels as 
well as on the level of law enforcement. This can be settled by a spe-
cial police chief regulation or a fixed procedure of handling religious 
conflicts. The existing regulations and procedures indeed control 
the police mechanisms of dealing with conflicts. But when confront-
ed with a religious conflict, the police is too cautious in handling it. 
This caution can have negative effects: the police may fear to deal 
with the conflict. With the special regulation with regard to religious 
conflicts, the negative effects of police caution could be reduced. The 
regulation and the fixed procedure should be supported by new leg-
islation on religious conflicts in Indonesia. There should be, for ex-
ample, laws on the matter of hate speech. Religious violence occurs 
when it is preceded by hate speech. The police should encourage the 
House of Representatives (DPR) to formulate and draft such law.***
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THE CASE OF ANTI-SHI‘A IN 
SAMPANG, MADURA
Foreword
Sampang regency on the island of Madura, East Java, has re-
ceived an increased national and international coverage following 
several incidents of conflict between the Sunni majority and a small 
local Shi‘a community. Two of the incidents which attracted huge 
attention took place on 29 December 2011 and 26 August 2012. But 
the discord between the two groups has lasted longer, at least since 
2006. The two incidents of this sectarian, intra-Muslim conflict, 
which took place in Omben and Karang Penang districts of Sam-
pang, were of particular importance since they lead to loss of life, 
left dozens of houses burnt, and resulted in expulsion of Shi‘a resi-
dents from their hometown. 
The findings of this research show that the policing process in 
Sampang went through various stages of the long-lasting conflict. 
Judging from its results, however, the policing was not always suc-
cessful. Fatalities indicate that the police failed to prevent the ten-
sions from escalating into violence.
In this chapter, two matters are discussed: the Sunni-Shi‘a sectar-
ian conflict in Sampang and the aspects of policing of this conflict. 
The aspects of policing are presented one by one, and preceded by a 
101
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts102
short description of the formation and development of the conflict. 
The chapter ends with several conclusions.
A Glimpse at Religious Demography in Sampang 
Sampang is located on the island of Madura, East Java, 110 km 
from Surabaya, the capital of East Java. The district consists of four-
teen sub-districts. According to the 2010 census, the total population 
amounted to 877,772 people. 
The Sunni-Shi‘a conflict discussed here occurred in two sub-dis-
tricts: Omben, with population of 77,396, and Karang Penang, with 
population of 66,639. Both sub-districts are situated in the western 
part of Sampang. All inhabitants of these sub-districts are Muslims, 
belonging to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), just like most of the residents 
of Sampang and of Madura in general.1
The most violent manifestation of the conflict unfolded in two 
villages: Karang Gayam (Omben) and Blu’uran (Karang Penang). 
In 2011, the population of Blu’uran was 14,664, and of Karang 
Gayam was 5,158. Special attention needs to be given to two neigh-
bourhoods in these villages, namely Nangkernang (Karang Gayam, 
Omben) and Gading Laok (Blu’uran, Karang Penang). Neither of 
the villages can be reached by a paved road. When the rainy sea-
son arrives, visiting them is even more difficult because of slip-
pery walkways.
Like other sub-districts of Indonesia, Omben and Karang Penang 
have their police stations in the rank of sub-district police; altogeth-
er they were around two dozen officers stationed here, who were 
led by a sub-district police chief. 
Sunni-Shi‘a Conflict in Sampang
The communities of Omben and Karang Penang, as the Sam-
pang society in general, are characterised by a high social cohesion. 
Agriculture is the main economic activity in both sub-districts.
1BPS Sampang, Sampang dalam Angka 2012, p. 84.
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There is no industry.2 The institution of gerjih functions on the 
family and village level as a self-help and solidarity mechanism. 
Many extended families form housing estates, taneyan lanjhang, 
with a cattle enclosure and surrounded by agricultural lands where 
they grow corn, chilli, rice, or tobacco, depending on the season and 
soil. The buildings which stand out are the musalas, mosques and 
religious schools. Kiais have much social influence due to their roles 
in religious rituals such as the remembrance of the Prophet’s birth-
day, and in community life in general. Status is an important factor, 
especially in the kiais relation to their students, where it assumes a 
hierarchical order, similar to a patron-client relationship. Kiais are 
associated in various organizations such as NU, MUI, Consultation 
Body of the Ulama of Madurese Boarding Schools (Badan Musy-
awarah Ulama se-Madura, BASSRA), and Ulama Consultation Fo-
rum (Forum Musyawarah Ulama, FMU).
The above indicates that there are numerous tools of social con-
trol which originate both from the local tradition and religion, and 
which sustain and legitimize the social cohesion. However, the ef-
forts to sustain the tradition and high social cohesion also contain 
disintegration features, as they often assume aggressive form, such 
as carok. Persons who openly transgress the norms and traditions 
commit tengkah and can be subject to violence in line with the cus-
tomary law of Sampang.
The emergence of Shi‘as in Sampang, and the conflict with the 
Sunni majority which followed, must be seen in the context of a very 
traditional and norms-conscious society. Policing of the Sunni-Shi‘a 
conflict and constraints met by the police have to be understood 
in relation to the social background of Sampang, and especially of 
Omben and Karang Penang.
Police, as a state institution, often seeks the help of kiais because 
of their influence and access to the society. The police needs kiais in 
order to maintain security and order, to reduce crime, and to social-
2BPS Sampang, Sampang dalam Angka 2012, p. 221.
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts104
ize police activities. The police also see the role of kiais as informal 
community leaders. Cooperation with them is considered as having 
a direct impact on the network of their followers. “If a kiai says so, 
usually the situation is quickly resolved” — thus spoke upon one 
occasion Kombes Kadarusman, officer of East Java province police.3
In other words, kiais are the partners of police in maintaining 
security and public order. However, when the kiais as a social class 
join one of the parties to the conflict, the peacekeeping activities of 
the police, which are the most responsible for it among all state in-
stitutions, can be terminated or hindered.
In the following part, the synopsis of the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict is 
divided into three periods.
Sunni-Shi‘a Conflict 1980-2003
In the 1980s, Makmun, a kiai from Omben, Sampang, became at-
tracted to Shi‘a Islam which was then popular because of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s 1979 Revolution in Iran which overthrew the Shah’s 
dictatorship. Has Kiai Makmun become a Shi‘a himself? This is still 
disputed. However, those who consider him so, like neighbours, 
family and close friends, agree he did not practice Shi‘a Islam open-
ly, nor did he preach it to the community, except for his own children 
of whom some followed him. Kiai Makmun had several daughters 
and sons, among them Iklil al-Milal, Ali Murtado alias Tajul Muluk 
(born 1973), and Rois al-Hukama.
In the end of 1980s, Kiai Makmun sent two of his sons, Tajul Mu-
luk and Rois al-Hukama to study at the Yayasan Pesantren Islam 
(YAPI), a religious boarding school in Bangil, Pasuruan. Founded 
in 1976, it is known as an influential Shi‘a educational institution 
(Zulkifli 2009: 62). Tajul Muluk studied at YAPI from 1987 until 
3Delivered during a discussion entitled “The Role of the Police and Civil Society 
in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the Center for the Study of Religion 
and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center 
for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Sura-
baya, 27 February 2013.
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1991. This was not accepted by some members of Kiai Makmun’s 
extended family, particularly Kiai Karrar, who opposed the boys be-
ing sent to the Shi‘a boarding school and was trying to make them 
come back to Madura and study at his own madrasah. Kiai Karrar is 
Tajul Muluk’s uncle. 
Finally, having graduated from YAPI, Tajul Muluk spent a few 
months of 1993 at Kiai Karrar’s school. He was later sent to Saudi 
Arabia to learn Sunni Islam, but instead he became a laborer. In the 
meantime he would learn from the Saudi Arabian Shi‘a scholars, 
especially from Muhammad Liwa’ Mahdi in Qatif (Tajul Muluk, in-
terview, 27 March 2013).
In 1999, Tajul Muluk returned from Saudi Arabia to Omben. His 
younger brother assisted him in managing their father’s madrasah. 
He began to preach the Shi‘a teachings to the members of his fami-
ly and neighbours. But beside this, he also began to perceive some 
local practices as not right. In his community, he became a kind of 
reformer of social-religious affairs. He encouraged the community 
to protect livestock from thieves by organizing patrols. With his par-
ents and siblings, he stressed the importance of education and of 
making savings in order that families could afford to educate their 
children to the level as high as possible and were not forced to have 
them taught at madrasahs by incompetent clerics who themselves 
were “only madrasah graduates” (Tajul Muluk, interview, 27 March 
2013).
There is a cultural obligation among all families of Sampang to 
celebrate maulid or the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. It is an 
honor for a family to host these celebrations. Food is prepared for 
everyone who arrives, with chicken, goat or beef besides rice and 
other side dishes. The maulid tradition has become a communal 
feast, which for the whole month moves from one house to another. 
A kiai would be invited with his wife and children, and would give 
a speech or sermon on religion. When the celebration is over, the 
hosts would give an envelope with money to the kiai. The amount 
varies depending on the financial situation, but it is usually be-
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tween IDR 150,000 and IDR 500,000. Envelopes with lesser amounts 
are also given to kiai’s wife and children. Sometimes other visitors 
too come to shake hands with the kiai and present him an envelope 
containing money.4
In addition to the institutionalized religious practice, there is also 
a material aspect of maulid celebration. Or, as observed by a former 
police officer from Sampang police, there was an economic side in 
the controversy between Tajul Muluk and Omben kiais. It is not only 
during the maulid celebrations that the residents hand over money 
to kiais; instead, this also happens on the occasions when one leaves 
Madura to work on Java or elsewhere (chief of intelligence unit, 
Sampang police, interview, 7 February 2013). Therefrom comes the 
sarcastically-tinted expression that the month of maulid is the har-
vest period for the Sampangs, and generally for the Madura kiais. It 
is not seldom that a family has to sell livestock, pawn valuables or 
is in debt only because they must host the maulid feast. Tajul Muluk 
claimed that money should not be given to kiais during maulid, but 
a kiai ought to give money to the poor. Apart from this, which was 
not less important, Tajul introduced a new custom that maulid cele-
bration is to be held once and at one place — at the mosque. This, ac-
cording to him, would remove the burden from families and would 
allow them to save more for their children’s education (interview, 
27 March 2013).
Sunni-Shi‘a Conflict 2004-2010
Since 2004, Tajul has been more openly introducing Shi‘a teach-
ings and people from outside the immediate family began to join his 
4In other Indonesian Muslim communities outside Madura, as in mainland Java, 
maulid celebrations from house to house did not become a tradition. It is celebrated 
once, at a mosque, and it is attended by all residents. A kiai would deliver a lecture 
and would receive a honorarium. However, in some places in Aceh, it looks similar to 
Madura: in one day we can visit several maulid celebrations and at each lunch would 
be served. In the Christian community Christmas celebration is usually also held at 
one place, except for certain Christian communities, like in Tentena, Poso, Central 
Sulawesi, where Christmas takes place throughout December and its celebrations are 
held from house to house, with eating, singing, and listening to pastor’s sermons.
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group. Slowly but surely, the number of followers was increasing: 
from 30 families in 2004, it became 120 families in 2011. In the opin-
ion of those who were against him, the expansion of the group was 
very fast, and if not stopped it would even become faster. Tajul and 
his followers were sending their children to Shi‘a boarding schools 
in the East and Central Java. There were more and more students 
who in the future could preach their parents’ religious legacy. Apart 
from this, the mosque was refurbished and enlarged, and a learning 
room was added. This arose protests from Tajul’s opponents. Sev-
eral times the construction materials for the mosque were blocked 
by them at the entrance to Nangkernang neighbourhood of Karang 
Gayam. Those incidents had to be resolved through the police in-
tervention.
Several kiais, including Kiai Karrar, began to oppose Tajul and 
the discord led to an open conflict. Meetings were held between Ta-
jul and kiais who opposed him and accused him of deviationist un-
derstanding of religion. Attempts to resolve the conflict within the 
extended family of Kiai Makmun and Kiai Karrar, both of whom are 
known as descendants of Batu Ampar, were unsuccessful. A bigger 
conflict was avoided since some of Tajul’s opponents respected and 
revered Kiai Makmun, a charismatic religious leader, scholar, and 
an important member of the kiais group in Sampang. One of Kiai 
Makmun’s students, who now himself is a kiai and a NU Sampang 
figure, said, “if it were allowed to worship anyone else than Allah, 
people would worship Kiai Makmun” (Kiai Abdul Mannan, inter-
view, 30 April 2013).
Kiai Makmun died in 2006, and the conflict entered a new phase 
since Tajul not only lost a father but also a protector. He wanted 
to connect maulid with the celebration of the 40th day after his fa-
ther’s death. He also wished to invite several kiais and Shi‘a habaib 
from Bangkalan and Sumenep, outside of Sampang. A rumor was 
spread that twelve Shi‘a preachers from Kuwait would arrive for 
Tajul Muluk’s maulid celebration. This almost lead to clashes when 
the followers of Tajul and their opponents got into an argument and 
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reached for sticks and machetes. The police intervened and in order 
to prevent violence, the maulid celebration was cancelled (Tajul Mu-
luk, interview, 1 May 2013).
Kiai Karrar began to expand the conflict by bringing it to the wid-
er forum of Madurese ulama, including the ones of BASSRA. On 20 
February 2006, several ulama from four regencies of Madura invited 
Tajul to meet them. Kiais wished to inquire about the allegations that 
he was spreading the Shi‘a teachings which they considered heretical. 
Tajul was requested to leave Shi‘a Islam for Sunnism. It was agreed 
that he would deliver a response within a week, and it was hoped that 
in his response he would “revert” to Sunni Islam. Later, on 26 Febru-
ary, when Tajul did not respond, the FMU of Pamekasan and Sampang 
held a meeting in Pamekasan. Tajul was again requested to leave Shi‘a 
teachings and revert to Sunni Islam “in order to avoid the physical 
clashes and the clash of understandings.” At the same time, the kiais 
announced that Tajul was still refusing to accept their demands. In a 
statement given after the meeting, they requested the MUI of Madura 
to issue a fatwa on the danger of deviationists groups, “including the 
Shi‘a.” Several members of the police, among them the police chief of 
Omben, were present to supervise the meeting (police chief of Omben, 
interview, 7 February 2013; Tajul Muluk, interview, 1 May 2013). 
Tensions rose again in 2009. On 26 October, the local government, 
MUI Sampang, the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
representatives of NU and Bakorpakem, met together in Sampang. 
The aim of the meeting was to find the solution to the Shi‘a problem 
in Karang Gayam, Omben. In a statement issued after the meeting, 
Tajul was asked to stop the Shi‘a worship and missionary activities. 
It was mentioned that Tajul would approve the request, and was 
willing to face the legal consequences had he continued the Shi‘a 
practice. Bakorpakem, MUI, and NU would monitor and supervise 
the Shi‘a followers. They also promised to maintain order when Ta-
jul would fulfil their demands.
Tajul was requested to sign the “agreement”. The head of the 
MUI, the head of the NU, the head of the local office of the Ministry 
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of Religious Affairs, the head of the local government, the head of 
Bakesbangpol, and a number of ulama all signed it too as witnesses.5
These meetings were intended to suppress Tajul and his fol-
lowers. It is interesting to see that the parties who pressurized him 
seemed to believe that this kind of approach would succeed. Even 
more interesting is that the signed agreement became the basis for 
and legitimization of the confrontation which took place later.
Certainly, Tajul did not really mean to adhere to the demands of 
the so-called agreement. He admitted that the police requested him 
to sign it even though he did not agree, because later on he could 
always admit that he signed it under pressure. But Tajul also felt 
that he could accept the phrase “return to ahl as-sunnah wa l-jama‘ah” 
as long as there was no word “mazhab” in front of “ahl as-sunnah,” 
because, according to him, Shi‘as too belong to the ahl as-sunnah (in-
terview, 27 March 2013).
Sunni-Shi‘a conflict 2011-2013
The relations between the parties to the conflict had passed the 
stage where working together and reaching compromises was not 
possible. Both sides stuck to their respective convictions. In the 
words of the head of Kesbanglinmas Sampang, “The majority want-
ed 100, the minority wanted 100 — each wanted to get 100” (inter-
view, 7 February 2013). One side did not want their habits, customs, 
influence, and followers disturbed, the other side did not want their 
rights and freedom disturbed just because their religious practices 
and beliefs were seen as new and different. Since neither wanted to 
give up their respective positions, the hostility increased.
In this context, the government’s attitude was minimalist. “Uni-
versal principles of human rights,” said a government official, “can-
not be accepted there as of yet.” He confessed to have spoken with 
a few kiais about the external pressures on the Sampang local gov-
5Photocopy of the mentioned agreement as well as of several other agreements 
are available in researchers’ archive.
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ernment to protect the Shi‘as from inhuman treatment, looting, and 
neglect of their rights. But this was not acknowledged. “Do I have to 
confront the kiais? Won’t it be better if we confront them?” (head of 
Kesbanglinmas, interview, 7 February 2013). In other words, the lo-
cal government was faced with the kiais whose strength was greater 
than its own, which made it impossible to implement the “universal 
principles of human rights.”
According to several government officials, including the regent, 
domination of kiais over the Sunni majority in Sampang was a “lo-
cal ethics” that could not be ignored and had to be both the refer-
ence and starting point in all community affairs. Demands that chil-
dren of Shi‘a families did not attend YAPI and other Shi‘a boarding 
schools on Java “should be obeyed, even though the law allows” 
one to be schooled where one wished. The kiais “already envisioned 
the future problem: one Tajul Muluk and there is already such a 
confusion. In ten years from now when people who were schooled 
at YAPI and Pekalongan come back, what would happen then?” 
(Omben police chief, interview, 7 February 2013). Tajul Muluk and 
the Shi‘a community of Omben resisted the local ethics which con-
tradicted the law, and they suffered consequences. The local govern-
ment accepted this, complied and provided explanation in a form 
of a negative stereotype: when angry, the Madurese would not be 
afraid of authorities.
In 2011, there were several important incidents involving the 
conflicted parties. On 4 April 2011, Tajul was going to host the 
maulid celebrations. As always in Karang Gayam and Blu’uran, 
tensions would become high during the maulid period. Hundreds 
of armed men approached Tajul demanding that he abandoned 
the intention to host the celebrations. They argued that Tajul 
agreed (the agreement made on 26 October 2009) to stop the Shi‘a 
activities or to stand trial upon violating the agreement. Fearing for 
Tajul’s safety, the police forced his evacuation to Sampang police 
headquarters. This was the beginning of a process that lasted sev-
eral months and ended up with Tajul Muluk being relocated in July 
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2011, for one year period, to Malang, at the expense of the local and 
provincial governments.
Although relocated to Malang, Tajul was able to return to his 
village several times. He would travel from Malang to Sampang and 
back in order to see his wife and to visit the tomb of his father. But 
each time he was back, usually for several days up to two weeks, 
he gave sermons and held meetings with his followers. In mid-De-
cember 2011, one of the houses in Karang Gayam, which Tajul most 
often visited, was burnt down by his opponents. Residents of the 
house were safe and the material damage was minimal. However, 
this incident was followed by a bigger arson attack which attracted 
much wider attention.
On 29 December 2011, the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang 
reached its peak. The attacks were precisely directed and coordinat-
ed. First, around 9:30 am, Tajul’s house in Nangkernang neighbour-
hood, Karang Gayam, Omben, was set on fire. The attackers burnt 
the house, three classrooms, prayer room, five bedrooms of students 
and teachers, two bathrooms, twelve computers, satellite dish, ki-
osk, and cowshed. Then they moved to their next target, the house 
of Iklil al-Milal, Tajul’s older brother, in Gading Laok, Blu’uran, 
Karang Penang, located approximately five kilometers from Tajul’s 
house. At noon they set fire to the house, bathroom (not in the main 
house), and piles of construction wood. Three mango trees were cut 
and torn down. Finally, the attackers went to their last target, the 
house of Ustad Saiful Ulum, Tajul Muluk’s brother-in-law, in Solong 
Daya, Karang Gayam, Omben, approximately five kilometers from 
the house of Iklil al-Milal. At about 3:00 pm, the attackers set fire 
to the house, kitchen, bathroom, and prayer room. Having reached 
three different targets which were relatively far apart, the attackers 
stopped.
The atmosphere of anxiety struck the Shi‘a community to the 
point that after the arson attacks they gathered to stay all together. 
Due to security reasons in case of further attacks, the limited sanita-
tion and space in the house where they assembled, the police evac-
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uated 250 of them to the Sampang Sports Centre, where they stayed 
for two weeks, before later sending them back to their homes.
The police arrested one arsonist, Musikrah, and brought him to 
the court. He was sentenced to less than four months and set free. 
The police also caught another one named Saripin. However, due to 
strong protests from the kiais and the community, he was released 
without trial. Tajul Muluk, who suffered most due to the attack, was 
also arrested, tried, and sentenced to two years in prison. When he 
appealed, the punishment was raised to four years. The reason was 
that he spread deviationist teachings and caused unrest in the soci-
ety.
In the mid-2012, the children of Shi‘a families returned to Omben 
for Ramadan holidays. For the police it was a matter between par-
ents and children, but for the Sunni residents this was a trigger to 
several issues which, according to them, were settled due to the 
“agreements” reached earlier. The first issue was that the Shi‘a 
community was forming cadres by sending their children to Shi‘a 
schools in East and Central Java, while the Sunnis wished they were 
sent to Sunni schools in and around Sampang. They felt that, as it 
was expressed by one kiai of the MUI Sampang, “what was the point 
of imprisoning Tajul if in ten years these children finish their educa-
tion at Shi‘a schools, hundreds of new Tajuls would come, and they 
would be even better trained that Tajul himself” (secretary of the 
MUI Sampang, interview, 25 February 2013).
In the context of the built-up hostilities, Tajul’s opponents de-
clared he had violated the Madurese norms and codes of honor, 
which could result in acts of revenge and murder. The violation 
to them was the fact that he had “bred something new where the 
99,99 percent were Sunnis” (head of Kesbanglinmas Sampang, 
interview, 7 February 2013). The Shi‘a community in Sampang was 
increasingly seen as a disease that must be removed. To put it in the 
words of a MUI Sampang representative, if a person suffered from 
severe diabetes, then the affected limb must be amputated — “if not 
cut off, it [the disease] would spread everywhere. And what would 
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be left?” (Secretary of the MUI Sampang, interview, 25 February 
2013).
Because of this, on 26 August 2012, a week after the Eid celebra-
tion, the Sunni residents of Omben, blocked the Shi‘a students from 
returning to their schools. The two groups who have long been hos-
tile towards each other, were caught in a quarrel. As more and more 
people gathered, violence could not be avoided. The few members 
of the Omben police were helpless. A fight broke out with the use 
of machetes, sickles, batons, stones, and bondet (a home-made ex-
plosive used by fishermen to catch fish). One member of the Shi‘a 
community, Chamamah, was killed and dozens of others from both 
groups were wounded. Some of the police members were also in-
jured. Besides, 26 Shi‘a households were burnt down in Gading 
Laok neighbourhood of Blu’uran, Karang Penang, and 23 in Nang-
kernang neighbourhood of Karang Gayam, Omben (the houses 
were made of bamboo and straw and burnt easily). In the afternoon, 
the members of Shi‘a community took refuge in the Sampang Sports 
Centre. On 20 June 2013, they were moved to Puspo Argo housing 
estate in Sidoarjo.
After the incident, the police indicated six suspects who were 
tried with various results: one suspect, Mukhsin, was sentenced to 
ten months imprisonment for beatings; Mat Safi was sentenced to 
one year and six months imprisonment for torture; Saniwan, eight 
months for beatings; Saripin, eight months for beatings; and Hadiri, 
four years for beatings. Meanwhile, Roisul al-Hukama, the brother 
of Tajul Muluk, who played a particular role in this conflict (see fur-
ther below), and for whom initially two years imprisonment were 
demanded, was found not guilty — a decision that hurt the Shi‘a 
community’s sense of justice.6
6Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (Indonesian Legal Aid Founda-
tion), “Putusan Bebas bagi Pelaku Kerusuhan Sampang Mencederai Rasa Kead-
ilan Masyarakat,” http://www. ylbhi.or.id/2013/05/putusan-bebas-bagi-pela-
ku-kerusuhan-sampang-mencederai-rasa-keadilan-masyarakat/ (accessed 13 No-
vember 2013).
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Dynamics of Policing the Conflict in Sampang
Policing Activities
In the long duration of the conflict, the police officers of Sam-
pang, particularly from the Omben sub-district police, changed 
many times, especially at the managerial level. A few important 
notes need to be taken with regard to these changes. The Sampang 
police chief was holding the same post before the incident in Decem-
ber 2011 and after it, until 2013. Omben and Karang Penang police 
chiefs were also serving at their positions when the December 2011 
incident took place, and they were still there at the time of August 
2012 incident and afterwards. Sampang police officer who also had 
long followed the conflict, Kompol M. Jusuf, has been serving in 
Sampang from the first incident, holding various positions, as a the 
head of Bimas (at the time of December 2011 incident) and the head 
of Planning (at the time of August 2012 incident). In the Omben po-
lice, most of the officers have also been serving long in Omben, and 
after the December 2011 incident, three more officers joined them, 
becoming together a 23-member force.
Therefore, both the Sampang and Omben police had adequate 
knowledge about the conflict. In fact, some of the higher-ranking 
officers (district and sub-district police chiefs) were requested to re-
main at their posts to handle the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict. The Sampang 
police was also strengthened by a new head of Intelkam after the 
December 2011 incident, who was serving there at least until 2013, 
when this report was written.
In the incident of 29 December 2011, the police, particularly in 
Omben, had information on mass mobilization of both parties. This 
was admitted both by the police (Omben police chief, interview, 
28 March 2013) as well as by an NGO which monitors the conflict 
in Sampang.7 A day before the incident, the police chief of Omben 
called Iklil al-Milal, one of the Omben Shi‘a leaders, a brother of 
7Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), “Negara Gagal 
Melindungi Jamaah Syiah Sampang,” Syahadah 16, January 2012, p. 4.
The Case of Anti-Shi‘a in Sampang, Madura 115
Tajul Muluk, to the police station and informed him about the pos-
sibility of an attack on the following day. On the morning of 29 De-
cember, when the crowds began to gather, Iklil called the police and 
confirmed that the “threats of which he was informed were indeed 
true.”8
However, intelligence was not accompanied by adequate meas-
ures to prevent violence. The police themselves admitted that very 
few officers were present at the location before and during the De-
cember incident. According to the report of the Center for Marginal-
ized Communities Studies (CMARS), “the capacity of police person-
nel deployed in the field was insufficient to stop the violence. In fact, 
the police at the location were merely looking at the burning houses 
and musala.”9 Initially, there was only one policeman and one soldier 
at the scene of crime.10 And they were unable to ward off the attacks.
The number of police officers was increased right after the ar-
son attack of 29 December 2011. In addition to Omben police, of-
ficers from Sampang were deployed under the command of their 
police chief. Police pacified the masses, dispersed the crowd, and 
persuaded those who carried sickles and sharp weapons to leave. A 
few days after the incident, the police returned to Omben and seized 
sharp weapons, including 23 sickles and swords. This was protested 
by the Shi‘as who claimed they needed weapons for self-defence. 
But this was exactly what the police feared since they slept in groups 
with unsheathed swords and sickles. The police did not carry out a 
similar weapon-seizing from the Sunni residents.
In normal circumstances the police would be much more in-
volved. According to a police officer from the provincial police 
(Polda), when a situation becomes tense the district police (Polsek) 
8Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), “Pengungsi Syiah Di-
paksa-Pulangkan tanpa Jaminan Keamanan,” Syahadah 16, January 2012, p. 5.
9Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), “Negara Gagal 
Melindungi Jamaah Syiah Sampang,” Syahadah 16, January 2012, p. 4.
10Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), “Pengungsi Syiah Di-
paksa-Pulangkan tanpa Jaminan Keamanan,” Syahadah 16, January 2012, p. 5.
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handles it, yet when attacks or clashes occur, the provincial police 
(Polda) would be deployed.11 When security tasks are performed, 
officers are deployed from several units, such as intelligence, Sab-
hara, and Samapta. In tense situations police mobile brigades would 
arrive from Sampang. In Sampang also the military from Koramil 
(and Kodim, depending on circumstances) would join the police. On 
29 December 2011, at 9:30 am, there were two forces (military and po-
lice) present when the burning began. An hour after that, at 10:30 am, 
“25-armed members of mobile brigade arrived to the scene. Unfortu-
nately, they also did not undertake any preventative actions, some 
just enjoyed sitting in the prayer room next to the madrasah.”12
The police sent more troops right after the attack, with 435 of-
ficers were deployed to the location. They consisted of 175 members 
of Sampang district police, 50 Sabhara from East Java provincial 
police, 150 troops of mobile brigades, 30 operations officers from 
Pamekasan district police, and 30 soldiers from Kodim Sampang. 
The police referred to this deployment as “preventive measures,” in 
the sense that it was meant to prevent the incident from reoccurring. 
The police and the military later evacuated the Shi‘a residents (first 
to the district office, later to Sampang Sports Centre) and guarded 
those who refused to be evacuated.13
With regard to the incident which took place on 26 of August 
2012, the police admitted the forces deployed were not adequate. 
Several reasons were given to justify this. First, the atmosphere of 
“Lebaran Ketupat” holiday made the 23-member police force busy 
11Delivered during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role of the Po-
lice and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the Center for 
the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooper-
ation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia 
Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.
12Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS), “Pengungsi Syiah Di-
paksa-Pulangkan tanpa Jaminan Keamanan,” Syahadah 16 Januari 2012, p. 5.
13 Presentation slide made by a police officer (of Polda East Java) at a workshop 
entitled “Overcoming Anarchic Activities: Tackling Social Conflict by the Police 
based on Human Rights Principles and Procedures,” organized by Ditbangpes Ses-
pimti Polri, in cooperation with Yayasan Lembaga Hukum Indonesia and The Asia 
Foundation, in Lembang, on 28 November 2013.
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enough with their routine security duties. Another reason is the rel-
atively far distance which could not be made on four-wheeled ve-
hicles, the scene as well was quite broad as people gathered in sev-
eral places. In contrast to the settlement areas in Javanese villages, 
the ones in Omben are not localized in one place but spread along 
various plantations and fields. The distance from one Shi‘a house-
hold to another can amount to two to five kilometers. But the most 
important reason was the quick outbreak and mass mobilization, 
which was made even more rapid with the help of loudspeakers in 
mosques and the circulation of rumors. Within three hours the num-
ber of Omben and Karang Penang residents who were mobilized 
reached thousands. “Five thousand people were there surely,” said 
a police member.14 When masses arrived in thousands, there was no 
adequate police force that could be sent to the location.15
Of course, after the arson attack the number of police increased 
with the support of arriving from the East Java police. However, lat-
er in the afternoon the challenges faced were already different, from 
prevention and handling of conflict, to post-incident mitigation. In 
the post-incident phase, the security forces deployed were quite 
enough: Four SSK (company-level units) from the mobile brigade 
of East Java police, two SSK from Sabhara of East Java police, one 
SST (platoon-level unit) from Pamekasan district police, and three 
military SSK from Batalion Rider Kodam Brawijaya. Similarly to the 
29 December 2011 incident, security forces could have been sent in 
case of open violence. The police and soldiers whose number could 
reach over a thousand, were not deployed in advance.
14A statement made during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role 
of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the 
Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, 
in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and 
The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.
15Presentation slide made by a police officer (of Polda East Java) at a workshop 
entitled “Overcoming Anarchic Activities: Tackling Social Conflict by the Police 
based on Human Rights Principles and Procedures,” organized by Ditbangpes Ses-
pimti Polri, in cooperation with Yayasan Lembaga Hukum Indonesia and The Asia 
Foundation, in Lembang, on 28 November 2013.
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In the 26 August 2012 incident, several policing activities were 
employed, including community relations, documentation, and 
persuasion. No repression was applied despite the occurrence of 
fighting, arson, and murder. The atmosphere of conflict, and the 
unequal balance of power between the police and the masses did 
not allow repression. Police worried the violence would expand and 
they themselves might become victims of mob attacks.
In the 26 August 2012 incident, the police again relied on evac-
uation as the measures to handle the post-incident situation. Shi‘as 
were evacuated first to the district office and then, on the same day 
in the afternoon, to the Sampang Sports Centre. Since more than 60 
homes were burnt, they no longer had a place to stay. This many 
houses could be burnt by the anti-Shi‘a groups because the police 
did not have sufficient strength to impede the clashes or ward off 
the masses. The police also found it easier to protect the Shi‘a leaders 
and their followers in the post-conflict phase if they were grouped 
in one place in Sampang.16
In the post-conflict phase, the police carried out a law enforce-
ment action against six suspects. One of them, Roisul al-Hukama, 
was released which raised objections of many. 
Police Knowledge
The Sampang police subscribe to the constitutional provisions 
on democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance. 
Their knowledge of these issues is not detailed but just general. Po-
lice admits that the matter of belief belongs to civil rights and cannot 
be contested. According to the chief of intelligence unit of Sampang 
police, in matters of belief “as it is stipulated in the constitution, we 
cannot reject [to protect] anyone,” and Tajul Muluk can believe in 
16A statement made during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role 
of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the 
Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, 
in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and 
The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.
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what he does. “Want to worship stones? No problem,” he added. 
Ritual differences between Sunnis and Shi‘as, such as the way hands 
are put during prayer, are not to blame because each group has its 
own beliefs behind these differences. People also have the right to 
stay in their own houses and on their own land. The duty of the po-
lice is to maintain public safety (interview, 1 May 2013).
But the conflict between Shi‘as and Sunnis was not merely a 
matter of belief and worship. Conflicts of this kind may occur with 
minimal disruptions of public order. The Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in 
Omben expanded and escalated due to the behaviour of both par-
ties. Two brothers, Tajul Muluk and Roisul al-Hukama, who earlier 
were like-minded, later parted for several reasons, which includ-
ed financial problems, jealousy over women, and some more. The 
separation made Tajul Muluk lose a supporter and defender whom 
he used to find in his brother. Apart from this, having left the Shi‘a 
community, Rois, through speeches in various places and through 
loudspeakers in mosques, was spreading his views on what he 
thought were the mistakes and errors of Tajul and his followers in 
the field of religious belief and worship. This conflict culminated in 
the 29 December 2011 incident.
The local community context also affected the police perfor-
mance. What in many societies constitutes the rights and freedoms 
of worship and belief, in Sampang was not so. Some of the Sampang 
police members and government officials interviewed speaking of 
the local context pointed towards several issues. First, the inhab-
itants of Omben and Karang Penang were not yet capable of ac-
knowledging the rights and freedoms as set forth by law. This is an 
important fact which affected the police performance. In the words 
of a police officer, “social tolerance, religious tolerance” were not 
there (chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 1 May 
2013).
Yet more importantly, the police and the local government treat-
ed this fact as a parameter which could not be tampered with, a 
frame to constrain their performance in Sampang. According to a 
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts120
police officer from Sampang police, in their actions against the Shi‘a 
community, Sunnis were against the law. But in Sampang, such acts 
of law-breaking could not be dealt with. “[We should] bring the is-
sue back to the [above-mentioned] problem of human resources, 
Sir,” said the policeman, “depending on the culture.” The local res-
idents receive only religious knowledge. “It’s not wrong. But in my 
opinion, its implementation sometimes doesn’t fit.” He compared 
the situation here with the one in Sidoarjo: “In my place [where he 
grew up], in Sidoarjo, there are various religious groups” and they 
are able to live together (police intelligence, Sampang, interview, 1 
May 2013).
Sometimes, as it was mentioned in other sections, the police and 
the local government referred to this problem as the “local ethics.” 
In understanding of the Sampang and of the East Java police, the 
local ethics constituted the main determinant. According to the East 
Java police chief, the law enforcement is “the last resort after the 
solution is not achieved by the means of the local ethics.”17
Law enforcement is the last resort — such is the core of mental-
ity and perception of the Sampang police as the law enforcement 
institution. This contradicts the police views on religious freedom 
as a right which should be protected. The police would not give this 
protection because of the importance of the “local ethics.” 
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution 
The police are aware of their duties and functions as defined in 
the Police Act — maintaining security, protecting citizens, and en-
forcing the law. At the same time, the police are also aware that the 
contemporary legislation actually does not put on them the main 
17Opening speech delivered by the East Java police chief during a focus group 
discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Re-
ligious Freedom,” organized by the Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy 
(PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized 
Communities Studies (CMARS) and The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 
2013.
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responsibility of handling social conflicts. Act No. 7 of 2012 on man-
aging social conflicts places the local governments as, to use the 
words of the chief of the Sampang police intelligence unit, “leading 
sector in the management of social conflicts.” Similarly, Presidential 
Instruction No. 1 emphasizes what the officer of the East Java police 
called the “synergy between the local governments and agencies, in-
cluding the police and the military” in dealing with social conflicts.
However, in practice, the police felt they were left alone, both in 
upholding the constitution and in taking responsibility for failures. 
The local government of Sampang “just ignored the handling of the 
Sampang conflict,” said a police officer.18
The failure was also related to the 2012 local elections in Sam-
pang. The Sunni-Shi‘a conflict became one of the campaign themes. 
Incumbent regent, Noer Tjahya, on several occasions openly ex-
pressed his displeasure with the Shi‘as who, according to him, 
should revert to Sunnism or should be expelled from Sampang. 
Candidates who competed with him were also against the Shi‘as 
and sided with the Sunni group. 
East Java police gave special attention to the problem of com-
munal conflicts through a program titled “East Java in One Grip” 
(Jawa Timur Dalam Satu Genggaman). In the program, which began 
in mid-July 2012, a total of 8,000 villages in East Java, each of which 
had a police officer, were to be connected through a website run by 
Babinkamtibmas. Babinkamtibmas patrols villages, monitors crim-
inal activity, and establishes partnerships with community lead-
ers, religious leaders, youth leaders, and traditional (adat) leaders. 
Incidents of conflict and crime that occur in the region, including 
remote areas, can be quickly reported to the police. “Within min-
utes we could handle a particular event,” said the East Java police 
18A statement made during a focus group discussion (FGD) entitled “The Role 
of the Police and Civil Society in Protecting Religious Freedom,” organized by the 
Center for the Study of Religion and Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, 
in cooperation with the Center for Marginalized Communities Studies (CMARS) and 
The Asia Foundation, Surabaya, 27 February 2013.
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chief, Inspector General Hadiatmoko.19 The system became a part of 
the Integrated Police Service Center of East Java Police. “East Java 
in One Grip” program was also a response to the local problems, 
including that of Sampang. Nevertheless, the fact that the incident 
which occurred on 26 August 2012 was not prevented, shows the 
program’s limitations.
Police Culture
Although the absolute majority of police in Sampang are Mus-
lims, they are trying to distance themselves from the warring par-
ties. The police officers also emphasized the specificity of the Sam-
pang community in their reverence of kiais, to which they referred 
to as the “local ethics.” During maulid, the police also observed dif-
ferences between the whole month house-to-house celebrations in 
Sampang and one day mosque events in East Java (place of origin 
of some of the policemen). They also compared the low-degree of 
tolerance in Sampang with relatively better situation in other places, 
such as Surabaya and Sidoarjo.
A police officer admitted that in his neighbourhood in Sura-
baya, there were various ethnic groups, persons from Ambon, Pap-
ua, Manado, Java, etc. And also there were many religions. “Not 
to mention the Kejawen groups.” There is a temple, a church, and 
mosques of NU and of Muhammadiyah. “On Christmas we all cel-
ebrate Christmas; on Buddhist celebrations we join the feasts when 
invited to eat together,” he said laughing. “Differences do not up-
set me. But in this environment (Omben), things are very sensitive” 
(Omben police chief, interview, 6 February 2013 and 28 March 2013). 
Another officer said that in his neighbourhood, in Sidoarjo, there are 
Muslims who have beards and wear long ankle-length trousers, yet 
they pray with other Muslims although different from them; when 
in tarawih prayers there is a difference in the number of rakaat, some 
19“Kapolri: Harus Dikontrol Program Jatim Dalam Satu Genggaman,” http://
infopoljatim.com/ (accessed 24 May 2013).
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participate, while some do not. There is a difference but we accept 
each other. “No problem, there’s no issue,” he said, it is because peo-
ple are more tolerant. But “here, it’s a different culture” (chief of 
intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 1 May 2013).
In matters of belief, the police cannot supervise anyone because 
the constitution guarantees the freedom of belief. Chief of intelli-
gence unit, Sampang police (interview, 1 May 2013) said: 
Tajul Muluk and Shi‘as follow what they believe. Families are free to send their 
children to boarding schools, including to Shi’a schools; this is their right, the po-
lice cannot interfere. Similarly, when there is a difference within the community 
with regard to maulid tradition, the police could not determine who is right and 
who is wrong. 
In fact, in personal views of several police officers in Sampang, 
some innovations done by Tajul were right and good. Unfortunate-
ly, the good ones were delivered in a confrontational way, and in the 
environment where the audience did not tolerate them.
Thus, part of the problem between the warring parties of Sam-
pang lied in the issues mentioned above. Shi‘as wanted to send their 
children back to the boarding schools on Java, but were opposed by 
Sunnis who by force and intimidation wanted them to return home. 
In the maulid tradition, a kiai comes from one celebration to another 
and receives money from the hosts and guests. According Tajul Mu-
luk, it should not be so for and it was the kiai who was supposed to 
give money to the poor. Both sides were ready to defend their views 
through confrontation. There was no religious tolerance (chief of in-
telligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 1 May 2013).
The police perceived the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang as 
a more sensitive one than, for example, conflicts over natural 
resources and borders and which, therefore, should be handled 
with more care. The police did not want to be seen as partisan by 
any of the warring parties. The parties to the conflict had their 
religious and cultural justifications for self-defence, which led 
them to defy the authorities. For example, according to those 
who opposed the Shi‘as, Tajul Muluk and his followers breached 
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the local cultural norms and the aggressive vengeance against 
them could be excused. “This is a matter of honor, Sir; you should 
not get involved,” they said to the police on 26 August 2012. In 
the 29 December 2011 incident, hundreds of people holding ma-
chetes and swords forced the police chief and district military 
commander back from the conflict scene. “Culture influences the 
thinking and behaviour of people,” said the Omben police chief 
(interview, 6 February 2013) and the local Madurese culture af-
fected not only the minds and behaviour of Omben and Karang 
Gayam residents, but also the policing strategy there.
It was difficult for both sides in this conflict to coexist peaceful-
ly because differences in convictions and religious practices had an 
impact on kinship and social life in general. The important dates for 
the community, such as maulid, circumcision, marriage, and inher-
itance, brought controversies and hostile expressions to which the 
police chief of Omben referred as “rude phrases,” which employed 
terms such as “haram” (forbidden), “kafir” (infidel), “hell,” etc. Of 
course, incidents of violence on 29 December 2011 and 26 August 
2012, especially the latter, complicated the reconciliation of Sunnis 
and Shi‘as who lived in the same villages and were still tied by the 
bonds of kinship.
After the 29 December 2011 incident, the police and the parties to 
the conflict tried to associate. According to the Omben police chief, 
there were attempts and appeals for “mingling” and “bridging” 
even before the 29 December incident. Association means that Sun-
nis and Shi‘as would pray together in the same mosque. While pray-
ing, “ones had their arms bent, ones had their arms straight,” said 
the police chief referring to the difference between Sunnis and Shi‘as 
in the position of hands during prayer. However, these peace-build-
ing attempts, which according to the police chief were “derived 
from the universal concepts,” were challenged by the “local ethics” 
and kiais. “The universal concepts which we advocated were reject-
ed by the local ethics” (interview, 6 February 2013).
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Public Opinion
The MUI Sampang has been involved in the conflict in Omben 
and Karang Penang since 2006, after Kiai Makmun died. The ten-
sions increased after Tajul Muluk insisted that the maulid celebra-
tions be held together at mosque. Since then, the local MUI favoured 
Sunnis and opposed Tajul Muluk and his followers. In the view of 
the MUI Sampang, this was the side which they were supposed to 
take. In several meetings, the MUI Sampang proposed the way out 
which they found the most appropriate, that is the “return” of Tajul 
Muluk and his followers to the Sunni school of thought.
These efforts were unsuccessful. The MUI and the network of Ma-
durese ulama (BASSRA) did not only render Tajul Muluk and Shi‘as 
of Sampang heretics, but also actively lobbied to have the East Java 
branch of the MUI and the central MUI do the same. They succeeded 
with the MUI of East Java which in February 2012 issued a fatwa 
declaring Shi‘as deviationist. But they failed with the central MUI.
MUI, BASSRA and NU Sampang did not use their influence to 
decrease the polarization in the community which was already po-
larized before they became formally involved in the conflict. Also 
the ulama did not make bridging attempts as they had already joined 
one of the conflicted parties, the Sunni group. The ulama voiced, rep-
resented, and pursued the interests of the Sunni side.
The police and the local government of Sampang, which in many 
cases relied on the ulama and kiais in guiding the community, could 
not do this in relation to the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict. The ulama could 
not become actors of reconciliation, could not help in bridging the 
warring Muslims, instead, they became a part of the problem them-
selves. These are some of the fundamental weaknesses of the Sam-
pang ulama from the perspective of policing and conflict resolution.
FKUB (Interfaith Harmony Forum) does not exist in Sampang. Re-
gent Noer Tjahja declared that as long as he would be the regent, he 
would not formalize the establishment of FKUB in Sampang. Accord-
ing to him this attitude would be in line with the wishes of the ulama. 
The regent did not want FKUB in Sampang because one of its functions 
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is to provide recommendations with regard to construction of places of 
worship. “This is what I do not like, and what the Sampang residents 
do not like either,” he said. He was willing to risk his position in the 
regent’s office, but “as long as I am the regent of Sampang, the FKUB 
would not be established.” In Bangkalan there is a church, in Pameka-
san there is a fairly large church, and in Sumenep there is more than 
one church, but not in Sampang. The regent asserted, “let Sampang be 
unique with its local ethics,” including the fact of there being only one 
kind of places of worship, mosques.20 It is interesting that the regent 
presented such statements in broad daylight, at a public event, at the 
regent’s office, and in the context of Sampang local election which was 
to be held “on the 12th of the 12th month, year 12, if there’s no apoca-
lypse. In case of apocalypse, the election will be held in the hereafter.”
This event showed that the constraints of policing the Sunni-Shi‘a 
conflict and reconciliation efforts came from the regent and the strength 
of the ulama and kiais who were a part of the group opposing the Shi‘as. 
One of the reconciliation efforts was made by the Muhammadiyah 
University in Malang, under the leadership of Syamsul Arifin (who 
incidentally was born in Sampang), but it was stopped since the “lo-
cal ethics” was against it. Similarly, institutions which defend human 
rights, such as Kontras in Jakarta and the Center for Marginalized 
Communities Studies (CMARS) in Surabaya, or the advocacy or-
ganizations of the Shi‘a community such as Ahlul Bait Indonesia 
(ABI), faced difficulties in the field due to the power of kiais who, 
according to one of the local government officials, had “harsh dis-
positions.” Local ethics as the key factor influencing public opin-
ion became non-ethical in the context of conflict resolution. When 
the reconciliation efforts of the lower level took place at the refugee 
camps in Sidoarjo, local ethics again impeded reconciliation.
20This video, “Ceramah Noer Tjahya di Pendopo Kabupaten,” is available on 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTn7Kzijz2g? (accessed 24 May 2012). The 
same thing was said by the regent on various occasions in 2012, ahead of the election, 
with the intention of seeking the voters’ support. Noer Tjahja, however, lost and was 
third among the five candidates in the December 2012 election.
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Local Politics
As already mentioned earlier, the Sampang regent, Noer Tjahja 
(in office from February 2008 until February 2013) was not hiding 
his attitude towards the Shi‘as in public. Furthermore, he wanted 
the Shi‘as to be expelled from Sampang. According to him, “99.99 
percent” of Sampang population were Sunnis led by the ulama and 
kiais. In a meeting at the regent’s office which was attended by the 
ulama, he requested the military and the police to expel the Shi‘as 
from Sampang so that the majority would not be “contaminated”. 
On other occasions too, such as maulid celebration and Musrembang 
in Omben, the regent expressed the same views, that the Shi‘as were 
deviationist and should be expelled from Sampang and Madura.21
Regional House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Daerah, DPRD) of Sampang also sided with the anti-Shi‘a majority. 
In a meeting at the Sampang police office headquarters, on 26 Octo-
ber 2009, its chairman together with government officials as well as 
the representatives of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Sampang 
and Bakesbangpol Sampang, became witnesses when Tajul Muluk 
again was pressed to sign the declaration in which he “agreed to 
stop rituals and the spread” of Shi‘a teachings “because they dis-
turbed the public.” If Tajul Muluk complied with the agreement, 
“Pakem, MUI, NU, and the NGOs would be ready to lessen the so-
cial turmoil.” Also the leaders of the Sampang MUI and NU signed 
it as witnesses.22
The Ministry of Religious Affairs also played a limited role, and 
it too tended to side with one of the parties to the conflict, the an-
ti-Shi‘a group. The police wanted the ministry to be more involved 
in the conflict resolution as the issues of religion and religious guid-
ance was under its control. However, because of the budget reasons, 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Sampang did not do much, 
except for its brief involvement after the 26 August 2012 incident 
21Video “Ceramah Noer Tjahya di Pendopo Kabupaten.”
22Photocopy of this agreement is available in researchers’ archives.
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts128
(Ministry of Religious Affairs official, interview, 1 May 2013). It must 
be kept in mind, that the then Minister of Religious Affairs, Sury-
adharma Ali, during his short visit to the Shi‘a refugee camp at the 
Sampang Sports Centre, after the 26 August incident, said that the 
conflict in Sampang was not a religious conflict. While it might seem 
improper if seen from the perspective of how the conflict evolved, 
the purpose of the statement given by the minister was to show that 
the problem was outside of the Ministry of Religious Affairs juris-
diction and, thus, not of its concern.
The role played by the government, especially local government 
of Sampang, was neither neutral nor impartial as it sided with one 
of the parties to the conflict, i.e. the more powerful Sunni group. The 
reason was that the local government followed the “local ethics.” 
As mentioned by a local government official, the local ethics was 
embedded in culture, the obedience towards kiais was in the cul-
ture of Madura. “I do not submit and pledge obedience to the kiais, 
but people in the conflict area do,” he said. However, he felt there 
was no other choice but to follow the local ethics. “Can a culture be 
changed offhand?” A consequence thereof was that in case when the 
local ethics was against the ways of handling a conflict, those ways 
should be avoided. “Should something that is rejected be contin-
ued?” If there is a conflict between the local ethics and the human 
rights approach, the former would be chosen. “I think that the local 
ethics is something that cannot be replaced by rights” (Kakesbang-
pol Sampang, interview, 30 April 2013).
This condition, together with other factors made the police, 
which wished to keep the middle ground, face difficulties, either be-
cause of lack of support or because of the threat of being identified 
with the Shi‘a group, which in the local context would make them 
unpopular and could also pose danger. In the words of a govern-
ment official, if a kiai does not accept human rights, there is no point 
in talking about the right to life, freedom of speech, and freedom 
of religion. Opting for human rights, he said, “would lead to more 
bloodshed” (Kakesbangpol Sampang, interview, 30 April 2013).
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The Sampang police saw another problem. They felt the coordi-
nation with local government did not work, especially before the 26 
August 2012 incident. According to a Sampang police officer, “there 
was a miss” — miscommunication — between the police and the 
local government. “If there was coordination, not even in 100 per-
cent, just 80 percent, what happened on 26 August could have been 
avoided,” he said. One of the issues which complicated the coor-
dination was the 2012 local election in Sampang (Kasat Intelkam 
Sampang, interview, 7 February 2013).
What was meant by coordination, from the police point of view, 
was that the police and the government should cooperate in the 
sense of working together, but the government and not the police 
should become the “leading sector,” in accordance with the laws 
on the management of social conflicts. The government would pro-
vide assistance, including funds, for the police field operations. In 
the police budget, the handling of Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang 
was a routine operation and thus funded from the regular budget, 
not as a special operation. Besides funds, water in the conflict area 
was difficult to obtain and also of poor quality, and the police and 
military personnel needed both water and sanitation to be able to re-
main stationed in the field after the December 2011 and August 2012 
incidents. The government was also requested to refrain from be-
haviours which worsened the situation and emotions of the conflict-
ed parties, particularly in the context of elections. Police deplored 
“negative statements, which heated up the situation,” which made 
it a matter of time for an open conflict in Omben to break out (Kasat 
Intelkam Sampang, interview, 7 February 2013).
Very regrettable to the security forces, both the police and mili-
tary, was the address of the regent who requested that they expel the 
Shi‘as from Sampang. Omben police chief said it was “completely 
beyond our comprehension what the regent said; [we] the police 
were shocked” (interview, 28 March 2013). The police and the local 
government officials were trying hard to prevent from spreading 
the recordings of that event, which was attended by the government 
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officials, police, and military. But this was of no use because the re-
gent in many cases repeated the incitement. During the election 
campaign, all candidates for regent’s office were against the Shi‘a 
of Sampang.23
Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict
The Sunni-Shi‘a conflict took a relatively long period to form, 
since 2004. Parties to the conflict were on one side the Sunni group, 
which consisted of kiais, ulama of NU, MUI and BASSRA, local gov-
ernment, and the blatter (thugs); and on the other side the Shi‘a 
group led by Tajul Muluk.
In the long process of conflict formation, the police of Omben in-
teracted with the warring parties to maintain security and order. Po-
lice officers were present in almost every meeting of kiais and ulama, 
both when Tajul Muluk and Shi‘a representatives were present and 
when they were not. The police attended the meetings for the sake 
of monitoring. In addition to this, the police also facilitated meetings 
between the warring parties. The police also tried to establish per-
sonal relationships with the leaders of both groups.
The clashes between the Sunnis and Shi‘as occurred repeatedly, 
although not throughout the year. One of the conflict periods was 
the month of Maulid. Every year the police was able to prevent vio-
lence on Maulid month, also in the early 2011. The incidents which 
took place on 29 December 2011 and on 26 August 2012, were the 
peak of the conflict and, therefore, received extensive attention from 
the media. Previous incidents in the history of this relatively long 
conflict had no coverage. Without the police efforts in pacifying the 
warring parties, violent clashes would undoubtedly be more fre-
quent.
23Noer Tjahja now lives in Surabaya and was not willing to be interviewed when 
we contacted him for the purpose of this research, on 29 March 2013. If he had hoped 
that discriminatory expressions would increase the number of votes, he was wrong. 
He lost the election and was third out of five candidates. He also lost in Omben con-
stituency.
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Having gone through the long formation period of the conflict, 
both Sunnis and Shi‘as anticipated greater violence. Both sides ap-
plied confrontational tactics, both used verbal attacks, intimidation, 
and insulted each other equally. Both parties also used loudspeakers 
in mosques to deliver hostile messages. The police repeatedly asked 
them to stop, sometimes successfully, but often the two parties did 
not comply with police appeals. Both parties were also arming them-
selves, especially with sharp weapons like sickles and machetes.24 
Such weapons were used in the December 2011 and August 2012 
incidents, in addition to a Molotov cocktails. In the August 2012 
incident explosives were also used, most likely by the Shi‘a side. 
Arson against the Shi‘a households made them lose their houses, so 
the evacuation was inevitable.
In case of both of the violent incidents, the police received in-
formation that the conflict was expected to escalate. The police re-
sponded by sending officers to the location, so that there already 
were officers when the clashes began. But the number of police and 
military who arrived, that is two to four officers, was inadequate. 
More troops arrived when the clashes were already taking place, 
and even more after they subsided.25
In case of the 29 December 2011 and 26 August 2012 incidents, 
the police tried to persuade the warring parties to not commit vio-
lence, but it failed. According to eyewitnesses, when arson attacks 
took place, some of the policemen were taking pictures with their 
phone cameras while some other were just sitting, letting the Sunni 
attackers burn the houses. The strength of the members of police 
and military who were at the scene was insufficient to prevent the 
escalation of conflict into open violence. This led to the assessments, 
particularly among the Shi‘a community, that the police in both in-
cidents tended to favor the attackers.26
24Dardiri, “Api Kebencian Berkobar di Sampang,” Syahadah 16, January 2012, p. 14.
25Johan Avie and Khoirul Mustamir, “Tragedi Syawal Berdarah,” Syahadah 24, 
September 2012, p. 1-5.
26Ibid.
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts132
The police admitted the number of officers was inadequate. In 
fact, according to the police chief of Omben and the chief of intel-
ligence of Sampang police, no matter how many officers would be 
sent, their number would not be sufficient if both parties wanted 
to continue fighting and ignored the calls of police officers to stop 
(chief of intelligence unit, Sampang police, interview, 7 February 
2012; Omben police chief, interview, 28 March 2012). However, this 
reasoning can be reversed: a thousand of police and military troops 
in the location, before the massive mobilization occurred and vio-
lence broke out, could stop the clashes and give credibility to the po-
lice appeals, so that the masses would restrain their will to fight. In 
fact, as many as a thousand troops were available in the afternoon, 
after the arson attack took place.
After the 29 December 2011 incident, the police chief of Sampang 
issued an instruction which included several policing directions. 
It was meant as a preventive measure so that “the conflict did not 
occur again,” especially as legal proceedings against Tajul were 
already conducted. The planned activity was carrying out patrols 
to Sunni-Shi‘a conflict-stricken villages — named “Patroli Monali-
sa,” abbreviation of mondok silaturahmi di desa (staying and makin 
social relations in villages’). The police carried out public aware-
ness, attended sermons and Friday prayers in both Shi‘a and Sunni 
mosques of Omben and Karang Penang. If there was a policeman 
who was able to preach, he would deliver a Friday sermon. Other-
wise, the police requested some time after the prayers in order to 
deliver appeals and explanations to the congregations. Sometimes 
ulama and preachers from outside Sampang were also involved. The 
police called this program “Jumling” or “Jumat Keliling” (Going 
Around in Friday). Finally, the police provided assistance to both 
Sunnis and Shi‘as in form of food, clean water, goats, mass circum-
cision, sarong and skullcaps for prayer, pocket money to children, 
and other help, all in order to establish bonds with the community.
The fact that after the first and second incident no police official 
in Sampang was replaced or removed is, according to the police, 
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was the proof that the Sampang district police had undertaken its 
tasks correctly. Many people initially negatively assessed the per-
formance of the police in Sampang. The President also stated that 
the intelligence officers were missing. Sampang police did not agree 
with this assessment. According to the chief of intelligence unit of 
Sampang police, what they did “exceeded the limits of police com-
petences” and “exceeded the competences of the local government.” 
The visit of the Commission III of the Parliament and Komnas HAM 
to Sampang after the 26 August 2012 incident, was as well, according 
to the police, a proof that they have carried out their duties properly.
Conclusions
This study shows several things concerning the policing of the 
sectarian Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang. First, in terms of the po-
licing process in Sampang, it runs through various stages of the 
long lasting Sunni-Shi‘a conflict. The main drive behind the polic-
ing functions is the duty and the mandate of the police to maintain 
security and order. When the police took action by collecting infor-
mation, attending meetings of the parties to the conflict, restricting 
freedom of movement of Shi‘a leaders, evacuating members of Shi‘a 
community to Sampang Sports Centre, they did so to maintain se-
curity and order. Apart from that, the police put themselves outside 
the warring parties, and maintained the same distance towards both 
groups. 
Second, judging from the results, the policing of the Sunni-Shi‘a 
sectarian conflict was not always successful. Two incidents, which 
occurred on 29 December 2011 and on 26 August 2012, showed the 
failure of the police in preventing tensions from escalating into open 
violence which involved both of the warring parties and led to the 
loss of life and material possessions.
Third, the strategy applied by both parties to the conflict, namely 
the use of violence in communal aggression, is one of the factors be-
hind the failure of the police in handling the incidents of Sunni-Shi‘a 
violence. Determination of the conflicted parties hindered the police 
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performance. One of the hindrances was mass mobilization in num-
bers far beyond the capacities of the local police. Although support 
and additional troops arrived, they came too late to function as a 
deterrent. Also the activity of religious leaders who became parts of 
the conflicted groups, narrowed the middle ground, which was the 
space for the police intervention. Kiais and the masses of their fol-
lowers could only accept a solution which would show their dom-
inance, otherwise they would use aggression which they believed 
would be effective since they were in much bigger numbers. Finally, 
the Shi‘a group which was much less numerous, did not want to 
compromise in a way that would make them feel defeated and hu-
miliated.
In such circumstances, the police desisted from the use of vio-
lence and repression. Their inadequate strength would threaten the 
safety of officers and consequently would aggravate the situation. 
In line with this, warning shots, or the use of weapons to disable 
the fighting parties, was never employed by the police in the Sun-
ni-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang, not even during the worst of the inci-
dents on 26 August 2012.
More of the softer measures were undertaken by the police, such 
as persuasion or asking the groups which were on stand off to re-
treat. Policing of this kind, which avoided the use of repression al-
lowed the stronger party, which knew there would be no repression, 
to achieve what it wanted, which here included burning as many 
houses as possible in order to expel their inhabitants.
Of course, a lot of police units including several units of mobile 
brigades were deployed when the 26 August 2012 incident took 
place. However, this huge number of police, which was estimated to 
be about one thousand, has arrived to the location after the violence 
reached its peak. Their preventive use has lost its momentum. Hun-
dreds of weapons brought by mobile brigades were never used. Be-
fore the violence broke out in the early morning, the number of po-
licemen was very limited — they were only from the district police; 
and not even all of them were involved, because during “Lebaran 
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Ketupat” (seventh day after Eid) most of the local police members 
were in charge of guarding other crowded locations.
What would happen if a thousand policemen were present at 
the location when the tensions were peaking, for example at 9:00 
am on that day? Would such a number of police officers be able to 
prevent the death of a citizen and the burning of dozens of Shi‘a 
households? Most likely they would. Yet the deployment of such 
a huge police force required the deployment of forces from the 
sub-district, district and provincial police all at once, in accordance 
with the rules of control transition from the lower to the higher lev-
el. When it reached the level of provincial police, several additional 
issues emerged, the most important of which was that tensions had 
by then escalated into violence and there was not enough time to 
reach the location or the crime scene in the remote Omben and Ka-
rang Penang.
Therefore, the police stressed the importance of prevention. They 
worked together with all related parties, especially the local gov-
ernment which, according to the police, was the most responsible 
actor for handling social conflicts. Police repeatedly complained 
about the lack of involvement from the local government’s side in 
the prevention phase, which made them feel as if they were working 
alone and had to take all control because of the necessity to main-
tain security. The police also regretted that on several occasions the 
regent of Sampang instead of easing the tensions only exacerbated 
them. The strategy of aggression and domination, the weakness of 
government in the prevention phase, the absence of adequate deter-
rent police force at the critical stage when tensions escalated into vi-
olence — these were some of the negative traits behind the policing 
of the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang.***
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5
THE CASE OF ANTI-SHI‘A IN BANGIL, 
PASURUAN
Foreword
The conflict between the Islamic Boarding School Foundation 
(Yayasan Pesantren Islam, YAPI/Shi‘a) and the group Ahlu Sunnah 
Wal Jamaah (Aswaja/Sunni) emerged long ago and tended to be al-
ways ignited by the attacks from the Aswaja. Interestingly, although 
there was escalation of hostilities, it has never ended up to be as 
serious as the case of violence between Sunnis and Shi‘as in Sam-
pang. Policing strategy which emphasized the tactics of showing the 
force and applying persuasion combined with local knowledge and 
commitment of police officers to be loyal to the constitution, police 
regulations, procedures, and the principle of neutrality, played the 
central role in preventing violence in Bangil. The willingness of both 
parties to the conflict to cooperate with the police and the support 
of several outside groups, contributed to the success of the policing 
action.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first one is an 
introduction presenting the main arguments and the report’s 
structure. The second part presents the data related to the social 
and religious background of Bangil. The third part discusses the 
conflict between YAPI and Aswaja, with the focus on the demon-
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strations which took place on 20 April 2007, and the incident of 
verbal attacks which led to physical clashes on 15 February 2011. 
The fourth part is devoted to the dynamics of policing sectarian 
conflicts from the perspective of policing activities, police knowl-
edge, legal-procedural framework, institutional character of the 
police, police culture, public opinion and interactions between 
the actors of conflict and the police. In the fifth part we draw 
conclusions from the lessons learnt and give recommendations 
for strengthening the existing policing activities. 
A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Pasuruan 
In the Pasuruan regency the majority of the society follows Is-
lam. According to the 2010 census, there were 1,458,440 Muslims; 
15,955 Hindus; 7,651 Protestants; 1,913 Catholics; 411 Buddhists; 55 
Confucianists; and 36 other; while 843 persons did not reply and 
27,164 were not asked.
Out of the 1,512,468 residents of Pasuruan, 2,698 live in Kenep 
village of Beji district, and 4,836 in Bendomungal village, Bangil dis-
trict. In each of the villages there is a YAPI boarding school, one for 
boys and one for girls, both of which became the crime scenes.
No exact data on the number of Shi‘as in Indonesia or in Bangil is 
available. Rough calculations allow to estimate that there would be 
from 500,000 to 2,500,000, or even 5,000,000 followers of Shi‘a Islam. 
The data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (2009), an 
independent research institution from the United States which stud-
ies religious issues that intersect with public affairs, indicate that the 
number of Shi‘a Muslims is less than 1% of the total 203 million of 
Indonesian Muslims.
Sunni-Shi‘a Conflict in Bangil
In order to show the dynamics of the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict in Ban-
gil, the description can be divided with regard to two incidents: the 
demonstration on 20 April 2007, and the incident of verbal attacks 
which led to physical clashes on 15 February 2011. Both incidents 
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were outstanding in terms of the number of protesters in the former 
and victims of physical assault and destruction in the latter. 
First Incident: Demonstration on 20 April 2007 
Conflictual relations between Sunnis and Shi‘as in Bangil were 
occurring since the beginning of 2007, and started with pelting the 
house of Habib Ali Ridho, caretaker of the YAPI female boarding 
school. The incident took place in January 2007 at 10:00, and the 
stone pelting was carried out by unidentified persons. The school 
activities remained undisturbed until the 20 April 2007 incident, 
which attracted much more attention in the history of this conflict 
and which was a demonstration against the Shi‘a teachings. 
The course of massive protests was not without preventive ef-
forts. The police officers strived as hard as possible to avoid it by 
assuming persuasive approach on the community forum. The signs 
that the anti-Shi‘a demonstration might take place were already no-
ticed by the police a month earlier. Therefore, the police immediate-
ly initiated meetings with the parties, both the parties to the conflict 
and others concerned about the security in Bangil.
Three meetings were held, all of them upon instigation of the 
police intelligence. In the first meeting, on 21 March 2007, religious 
leaders, leaders of Islamic organizations of Pasuruan, Muspida and 
community leaders were present. The meeting took place at the Pas-
uruan regency office and all of its participants agreed to advocate 
social harmony. Yet it lasted for a limited time.
The second meeting between the Pasuruan police chief and 
PCNU Bangil was held on 7 April 2007. Despite the fact that the 
meeting was designed to discuss the efforts of protecting religious 
life, the participants insisted on expressing their respective views. 
The meeting ended with no agreement.
The third meeting was held on 19 April 2007, at Pasuruan police 
headquarters. It was attended by Muspida, Pasuruan religious lead-
ers (including Shi‘a leaders), and the field commander of the Asso-
ciation of Young Aswaja (HAMAS) Bangil. This meeting, which was 
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aimed at discussing the possibilities to prevent the worst option, 
that is the anti-Shi‘a demonstration, ended with fiasco. The demon-
stration took place the next day, on 20 April 2007. The police au-
thorities, including the police chief, anticipated the demonstration 
and oversaw the location also by installing police tapes to make it 
proceed orderly.
After the Friday prayers, around 1,000 people gathered at first 
at the Bangil main square and then headed towards the office of 
the state attorney, their final destination. Their demand was the dis-
solution of the Shi‘a group. Starting from the Bangil main square, 
they walked to the office of YAPI boarding school, Shi‘a-affiliated 
Mutiara Ilmi Primary School, and while expressing their demands 
through a Bangli radio, they finally reached the state attorney’s of-
fice. Protesters, most of whom were from the NU, were shouting out 
their displeasure with the Shi‘a doctrine.
During the anti-Shi‘a demonstration the weapons included only 
posters, banners and hate speech. Posters and banners carried mes-
sages such as: “Expel from Bangil the followers of Shi‘a teachings,” 
“Don’t pollute the city of Bangil with deviant teachings,” “Shi‘a = 
Jews,” “Mut‘a = Zina,” “Shi‘as allow zina,” or “Shi‘a bastards.” One 
of the protesters yelled in his speech: “The government must imme-
diately dissolve the deviationist Shi‘ism. Clean Bangil from Shi‘as.” 
Despite the tension, the situation did not escalate into open conflict. 
No casualties or damage were recorded. 
The failure of persuasion measures, taken before 20 April, did not 
discourage the Pasuruan police. Main tasks were carried out before 
the demonstration. A number of well-armed police were on guard 
while the Pasuruan police chief negotiated with the protesters and 
tried to persuade them to stop. He did not succeed and the protest 
continued. The demonstrators flooded the main Surabaya-Banyu-
wangi road, disturbed the mobility and caused traffic jams. 
According to police records, the first disruptive action after the 
events of 20 April was the “sweeping” action by a mob of 200 people 
on 27 November 2007. Around 10:30 pm, after the Koranic recitation 
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meeting of Majelis Roudlotussalaf at the house of Habib Umar As-
segaf. They plundered the Shi’a Musala Jumhur, and went to throw 
stones at Shi‘a houses. Although there were no causalities and the 
damages were insignificant, the incident caused the spread of anxi-
ety in the Shi‘a community. 
The police was not silent after that event. The next day, on 28 
November 2007, the district police chief organized a meeting with 
NU Pasuruan, Muspida, community leaders, MUI, Ministry of Re-
ligious Affairs, and Bakorpakem to depress the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict. 
However, according to police records, the results of the meeting did 
not give a solution, because the Shi‘a teachings had to be studied more 
in-depth. Two days later, the police chief again held a meeting with 
NU Pasuruan, Muspida, MUI, Ministry of Religious Affairs, Bakor-
pakem and Shi‘a leaders, during which he appealed to all parties to 
watch their followers and keep the social order in Pasuruan regency.
Stone-pelting incidents were still occurring. On 24 January 2009 
around midnight, unidentified persons threw stones at the house of 
Nuhhabsi, a member of Shi‘a community, and broke the front windows. 
Six months later, on 18 January 2009 at 00:30 am, the stone-pelting 
again took place, this time against the YAPI boarding school for 
girls. As in previous incidents, perpetrators were not identified. 
Nevertheless, the police remained on alert amid the tense situation 
which at any time could lead to escalation between the two parties.
Seven months later, precisely on 16 August 2009, around 00:30 
am, another incident took place. A group of unknown persons 
which numbered around 60 people, rode together on motorcycles to 
disturb the Shi‘a residents, and threw glass bottles of water on the 
security guard of the YAPI male boarding school. 
Throughout 2010, the provocations against the Shi‘a community 
were not as frequent as in previous years. The police have not re-
corded any of such incidents.
Nevertheless, the police kept on coordinating and mobilizing 
support of many parties. From July 2010 until January 2011, the 
police consistently engaged with various groups, not only the two 
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conflicted ones. Based on their records, such steps were repeatedly 
taken in various forms: coordination/meetings, gatherings, social 
campaigns during religious events, awareness campaigns on traf-
fic in which the police distributed free helmets to the members of 
Aswaja group and gave them free service with processing driving 
licences. The police also established the Joint Forum (Forum Bersa-
ma) and the Communication Forum of Muslim Organizations (Fo-
rum Komunikasi Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Islam).
The temporary peacefulness was enjoyed by the Shi‘as and all 
Bangil residents until 14 February 2011, when it was again dis-
turbed. On that day, at 2:30 am, the girls boarding school of YAPI be-
came a target of vandalism. There were no casualties, but the school 
property was destroyed, windows broken. The perpetrators were 
not identified. Having learnt from the cases of attacks which earlier 
took place in other places, such as Cikeusik and Temanggung, the 
police did not want to allow any omissions. They were on standby 
at the girls boarding school of YAPI on the morning of 15 February, 
a day after receiving an information that members of Aswaja group 
would be attending a prelection in Singosari, Malang.
Second Incident: 15 February 2011
The unfriendly attitude towards Shi‘as remained there until the 
second incident, on 15 February 2011. The incident was triggered 
by mutual mocking between the boys of YAPI boarding school and 
the Aswaja group who were returning from their prelection in Sin-
gosari. Before clashing, the Aswaja members started to pelt with 
stones the YAPI students who were playing football in the school-
yard. According to the then East Java police chief, Inspector General 
Badrodin Haiti, who commented on the incident, it was ignited by 
persons who disliked the YAPI, but the attack was not provoked by 
the Aswaja leadership.
As mentioned earlier, the attack on girls school of YAPI was car-
ried out by unidentified persons on 14 February 2011. The distance 
between schools is around four kilometers. There were no casualties 
The Case of Anti-Shi‘a in Bangil, Pasuruan 143
in both incidents, and the attacks did not lead to conflict escalation. 
Night pelting incidents of either stones or eggs had been frequent 
since 2007.
On 15 February 2011, although apparently unplanned by the As-
waja group, the verbal attack which ended up with physical clashes 
took place at the male boarding school of YAPI. Around 2:15 pm, 
about 75 to 100 members of the Aswaja group, on approximately 
50 motorbikes were returning from a religious session (pengajian) in 
Singosari. In the session, although mentioning the Shi‘a community, 
the lecturer did not provoke the group to attack them.
While passing by the male boarding school of YAPI, in Kenep 
village, Beji sub-district, some of them shouted “Shi‘a bastards.” 
The students who heard it while playing football in the schoolyard 
gave a mocking reply. This provoked the Aswaja group who broke 
into the school area and started throwing stones. The YAPI students, 
who numbered around 300, responded by rushing them out of the 
boarding school complex.
Physical clashes subsided around 3:00 pm. The situation re-
turned to order because of the alertness of the security forces. The 
under-cover police members who were stationed at the location, for 
instance, fired warning shots into the air to disperse the attackers. 
The warning shots were enough to make them scared and run away. 
The policemen from other units also turned up. The police chief, 
who happened to be passing by the scene, came to separate the two 
groups. Earlier the police offered protection to YAPI, but it was re-
jected to prevent the students and their parents from becoming ad-
ditionally anxious. 
The following part gives a detailed and chronological descrip-
tion of the clashes between Aswaja and YAPI students on 15 Febru-
ary 2011:
 2:05: a group on motorbikes, dressed in Muslim clothing and 
wearing prayer caps, arrived from the side of Pandaan.
 2:15: during verbal attacks they broke into the boarding school 
complex through the main gate. They attacked the security 
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guard, broke the windows in both the guard post and the guest 
room. To avoid more destruction, the YAPI students were trying 
to chase them away. 
 2:20: physical clashes and mutual stone-pelting was not avoid-
ed; as a result, students and workers of YAPI became victims. 
Having met resistance from the YAPI students, the attackers got 
out from the school complex and the clashes continued outside. 
Among the attackers, there were also casualties. Warning shots 
from the police were heard.
 2:30: police reinforcements of Beji police and Pasuruan police 
helped to restore the order. At the same time, supporters of the 
boarding school started to arrive from other areas. As soon as 
the East Java police chief arrived to the location, direct meetings 
were held with Muspida and YAPI administration.
 3:00: all from the YAPI side who were injured were rushed to 
the Masyitoh Bangil hospital for treatment and medical reports. 
One person was taken to the ophthalmology clinic, Rumah Sakit 
Mata Undaan Surabaya.
As a result of the 15 February incident, nine students and two 
YAPI security guards were injured, some of the school’s facilities 
were damaged, including the guard post. From the attackers side 
two persons were injured (Kabagops Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 
March 2013). Some of the weapons used at the scene were identified 
as batons, stones, and bricks from around the YAPI school. The in-
cident resulted in no fatalities. YAPI had repeatedly been subject to 
small-scale attacks since 2007, and the 15 February incident was the 
first large-scale conflict occurrence.
Aside from restoring the order, the police also initiated criminal 
procedure against six suspects, deployed officers to the areas which 
were considered vulnerable, and carried out persuasive measures 
through meetings, attending haul, staying in good relationships 
with the leaders of Aswaja and of YAPI, and contributing to estab-
lishment of the Communications Forum of Muslim Organizations.
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Dynamics of Policing the Bangil Conflict
Policing Activities
The conflict between Sunnis and Shi‘as in Bangil became sub-
ject to public attention in 2007, after the anti-Shi‘a demonstration 
took place on 20 April 2007. The local police had followed the de-
velopment of the conflict and was physically present at various fo-
rums and meetings even long time before the demonstration took 
place. All of the four policing actions employed run relatively well: 
pre-emptive measures taken by intelligence, prevention when the 
mass mobilization took place, timely response during the incident, 
and legal process after the clashes. 
Intelligence unit was aware of the tensions a few weeks before 
the anti-Shi‘a demonstration on 20 April, and a few days before the 
clashes on 15 February 2011. Before the demonstration, the Pasuruan 
police, upon recommendation of intelligence, organized three meet-
ings with several parties in order to prevent the escalation of con-
flict. The meetings took place on 21 March 2007, 7 April 2007, and 19 
April 2007. Of the three meetings, the last two failed to produce an 
agreement and the demonstration was still held on 20 April.
On 21 March 2007, the district police met with the religious lead-
ers, leaders of Islamic organizations of Pasuruan, Muspida and 
community leaders at the Pasuruan regency office. All of the partici-
pants agreed to advocate social harmony. Yet the results of it did not 
last long. On 7 April 2007, the police chief met with the NU Bangil 
but the meeting failed to produce an agreement on protecting social 
harmony, as all participants insisted on expressing their own views. 
The meeting on 19 April 2007 at Pasuruan police headquartres was 
attended by Muspida, Pasuruan religious leaders (including Shi‘a 
leaders), and HAMAS field commander. The meeting failed to pre-
vent the anti-Shi‘a demonstration which took place the next day. 
The Pasuruan police offered security to YAPI after the stone-pelt-
ing on the female boarding school the night before the 15 February 
incident. The offer, however, was rejected by the YAPI administra-
tion who did not want to make the students and their parents even 
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more anxious (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013; Ja-
jak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).1 The police anyway sent six 
officers (intelligence and Sabhara) wearing plainclothes who stayed 
in the school’s vicinity to guard it in case of the worst scenario tak-
ing place. The police had their own reasons to offer the security. One 
of them was that they feared that the violent conflicts such as those 
in Cikeusik and Temanggung, which took place a few days earlier, 
could also happen in Bangil.
This security precaution seems to have become a “habit” of the 
local police. During important religious celebrations, such as maulid 
and haul habib, the police officers are deployed to several locations 
close to the venue, such as village offices and houses of police mem-
bers, so that they can easily access the events in case something 
happens (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The number of 
policemen varies (once a platoon of police was stationed in a vil-
lage office) and the units involved include Sabhara, intelligence, and 
sometimes mobile brigade.
Throughout the conflict, there were changes in the personnel of 
Pasuruan police, but some of the personnel were not subject to rota-
tions, including the head of operations, Jajak Herawan. He has been 
serving there since 1993, and has been trusted to handle the conflict 
well. In recent years, he has become the communicator between the 
police and especially the Shi‘as. His long experience as a liaison had 
a positive impact on the policing performance of the Pasuruan po-
lice which was successful in preventing the sectarian conflict. As men-
tioned in the ICG report (2012) “[and] members of the police who work 
in the field and are committed to establish good relations, do not have 
much influence because of frequent rotations.” This was confirmed in 
another point of the ICG report (2012) “rotation undermines sustain-
ability of innovations introduced by the members of the police.”
1“Ponpes di Pasuruan Diserang Massa: Kapolda Jatim: Tawaran Pengamanan 
Polisi Ditolak Ponpes,” Detik Surabaya, 15 February 2011, http://surabaya. detik.com/
read/2011/02/15/202509/1571605/475/kapolda-jatim-tawaran-pengamanan-polisidi-
tolak-ponpes (accessed 24 November 2012).
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With regard to precaution measures taken by the police in case 
of mass mobilization, the police were ready and informed in both 
cases, on 20 April 2007 and on 15 February 2011. In the first incident, 
they had knowledge of the mass mobilization from the meetings 
which failed to reach an agreement. In case of the second incident, 
they already knew that the Aswaja group would be attending the 
religious session in Singosari and would return late in the afternoon. 
The information came from the YAPI and from the members of the 
unit deployed in the neighbourhood who contacted the police sta-
tion to notify about the possibility of an open conflict. The mutual 
mocking between the YAPI and Aswaja groups happened when the 
latter were heading to Singosari. This was an early indication of ten-
sions, and this situation was well understood by the police.
To prevent the demonstration on 20 April 2007, the then Pasuru-
an police chief, Boy Rafli Amar, and the vice-regent of Pasuruan, 
Muzammil Shafi’i, tried to persuade the protesters to refrain, but the 
attempts failed. The police sent 400 armed officers and one fire truck 
to guard the demonstration.
On 15 February 2011, two units were deployed to the field from 
the Bangil and Beji police, Pasuruan police and East Java police (Ja-
jak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). Apart from them, the plain-
clothes intelligence officers were also sent to the location.2
Once they arrived, they performed a series of policing actions: 
Intel officers fired shots into the air to disperse the attackers; the 
heads of Sabhara and Binmas together and their staff told the stu-
dents to enter the mosque and classrooms while they sent the Aswa-
ja group back to Bangil; the head of criminal investigations exam-
ined the crime scene, arrested three suspects (three other suspects 
were arrested later), identified witnesses, collected evidence, and 
2“Kasus Lama, Seharusnya Polisi Tahu Penyerang Ponpes Al Ma’hadul,” Detik.
com, 15 February 2011, http://www.yiela.com/view/1619912/kasus-lama-sehar-
usnya-polisi-tahu-penyerang-ponpes-al-ma-hadul (accessed 14 November 2012); 
“Kronologi Penyerangan YAPI,” 16 February 2011, http:// www.yapibangil.org/
Berita-YAPI/kronologi-penyerangan-yapi.html (accessed 9 November 2012).
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secure the scene; the head of traffic control unit and his staff man-
aged the traffic. Later that day, the police approached the leadership 
of Aswaja, who insisted they did not order the group members to 
attack the YAPI school.
In addition to that, the district and the sub-district police chief 
helped in the police action at the location. As the incident occurred at 
the time when the Pasuruan police chief arrived, he immediately in-
tervened trying to pacify both groups which were throwing stones. 
Then, he ordered the head of operations and the head of police inte-
grated service (SPKT) to arrive at the scene with one company-level 
unit (SSK, 180-250 officers) of Polres Siaga, one platoon-level unit 
(SST, 30-50 officers) of Polres Sabhara, as well as 160 police officers 
from the nearest police stations, that is from Bangil and Beji. He also 
requested assistance from Mobile Brigade Unit and Sabhara Direc-
torate of the East Java police for these items: two SSKs of mobile 
brigade, one SSK of Sabhara, two units of Desist Detachement (Da-
tasemen Tangkal); one SST of Gegana; two tactical cars (kendaraan 
taktis, Rantis), and one watercannon unit.
The Pasuruan police chief reported to the East Java police 
chief on the situation at the location. Besides, he also coordinated 
with religious leaders, Muspida and community leaders, includ-
ing: the head of NU, K.H. Sonhaji; the head of MUI, K.H. Nurul 
Huda; and a religious leader K.H. Khoiron Syakur. The police 
chief requested them to arrive at the location in order to devise 
the next steps for persuasive measures. At the same time, the 
police chief of Beji actively participated in helping victims and 
then taking them to the hospital, where he was accompanied by 
criminal investigation officers who was also looking for Visum at 
Repertum (VER). At 5:00 pm, the police chief of East Java arrived 
at the location.
After the incident, the police conducted three important actions. 
First, law enforcement: based on the article 170 of the Criminal 
Code, the police processed the reports of alleged criminal acts in the 
form of violence against persons or property; examined the crime 
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scene; examined the witnesses; detained six suspects; prepared case 
files; and submitted the suspects and evidence to the public prose-
cutor on 24 February 2011. The whole process was relatively fast and 
unhindered, and it took only nine days since the incident. Second, in 
four places which were considered as possible locations for further 
escalation, the police deployed its officers to guard, monitor and 
observe: both the male and female schools of YAPI; the Pasuruan 
police headquarters; and the vicinity of the scene of the most recent 
clashes.
Third, the police continued opening the line of communication, 
particularly through joint meetings, between the two conflicted 
groups and with other socially influential parties. The meetings 
were held for several weeks, the first one in the evening on 15 Feb-
ruary (police records show that the last meeting took place on 22 
March 2011). There were various participants, among them the reli-
gious leaders of the two conflicted groups, the leaders of NU, Mu-
hammadiyah, MUI, FKUB, administration of the boarding schools, 
community leaders, and students’ parents. Police also socialized 
and continued campaigning for a safe and peaceful community 
life during the events of haul and meetings with the leadership of 
the local religious schools. On the 15 February meeting, which was 
attended by the East Java police chief, Muspida, religious leaders, 
and community leaders, all agreed that the police should process 
the case in accordance with law, the religious leaders should con-
trol their followers, and the media should promote peace-building 
advocacy.
In conclusion, the main policing activities (pre-emptive intel-
ligence, prevention upon the occurrence of mass mobilization, 
response/counter measures at the time of the incident, legal pro-
cess after clashes) were all executed properly. That is, these ac-
tions were coordinated well by the police units and the number 
of troops deployed was neither excessive nor too little. The Pas-
uruan police performance can be a role model for dealing with 
sectarian conflicts.
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Police Knowledge
The police knowledge of the legal and procedural framework 
as well as of the occurring religious conflicts is important for pro-
cessing information related to policing. The police of Pasuruan 
had enough knowledge, both in terms of quality and quantity. 
This knowledge they used well and were able to determine the 
seriousness of the situation which threatened security and public 
order in Bangil.
In the context of sectarian conflicts, the legal and procedural 
framework refers to the Act No. 1/PNPS 1965 on abuse of reli-
gion and/or blasphemy and the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 
2009 on implementation of the principles and standards of hu-
man rights in the duties of police, as well as appropriate fixed 
procedures. The police apparatus knew the act, the regulation 
and the procedures (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). 
Police officers also knew and understood that the inherent rights 
of every individual must not be reduced, restricted, or revoked. 
These rights include the freedom of religion and worship in ac-
cordance with one’s religion, freedom to believe, and freedom of 
conscience, thus “[based on constitution] the state cannot prohib-
it Shi‘as from professing their faith” (Kabagops Jajak Herawan, 
interview, 27 March 2013).
In matters of human rights, which are explicitly stated in the Po-
lice Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009, the local police officers under-
stood the meaning of protection of personal liberties, the right to 
security, and the special rights of minorities, and they carried out 
this task as good as possible. Human rights, democracy, or freedom 
of religion, told Jajak Herawan, were usually discussed during the 
morning meetings. And, he pointed: “We are to protect, we are pub-
lic servants and law enforcement agency. We must protect everyone, 
even murderers or prostitutes.”
In connection with the police understanding of the sectarian 
conflict in Bangil, the police had adequate knowledge of local is-
sues, especially the Pasuruan police whose personnel had been long 
The Case of Anti-Shi‘a in Bangil, Pasuruan 151
serving in the region. One of them is Jajak Herawan who later was 
given the responsibility of bridging the communication between the 
police and particularly the YAPI.
According to Jajak Herawan, the conflict involving the groups 
of YAPI (Shi‘a) and Aswaja (Sunni) occurred because one group 
disliked the other. The police on various occasions requested both 
groups to restrain themselves and be tolerant (Jajak Herawan, inter-
view, 27 March 2013). Amid religious disputes, the local police were 
fully aware that their position and duties could not be determined 
by their own religious identity, and had to be in line with human 
rights and values of democracy. “We are in charge of keeping se-
curity. Many of us belong to NU. We fear of being provoked, and 
we are also anxious about fanatics. We must not let any of our staff 
become influenced [by them]. They also listen to the Aswaja prelec-
tions. [But] this is none of our business, our business is security” 
(Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).
Realizing the threat of implications of the conflict, the police very 
early saw the signs in the community that indicated the possibly of 
tensions turning into clashes, and was therefore ready to anticipate 
it. Before the 20 April 2007 demonstration, the police continued with 
persuasive measures and communication with parties who cared 
for social harmony in Bangil. Once the persuasion failed, including 
negotiations on the demonstration day, the police deployed 400 per-
sonnel, completely armed with weapons, and a fire truck to guard 
the demonstration which was expected to attract thousands of peo-
ple.
For the 15 February incident, the police already predicted the 
tensions since they knew of the Aswaja group plans to attend the 
prelection in Singosari. The police were convinced that extra securi-
ty was needed at the boarding school after the night assault incident 
on the female school of YAPI, and with the incidents in Cikeusik 
and Temanggung which took place a few days earlier. The police 
sent six officers wearing plainclothes who stayed on guard in the 
school’s vicinity.
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When the attackers fled, the police officers remain alert, suggest-
ing that they have worked appropriately and in accordance with 
the fixed procedures. They continued to carry out their duties and 
responsibilities to protect the public, even though the crisis situation 
already ended. Aside from processing the criminal aspects of the 
perpetrators’ actions, the police guarded four locations that were 
considered vulnerable: both boarding schools of YAPI, Pasuru-
an police headquarters, and the area around the incident location. 
Through joint meetings the police also continued carrying out the 
measures of persuasion and communication with both parties to the 
conflict, local elites, and the members of the community. According 
to Jajak Herawan, policing actions were appropriate (interview, 27 
March 2013).
The success rate of policing in Bangil was influenced by the 
support of other parties outside the conflicted groups, such as NU, 
MUI, media, government, local parliament, FKUB, youth organiza-
tions/NGOs. Also the Aswaja and YAPI to some extent were ready 
to cooperate with the police. On the other hand, there were religious 
sessions and lectures which incited hatred. Such lectures can easily 
ignite emotions and mass mobilization. Therefore, the police always 
requested the speakers not to air provocative messages. Sometimes 
the police requests succeeded, sometimes they failed.
To conclude, the Pasuruan police and the district and sub-dis-
trict police under it had a good understanding of the legal frame-
work and procedures which they had to follow in their duties. They 
subscribe to the provisions given in the constitution, including the 
protection of the right to choose and follow a particular religion or 
beliefs. Aside from these, the police had adequate knowledge of lo-
cal issues and the conflict, which they took into account in policing 
actions and in estimating the level of threat. The success of policing 
was also inseparable from the cooperation with the government and 
other groups. The conflicted parties also did not have much choice 
but to obey the law.
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Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
Legal framework refers to the legal framework of policing reli-
gious issues, such as the act on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy, 
regulations which outline the responsibilities of the police in pro-
tecting religious freedom in Indonesia, and the police regulations 
and fixed procedures. Policing religious conflict in Bangil also fol-
lowed these regulations.
The Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 on abuse of religion and/or blas-
phemy is by many perceived as a legal tool for justifying violence 
against other religious groups, especially minorities. The revision of 
the law is difficult because the Constitutional Court needs to take 
the middle way. In other words, the Constitutional Court feels it 
must accommodate it with the facts of religious life in a country 
where Islamic values are professed by the majority of the popula-
tion (Muktiono 2012; Margiyono, et al. 2010). Various groups and 
individuals, including the former President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
have requested the Court to review this law on 9 February 2010, but 
the Court, in its decision of 19 April 2010, found that the law was 
constitutional (Marshall and Shea 2011, 159).
While the above Act is used by many to persecute groups ac-
cused of heresy, the Pasuruan police is consistently committed to the 
highest legal reference in Indonesia. According to Jajak Herawan, 
the police work related to faith-based conflicts takes the constitu-
tion as its reference (interview, 27 March 2013). The constitution of 
Indonesia says that the state cannot prohibit anyone from adhering 
to their respective beliefs. Consistency and commitment of law en-
forcement officers in Pasuruan to follow the constitution is an excel-
lent example of how it is perceived as the basis for the police vision 
and mission in dealing with sectarian conflicts.
In addition to the legal framework which governs religious af-
fairs, the police also used regulations and procedures as a frame-
work of policing in the field. The police chief may issue specific pro-
cedures in line with the law. An example of police action based on 
such procedures was the security operations after the 15 February 
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incident, based on the Protap/ III/2011. According to this proce-
dure, officers had to perform security measures as follows:
1. When there are no teaching activities: (a) at YAPI female school, 
one SSR (20 people) of Sabhara sub-district police is deployed to 
guard it 24 hours, two members of intelligence and two members 
of Mobile Detective Unit (Buser) carry out surveillance with one 
SSR of Sabhara patrol; (b) at YAPI male school, one SSR of Sabhara 
is deployed to guard 24 hours, two members of intelligence and 
two members of Buser conduct observations, with one SSR of 
Sabhara patrol; (c) patrol vehicle is parked in front of the school.
2. When there are teaching activities: (a) at YAPI female school, 
one SSR of Sabhara sub-district police is deployed to guard it 24 
hours, two members of intelligence and two members of Buser 
carry out surveillance; (b) at YAPI male school, one SST of mobile 
brigade and one SSR of Sabhara sub-district police are deployed 
to guard it 24 hours, two members of intelligence and two Buser 
members carry out surveillance; (c) patrol and mobile brigade 
vehicle is parked in front of the school; (d) one SST of Sabhara; 
(e) one SST of mobile brigade.
In conclusion, the priorities of the Pasuruan police were based on 
the constitution of 1945 and supported by fixed procedures. Police 
managed to uphold them in all policing actions, regardless of the 
Act No. 1/PNPS/1965 and the fatwa of East Java MUI according to 
which the Shi‘a teachings were deviationist.
Police culture
Police culture discussed here refers to two kinds of culture, the 
democratic culture of the police and the professional culture of the 
police. The first one refers to the Pasuruan police officers views on 
issues pertaining to democracy, human rights, religious freedom, 
and tolerance. The latter refers to their views on their role in the 
increasingly democratic Indonesian society and their views on the 
actors of conflict in Bangil.
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In general, in their perceptions on the issues of democracy, hu-
man rights, religious freedom, and tolerance, the police officers are 
supportive. Moreover, in the present period of transition to democ-
racy, these issues cannot be neglected, and the police needs to adapt 
to changes in the social system which is now becoming more dem-
ocratic. The evidence of this is the introduction of the principles of 
democracy and human rights (including religious freedom) to the 
police regulations and procedures. According to Nanan Soekarna, 
deputy chief of Indonesian National police, “[The meaning of dem-
ocratic policing is that the police] are subject to the principles of de-
mocracy and good governance and they conduct modern policing 
(community policing).”3
The idea that the police are subject to the principles of democracy 
and good governance and that they should conduct modern polic-
ing often stands in contradiction with the facts. The social problems 
considered “sensitive” in many ways make the police attitude seem 
ambiguous (always swiftly and firmly cracking down on perpetra-
tors in criminal cases; hesitating in sensitive cases). In some of the 
recent cases, they often sided with the majority groups which were 
the ones who clearly violated the principles of democracy and good 
governance (see Kontras 2012a).
In the context of the conflict between Sunnis and Shi‘as in Bangil, 
the perceptions of the police, with regard to their role in the public 
life of increasingly democratic Indonesia, were positive. There are 
more than a few policies or laws in Indonesia that are considered 
the source of the problem: in case of sectarianism especially the Act 
No. 1/PNPS/1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy, and in 
case of construction of places of worship, the joint decree (SKB) of 
two ministers. Despite all these, the local police firmly relied on the 
3A statement made in a lecture titled “Democratic Policing: Implementing Communi-
ty Policing Program,” organized by the Department of Criminology, University of In-
donesia, in March 2012. See “Bahas Polisi Demokrasi, UI Hadirkan Wakapolri,” Oke-
zone, 21 March 2012, http://kampus. okezone.com/read/2012/03/21/373/597643/
bahas-polisi-demokrasi-ui-hadirkan-wakapolri (accessed 6 December 2012).
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general principles of democracy and human rights as enshrined in 
the 1945 Constitution.
With regard to the actors involved in the Bagil conflict, the po-
lice believed that both groups could coexist and that different be-
liefs did not have to make them live apart (Jajak Herawan, inter-
view, 27 March 2013). In order to avoid biases, the police performed 
problem-oriented policing, which was not aimed at handling what 
was in the interests of just one of the parties to the conflict. In other 
words, the police officers upheld the principle of neutrality. In his 
response to one of the YAPI administrators who was urging that 
perpetrators in Bangli conflict be arrested, the then East Java police 
chief, Badrodin Haiti, replied raising his voice: “Even if not request-
ed to, I will still capture the culprits.”4
The local police well understood that the measures they took 
could send a certain message to the public and that they had to be 
careful in order to avoid the bias. Although under majority pressure, 
they consistently and strongly believed that partisanship would 
only complicate the conflict. Thus, according to Jajak Herawan, the 
police provided security for both parties when their religious activi-
ties took place, and they kept distance from each group, not willing 
to appear as if favouring one of them. When invited to participate 
in various events, the police as representatives of the security forces 
would not give speeches but would request the military to do so. 
Sometimes the police would come late to avoid giving a speech at 
the beginning of the meeting, so as not to be identified with any of 
the groups.
The police generally knew what must be done in accordance 
with the principles of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, 
and tolerance, and in particular how to provide protection to groups 
which could clash because of different beliefs. In addition, there was 
4“Pesantren di Pasuruan Diserang, Ulama-Polisi Bergerak Cepat,” Antara, 16 
February 2011, http://www.yiela.com/view/1620367/pesantren-di-pasuruan-dis-
erang-ulama-polisi-bergerak-cepat (accessed 14 November 2012).
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also the professional culture of the police. One attitude that strongly 
indicates professionalism is that they worked based on the principle 
of neutrality and performed problem-oriented policing. In the fol-
lowing part, it will be visible that the police in Pasuruan could act in 
accordance with their understanding of human rights and democra-
cy due to the support of the wider community.
Local politics
Local politics refers to policies at the level of provinces and cit-
ies/regencies which regulate the matters relating to the practice of 
religion/beliefs and the attitudes of policy makers at the local level 
(local government and parliament) towards the increasing conflict. 
Written policies of local governments adhere to the East Java Gover-
nor’s Regulation No. 55/2012 on the overseeing of religious activities 
and supervision of deviationist cults in East Java, which basically serves 
controlling “cults” considered as heretical by the MUI or similar reli-
gious institutions. Yet the attitudes of the Pasuruan regent and parlia-
ment tended to support efforts aimed at establishing peace in Pasuru-
an. In this sense, they shared the interests of the local police who sought 
to maintain security for the sake of peace. The governor’s regulation 
and a fatwa which banned the Shi‘a teachings did not influence the 
police responsibility to protect the citizens’ religious rights and the 
rights of minorities (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013).
The latest campaign of the Aswaja group was putting up banners 
at several places in Bangil which later were removed by the local 
government. The banners were quoting the fatwa of the MUI East 
Java which stated that Shi‘a teachings were deviationist. It must be 
kept in mind that the MUI East Java was the only branch of the MUI 
which issued a fatwa banning the Shi‘a teachings.5 The police regret-
ted that such a fatwa was issued and asked the Kesbangpol and Lin-
mas Pasuruan to remove from the Pasuruan main square the ban-
5For the study showing the impact of fatwas on religious intolerance and violence 
in Indonesia, see Assyaukanie (2009).
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ners which contained it (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). 
“It’s OK to put up a banners, but don’t let those banners disturb 
or agitate others,” said the Pasuruan regent, Dade Angga.6 When 
the banners were installed, the Regional Leadership Forum (Forum 
Pimpinan Daerah, Forpimda) and other organizations controlled 
the situation and the disturbing banners were removed.
If we compare the attitudes of the Sampang regent and the regent 
of Pasuruan who both faced the Sunni-Shi‘a conflict, the Pasuruan 
regent’s approach was clearly and decisively against all forms of 
violence, also in the name of religion. On the contrary, the Sampang 
regent, Noer Tjahja, several times delivered speeches which con-
tained hateful messages against the Shi‘as. He also asked the police 
and the military to expel the Shi‘a community from Sampang. Such 
messages threaten Indonesian pluralism.
Apart from taking part in the Forpimda, the regent of Pasuruan 
showed the commitment to peace-building in the region by partic-
ipating in other forums held before the demonstration on 20 April 
2007. On the day, he took part in a meeting at the Pasuruan regency 
office between the police and religious leaders, leaders of Islamic or-
ganizations of Pasuruan, Muspida and community leaders who all 
agreed to advocate social harmony. On 19 April 2007, he also partic-
ipated in a meeting between the police, Muspida, community lead-
ers, Pasuruan religious leaders and HAMAS. Although this meeting 
failed to dissuade the protesters, the police anticipated their demon-
stration and guarded the streets of Pasuruan.
In an important meeting after the 15 February 2011 incident, i.e. 
the Joint Forum (Forum Bersama) meeting on 3 March 2011, the re-
gent was also present along with the Muspida, religious leaders, 
community leaders, and YAPI. The representatives of Aswaja did 
not show up. The meeting resulted in significant agreements, 11 of 
which are presented below:
6“Spanduk Fatwa MUI Soal Syiah, Mengusik Warga Pasuruan,” wartapasuru-
an.com, 9 May 2012, http://www.wartapasuruan.com/2012/05/09/spanduk- fat-
wa-mui-soal-syiah-mengusik-warga-pasuruan/ (accessed 23 November 2012).
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a. Peace and order are conditions expected by the residents of Pas-
uruan regency. Therefore, all parties must actively participate [to 
achieve them].
b. In all social activities, both individual and group ones, the aspect 
of security and order must with no exception be taken into account.
c. The use of loudspeakers in religious sessions must not allow ex-
cessive volume so as not to disturb the peace and quiet of the 
neighbourhood.
d. It is forbidden to abuse or offend other religions, groups, and 
[religious] interpretations. 
e. Religious speeches must not provoke others.
f. Not to impose one’s religious beliefs on others who have their own.
g. It is forbidden to organize marches, convoys or processions with 
sticks or other tools which according to the police may disturb 
security.
h. In an event of disagreement or misunderstanding, the settlement 
should be reached through dialogue, avoiding violence and, if 
needed, with assistance of Forum Bersama.
i. For closing roads must be obtained permission from the police, after a 
recommendation from the local neighbourhood authorities is issued.
j. Supervision of implementation [of these points] will be carried 
out by Forum Bersama which is granted authority to reprimand, 
to warn and to stop the activities in question. 
k. In case teaching activities violate the law, all parties agree to be 
subject to the existing law. 
The parliament of Pasuruan also supported the peace-building 
efforts. “I hope all parties will remain calm, not agitated but still 
thinking critically, so that none of us would be manipulated or eas-
ily provoked,” commented Bambang Soesatyo, member of the III 
Commission of the DPRD from the Golkar party.7 The comment of 
7“Pesantren di Pasuruan Diserang, Ulama-Polisi Bergerak Cepat,” Antara, 16 
February 2011, http://www.yiela.com/view/1620367/pesantren-di-pasuruan- dis-
erang-ulama-polisi-bergerak-cepat (accessed 14 November 2012).
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the legislator was in tune with the approach of the chairman of the 
Pasuruan parliament, Irsyad Yusuf. At the meeting attended by For-
pimda and organizations mentioned above, Irsyad Yusuf approved 
the 11 points of the agreement: “The parliament accepts. It is for 
keeping the conducive situation in the region.”8
Contrary to the results of police analysis, the Minister of Religious 
Affairs, Suryadharma Ali, stated: “I received an information that the 
event in Pasuruan was just an ordinary brawl between students.”9 This 
view was disconnected from the reality and showed the attitude of 
denial in order to wash one’s hands and avoid responsibility.
In conclusion, the policing became positive because of the 
healthy attitudes of the regent, the vice-regent, and the local parlia-
ment. Regional leaders were active in attending coordination meet-
ings with the police and urged the public to express their aspira-
tions in a right way, and the parliament to support Forum Bersama. 
They were united for the safe and peaceful Pasuruan. The East Java 
Governor’s Regulation No. 55 of 2012 on the overseeing of religious 
activities and supervision of deviationist cults in East Java and the 
fatwa of the MUI East Java, did not affect the decisions of the regent 
and the local parliament. In these circumstances, the police could 
work in accordance with the constitution to protect the freedom of 
religion in Pasuruan, regardless of governor’s regulation or the MUI 
East Java fatwa.
Public Opinion
Public opinion in the context of the sectarian conflict in Bangil is 
associated with the views of religious leaders, leaders of religious 
organizations, representatives of FKUB, youth organizations, and 
8“Spanduk Fatwa ‘Syiah Sesat’ Beredar, Forminda Rapatkan Barisan,” berita-
jatim.com, 9 May 2012, http://www.beritajatim.com/detailnews.php/8/ Peristi-
wa/2012-05-09/134979/Spanduk_Fatwa_%27Syiah_Sesat%27_Beredar,_ Formin-
da_Rapatkan_Barisan (accessed 2 December 2012).
9“Menag: Insiden Pasuruan Hanya Tawuran,” Liputan6.com, 16 February 2011, 
http://www.yiela.com/view/1621245/menag-insiden-pasuruan-hanya-tawuran- 
(accessed 14 November 2012).
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local media on the conflict and on the policing action. Opinion on 
both issues in Pasuruan was generally positive, as was indicated by 
the statements of various parties in the mass media, interviews, or 
written data which were all gathered by the research team during 
fieldwork.
Views of the local ulama, religious leaders, and leaders of local 
religious organizations on the Shi‘a and Sunni relations tended to be 
tolerant. Religious leaders unrelated to YAPI and Aswaja attended 
the meeting on 15 February where it was decided that the parties to 
the conflict should submit to the police. Ulama from Sidogiri board-
ing school, Kraton district, also participated in the meeting held on 
16 February 2011. MUI Pasuruan representative was present at the 
Forum Bersama on 3 March 2011. In both meetings it was request-
ed that all members of the society, including the conflicted groups 
maintain peace in Pasuruan.
Leaders of the NU and Muhammadiyah took part in mitigating 
the atmosphere. Chairman of the NU, K.H. Hasyim Muzadi, con-
tacted Kapolwil Malang, Syafrizal Ahiar, to resolve the situation in 
Bangil when the anti-Shi‘a protests were taking place on 20 April 
2007. Leaders of both organizations also took part in the closed 
meeting with Muspida, one day after the events of 15 February 
2011.10 These steps aimed to achieve peace and security in Pasuruan. 
The Muhammadiyah and NU also cooperated with the police and 
local government by reducing tensions in the community, and dis-
tancing themselves from the Aswaja group (secretary of FKUB Pas-
uruan, interview, 1 March 2013; Ustad Muhsin Assegaf, interview, 
27 March 2013). According to both respondents, the Shi‘as generally 
perceived the NU and Muhammadiyah as unrelated to the intoler-
ant Aswaja.
The response of the central MUI was also positive: “Do not allow 
violence, differences should be resolved through dialogue, especial-
10“Pesantren di Pasuruan Diserang, Ulama-Polisi Bergerak Cepat,” Antara, 16 
February 2011, http://www.yiela.com/view/1620367/pesantren-di-pasuruan-dis-
erang-ulama-polisi-bergerak-cepat (accessed 14 November 2012).
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ly differences between Muslims, not by attacking each other,” said the 
MUI chairman K.H. Ma‘ruf Amin.11 At the same time, the MUI Pasuru-
an was generally cooperating with the police and local government 
in order to maintain peace. Privately some of the Pasuruan ulama, 
including those of the MUI, considered the Shi‘a and some other 
Islamic movements such as the Ahmadiyya and Hizbut Tahrir Indo-
nesia as deviationist, but as an institution and for the sake of pub-
lic life in Pasuruan, they showed a tolerant attitude towards Shi‘as, 
who were the most prominent of all minority groups in the regency 
(chairman of the MUI Pasuruan, interview, 1 March 2013).
Apart from the ulama and religious organizations, the atti-
tude of the youth activists and NGO groups in Bangil was also 
pro-peace. The chairman of the Ansor Youth in Bangil, Samsul 
Hidayat, stated: “We strongly condemn the attack. When under-
standings are different, still [violence is] not justified. Because Is-
lam does not teach violence.”12 A similar statement was delivered 
by Bambang Ju, representative of the nationalist United Indone-
sia Movement (Gerakan Indonesia Bersatu) who in his speech 
asserted that: “We should not demand it from the authorities, it 
is our own obligation to maintain the integrity of the Republic 
of Indonesia.”13 The speech was delivered during the peaceful 
demonstration in front of the Pasuruan police station and in front 
of the YAPI school, a day after the incident. 
The opinion of the FKUB Pasuruan was also important for main-
taining harmony. They cooperated with the police and local gov-
11“MUI Sesalkan Penyerangan Pesantren Yapi,” Kompas, 16 February 2011, 
http://www.yiela.com/view/1620660/mui-sesalkan-penyerangan-pesantren-yapi 
(accessed 14 November 2012).
12“Ponpes di Pasuruan Diserang Massa: Ansor Desak Polisi Tangkap Aktor Uta-
ma Penyerangan,” detikSurabaya, 15 February 2011, http://surabaya.detik. com/
read/2011/02/15/211137/1571612/475/ansor-desak-polisi-tangkap- aktor-uta-
ma-penyerangan (accessed 23 November 2012).
13“Ponpes di Pasuruan Diserang: Prihatin Aksi Kekerasan, Massa GIB akan Demo 
Polres Pasuruan,” detikSurabaya, 16 February 2011, http://surabaya.detik.com/read
/2011/02/16/161706/1572174/475/prihatin-aksi-kekerasan-massa-gib-akan-de-
mo-polres-pasuruan (accessed 23 November 2012).
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ernment and always voiced the spirit of tolerance amid differenc-
es (secretary of the FKUB Pasuruan, interview, 1 March 2013). The 
FKUB’s relationship with the YAPI administration was also good. 
The media as well through their news coverage provided support 
when the local government and police asked them not to heat up 
the situation.
As already mentioned above, the public perception of the Sun-
ni-Shi‘a conflict and policing activities in Bangil was constructive. 
By the public we mean the local ulama, the NU and its regional 
branches, the MUI and the MUI Pasuruan, the FKUB Pasuruan, 
Ansor Youth in Bangil, United Indonesia Movement, and the mass 
media. Some of them coordinated with each other and did not hesi-
tate to turn the matter entirely to the police. There was trust in their 
relationship with the police.
Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict
Police interaction with the parties to the conflict is portrayed 
by the police intervention and reaction. In case of Bangil, the po-
lice reaction indicated they understood why the conflict occurred 
and could well determine the chronology of events involving both 
groups. In summary, the police described the conflict as recurrent. 
The most frequent forms of it included (a) mocking, (b) hate speech 
in religious lectures, (c) stone-pelting, and (d) clashes (Jajak Her-
awan, interview, 27 March 2013). The conflict was recurring because 
one of the parties, Aswaja, continued to have provocative and intim-
idating lectures against Shi ‘as (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 
March 2013).
The police conducted a series of efforts to solve the conflict and 
prevent escalation. Some of them included coordination with Mus-
pida and the military, holding meetings with the warring parties, 
maintaining good relations with the Aswaja group by distributing 
to them free helmets and providing free services for obtaining driv-
ing licences. During the incident on 15 February 2011, the policing 
action covered all stages, from persuasion to the legal process. The 
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts164
conflict escalated but it lasted short and the wide-scale violence was 
prevented by placing police officers at the scene, and immediately 
deploying additional personnel to stop the clashes (Jajak Herawan, 
interview, 27 March 2013).
In addition to the police reaction to the conflict, the interac-
tions can also be seen from the police action before, during, and 
after the occurrence of violence. The interaction between the po-
lice and victims, as well as between the police and perpetrators, 
was limited to the police duties and responsibilities in Bangil. 
Based on the information delivered by victims, the police knew 
that Aswaja group would attend the prelection in Singosari, but it 
did not expect the clashes at the boarding school on that day. The 
Aswaja group left for Singosari through another way, not passing 
by the YAPI male school in Beji (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 
27 March 2013; Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The vic-
tims also reported to the police that YAPI was repeatedly intimi-
dated. The police responded by offering guards but the offer was 
rejected by the school which did not want to worry its students 
and their parents. The police then provided a minimal guard with 
plainclothes officers (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 
2013; Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). The victims were 
aware of the police presence before, during, and after the clashes. 
The police intelligence officer fired his gun into the air to disperse 
the attackers who broke into the boarding school area. According 
to the victims, the police managed to prevent the violent conflict 
from expanding.
While handling the Bangil case, the police neither defended the 
YAPI nor did they have a specific and beneficial relationship with 
the Aswaja, who even accused the police of siding with YAPI by 
providing them excessive security — according to the police, these 
allegations were not true (Jajak Herawan, interview, 27 March 2013). 
The name of Aswaja for the first time was mentioned by the YAPI 
speaker, Muhammad Alwi, who remembered that when the female 
school Al Ma’hadul Islam was damaged in 2007, the perpetrators 
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used Aswaja Bangil attributes.14 That case was reported to the po-
lice.15
The number of Aswaja members is relatively small. They are 
radical and come from various backgrounds, not all from the NU 
(Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013; Jajak Herawan, 
interview, 27 March 2013).16 The incidents in which Aswaja were in-
volved generally included pelting and intimidation (Ustad Muhsin 
Asegaf, interview, 27 March 2013). The first of their attacks which 
resulted in damage, though minor, was against the female boarding 
school of YAPI in 2007. They tended to use aggressive or confronta-
tional tactics in the conflict, such as intimidation, mocking, pelting, 
and damaging property (Ustad Muhsin Asegaf, interview, 27 March 
2013).17 Their involvement in the sectarian conflict in Bangil is now 
a history.
From the earlier descriptions it can be concluded that the police 
reaction to the conflict showed that the police had good knowledge 
of the conflict dynamics. Police intervention was tactically adjusted 
to the situation encountered before, during, and after the conflict. 
Police worked in accordance with its duties and procedures while 
approaching the victims and the perpetrators. They processed every 
report submitted by the victims and took necessary action, their ap-
proach to the parties to the conflict was persuasive, and certainly 
not one-sided.
14“Ponpes Yapi Sebelumnya Sudah Pernah Diserang 2007 Lalu, Namun Polisi 
Lakukan Pembiaran,” Republika, 16 Feburary 2011, http://www.rimanews.com/ 
read/20110216/16884/ponpes-yapi-sebelumnya-sudah-pernah-diserang-2007-la-
lu-namun-polisi-lakukan (accessed 15 November 2012).
15“Ponpes Yapi Sebelumnya Sudah Pernah Diserang 2007 Lalu, Namun Polisi 
Lakukan Pembiaran.”
16“Penyerangan Yapi karena Perbedaan Madzhab,” Antara, 16 February 2011, http://
www.yiela.com/view/1620547/penyerangan-yapi-karena-perbedaan-madzhab (ac-
cessed 15 November 2012).
17“Ponpes Yapi Sebelumnya Sudah Pernah Diserang 2007 Lalu, Namun Polisi 
Lakukan Pembiaran.”
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Conclusions
Policing of the conflict involving the YAPI (Shi‘a) group and the 
Aswaja (Sunni) group in Bangil was successful. The police man-
aged to reduce unilateral and recurrent anti-Shi‘a provocations 
which peaked in an incident of insults that lead to clashes but were 
promptly addressed so there was no wider escalation. This success 
was due to policing strategies and commitment of the police to per-
form their obligations to serve and protect the public.
Policing strategies are understood as follows. First, the police 
officers always relied on communication, coordination and cooper-
ation. Communication and cooperation were constant (although it 
happened that the results were not as expected, like it was ahead of 
the demonstration on 20th April 2007) and carried out before, dur-
ing, and after the incident. Forms of communication and cooper-
ation in general included negotiations, hearings, gatherings/haul, 
meetings, and forums.
With the strategy of coordination and cooperation, the police 
did not work alone and, most importantly, this strategy gave a clear 
message that the sectarian conflict in Bangil was a problem which 
had to be addressed jointly by all parties. Second, the placement of 
officers at their posts for a longer time, without rotations, gave them 
enough time to allow the “go native” approach whereby the officers 
could gain local knowledge, develop new solutions for problem 
solving, and become communicators who could bridge the police 
with society as did Jajak Herawan who started working at Bangil 
police and with the Shi‘a community in 1993.
Good performance of Pasuruan police in dealing with the con-
flict cannot be separated from a number of important commitments 
which they held throughout the whole process. They faithfully fol-
lowed their responsibilities in line with the constitution, not other 
legal products. Working with the fixed procedures governing their 
duties in the context of policing religious conflicts (and being sensi-
tive to the contagious effects of conflicts in other places) was to the 
advantage of their performance. Another, not less important, com-
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mitment was maintaining the principle of neutrality. In the context 
of turbulent majority-minority relations, they were well aware that 
disproportionate actions or statements would be likely to be per-
ceived as bias. Therefore, they kept distance from both parties to the 
conflict.
Another important lesson: policing strategy would become light-
er and easier if the warring parties, in this case the YAPI and the As-
waja group, were willing to cooperate with the police. Both of them 
to a certain level were. The existence and the positive role of other 
parties in overseeing the conflict contributed to creation of a more 
conducive atmosphere. In Bangil and Pasuruan, there were many 
people who contributed to this: the mass media, FKUB, the local 
parliament, the local government, religious leaders and leaders of 
religious organizations such as the NU, Muhammadiyah, and the 
MUI, the community leaders from Muspida, and the youth organi-
zations such as Ansor and United Indonesia Movement.
This success story indicates positive prospects for policing of sec-
tarian conflicts. Sectarian conflicts are a sensitive issue which Indo-
nesian police usually fails to handle. A recommendation for policing 
in Bangil would be retaining the policing strategies and commit-
ment they have been applying so far and strengthening them with 
knowledge of conflict resolution. Aspects of the conflict (the conta-
gious effects of the conflict, the phases of the conflict, etc.) and its 
resolution (effective communication, negotiation, facilitation, prob-
lem solving, etc.) are very relevant and important, although not the 
most important of police tasks as is the law enforcement. In addition 
to this, the police cannot work alone and is not supposed to work 
alone, especially in case of religious conflicts which can easily stir 
up communal anger and mobilize masses. The wider the network-
ing and cooperation, also with the warring parties, the easier the 
police duties in dealing with sectarian conflicts.***
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OVER PLACES OF WORSHIP: 
THE CASE OF HKBP FILADELFIA CHURCH,
BEKASI
Foreword
The conflict over the construction of the Batak Christian Prot-
estant Church (Huria Kristen Batak Protestan, HKBP) Filadelfia in 
Jejalen Jaya village, Tambun Utara district, Bekasi regency began in 
2007. When the results of this research were compiled in November 
2013, there were no signs of the conflict to end. The HKBP Filadelfia 
congregation was still using the location for their religious purpos-
es, while the local residents were rejecting their right to do so.
Although there have been several incidents of clashes between 
the members of HKBP and local residents, so far the security forces 
were able to prevent the tensions from escalating into a wider and 
open violent conflict. There are several issues which may be consid-
ered as important factors contributing to the relatively manageable 
security situation in the field.
First, preventive measures have been consistently carried out 
by the security forces. When this research was conducted, for more 
than a year about 200 police had been deployed every Sunday to 
guard the location. The security forces deployed consisted of Tam-
bun sub-district police, Bekasi district police, units of guarding pa-
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trol and mobile brigade from Metro Jaya regional police, and the 
army unit from 02 Cikarang military regional command. Besides 
them, although not always, officers from Bekasi municipal police 
were also deployed. Secondly, persuasive approach was applied in 
policing of the conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship. 
In security efforts, the local police leaders enacted policies to not 
equip the officers with guns and batons. The same policy was ap-
plied by the municipal police. Thirdly, the security forces tried to 
assume a neutral, non-partisan position towards the parties to the 
conflict, although this not always succeeded. 
In terms of conflict resolution, the police perceived their prima-
ry task as maintaining the public order and security. To the police 
the party who had the authority in resolution of the conflicts over 
the places of worship was the FKUB and the local government. The 
policies set by the government (especially the local government) 
limited the policing tasks. When this research was conducted, the 
government has not revoked the decree of the Bekasi regent on seal-
ing of the land for the construction of the HKBP Church. At the same 
time the Bekasi government provided a temporary place of worship 
for the HKBP Filadelfia at the Teachers’ Building (Gedung Guru) in 
Metland Tambun complex. In line with that policy, the security forc-
es attempted to convince the HKBP Filadelfia to use the temporary 
facility provided by the government.
This chapter is divided into five sections. After the introduction 
in the first part, the second part presents the social and religious 
overview of Bekasi. In the third section the dispute is divided into 
three periods. The fourth section discusses the dynamics of polic-
ing seen from the policing actions, knowledge of the police, the le-
gal-procedural framework of policing and institutional character 
of the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the 
police interaction with the actors of conflict. Finally, the fifth section 
provides a summary as well as a number of important lessons and 
conclusions.
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A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Bekasi 
Based on the 2010 census, the population of Bekasi regency was 
2,630,401 of which 2,508,492 (95.37 percent) were Muslims, 80,636 
(3.07 percent) Protestants, 19,594 (0.74 percent) Catholics, 11,769 
(0.45 percent) of Buddhists, 1,920 (0.07 percent ) Hindus, 475 (0.02 
percent) Confucianists, and 312 (0.01 percent) others. The rest, 7053 
(0.27 per cent) did not answer, and 150 (0.01 per cent) were not 
asked. In terms of gender, the divide was almost equal: 51.2 percent 
males and 48.8 percent females.
The total number of places of worship, according to the data of 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Bekasi (2013), was 4,427 units. 
There was 4,387 Muslim places of worship, consisting of 1,450 
mosques and 2,937 musalas or langgars. There were 13 Protestant 
churches, 11 Catholic churches, one Hindus and 15 Buddhist tem-
ples. In the Tambun Utara district alone, there were 65 mosques and 
105 musalas, and no places of worship of other religious communi-
ties.
The land for the planned construction of the HKBP Filadelfia 
Church is located in RT 01/09 of Jejalen Jaya village, Tambun Utara, 
Bekasi, West Java province. Jalen neighbourhood (Dusun, or Ham-
let, III) is one of the three hamlets in Jejalen Jaya village. The other 
two hamlets are Gondrong and Kebon neighbourhoods. Consisting 
of an area around 276.224 hectares, Jejalen Jaya village is divided 
into 15 RWs and 84 RTs.
According to the data issued by Jejalen Jaya village, in January 
2013, the number of its inhabitants was 16,251 persons, with almost 
equal proportion of men and women. The number of families was 
4,727. Majority of the Jejalen Jaya inhabitants are Muslim, 96.1 per-
cent. The rest belong to several other religious communities: Prot-
estant (2.4 percent), Catholic (0.7 percent), Hindu (0.5 percent), and 
Buddhist (0.3 percent). In terms of education, more than a half of 
Jejalen Jaya inhabitants completed primary education and almost 
one fourth of them finished junior high school. 
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Conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship
On Monday, 24 December 2012, around 6:00 pm, dozens of Huria Kristen Batak 
Protestan (HKBP) Filadelfia members were heading towards the location of their 
future church in Jalen neighbourhood RT. 01/09, Jejalen Jaya village, Tambun 
Utara, Bekasi. They wanted to celebrate the Christmas Eve. About 300 meters 
from their destination, they were stopped by hundreds of local residents who 
apparently gathered there already in the late afternoon. Security forces, around 
200 policemen, were on standby, ready to perform pacification. HKBP Filadelf-
ia leaders managed to approach the policemen and representatives of the local 
residents to request the protection of their right to pray in the place which was 
their property. When the negotiations were still ongoing, a commotion broke out. 
Both sides were pushing each other. Then the members of HKBP were pelted 
with various objects, including sewage and rotten eggs. In order to avoid fur-
ther clashes, the security forces tried to separate the members of HKBP from the 
crowd. Eventually the HKBP left.
The above event was one of the series of episodes from the con-
flict in which the HKBP Filadelfia and the inhabitants of Jejalen Jaya 
have been caught since a few years. The main reason of the con-
flict is the rejection of the plans of the HKBP Filadelfia to build their 
church on the land located in Jalen RT. 01/09, Jejalen Jaya village. 
Taking into account the dynamics of the conflict, its shape, intensity 
and tactics applied, it can be divided into three periods: (1) 2000-
2006, (2) 2007-2009, and (3) 2010-2012.
2000-2006 Period
Since April 2000, a number of Protestant Batak families who 
lived in the Tambun Utara and Tambun Selatan districts established 
HKBP Filadelfia.1 At that time the congregation was under Duren 
Jaya district police. HKBP Filadelfia was led by Pastor Elmun Ru-
mahorbo S.Th., who resided in Villa Bekasi Indah 2 Block C5 No. 35. 
The house also served as HKBP Filadelfia’s office and sometimes the 
place for their worship practices.
In 2003, the HKBP Filadelfia bought the land in Villa Bekasi In-
dah 2, Sumber Jaya, Tambun Selatan. They built a ruko (shop-house) 
1The members of HKBP Filadelfia live in several neighbouring villages: Sumber 
Jaya, Satria Jaya, Mangun Jaya (located in Tambun Selatan) and Jejalen Jaya (in Tam-
bun Utara).
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on this land and then also used it as their place for prayers.2 One 
time, when HKBP was holding their service, a number of local res-
idents approached them and insisted that the ruko was no longer 
used as a place of worship. Ultimately, the HKBP’s worship activi-
ties were moved to the houses of congregation members who lived 
in the neighbourhood of Villa Bekasi Indah 2, Sumber Jaya, Tambun 
Selatan.
On Sunday, 2 April 2006, when the HKBP Filadelfia was perform-
ing their prayers at the house of Pastor Elmun Rumahorbo, a num-
ber of local residents approached them. Residents asked the HKBP 
to no longer perform their services in the neighbourhood of Villa 
Bekasi Indah 2. Upon pressure, Pastor Elmun Rumahorbo signed a 
statement that HKBP Filadelfia would no longer perform their wor-
ship in Villa Bekasi Indah 2, especially in the Block C.3 Because of 
this the HKBP Filadelfia began to look for another location to build 
their church.
In June 2006, HKBP Filadelfia finally acquired the land for con-
struction of their church. The area of 1,088 square meters was bought 
from Mrs Sumiyati. This land plot is located in the Jalen neighbour-
hood RT 01/09, Jejalen Jaya village. While the Villa Bekasi Indah 
2 is under Tambun Selatan administration, Jaya Jejalen belongs to 
Tambun Utara.
Although the land in Jejalen Jaya village was purchased in 2006, 
the news of the planned church construction were circulated among 
local residents since the end of 2005. It appears so from the letter of 
rejection of the church construction plan which was sent by the local 
2This ruko has obtained the certificate of occupancy (Hak Guna Bangunan, HGB) 
No. 10095 and No. 10096 dated 21 October 2003.
3According to one of the sources, the residents’ opposition towards HKBP was 
due to frustration over HKBP activities which were disturbing the peace in their 
neighbourhood. One of the triggers was an incident in which a local resident could 
not enter the neighbourhood because the entrance was blocked by HKBP vehicles 
parked on the roadside. According to the source, when the HKBP was reprimanded, 
its members reacted in a way which local residents perceived as rude and arrogant. 
Eventually, the HKBP worship activities were opposed.
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religious leader H. Naimun, in the name of the Forum of Islamic 
Study Groups of Jejalen Jaya village, to the village chief.4
2007-2009 Period
Despite the objections of local residents, the HKBP Filadelfia con-
tinued with their plans to establish a church on the land they had 
bought. In accordance with the provisions of the Joint Regulation of 
the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs 
No. 9 and No. 8 of 2006, which was issued on 21 March 2006, the 
HKBP Filadelfia began to seek the support of the local community 
for their plans. One of the requirements given in the Joint Regula-
tion is that the construction committee must obtain the support of 
at least 90 prospective users of the place of worship and the sup-
port of at least 60 local residents. Another requirement was that the 
committee must obtain a recommendation from the local FKUB or 
the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Upon meeting 
the requirements, the construction permit can be obtained from the 
local government.
In 2007, the HKBP Filadelfia sought support for the construction 
of their church. The attitude of H. Sukardi HN, the then Jejalen Jaya 
village chief, towards the construction plans was positive and he 
tried to facilitate the process. He said that as a government official, 
he was obliged to facilitate the needs of citizens with regard to the 
place of worship. He did not question the beliefs of HKBP Filadelf-
ia. That is why he asked some of the RW leaders to help in finding 
4Letter No. 01/FMT-JLJ/2005 dated 26 December 2005, contained an attachment 
with signatures of 312 residents of Jejalen Jaya (See “Inilah Kronologi Lengkap Kasus 
HKBP Filadelfia Versi Warga Jejalen Jaya,” http://www.suara-islam.com, Monday, 
7 May 2012 (accessed 8 February 2013). Later H. Naimun also wrote an open letter 
titled “Untuk Semua Warga Kampung Yang Fikirannya Tidak Kampungan,” which 
was circulated among Jejalen Jaya residents. Parts of Naimun’s letter were quoted by 
the online media. See “Inilah Surat Kyai Pemicu Penolakan Gereja HKBP Filadelfia,” 
http://www.beritasatu.com, 18 May 2012 (accessed 5 March 2013); “The Battle Over 
Bekasi’s HKBP Filadelfia Church,” http://www.thejakartaglobe.com, 19 May 2012 
(accessed 28 January 2013).
The Case of HKBP Filadelfia Church, Bekasi 177
the support or approval of the local residents.5 On 11 October 2007, 
Jejalen Jaya village chief issued a permit for the HKBP Filadelfia to 
build a church in Jejalen Jaya.6 The village chief issued the permit 
because the requirements stipulated in the regulation No. 9 and 8 
of 2006 were fulfilled.7 With the permit from the village chief of Je-
jalen Jaya, the construction committee of HKBP Fildelfia submitted 
a request to the head of the Tambun Utara for the construction rec-
ommendation.8
The efforts to obtain construction permit for the HKBP Filadelfia 
Church were met with obstacles on the district level. The meetings 
held by the local district government have actually reversed devel-
opments in raising support for the construction.
In the meeting on Friday, 13 December 2007, it was decided that 
the signatures of the Jejalen Jaya residents who supported the con-
struction of HKBP Filadelfia’s church had to be verified.9 On 18 
February 2008, another meeting was held by Tambun Utara district 
government to discuss the application of the HKBP Filadelfia. To 
this meeting for clarification, the residents who earlier signed the 
support statement for the plans to construct the HKBP Filadelfia 
Church were invited. However, they did not turn up. Those who 
attended the meeting were the residents who opposed the HKBP 
Filadelfia plans in their village. Some of the residents who had pre-
5H. Sukardi HN, Jejalen Jaya village chief in 2002-2007 and 2007-2012, interview, 
17 February 2013.
6Letter No. 451.2/09/X/2007 dated 11 October 2007. This document/letter was 
the answer to HKBP’s request No. 01/ SPI/H6/R5/DXIX/2007.
7Earlier, on 25 September 2007, Jejalen Jaya village chief, H. Sukardi HN, approved 
and signed the list of 117 names of HKBP’s members who resided in Jejalen Jaya.
8Letter No. 03/SPI/H6/R5/DXIX/2007 dated 29 October 2007, on request for 
recommendation for church construction permit for HKBP Filadelfia in RT 01 RW 09 
Dusun III Jejalen Jaya, Tambun Utara, Bekasi.
9The meeting was attended by religious leaders, community leaders, youth lead-
ers, Muspika Tambun Utara, head of KUA Tambun Utara, and village officials. As 
a follow-up to the meeting, on 14 January 2008, the head of Tambun Utara district 
issued SK No. 452.2/Kep.11-1/2008 on establishment of a data-checking team with 
regard to the HKBP Filadelfia’s church construction plans. The team was to be led by 
the head of KUA Tambun Utara and the head of the Economy and Social Section of 
Tambun Utara district.
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viously signed the support statement said they did not know that 
their signatures were taken for the purpose of the planned church 
construction.10 The last meeting was held by the Tambun Utara 
district government at Jejalen Jaya village hall, on Wednesday, 5 
March 2008. Due to the opposition of some of the residents against 
the church construction (as expressed in the letters from the Islam-
ic Community Communication Forum, FKUI, and several Islamic 
study clubs of Jejalen Jaya village), the meeting resulted in rejection 
of the HKBP Filadelfia’s plans.11
Meanwhile, Jejalen Jaya residents who rejected the HKBP Fi-
ladelfia plans began to consolidate. On Friday, 22 February 2008, 
they established the above-mentioned FKUI at At-Taqwa Mosque 
in Jalen neighbourhood, with Nesan SE as its chairman.12 Nesan is a 
former village chief candidate who was defeated by Sukardi in 2007 
election. During one of the FKUI actions, he tore a letter from the 
regent because he thought that the HKBP Filadelfia did not respect 
the regent’s letter on banning its religious activities.13
While the waves of rejections intensified, on 2 April 2008, the 
HKBP Filadelfia Church construction committee applied to the 
FKUB of Bekasi, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Bekasi, and to 
the Bekasi local government for recommendations. The Ministry 
of Religious Affairs Bekasi office replied a year later, on 18 August 
2009, that it could not yet issue a recommendation for the HKBP Fi-
10The meeting took place at the Jejalen Jaya village office, and was attended by 
Muspika and the related officials from Tambun Utara Regency, Jejalen Jaya village 
officials, religious leaders, community leaders, youth leaders, and some of the Jejalen 
Jaya residents.
11The meeting was attended by Muspika Tambun Utara, Jejalen Jaya village offi-
cials, religious leaders, community leaders, youth leaders, and some of Jejalen Jaya 
residents. The HKBP Filadelfia was not present.
12The next day FKUI Jejalen Jaya on behalf of the Muslim community of Jejalen 
Jaya submitted rejection of the planned establishment of HKBP Filadelfia’s church to 
the village chief of Jejalen Jaya. The rejection was stated in a letter of FKUI of Jejalen 
Jaya No. 01/FKUI-JJ/II/2008 dated 22 February 2008, regarding the refusal of the 
church construction plans. This letter was used as one of the bases for rejection of the 
planned establishment of HKBP Filadelfia’s church on the meeting on 5 March 2012.
13 See Ali-Fauzi et al. 2011: 102.
The Case of HKBP Filadelfia Church, Bekasi 179
ladelfia Church construction plans.14 Meanwhile, the FKUB Bekasi, 
until this study was completed, has not given a written answer to 
the HKBP Filadelfia petition.
Around October 2009, leaders and the community of the HKBP 
Filadelfia held a meeting to discuss the answer of the office of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs, concerning the petition for recommen-
dation of the church construction. They decided to still use the land 
belonging to them in Jalen RT 01/09, Jejalen Jaya village, for car-
rying out their worship activities. They also began preparing the 
foundations for the construction.
Friday 25 December 2009 was an important moment in the se-
ries of episodes in the conflict between the HKBP Filadelfia and lo-
cal residents. On that day the HKBP for the first time carried out 
prayers on their land at the same time changing the shape of pro-
tests against them from petitions into collective demonstrations, 
and later into disruptive actions such as blockades preventing the 
church construction and worship activities of the HKBP Filadelfia 
in the village Jejalen Jaya.15 On Sunday, 27 December 2009, HKBP 
Filadelfia again conducted a service at the site, and local residents 
again rallied against their devotional activities.16
14Answer from the Ministry of Religious Affairs Bekasi office to HKBP Filadelf-
ia No. d.10.16/II/1473/2009 dated 18 August 2009, which contained the statement: 
“For the sake of creating a conducive atmosphere of religious life, the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs Bekasi office is not yet able to give recommendation for the church 
construction. Therefore, we recommend that you first approach the public/commu-
nity/religious leaders and the local government.”
15On 25 December 2009, at 08:30 am to 10:50 am, around 250-300 people gathered 
to protest against HKBP’s worship activities in the name of residents of Jalen RW 04, 
08, 09, 10 and 12 of Jejalen Jaya willage, Tambun Utara district, led by Ustad Naimun 
(community leader), Aseng (head of youth association), and Ustad Ikrom (head of 
FKUI). They protested in front of the gate of the HKBP Filadelfia’s construction site, 
chanting salawat and takbir and calling for ceasing the meetings, activities and church 
construction. At 10:00 am, a meeting was held with Ustad Naimun, Aseng, Ustad 
Ikrom and the HKBP Filadelfia leaders – Hutasoit, Simanjuntak and Pastor Palti H. 
Panjaitan. The meeting was facilitated by Muspika, district and village officials, and 
the then Bekasi district police chief Drs. Herry Wibowo, MH.
16Around 9:15 am, around 100 persons, most of them women from the local 
neighbourhood led by Ustad Naimun rallied in front of the worship site of HKBP 
Filadelfia. They demanded that the service and church development activities which 
did not follow the procedures (no construction permit) were immediately stopped. 
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Amid increasing rejection of the village residents against the 
HKBP Filadelfia Church construction plans, on 31 December 2009, 
the regent of Bekasi issued a letter ordering halt to the HKBP Fil-
adelfia’s church construction and worship activities.17 This policy 
marked the occurrence of an important incident which influenced 
the shape of conflict development.
2010-2012 Period
On the Sunday morning of 3 January 2010, the HKBP Filadelfia 
were about to perform prayers at their land. But they were unable to 
access it since about 300 people under the leadership of H. Naimun 
occupied the site. Finally, the village leadership gave the place to 
the HKBP to hold their service at the Jejalen Jaya village hall. Since 
the worship activities at the village hall were also questioned by the 
local residents,18 on Sunday, 10 January 2010, HKBP Filadelfia again 
held the service on their land. Having learnt of HKBP activities, a 
number of community leaders who at that time were attending a 
religious gathering at Madinatul Munawwaroh Mosque, came to 
the site where they requested the termination of worship activities. 
Several governmental officials were also present: the Bekasi district 
secretary, the chairman of Bekasi local parliament, the head of Agen-
cy for Protection of National Unity, Politics, and Public Linmas and 
the head of Binamitra of Bekasi police.
At 10:00 am, the protesters dispersed in an orderly manner.
17The letter No. 300/675/Kesbangpollinmas/09 dated 31 December 2009, con-
cerning termination of construction and worship activities of the HKBP. Based on 
the Article 13, 14, 16 and 18 Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and 
the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 and No. 8 of 2006 on the guidelines for heads of 
the regions and their deputies on maintaining religious harmony, strengthening the 
Forum for Religious Harmony, and construction of places of worship, Article 3 of the 
Bekasi Regency Regulation No. 7 of 1996 on construction permits, the Bekasi govern-
ment asked the HKBP Filadelfia to: (1) stop the construction activities on RT 01/09 
Jejalen Jaya, Tambun Utara, and (2) not use it for worship activities before the permit 
is processed in accordance with laws and regulations.
18In a meeting held between the village chief and the residents in the Jejalen Jaya 
village hall on 8 January 2010, residents also rejected the use of the village hall for 
HKBP’s worship activities. The residents also rejected the worship activities at the 
site of the planned church construction.
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On 12 January 2010, the Construction Control Team of Bekasi 
government sealed the HKBP Filadelfia Church construction site 
in Jalen. The reason behind the sealing was the effort to maintain 
order and security within the community as well as enforcement of 
the Regulation No. 7 of 1996 on construction permits. As a result of 
this sealing, every Sunday since 17 January 2010, the HKBP Filadel-
fia were holding their services on the street in front of their sealed 
property.
The HKBP tried to resist the Bekasi government’s policy by taking 
legal measures. The lawsuit was registered in March 2010, at the Admin-
istrative Court in Bandung, and followed by court’s visit to the location 
on 14 June 2010. After the proceedings in July 2010, the court ruled in 
favour of the plaintiff (HKBP Filadelfia).19 In response to the decision of 
the Administrative Court in Bandung, Bekasi government appealed 
to the High Court in Jakarta on 15 November 2010. However, the 
appeal failed and on 30 March 2011, the High Court in Jakarta con-
firmed the decision of the Administrative Court in Bandung.20
Between 2010 and 2011, the HKBP were holding their services 
in front of their sealed land. The opposition from the local residents 
was generally expressed in written statements which were filed to 
various stakeholders. The protests in form of rallies, according to 
the data collected, were recorded only 3 and 10 January 2010, and on 
20 and 28 June 2010. They did not involve violence.21
19Decision of the Administrative Court in Bandung No. 42/G/2010/PTUN-BDG 
dated 2 September 2010, with the following verdict: (1) Declaring void the Bekasi 
regent’s letter No. 300/675/Kesbangpol Linmas dated 31 December 2009, regarding 
the halt to construction and worship activities; (2) Instructing the Bekasi regent to re-
voke the letter No. 300/675/Kesbangpol Linmas dated 31 December 2009, regarding 
the halt to construction and worship activities; and (3) Instructing the regent to pro-
cess the application for permission to construct the place of worship in accordance 
with the provisions.
20Decision of the High Court in Jakarta No. 225/B/2010/PT.TUN/JKT which 
upholds the ruling of the Administrative Court in Bandung No. 42/G/2010/PTUN-
BDG dated 2 September 2010.
21On Sunday, 20 June 2010, before the HKBP carried out their service, about 100 
people led by Ustad Naimun rallied in front of the construction site of HKBP Filadel-
fia, demanding (1) Halt to worship activities of HKBP Filadelfia, (2) Revocation of 
Jejalen Jaya’s village chief recommendation over HKBP Filadelfia Church develop-
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In 2012, the dynamics of the conflict over the construction of the 
HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship has increased, both in terms of 
frequency of incidents and their intensity. The tactics of disruption 
began to be used by the protesting residents. Disruption assumed 
the shape of collective actions which tended to be aggressive, but 
not violent. The main goal of that tactics was disruption of activities 
of the party they opposed.
Throughout 2012, at least 20 protests were recorded, a sharp in-
crease from the previous period where only one incident took place 
in 2011 and 12 in 2010. In terms of numbers, in 2012 between 100 to 
600 people were involved in the mass protests, while previously, 
the number of protesters generally amounted to dozens, although 
twice, in late 2009 and early 2010, a few hundred were involved too.
Among the disruption tactics used was organizing prelections or 
voluntary activities accompanied by playing religious songs through 
loudspeakers at a location adjacent to where the HKBP Filadeflia held 
their services. Also increasingly frequent were the actions of occu-
pying the site or hindering access to it.22 As a result of that tactics, sev-
eral times there were tensions and clashes between the local residents 
and members of HKBP — on 26 February 2012,23 4 March 2012,24 15 April 
ment, and (3) Jejalen Jaya village head to clarify the administrative court’s statement 
which mentioned that only 5 people protested against HKBP’s devotional activities/
church construction. Then on Monday, 28 June 2010, residents also protested in front 
of the village office of Jejalen Jaya, demanding that the village chief revoke his earlier 
letter of recommendation for the establishment of HKBP Filadelfia’s church.
22One of the sources stated that the disruption tactics was first applied on 22 Jan-
uary 2012. Approximately 20 residents led by H. Naimun were playing Islamic songs 
next to the location used for HKBP Filadelfia’s worship. Other sources mention that 
these activities began on 1 January 2012.
23Based on information from various sources, the mass rejection of HKBP Filadel-
fia’s construction plans was in form of verbal “quarrels” between the field coordina-
tor and protesters. The situation was still under control.
24At 8:30 am, when residents of Jejalen Jaya were carrying out their activities on 
land owned by Ramin, which is located next to the construction site of HKBP Fil-
adelfia, they burnt rubbish on the back of HKBP Filadelfia’s prayer place, Samosir 
(community member and a member of Detachment 88 of the National Police in the 
rank of 2nd inspector) reprimanded Abdul Aziz (Ustad Naimun’s son) telling him 
not to burn rubbish there. When they started to argue, some of the local residents 
approached them. Samosir panicked, took out his gun and shouted “I am a member” 
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2012,25 and 6 May 2012.26
The last incident that year took place during Christmas, on 
24 and 25 December 2012. When the members of HKBP Filadelfia 
were heading to their land to celebrate Christmas, hundreds of 
people met them about 300 meters from the location. After nego-
tiations between the residents and the HKBP Filadelfia failed, the 
HKBP group was forced to disperse. The next morning a similar 
incident took place. The HKBP still could not celebrate Christ-
mas on the land their owned. Finally, they went to Tambun police 
station, and carried out their celebrations there. In the afternoon 
they went to the Presidential Palace in Jakarta and joined the con-
gregation of GKI Yasmin holding Christmas celebrations in front 
of the Palace.
Dynamics of Policing the HKBP Conflict
Policing Activities
Involvement of the police in handling the case of conflict over the 
HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship was long-term. Types of action, 
units involved, and the number of officers deployed varied with the 
dynamics of the conflict.
Conflict resolution involved almost all available units, such as 
intelligence, criminal investigations unit, Binmas, Sabhara, traffic 
police and health services. The functions these units represented 
were seen as complimentary in security activities conducted by the 
police in handling of the conflict.
(later the incident was handled by the Internal Affairs Division of Bekasi Police, then 
transferred to the same division within National Police, and finally to the Police’s 
Central Headquarter, since Samosir was a member of the 88 Special Detachment).
25HKBP Filadelfia came back to hold their worship activities in front of the fence 
of their planned church. They were confronted by the local residents about 200 me-
ters from the location. In this incident Abdul Aziz, son Naimun, threatened to kill 
Palti H. Panjaitan.
26At 8:00 am women from Islamic study group (majlis taklim) occupied the site, 
and about 500 other people blocked the T-junction by the Guru Nora house in RT 
02/04 (300 meters before HKBP’s land). The 40 members of HKBP Filadelfia who 
wanted to perform a service at the location, were escorted back to the Villa Bekasi 
Indah 2 by the security forces.
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In this research, the term “policing of religious conflicts” is used 
to describe the series of police actions in dealing with the conflict. 
These can be divided into intelligence, mediation and pacification.
1. Intelligence
The main task of intelligence is to collect information useful 
for detecting potential disruptions of the public order and secu-
rity. Given the secret nature of intelligence activities, not many 
things that can be looked into with regard to intelligence activ-
ities related to the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia’s place of wor-
ship. However, there are a number of important issues which 
should be noted.
First, although the police formally have separate personnel 
assigned to intelligence activities which are under the organi-
zational structure of the intelligence unit (at the level of district 
police) or intelligence unit (at the level of sub-district police), the 
intelligence functions can be carried out by all police officers. As 
stated by Kasubag Humas of Bekasi district police, AKP Bam-
bang Wahyudi, “A member of the police from the Binmas unit 
may also carry out the task of collecting various information 
which is important for the police” (interview, 12 February 2013).
Second, in line with the rapid developments in technology 
and information, intelligence coordination and communication 
can also be done quickly. According to one of the intelligence 
officers of Bekasi police (interview, 14 February 2013), the intel-
ligence officers take advantage of the BBM (Blackberry Messenger) 
service to communicate their activities and the intelligence infor-
mation is quickly available. In spite of this, the intelligence officers 
were still required to make a written report of their activities. 
Third, intelligence officers work on a daily basis to collect various 
information from the public. When a conflict becomes a routine and 
is ongoing for years, as in the case of HKBP, intelligence information 
is used as the basis for routine pacification plans. Pacification plans 
made by the operations section of Bekasi police on Friday or Sat-
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urday, were then distributed among the police and other security 
institutions, such Sabhara of Jakarta police, mobile brigade, district 
military command and Bekasi municipal police. These plans were 
routinely performed every Sunday when HKBP Filadelfia wanted 
to use their land as a place of worship, and when, at the same time, 
the local residents would mobilize against them (Andri Ananta Yu-
dhistira, Tambun police chief, interview, 3 February 2013).
2. Negotiation and mediation
Negotiation and mediation were another kind of involve-
ment of the police officers in handling the conflict over HKBP 
Filadelfia’s church, carried out both in the field and through 
various meetings. Based on the information obtained, the police 
officers were involved in the mediation process since the Tam-
bun Utara local government held a number of meetings to dis-
cuss the conflict.27 At that stage, the police officers were from the 
Tambun district police which at that time was headed by Arif 
Ismari, and from Tabun Utara sub-district police which was 
then headed by Aiptu Harmoyo, who both were signed on the 
attendance list and in the report of one of those meetings.28 Apart 
from this, when the Tambun Utara local government established 
a data-checking team with regard to HKBP Filadelfia’s church 
construction plans, which was chaired by Tambun Utara district 
head, A. Junaidi Rakhman, security forces were also involved as 
vice chairmen of the team: Tambun police chief as the first vice 
chairman and the sub-district military commander (Danramil) of 
Tambun as the second chairman.29
27Several meetings on the construction plans of the HKBP Filadelfia’s place of 
worship were held by the Tambun Utara district government, on 14 December 2007, 
18 February 2008 and 5 March 2008. See description in the previous section.
28See minutes of Discussion on the Application for the Church Construction 
Permit (HKBP Filadelfia) Jejalen Jaya village, Tambun Utara, of 5 March 2008. The 
security forces who were involved in the initial meetings derived from the district 
military command 02 Tambun, and were represented by Captain ARM Kayat who 
then served as a military commander of Tambun 02.
29See the decree of Tambun Utara district head No. 452.2/Kep. 11-1/2008 dated 
14 January 2008, on establishment of a data-checking team with regard to the HKBP 
Filadelfia’s church construction plans in Jejalen Jaya, Tambun Utara.
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The involvement of the district police began when the ten-
sions increased, especially since the HKBP Filadelfia decided to 
keep using their land on 25 December 2009, which triggered mo-
bilization of the local residents who opposed it. The police of the 
Bekasi police became the mediators in several meetings between 
the HKBP and the residents. The police was represented by the 
Herry Wibowo and Y.S. Muryono the head of Binamitra of the 
Bekasi district police (who at the time of this research assumed 
the position of the head of operations of the Bekasi police).
The police officers of the National Police (Polri) were also in-
volved in the process of negotiation and mediation. In the conflict 
over HKBP Filadelfia’s church, a number of female police officers 
were deployed as part of the negotiation team. The negotiation team 
numbered about 10 people who came from the traffic police and Bin-
mas unit. The reason to deploy the policewomen was the fact that 
the group who demonstrated against the establishment of HKBP Fi-
ladelfia Church, consisted mostly of women. Similarly, in the HKBP 
Filadelfia group there was a significant number of women.
The negotiation team tried to convince the HKBP Filadelfia to 
not carry out their worship activities at the location which was 
questioned by the local citizens. The HKBP was advised to hold 
their services in the place provided by the Bekasi local govern-
ment as a temporary place of worship in Gedung Guru Metland 
complex, Tambun. That place was about 5 kilometers from the 
HKBP’s land in Jejalen Jaya. Had the persuasion attempts failed 
and the HKBP Filadelfia insisted on holding their service at their 
land, the police would let them go to the location and would pro-
vide security (Kasubag Humas Bekasi police, Bambang Wahyu-
di, interview, 12 February 2013). However, the security activities 
did not include expulsion of the crowd, so the HKBP could not 
access their land to perform their worship activities. This has 
been criticized by the HKBP Fildelfia members who claimed that 
the police did not carry out their duty to protect citizens (Pastor 
Palti H. Panjaitan, interview, 12 February 2013).
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3. Pacification
Pacification activities in conflict resolution were performed 
by the police since the conflict escalated, that is since Friday, 
25 December 2009. On that day the HKBP Filadelfia decided to 
carry out the Christmas celebrations on their property in Jejalen 
Jaya. The decision was made after the HKBP Filadelfia received 
the letter from the Ministry of Religious Affairs Bekasi office, in 
which it was stated that the requested recommendation for the 
church construction could not be issued yet. With the number 
of people protesting ranging between 250-300, as well as with 
the presence of Bekasi police chief at the location, the troops de-
ployed could no longer be from the level of Tambun district only, 
but were also deployed from the Bekasi police. 
The number of troops deployed varied with the dynamics of 
the conflict. From the district level police only around 40-60 peo-
ple could be deployed, but when joint personnel was involved, 
the number could reach about 460 officers, consisting of one 
platoon of district police officers, two platoons of Dalmas from 
Bekasi police, two SSK of Sabhara Polda Metro Jaya, one SSK of 
mobile brigade, one military platoon, and a platoon of municipal 
police. For the routine security activities since the beginning of 
2013, the number of police deployed was around 250, consist-
ing of: one platoon of district police officers, one SSK of Bekasi 
police, two SSK of Sabhara Polda Metro Jaya, and one platoon 
of mobile brigade. This group did not yet include the military 
platoon and the municipal police officers (Tambun police chief, 
Andri Ananta Yudhistira, interview, 20 February 2013).
The deployment of troops in considerable amount was done 
because the police did not want to risk failing to anticipate the 
situation where tensions could escalate into violence. It was also 
done because the distance and traffic jams would complicate a 
quick mobilization of security forces in case more troops were 
needed. The police preferred to have an adequate number of 
troops ready at the location.
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Routine security activities were taking place every Sunday since 
2012, when the tensions escalated. According to the police chief of 
Tambun, almost all of the local police personnel was familiar with 
the situation. Similarly, the entire mobile Brigade (Detachment A, B 
and C) already knew the location and security activities performed 
there (interview, 10 February 2013).
Routine security activities were carried out in accordance with 
plans made by the operations section of the Bekasi police. The plans 
for Sunday were usually delivered on Friday by Bekasi police to re-
lated parties, such as the Tambun police, district military command 
02 Cikarang, Polda Metro Jaya and municipal police of Bekasi re-
gency. The plans were made based on the analysis of information 
gathered from Monday to Friday (Tambun police chief, interview, 
10 February 2013).
In the beginning the security forces were deployed in front of 
the land plot of the HKBP Filadelfia. However, since each time 
there were protests of the local residents who several times pelted 
the members of HKBP Filadelfia, the police decided to widen the 
distance between the residents and the congregation. When this re-
search was carried out, the security forces were deployed in front of 
the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 housing estate which was about 900 meters 
away from the HKBP land plot. The location for troops deployment 
was chosen since the HKBP would usually gather first at the HKBP 
Filadelfia secretariat in Block C of Villa Bekasi Indah 2.
Before 8 am, security forces would arrive at the site and would carry 
out an appeal led by the Tambun police chief, and a briefing for officers 
in charge of each unit deployed. Because the officers in charge were 
changing, the leading officer would each time update them on the most 
recent status of the case. The updates included the information on the 
HKBP land which was still sealed by the Bekasi government, the need 
of applying persuasive approach both towards the local residents and 
the members of the HKBP to avoid escalation of the conflict, as well as 
the instruction that the security forces should not carry firearms. The 
officers who had rifles or pistols were required to deposit them with 
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the Propam (Internal Affairs Division) officer. Also the municipal po-
lice officers should not be equipped with weapons, including batons. 
According to Deni, the head of security section of the municipal police, 
this was done in order to avoid the possibility of accidents (interview, 
7 February 2013). The mobile brigade unit whose officers were armed 
and used motorcycles was usually stationed in the rearmost position.
After the 15-minute appeals, the security forces would spread 
to several positions around the Villa Bekasi Indah 2 housing estate. 
Negotiators along with the Tambun police chief would come to the 
HKBP secretariat to meet the HKBP Filadelfia leadership and try to 
convince them to not hold their service in front of their property in 
Jejalen, but to use the temporary space provided by the Bekasi local 
government on the third floor of Gedung Guru in Metland complex, 
Tambun. When this research was taking place, the security forces 
were failing to meet the leadership of HKBP who at those times was 
either ill or leading prayers in front of the Presidential Palace togeth-
er with the representatives of the GKI Yasmin.
The tactics applied by the security forces in handling the conflict 
over the HKBP Filadelfia place of worship, were mainly persuasive 
measures, also at the time when the protesting residents were pelting 
the members of HKBP with sewage, animal waste etc. At the times 
when protesters were approaching the church members and the dis-
tance between them was no longer maintainable, the police would usu-
ally lead the members of HKBP congregation back to the Villa Bekasi 
Indah 2. The Tambun police chief said that the persuasive approach 
was applied even towards the disruptive actions of the local residents 
(which could not be categorized as acts of violence, although they could 
lead to violence), because the security forces did not want to trigger ex-
pansion of the conflict. Although the persuasive approach might have 
contributed to preventing the conflict from spreading and escalating, it 
was criticized by the HKBP and NGOs as a lack of decisiveness, or even 
inaction towards acts of intolerance. This, in the view of HKBP and 
NGOs, was a failure of security forces in protecting and guaranteeing 
the right of HKBP Filadelfia to perform their worship activities.
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Police Knowledge 
In this research, what is understood as police knowledge is the 
police perceptions of their roles and of the external reality they face. 
Apparently not all police officers had thorough knowledge of reg-
ulations related to conflicts and regulations defining the ways of 
handling them. The junior police officers’ knowledge was general 
and practical because they acted primarily upon instructions of the 
leaders or commanders of their units. This kind of knowledge was 
acquired mainly through regular appeals at the police stations or, 
in case of field operations, through the Chief of Officers Gathering 
(Acara Pimpinan Pasukan, APP) prior to the start of operations. 
Broader knowledge of various rules relating to conflicts and dealing 
with them seemed to be possessed only by the senior police officers. 
Yet it remains unknown how extensive and in-depth their knowl-
edge was.
From the interviews with a number of police officers who were 
asked about their roles in conflict resolution, “maintaining security” 
was mentioned most often. As stated by the Tambun police chief, 
“Our main function is to maintain security, prevent the conflict from 
spreading and escalating into violence, as well as preventing casu-
alties. We do not interfere in the matter of places of worship. It is 
under the authority of the local government” (interview, 3 February 
2013).
The way the police perceive the external reality is another impor-
tant component of police knowledge. According to della Porta and 
Reiter (1998), although police is equipped with a number of rules 
and guidelines underlying operations, during the interventions the 
police generally act first on the basis of their assessment of the situ-
ation and only then on the basis of rules and regulations. According 
to della Porta and Rieter (1998), the police perception of external 
reality is not subordinate to written rules and regulations, but is of 
equal importance when the police carry out their duties.
There are a number of factors which shape the police percep-
tions of external reality. Among them important are those related to 
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the information obtained by the police from intelligence activities 
regarding the cases handled, information on similar cases which 
occurred in other places, as well as their own policing experience. 
Some of the information obtained might be valid, but some might 
be not.30
This research shows that despite the importance of police per-
ceptions of external reality and their situation assessment for po-
licing activities, the legal framework and government policies 
provide boundaries or constraints to the options which the police 
can choose. As mentioned by the Tambun police chief, “One of our 
tasks, as security forces, is to uphold the government policy both at 
the national and local level.” It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that 
the police would take an action that openly contradicts the govern-
mental regulations or policies, even if those were legally unsound. 
In case of the HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship, the Bekasi 
government’s policy was sealing. With its decision the Bekasi gov-
ernment was defeated in the Administrative Court of Bandung, 
and then again in the High Court in Jakarta. However, by the time 
this research was completed, the Bekasi government has still not 
complied with the court decision and did not revoke its decree on 
sealing the HKBP’s land, nor has it removed the seals from the site. 
The police therefore had to stick to the government’s policy. In other 
words, it seemed unlikely, if not impossible, that the police would 
take unilateral action and unseal the location, even though the seal-
ing was illegal. 
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
The main legal reference for the police in handling the conflict 
was the Act No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, in par-
30In a conversation (27 January 2013), the then Bekasi police chief, Haryanta, said 
“Why is it always a problem with HKBP? Take a look at the case in Ciketing. Also the 
case in Setu. Then there is the case of Yasmin in Bogor. What’s going on?” Associating 
the Ciketing and Setu cases with HKBP is not wrong, but connecting the case of GKI 
Yasmin in Bogor with HKBP was certainly a mistake.
Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship192
ticular its articles 4 and 5, which state that among the duties of the 
police is to maintain security and public order. Police officers did 
not refer to the Act No. 7 of 2012 on the management of social con-
flicts, because the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship 
in Jejalen Jaya village was not yet seen as a kind of conflict defined 
by the Act No. 7 of 2012 (Haryanta, the then deputy chief of Bekasi 
police, interview, 3 February 2013). The police activities undertaken 
then were still not categorized as “police operations”.31
In handling the conflict over the HKBP Filadelfia’s place of wor-
ship, the security activities were under Bekasi police with the Tam-
bun district police chief acting as field controller (or Kepala Penga-
manan Objek, Ka Pam Objek).32 There was a pacification/security 
plan prepared by the operations section of Bekasi police. Beside the 
deployment of the police personnel from the national police, Bekasi 
police and Tambun district police, the security activities in Jejalen 
Jaya also involved the support of the Under Operational Control 
(BKO) unit of the guarding patrol and mobile brigade from the Met-
ro Jaya provincial police. The security forces were also reinforced 
by military units from the Cikarang sub-district military command 
(Koramil) and the municipal police of Bekasi.
Police Culture
In various studies on the police, police culture is seen as one of 
the factors affecting the policing activities. Following della Porta 
31“Policing activities” (kegiatan kepolisian) is “daily operational activities [by the 
police] in order to maintain security and public order through pre-emptive, preven-
tive and repressive measures” (article 7 of Police Chief’s Regulation No. 3 of 2009 on 
the police operational system). There is also “policing operations”, which refers to 
“[special] police operation that is run based on an assessment on specific situation to 
tackle real threats that wouldn’t be effective when it handled through regular police 
activities” (Police Chief’s Regulation No. 3 of 2009 on the police operational system).
32Operational unit (Bagops) at the district police level is in charge of “planning 
and controlling the administration of police operations, security of public activities 
and/or government agencies, providing information and documentation as well as 
controlling the security of police headquarters” (on Bagops, see sections 16-18 of Po-
lice Chief’s Regulation No. 23 of 2010, on the structure and work of the district and 
sub-district police).
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and Reiter (1998), the police culture is understood as both the polit-
ical culture of the police, particularly their conceptions of the state 
and constitutional rights, and the professional culture. In this re-
search, the police culture refers to the views of the police officers on 
human rights, particularly freedom of religion and worship, as well 
as their views on the conflicts over places of worship and their role 
in handling them.
The interviews with a number of police officers revealed that 
the police recognized the freedom of religion and worship as 
one of the human rights guaranteed by the constitution and law. 
With regard to human rights, the police have the Police Chief 
Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles and 
standards of human rights in the duties of Indonesian police.33 As 
told by the Tambun police chief, “The regulation, together with 
other regulations regarding security procedures have been cir-
culated to all [police] members, mainly through briefings during 
appeals.”
In private, several police officers said they had no problem about 
the presence of other religions’ places of worship. “Even near to my 
house there is a place of worship of a different religion. Every Sun-
day they hold a service. I personally do not find this a problem,” 
said one of the police officers. Another member of the police, from 
Yogyakarta said:
33In Article 5 paragraph (1) of the Police Chief’s Regulation it is mentioned that 
the human rights protection instruments which need to be considered by every mem-
ber of the police in carrying out duties under Article 27, Article 28 and Article 29 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, include “the right to freedom of 
religion and worship according to one’s religion” (point d). Paragraph (2) of Article 
5 mentions that among human rights that cannot be reduced by anyone and in any 
circumstances (non-derogable rights), is the “right to [have a] religion” (point d). 
Furthermore, Article 6 of the Regulation states that the rights referred to in Article 
5 paragraph (1) are in the scope of police duties and include: “the right to personal 
freedom: everyone is free to choose and have political beliefs, expressing opinion in 
public, embracing a religion, not being enslaved, choosing citizenship without dis-
crimination, having the right to freedom of movement, moving and residing in the 
territory of the Republic of Indonesia” (point b); “special rights of minority groups, 
such as ethnic, religious, disabled, sexual [orientation]” (point d).
Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship194
This problem [conflict over the place of worship] is more related to culture, I 
think. Where I come from [Yogyakarta], nobody makes an issue about the differ-
ences in beliefs or places of prayer. Even when one religious group wants to build 
their place of worship, other religious communities would help them. Perhaps in 
Bekasi there is a different culture where such things are a problem.
There are two things that stand out in the police perceptions of 
their role in handling religious conflicts. First, the police understood 
their role as the keepers of security and public order. “The police 
only focuses on security aspects, it doesn’t manage religious affairs,” 
said one of the policeman. With regard to the duty to protect the 
rights of citizens to worship, a police officer said, “This is not to be 
understood in the sense that the police invites anyone to carry out 
their worship practices anywhere [they want], and then the police 
would guard them. If it goes like this, there might be mass rioting. 
The role of the police is to come to the location where tensions with 
regard to the place of worship occur, and to prevent the clashes.” 
Second, the police saw itself as a party which should be neutral, 
not in favour of any of the parties to the conflict. A member of the 
police revealed, “Although we have our own religious beliefs, when 
dealing with religious conflicts we remain [in support of] the Uni-
tary Republic of Indonesia” (interview, 12 February 2013).
Although the police claimed they sided with neither of the par-
ties to the conflict, the involved did not perceive them as neutral. 
By the persons who rejected the presence of the HKBP Filadelfia 
Church, the police was seen as defending the HKBP Filadelfia and 
letting them carry out the worship activities at the location which 
had no license to be used as a place of worship. “At first we, the 
police, were seen as defenders of the HKBP. We were insulted, con-
demned and even pelted. But we still applied [the measures of] per-
suasion. Now people understand that we are there not to defend the 
HKBP, but to maintain security and order,” said the Tambun police 
chief (interview, 3 February 2013). In contrast, the HKBP saw the 
police as siding with the majority since they did not decisively se-
cure their right to worship and were guilty of omission, especially 
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when they allowed the masses to disrupt the HKBP’s worship activ-
ities with pelting. While the police was deemed not neutral, some of 
its officers were even seen as intolerant. However, according to the 
HKBP, there were officers who actually tried to prevent the clashes. 
“I was sorry to see the Tambun police chief running around to ap-
pease the masses, while other policemen were just standing quiet,” 
said Pastor Palti H. Panjaitan (interview, 12 February 2013). 
With regard to the church construction, the police considered it 
to be under the authority of other agencies. Besides this, there was 
a procedure that had to be interpreted by the stakeholders, i.e. the 
Joint Regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minis-
ter of Home Affairs No. 9 and No. 8 of 2006 (PBM) on the guidelines 
for heads of the regions and their deputies on maintaining religious 
harmony, strengthening the Forum for Religious Harmony, and con-
struction of places of worship.34 With regard to the case of HKBP 
Filadelfia, the deputy chief of Bekasi police, AKBP Haryanta, said 
that “The HKBP has not yet met all the requirements needed to es-
tablish a place of worship. They still have a recommendation from 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs and FKUB, which requires them to 
obtain the construction permit. They have only obtained the neigh-
bourhood’s permit. But even that was latter questioned because, ac-
cording to some, there was a manipulation in the process of collect-
ing signatures from the community members.” When asked if there 
indeed was a manipulation in collecting the signatures from the lo-
34The construction of places of worship requirements are set out in Article 14 of 
the Joint Regulation, which reads: (1) Construction of a place of worship must meet 
the administrative and technical requirements. (2) In addition to meeting the require-
ments referred to in clause (1) the establishment of places of worship must meet the 
special requirements which include: a) a list of names and numbers National Identity 
Cards of at least 90 prospective users of the place of worship which is authorized 
by the local authorities in accordance with the borders of the regions as referred to 
in Article 13 clause (3); b) the letter of support of at least 60 members of the local 
community, authorized by the head/village chief; c) written recommendation from 
the head of the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and d) a written rec-
ommendation of the local FKUB. (3) In case the requirements referred to in clause 
(2) point a) are met while in point b) are not met, the local government is obliged to 
facilitate a construction site for the place of worship.
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cal community, and if so why it was not processed as criminal case of 
fraud, AKBP Haryanta replied, “It actually could have been done. But 
we did not want this to have criminal aspects. We want this issue to be 
solved through deliberations” (interview, 3 February 2013).
Local Politics
In the HKBP Filadelfia case, different attitudes can be seen at the 
local level of village governance and above it. On the village level, 
the village chief and several officials below him had a positive atti-
tude towards the construction plans of HKBP’s Filadelfia Church. 
The obstacles appeared when the process of issuing the construction 
permit reached the district and the regency level.
When asked about this, Sukardi HN, who for two periods served 
as a village chief (in 2002-2007 and 2007-2012), said “Although I am 
a Muslim, my job as the village chief was to facilitate the residents’ 
need of a place of worship. I do not question the matter of conscience 
because it is a private one”. According to Sukardi, the presence of 
another religion did not have to be seen as a threat. “I think that, if 
ustad is right, the presence of other religions can actually strengthen 
our own faith. We should perceive it as something that encourages 
us to compete in doing good” (interview, 7 February 2013).
Based on this attitude and as the village chief at the time, Sukar-
di ordered the Head of RW 09 Bongkon and a few heads of RTs, to 
help in the search of support from local residents. In this way was 
obtained the list of 257 people who did not object to the planned 
construction of HKBP Church. The list was then approved by the 
village chief who also checked the list of 117 persons who would be 
using the church. Then the village chief issued a letter approving the 
planned construction (No. 451.2/09/X/2007 dated 11 October 2007).
Sukardi rejected the allegations that he did not check the list of 
local residents. “I didn’t sign it arbitrarily. I checked one by one. I 
know everyone,” said Sukardi. He also rejected the allegations that 
there was a manipulation with obtaining signatures or that residents 
were requested to sign empty forms. “The residents were told that 
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the form was for the purpose of a planned church construction,” he 
said. According to him, at that time indeed there was one resident 
who did not sign the form and said, “I will principally follow Pak 
[chief] RW. Let Pak RW sign it.” This, according Sukardi, is what be-
came the evidence of those who claimed there was a manipulation 
(interview, 17 February 2013).
The issue of manipulation, in addition to the rejection from other 
residents, became the main reason of the Tambun Utara district gov-
ernment, the Bekasi office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and 
the Bekasi government, to not process the request for recommenda-
tion for the construction of the HKBP Filadelfia Church. Instead, on 
31 December 2009, the Bekasi government issued the decree on seal-
ing of the land plot for the planned church construction (for more on 
this process see the description of the conflict).
The Bekasi government’s decision on sealing of the land for the 
planned construction of the HKBP Church, although legally defeat-
ed in the Administrative Court in Bandung, and then in the High 
Court in Jakarta, was still not revoked by the time this research was 
completed. With regard to the court decision, the head of the Bekasi 
local government’s Kesbang pollinmas, Hasan Basri, said that the 
Bekasi government respected the court ruling on the need to remove 
the seal. The ruling was presented to the local residents. However, 
said Hasan, their rejection was still strong, “The government does 
not want to revoke the sealing policy if this may trigger a larger 
conflict” (interview, 11 February 2013).
With regard to the use of the site as a place of worship, Hasan 
requested that the HKBP followed the procedures required for the 
construction of places of worship since, as of what he knew, the 
HKBP did not have the construction permit yet, nor the recommen-
dations from the FKUB and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. “There 
were only 3 followers of HKBP who were registered as residents of 
Jejalen Jaya. Most of the prospective users of the place of worship 
actually came from the neighbouring villages” (interview, 11 Febru-
ary 2013).
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The sealing policy of the Bekasi government was taken into con-
sideration by the police in their performance. During the appeals 
before deployment of forces for the pacification activities at the site 
of HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship, police leadership always 
mentioned that the land plot which belonged to the HKBP was 
currently sealed by the Bekasi government. The information on the 
court rulings, as far as we know, has never been delivered during 
the appeals. 
Although the police certainly was not going to act against the 
government policies (Bekasi government in this case), this did not 
mean that the police was fully “comfortable” with the situation. 
Conversations with several police officers revealed that to them the 
local government did not maximize the efforts to resolve the con-
flict, although the authority was in its hands. Haryanta, at that time 
the deputy of Bekasi police chief, compared the then police action 
to “preventing embers from becoming a big fire,” while the police 
alone could not douse the embers. This was because the police had 
no authority to do so. “The one who had the fire extinguisher as 
well as the authority to use it is was the [local] government, not 
the police. The police task was only to maintain security and public 
order, preventing tensions from escalating into clashes or violence” 
(interview, 10 February 2013).
Public Opinion 
FKUB Bekasi was formed on 10 July 2007, to run the organiza-
tion of 2007-2012 period. In 2012-2017, it was chaired by Sulaiman 
Zachawerus.35 The FKUB secretary was Sudarno Sumodimedjo of 
Muhammadiyah Bekasi.
35Sulaiman Zachawerus is the head of Bekasi Muslims Guard (Garda Umat Is-
lam Kota Bekasi, GAMIS). He was born in Jakarta on 25 April 1948, in a family from 
Ternate-Halmahera, Maluku. He has been active in various endeavours opposing 
Christianisation of Bekasi. See “KH. Sulaiman Zachawerus: Gerombolan Kristen 
Membuat Kisruh,” http://www.voa-islam.com/read/upclose/2010/06/24/6120/
kh-sulaiman-zachawerus-gerombolan-kristen-%20membuat-kisruh/#sthash.cA7D-
Cd2E.dpuf (accessed 17 March 2014).
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According to Sudarno, the FKUB many times came to Jejalen Jaya 
village when the tensions between the local residents and members 
of HKBP occurred. The FKUB, together with other parties including 
the local government and police, have tried to facilitate dialogue 
and conflict settlement. But it has not produced any results. Accord-
ing Sudarno, the problem of the HKBP in Bekasi was related to the 
issue of assimilation and acculturation. “Based on the investigation 
through ‘Operation Candle’ (Operasi Lilin) in 2012, there were 123 
known locations used for worship, both in houses and ruko. Even in 
the same housing complex where HKBP community resides, there 
is a house used as a place of worship of the Indonesia Bethel Church 
(Gereja Bethel Indonesia, GBI) congregation, but the public does 
not have a problem about it,” said Sudarno. According Sudarno the 
general interactions between the HKBP and other residents were 
not good, so even the matter of their place of worship became an 
issue (interview, 4 March 2013).
With regard to HKBP’s application for recommendation for 
church construction, Sudarno argued that until then the FKUB did 
not provide a written answer, because the FKUB generally did not 
want to give responses preventing establishment of places of wor-
ship. “However, in reality the opposition against the construction 
of HKBP’s church is very big,” he added. Additionally, some ques-
tioned the process through which the HKBP obtained the approv-
al from the local residents. “Some people did not know that their 
signatures were requested for the sake of building a church. They 
claimed they were told the signature was required to obtain a free 
ID card and assistance,” Sudarno continued.
According to Sudarno, the FKUB, in line with the policy of the 
local government, advised that HKBP should accept the temporary 
place of worship offered by the government, while waiting for a 
more appropriate location, because it was not yet possible to build 
the church in the problematic location. Meanwhile, Pastor Adrian 
Matkussa of FKUB said that the HKBP tended to ignore the advice 
of the FKUB. “If they want it their way, fine. We have given many 
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suggestions on how to settle the problem. We have also repeated-
ly facilitated meetings between the HKBP and local residents, but 
several times the HKBP did not even attend them,” said Matkussa 
(interview, 4 March 2013).
Matkussa is a Protestant representative in the FKUB, and chair-
man of the Forum of Bekasi Churches Alliance (Forum Persekutuan 
Gereja se-Kabupaten Bekasi), which consists of 42 Protestant de-
nominations. The Forum of Bekasi Churches Alliance is not connect-
ed to the Union of Indonesian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja 
Indonesia, PGI) to which HKBP belongs. Pastor Matkussa told that 
“So far, the PGI did not get in touch [with them], nor did they ask his 
opinion with regard to the problem of HKBP’s place of worship in 
Jejalen Jaya village.”According to Matkussa, the followers of HKBP 
have been in the region since the 1990s. They had built a ruko in 
Villa 2 housing estate to be used as their place of worship. But this 
was objected by other residents. Then they held their meetings in 
the house of Tigor Tampubolon, also in Villa 2. At the beginning no-
body had a problem about it, but then there were rows between the 
congregation and the residents with regard to parking space. When 
a resident wanted to park his car, he was blocked by a motorcycle 
of the congregation member, he asked the motorcycle to be moved, 
but that caused an angry reaction from the HKBP. “That is what trig-
gered rejection of the HKBP worship activities at the house of one of 
its members in Villa 2 housing estate,” said Matkussa.
Matkussa added, the problem with HKBP is simple, i.e. that the 
HKBP is seen as disregarding the local residents. “In various meet-
ings ustad Naimun and others said that HKBP did not respect them”. 
HKBP only approached the village chief but not the public. “Maybe 
they approached the local residents, but it seems that only a few.” 
Matkussa himself admitted that when he wanted to get the com-
munity support to obtain the construction permit for his church, for 
several years he was approaching various community leaders. “Im-
agine, for 10 years I was approaching the community. Only after 10 
years I could build my church [in Mangun Jaya, Tambun Selatan].” 
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So far the Setia Allah Church, which is led by Matkussa, is the only 
church in Tambun Selatan district with a construction permit.
Both Sudarno and Adrian Matkussa appreciated the work of the 
police officers in managing the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia’s place 
of worship. “Every Sunday, for more than a year now, the police 
continues to deploy troops to prevent clashes. One can imagine how 
much this much cost in terms of resources and efforts of our friends 
from the police,” said Sudarno.
The negative assessment of police performance has yet come 
from the NGOs. To Kontras, for example, the police was inactive 
and allowed the masses to attack the HKBP community so that they 
were unable to perform their worship at the site of their own land 
plot. The executive director of Kontras, Haris Azhar, said that “On 
every Sunday, the Tambun police and even the Tambun police chief, 
would be present at the scene. But they just stood there.” The police 
was also seen as not neutral and generally giving better protection 
to the stronger groups and to majority. “The police is not assuming a 
neutral position to maintain security and public order. In addressing 
certain groups they seem scared and silent,” said Haris.36
Interaction Between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict
The conflict over HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship has been 
ongoing for years. The long duration of the conflict and experience 
of the police in interacting with the parties to the conflict affected 
the dynamics of policing and measures undertaken by the police.
When the conflict began to escalate in the late 2009, pacification 
was carried out around the location of disputed land. However, be-
cause the tensions and commotion were increasing between the lo-
cal residents and the HKBP community when the latter performed 
worship activities on their own land, the police decided to widen 
the distance between the two conflicted parties.
36See “Kontras: Polisi Titik Lemah Kekerasan HKBP Filadelfia,” 6 May 2012, http://
www. tempo.co/read/news/2012/05/06/214402025 (accessed 8 February 2013).
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Such measures were undertaken, especially when the conflict es-
calated greatly in 2012. The placement of security forces was shifted 
to the Villa Bekasi Indah 2, about 900 meters from the location of the 
HKBP’s land used as their place of worship. According to a number 
of officers, it was done so because the HKBP’s secretariat and the 
house of its leadership in the Villa Bekasi Indah 2, became the meet-
ing point of the HKBP community before they would head further 
to the location of their planned place of worship. The Villa Bekasi 
Indah 2 housing was also chosen for deployment because the area 
was already within Satria Jaya village of Tambun Selatan, while the 
protesters derived mostly from Jejalen Jaya village of Tambun Ut-
ara. “Thus the protesters had no solid base to carry out their protest 
action here,” said the Tambun police chief.
The police admitted that their presence was not to hinder the wor-
ship activities of the HKBP, but to persuade them to use the place 
provided by the Bekasi government at the Gedung Guru in Metland 
complex, Tambun. “When the HKBP insisted on going to the location 
of their land, the police would not block them.” The police usually 
accompanied HKBP to the location. But when the protesters attacked 
them before they arrived, the police did not dissolute the hostile crowd. 
The police attempted to mediate between both groups, but when the 
negotiations failed and clashes began, the police usually tried to lead 
the HKBP back to the Villa Bekasi Indah 2. According to the testimony 
of one of the police officers, they did not disperse the protesting crowd 
because they wanted to avoid riots.
When this research was conducted, it seemed that the communi-
cation between the police and the leadership of HKBP Filadelfia has 
worsened. “We were always in communication [with Pastor Palti]. 
When they wanted to perform their worship activities, usually the 
Pastor would inform us via SMS. But for the last few weeks our 
communication was cut off. We tried several times to come to his 
house, but the Pastor would not open the door. Our text messages 
were not answered either,” said the Tambun police chief (interview, 
20 February 2013).
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The police began to take legal action against both parties to the 
conflict. Around November 2012, the police summoned Abdul Aziz, 
son of H. Naimun, as a witness. Both Abdul Aziz and H. Naimun 
lead the protests of local residents against the planned construction 
of the HKBP Filadelfia’s church building. In the second call, Abdul 
Aziz was named as a suspect in the alleged death threats to Pastor 
Palti H. Panjaitan. In March 2013, the police also initiated legal pro-
ceedings against Pastor. Palti H. Panjaitan, who was reported to the 
Bekasi police by Abdul Aziz on suspicion of beating him during the 
24 December 2012 incident.
Conclusions
This research shows that in dealing with the conflict over construc-
tion of the HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship in Jejalen Jaya village, 
Tambun Utara district, Bekasi, the police officers tended to focus on 
their role as the keepers of security and public order. The police also 
tried not to side with any of the warring parties, neither the HKBP Fil-
adelfia nor the local residents who rejected the plans of HKBP’s church 
construction. The police was also seen as very cautious. Apparently, the 
main reason was that the conflict involved religious sentiments. This 
was demonstrated by the decision to deploy a considerable amount 
of police personnel, about 200 people, every Sunday in order to an-
ticipate the clashes between the HKBP community and local residents 
who protested against them. These security activities took place every 
Sunday, for over a year. The number of troops at the site was based on 
the considerations regarding the number of protesters and the distance 
as well as traffic conditions which would not allow a quick mobiliza-
tion otherwise.
The cautiousness was also visible in the decision of the police 
leadership to not equip the officers deployed with firearms and 
batons. This was done in order to avoid the possibility of exces-
sive use of weapons and to avoid the raise of tensions at the lo-
cation. Despite several incidents of unrest between the residents 
and HKBP Filadelfia, the police managed to prevent loss of life or 
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damage to property which often became a case in other religious 
conflicts.
The research also shows that the role of the security forces, par-
ticularly the police, was limited in conflict resolution, because to the 
police their main task was to prevent clashes or violence, while the 
resolution of the conflict over places of worship was under govern-
ment’s authority, the Bekasi local government in this case.
Another thing that needs to be underlined is that the policy of the lo-
cal government became the constraint for policing activities. Although 
the police have discretion in determining policing tactics, in most cases 
the policing would not be in conflict with the policy set by the local 
government. In the conflict over HKBP Filadelfia’s place of worship, 
the sealing of the HKBP’s land ordered by Bekasi government was 
used as a general guideline by the local police in their activities, despite 
the sealing order being nullified by the decision of the Administrative 
Court in Bandung, and the High Court in Jakarta.
Bekasi government offered to the HKBP Filadelfia a temporary 
place of worship facility, first at the Gedung Guru in Metland com-
plex, Tambun, and then at the church of Setia Allah community in 
Mangun Jaya village, Tambun Selatan. Until now, the HKBP Filadel-
fia has been rejecting the offer. The police tended to be in favor of 
the solution provided by the government. The offer to carry out HK-
BP’s worship activities at the place provided by Bekasi government 
has always been delivered by the police during their persuasion at-
tempts.
So far the police managed to prevent violence in the conflict be-
tween the local citizens and the HKBP Filadelfia community, but 
to several parties, including human rights activists and the HKBP 
itself, the police failed in their duty to protect the citizens’ right to 
worship. The police officers were deemed unable to provide secu-
rity and protection to the HKBP, and criticized for allowing the dis-
ruptive actions of local residents which prevented the HKBP con-
gregation from exercising their right to worship at the land in Jejalen 
Jaya village which is their property.***
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THE CASE OF GKI YASMIN, 
BOGOR
Foreword
The conflict over the construction of the GKI Yasmin Church is 
one of the conflicts that did not end by the time this research was 
concluded. Although the tensions between the GKI Yasmin commu-
nity and its opponents have risen since the beginning of the con-
flict, the incidents at the planned church construction site have not 
involved violence, as both groups restrained themselves in front of 
the police.
The police presence, however, was not without criticism. Both 
parties considered the police as not neutral. According to the GKI 
Yasmin, the police more often accommodated the demands of their 
opponents rather than protected the rights of the congregation. On 
the other hand, the GKI opponents labelled the police as indecisive 
towards the existence of a church which, according to them, was 
illegal.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first one is an in-
troduction presenting the arguments and report structure. The sec-
ond part presents demographic and religious data of Bogor. In the 
third the GKI Yasmin conflict is divided into three phases: the initial 
phase (early 2002-April 2010), the second phase (April 2010-March 
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2011) and the third phase (March 2011-December 2012). The fourth 
section discusses the dynamics of policing the GKI Yasmin conflict 
in terms of policing activities, police knowledge, legal-procedural 
framework of policing, institutional character of the police, police 
culture, local politics, public opinion, and the police interaction 
with the parties to the conflict. Finally, the fifth section describes the 
lessons learnt from this conflict and presents recommendations for 
better policing.
A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Bogor 
GKI Yasmin congregation resides in the Taman Yasmin complex, 
Curug Mekar village, West Bogor district, Bogor city, West Java. 
According to the 2010 census, the city of Bogor was inhabited by 
950,000 people (BPS Kota Bogor 2011: xxi).
In terms of religious affiliation, 90 percent of Bogor residents 
are Muslim. The rest are Protestants (5%), Catholics (3%), Hindus 
(1%) and Buddhists (1%). As for the number of places of worship in 
the city of Bogor, there are 615 mosques, 566 musalas, 19 Protestant 
churches, 8 Catholic churches, 3 Hindu temples and 9 Buddhist tem-
ples (BPS Kota Bogor 2011: 38).
GKI Yasmin has become a church after the synod of the Indo-
nesian Christian (Protestant) Churches (Gereja Kristen Indonesia, 
GKI) — one of the denominations under the Union of Indone-
sian Churches (Persekutuan Gereja-gereja Indonesia, PGI) – in 
the city of Bogor. GKI Yasmin derives from GKI Pengadilan. As 
a new church, GKI Yasmin was hoped to accommodate the GKI 
members who lived in Curug Mekar and surrounding villages, 
and who could no longer be accommodated by the GKI Church 
in Pengadilan street.
The church construction committee chose Taman Yasmin com-
plex as the location for the new church since the number of GKI 
members in the complex vicinity was relatively high. Located in the 
Curug Mekar village, West Bogor district, the Taman Yasmin com-
plex which has been developed by the PT Inti Innovaco, was con-
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sidered the most strategic place for the establishment of the second 
GKI Church in Bogor.1
Conflict over the GKI Yasmin’s Place of Worship 
The GKI Yasmin conflict can be divided into three phases. The 
first phase (early 2002-April 2010) is the early process of church 
construction plans until the acquirement of construction permit. 
This phase concluded with the municipal government’s decision 
to lock and seal the gates of the future church. The second phase 
(April 2010-March 2011) is when GKI Yasmin members began to 
pray in front of the sealed gates. In this phase, the tensions at 
the church site began to increase. Local residents and their sup-
porters responded to the religious activities at the site with a 
number of actions, such as demonstrations and tablig akbar. In the 
third phase (March 2011-December 2012), the tensions between 
the GKI Yasmin community and their opponents heated up, es-
pecially when the GKI Yasmin congregation wanted to perform 
worship activities ahead of Christmas 2012. In that phase, the 
opponents sought to halt the worship in the vicinity of Taman 
Yasmin complex.
First Phase (Early 2002-April 2010)
The beginnings of this phase can be traced to the first attempts 
the GKI Pengadilan in Bogor undertook to establish a new church. 
Around 2001, they started searching for the most appropriate loca-
tion. Because land plots for social facilities and public facilities in 
Taman Yasmin complex were already used by the mosque, the com-
mittee purchased a parcel in Taman Yasmin sector III, right in front 
of the main Yasmin road. The committee bought the land of 1,721 m² 
from the PT Inti Innovaco.2
1“Taman Yasmin,” http://intiinnovaco.co.id/taman-yasmin, Intiinnovaco.co.id 
(accessed 22 May 2013).
2 “Sejarah Masalah GKI Yasmin (Jayadi Damanik),” http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OnCflQAMSKY,Youtube.com (accessed 21 May 2013).
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After paying off the land plot, the GKI Yasmin church construc-
tion committee applied to municipal government for construction 
permit. The committee began to disseminate the church develop-
ment plans to the residents of Taman Yasmin complex on 10 March 
2002. About 170 people attended the event and signed a letter that 
they would not mind the construction. A year later, on 1 March 2003, 
the committee again held a meeting with youth leaders to discuss 
the development plans (GKI Yasmin 2010: 4).
On Tuesday, 25 October 2005, the committee submitted a written 
request for the city mayor’s recommendation for the church con-
struction. While waiting for the answer, for the next three months 
the committee held socialization activities with the residents of 
Curug Mekar village. On 8 January 2006, 42 residents signed the 
statement that they did not object to the construction of the church 
in the village. At the meeting four days later (12 January 2006), 71 
persons were present from the RWs 01, 02, 03, 04, 05 and 06 of Curug 
Mekar village. There were also the RW and RT chairmen, DKM offi-
cial and community leaders. Two days later, on 14 January 2006, 25 
residents signed the statement that they would not mind the con-
struction of the church. The last meeting was held on 15 January 
2006, with about 40 residents of sector III/RW 8 of Curug Mekar 
village (GKI Yasmin 2010: 4-6).
Subsequently, the committee received letters of recommenda-
tion for the church construction from the municipal government, 
the city mayor (15 February 2006), the Department of Environment 
and Sanitation (3 March 2006), Bogor Land Agency (14 March 2006), 
Department of Traffic and Transportation of Bogor (15 March 2006), 
Department of Highways and Irrigation of Bogor (12 April 2006), 
and the Department of City Planning and Landscape Architecture 
of Bogor (30 May 2006). On Thursday, 13 July 2006, the mayor of 
Bogor signed the building permit. Two months later, on 19 August 
2006, the committee held a groundbreaking ceremony which was 
attended by the Bogor municipal government officials, Muspika, 
village officials and the public. Although not present, the mayor of 
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Bogor sent a speech which was read by his assistant (Tim GKI Yas-
min 2010: 6-9).
In fact, people who objected to the church construction expressed 
their opposition before the construction permit was issued, during 
the socialization meetings held by GKI. Chairman of one of RT in 
Taman Yasmin complex said, as told by the Chairman of RW 08 (in-
terview, 5 July 2010), “I object to the establishment of a church on the 
grounds of faith.” His voice later sparked the rejection among other 
residents who then associated in the Forkami (Forum Komunikasi 
Muslim Indonesia).3 At that time, a number of Islamic organizations 
in Bogor demonstrated for a number of issues which included the 
dissolution of Ahmadiyya and refusal of HKBP church construction 
in Bincarung, Bogor. To these they added their opposition towards 
the planned construction of the GKI Yasmin Church.4 On 14 Feb-
ruary 2008, the municipal government responded by freezing the 
construction permit which it had earlier issued to GKI (Tim GKI 
Yasmin 2010: 12).
The GKI Yasmin appealed against this decision to the Admin-
istrative Court in Bandung. After a series of proceedings, on 4 Sep-
tember 2008, the court ruled in favour of the GKI Yasmin against 
the municipal government.5 The decision to freeze the construction 
permit was thus illegal. The Bogor municipal government appealed 
to the High Court in Jakarta, which upheld the ruling of the Band-
ung court. Not satisfied with the verdict, the municipal government 
of Bogor filed for its review by the Supreme Court.6
3“Kronologi Singkat soal GKI Yasmin Bogor,” Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, 
http://www.forkami.com/berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.
html (accessed 15 January 2013).
4“Sejarah Masalah GKI Yasmin (Jayadi Damanik),” http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OnCflQAMSKY,Youtube.com (accessed 21 May 2013).
5GKI Yasmin 2010: 15. See also Bogor Government (2011) and “Kronologi Singkat 
soal GKI Yasmin Bogor,” Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, http://www.forkami.com/
berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.html (accessed 15 January 2013).
6GKI Yasmin 2010: 15. See also Bogor Government (2011) and “Kronologi Singkat 
soal GKI Yasmin Bogor,” Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, http://www. forkami.com/
berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.html (accessed 15 January 2013).
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On the basis of the court’s decision, the GKI Yasmin commit-
tee resumed the church construction. In the midst of construction 
works (25 April 2009), a demonstration against the church took 
place in front of the location. After an argument, the crowd entered 
the church area. The police who were at the scene, tried to stop the 
intruders, but they failed to block the crowd which forced its way 
and halted the construction works. In this incident, H. Ujang Suja’i, 
the lawyer of GKI Yasmin, was beaten. Ujang reported the offenders 
to the Bogor police, but when this research was conducted, there 
was no information regarding the follow-up to the case.
On 4 January 2010, the committee decided to resume the con-
struction of the church. However, the protests repeated and they re-
ceived a number of threats. For safety reasons, four days later, on 8 
January 2010, the construction was stopped. Until then, the church 
construction committee of GKI Yasmin managed to rise a fence 
around the land plot and a barrack to store building materials and 
to be a shelter for workers (GKI Yasmin 2010: 15). Later, they used 
the barrack as a temporary place for worship.7
On Thursday, 11 March 2010, the municipal government through 
the municipal police installed a paper with the word “sealed” on 
the gate. The sealing was based on the Regulation No. 14 of 2008 on 
the construction of towers. According to the GKI Yasmin congrega-
tion, the sealing had no clear legal basis, especially as the court has 
declared the church construction permit was valid. On the basis of 
the court ruling, the GKI Yasmin ignored the paper seal and would 
use the temporary building as a place of worship (11 April 2010). 
They then sent a notification letter regarding the worship plans to 
the mayor, police chief, and the military with the hope of receiving 
protection (GKI Yasmin 2010: 17).
Instead of receiving protection, the GKI Yasmin congregation 
was made unable to carry out their worship at the location. On Sat-
7“Jemaat GKI Yasmin Beribadat di Dalam,” Radar Bogor, 20 December 2010, 
http://www.radar-bogor.co.id/index.php?rbi=berita.detail&id=65732 (accessed 17 
May 2013).
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urday, 10 April 2010, a day before the GKI Yasmin congregation’s 
planned prayers, municipal police replaced the paper seal with pad-
locks of the municipal government. Then the GKI Yasmin decided to 
pray in front of the gate until the municipal government was willing 
to open it and allow them to use the church site (Bona Sigalingging, 
spokesman of GKI Yasmin, interview, 12 May 2013).
Second Phase (April 2010–March 2011)
The sealing and locking of the church gate became a marking 
point of the second phase of the GKI Yasmin conflict. In this phase, 
the GKI Yasmin congregation was carrying out worship activities in 
front of the church gate as a protest against the government’s policy. 
GKI Yasmin believed that the sealing and locking of the gate was at 
odds with the court’s decision. Whenever the prayers took place, the 
committee always left time for the church members or human rights 
and interfaith activists to deliver speeches demanding that the gate 
be opened (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013). Meanwhile, 
the Forkami mobilized the masses against the GKI Yasmin congre-
gation on the pavement on the opposite side. Not only the residents 
of Curug Mekar, but also a number of organizations from the out-
side were expressing their rejection of the church construction plans 
in Taman Yasmin.
Until December 2010, GKI Yasmin prayed in front of the gate 
without hindrances. They only regretted the decision of the Bogor 
police to park the police cars, including a watercannon car, on the 
pavement as then they were forced to pray between the police cars 
(Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).
The Bogor municipal government opened the lock and the seal 
on 27 August 2010. Before the padlock was removed, the municipal 
police also presented the minutes of the decision on the opening. 
As stated in the minutes, the Bogor municipal government decid-
ed to open the padlock on the basis of the consideration that “the 
GKI construction fulfilled the obligations with the construction per-
mit No. 645.8-372 of 2006, and had a permanent legal basis set by 
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the Administrative Court’s in Bandung decision No. 41/G/2008/
PTUN-BDG regarding cancellation of the decision of the head of 
the Department of Urban Planning and Landscape Architecture of 
Bogor No. 503/208-DTKP, dated 14 February 2008, on freezing of 
the permit.” The Forkami crowd came to protest and demanded the 
mayor to reinstall the seal and padlock. In less than 24 hours that 
demand was satisfied by the municipal police.8
Tensions between GKI Yasmin and Forkami at the church loca-
tion were high on 19 December 2010. The members of GKI congrega-
tion removed the padlock themselves. Once open, they draw chairs 
and service equipment to the barrack they built there earlier. They 
unlocked the gate in the presence of Bondan Gunawan, interfaith 
leader and the former Secretary of State in Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
office. Bondan was helping the GKI Yasmin because he believed the 
government should not shut the places of worship.9
The next day (20 December 2010), the masses of Forkami and FUI 
visited the office of the mayor of Bogor. They asked about the open-
ing of the seal and padlock on the gates of the church. Bambang Gu-
nawan, who represented the Bogor government, said there was no 
command to open padlock. Bambang stated that it was not done by 
the Bogor municipal government. That afternoon, the government 
re-installed the seal and padlock on the basis of Regulation No. 7 of 
2006 on building construction. This time, the seal included informa-
tion on criminal sanctions towards anyone who would cut, remove 
or damage the seal.10
Tensions between GKI Yasmin and its opponents continued. 
The GKI Yasmin congregation wanted to celebrate Christmas in the 
8“Pokok Pikiran GKI Yasmin,” Kabarinews.com, 13 December 2011, http://ka-
barinews.com/pokok-pikiran-gki-yasmin/37640 (accessed 17 May 2013).
9“Jemaat Buka Paksa GKI Taman Yasmin,” Okezone.com, 19 December 2010, 
http://news.okezone.com/read/2010/12/19/338/404900/redirect (accessed 22 
May 2013).
10“Setelah dibuka Paksa Jemaat, Gereja Yasmin Disegel Lagi,” VOA Islam, 21 
December 2010, http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesia/2010/12/21/12416/
setelah-dibuka-paksa-jemaat-gereja-yasmin-bogor-disegel-lagi/ (accessed 22 May 
2013).
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church on Saturday (25 December 2010). Since the gate was pad-
locked, they decided to pray in front of it, which they could not do 
as the Forkami protesters had already gathered at the site and gave 
orations through loudspeakers. They demanded that the police and 
municipal police dispersed GKI Yasmin. The two groups were only 
about two meters away. Fortunately, the police formed a barricade 
between them. After negotiations between the police, the municipal 
government, and GKI Yasmin representatives, GKI Yasmin was al-
lowed to pray for 30 minutes. Then both parties to the conflict left 
under the watchful eye of the police.11
In anticipation of a broader incident, the district military com-
mand (Kodim) 0606, Bogor, invited representatives of the munic-
ipal government, GKI Yasmin, and Forkami to meet on Friday, 31 
December 2010. During the meeting the parties agreed to obey the 
Supreme Court’s decision. The GKI Yasmin would not hold worship 
activities on the pavement until the Supreme Court decision comes 
out. On the basis of the agreement, the GKI Yasmin worship took 
place at the Harmoni building, about 100 meters from the location 
of the church.
Without the GKI Yasmin knowing, the Supreme Court had al-
ready issued the ruling on 9 December 2010, where it rejected the 
review filed against the decision of the Administrative Court and 
the High Court by the municipal government. In its decision, the 
Supreme Court ordered the revocation of freezing of the church con-
struction permit of 2008.12 Despite this decision, the Bogor govern-
ment did not open the lock and seal on the gates of the church. In 
protest the GKI Yasmin again held the prayers on the pavement in 
front of the church gate (GKI Yasmin 2011: 4).
81“Polisi Barikade GKI Taman Yasmin,” Antaranews.com, 26 December 2010, 
http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1293302681/polisi-berikade-gki-taman-yas-
min (accessed 22 May 2013).
82Mahkamah Agung, “Putusan Mahkamah Agung Nomor 127 PK/TUN/2009,” 
9 December 2009.
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Third Phase (March 2011–December 2012)
In the third phase, the Bogor municipal government respond-
ed to the Supreme Court’s decision. On 8 March 2011, the freezing 
of the church construction permit was revoked. On the basis of the 
court’s decision, the permit had a legal effect. However, three days 
later (on 11 March 2011), the municipal government issued a new 
decision, that it no longer froze but cancelled the permit of 2006. 
Bogor municipal government argued that the decision was made on 
the basis of citizens’ resistance, security, and indications of forgery 
of signatures obtained in the process of permit application. Accord-
ing to GKI Yasmin, letters with these decisions were sent to them on 
the same day.
The problem of signature forgery in 2006, became the major point 
in this phase of the conflict. The accusations of fraud were present 
since January 2010. At that time, Forkami reported a number of res-
idents, including Munir Karta, former chairman of RT 07/03, Curug 
Mekar who allegedly falsified signatures of residents to facilitate the 
GKI Yasmin’s construction permit. District Court in Bogor convicted 
Munir in this case (Thursday, 20 January 2011), but the case is now 
under review.13
The Bogor municipal government claimed that the statement of 
residents who did not object to the church construction was a legally 
flawed document. According to the head of law division of Bogor 
municipal government, since the church construction permit was 
obtained through a legally flawed document, the permit itself was 
legally flawed. “Suppose you study at IAIN Jakarta and you grad-
uate. But later it was found out that you used a fake ID card. Isn’t 
your graduation invalid?” he said. Thus, the Bogor municipal gov-
ernment revoked the construction permit of GKI Yasmin (interview, 
14 February 2013).
13“Kronologi Singkat soal GKI Yasmin Bogor,” Forkami.com, 7 January 2012, 
http://www.forkami.com/berita-149-kronologi-singkat-soal-gki-yasmin-bogor.
html (accessed 15 January 2013).
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On the other side, Bona Sigalingging had three reasons to reject 
the grounds of that decision. First, this case was brought early in 
2010, after the Administrative Court in Bandung issued a ruling that 
the permit was legitimate. Second, if the signatures were forged, 
the file containing them was never attached to the application for 
construction permit. Third, Ateng, Curug Mekar village chief at 
that time, stated that the original file with signatures indentified as 
forged was with him until 2010, while the application for the permit 
was made by the church committee in 2005. Thus, obviously the file 
was never attached to the application (interview, 11 April 2013).
The Bogor municipal government stuck to its decision. If GKI Yas-
min rejects the decision, as is the case with the Supreme Court’s de-
cree, it could plan a new lawsuit (the head of law division of Bogor 
municipal government, interview, 14 February 2013). Meanwhile, Bona 
said that this wasn’t the case: rather, in his opinion, MA’s decree reads 
that if [we] reject the decree, we could plan a new appeal. The word 
“could” here means, for Bona, that planning a lawsuit is not a require-
ment. Meanwhile, in another point, the Supreme Court’s ruling used 
the word “duty” with regard to the municipal government’s necessity 
to comply with court’s decision (interview, 11 April 2013).
In the letter containing the decision to revoke the church con-
struction permit, the municipal government also offered compensa-
tion in the form of refund of all costs of licenses, the purchased land 
and the GKI buildings on KH Abdullah bin Nuh street, facilitation 
of a new alternative location and of a temporary place at Harmoni 
Building. The municipal government also established a mediation 
team and a team for preparing the relocation.14
14“Permasalahan Pembangunan Gereja GKI Yasmin Kota Bogor,” Kotabogor.go.id, 
http://kotabogor.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& id=8201 (ac-
cessed 24 May 2013). The mediation team was to convince GKI Yasmin to move the 
location of worship from the pavement to the Harmoni Building. The team for pre-
paring the relocation prepared relocation possibilities. Four places were provided as 
an alternative: (1) former building of General Election Commission (Komisi Pemili-
han Umum, KPU) office on Siliwangi street; (2) a house on Kapten Muslihat street; 
(3) building of the Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja on Jl. Pajajaran; and (4) a building on 
Kedung Halang Raya street, all in Bogor.
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GKI Yasmin rejected the municipal government’s proposal for 
two reasons. First, a similar settlement was made in the case of 
HKBP Ciketing, Bekasi. Instead of relocation only new problems 
arose. Until then, the HKBP Ciketing was stranded. The building 
the government promised never existed. GKI Yasmin rejected the 
offer because there was no guarantee that the proposal would be 
fulfilled. According to them, if the legally binding construction per-
mit could be revoked regardless of the Supreme Court’s decision, 
so could be the mere promises. Second, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion was not a matter of negotiations. The government, as stated in 
the Ombudsman’s latter, should comply with the decision. For GKI 
Yasmin the freezing of construction permit was wrong, let alone its 
revocation (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 11 April 2013).
This situation further heated the tensions when the GKI Yasmin 
wanted to pray in front of their land. Two days before Sunday, 13 
March 2011, the police sent a letter to the GKI Yasmin urging that 
they do not pray on the pavement in front of the gate for the sake 
of security and public order. GKI Yasmin wrote back and asked the 
police to provide protection when they carry out their worship ac-
tivities at the church gate. Since Saturday night, the police was re-
questing that neither GKI Yasmin nor its opponents should appear 
at the location. Some of the GKI Yasmin church members stayed in 
front of the church. The police wanted to remove them, but the ac-
tion was cancelled after the GKI Yasmin legal team questioned its 
basis (GKI Yasmin 2011: 6).
On Sunday morning, the police were on alert around the location. 
Around 6:30 am, the police forced away the congregation members, 
who were still in front of the church gate. Later, the police blocked 
both ends of the KH Abdullah bin Nuh street. At the same time, 
the Forkami protesters gathered approximately 200 meters from the 
church site. They asked the police and municipal police officers to 
disperse the GKI Yasmin congregation. Finally, GKI Yasmin decided 
to carry out their prayers in a house of a church member in Taman 
Yasmin complex (GKI Yasmin 2011: 6).
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Another incident took place on Sunday, 9 October 2011. Like in 
the previous week, GKI Yasmin was to pray in front of the gate. 
This time, the municipal police was more decisive in its attempts 
to disperse them. According to the municipal police, GKI Yasmin 
violated the regulations on public order. As a result, the GKI Yas-
min members and the municipal police were pushing each other. 
The municipal police chief fainted in the incident. Both parties (GKI 
Yasmin and the municipal police chief) reported each other for mis-
conduct.15
The most violent incident took place on Sunday, 22 January 2012, 
when the GKI Yasmin wanted to hold their prayers. Because they 
could no longer worship in front of the gate, they gathered at one of 
the houses in Taman Yasmin complex. The municipal police arrived 
to the house to stop the prayers in order to avoid clashes. The GKI 
Yasmin did not stop. After the municipal police failed to evacuate 
them, the Forkami and GARIS who were waiting outside the com-
plex broke through the police barricades and surrounded the house. 
Under police escort the GKI Yasmin congregation was evacuated 
from the complex.16
Although a number of parties claimed that the GKI Yasmin con-
flict was purely a matter of law, religious aspects of this conflict 
cannot be denied. The “apostasy” or “Christianisation” narratives 
were used by the GKI Yasmin’s opponents throughout the conflict. 
For example, on a Sunday, 2 January 2011, the Forum Umat Islam 
(FUI) Bogor held a rally on the side of the Radar Bogor newspaper’s 
building, opposite to the land of GKI Yasmin. As indicated on the 
flyers, the FUI rally’s theme was “People Unite Against Apostasy.” 
15“Kronologi Bentrok Versi Jemaat GKI Yasmin,” News.viva.co.id, 9 October 2011, 
http://metro.news.viva.co.id/news/read/253975-kronologi-bentrokan-versi-je-
maat-gki-yasmin (accessed 24 May 2013).
16 “GKI Yasmin Services Disrupted Again,” Thejakartapost.com, 22 January 2012, 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/01/22/gki-yasmin-services-dis-
rupted-again.html (accessed 24 May 2013). See also “Rumah Jemaat GKI di Peru-
bahan Yasmin Dikepung Massa,” Tempo.co, 22 January 2012, http://www.tempo.
co/read/news/2012/01/22/083378905/Rumah-Jemaat-GKI-di-Perumahan-Yas-
min-Dikepung-Massa (accessed 24 May 2013).
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Ahmad Iman, one of the protest leaders, stated that in the area of 
Taman Yasmin complex there were already several Christianiza-
tion points. Youth leaders from Curug Mekar also acknowledged 
that they knew from kiais of Bogor that GKI Yasmin’s church would 
become the centre of Christianization in the city (AS, interview, 25 
April 2013).
Dynamics of Policing the GKI Yasmin Conflict
The above description shows that the core of the conflict resolu-
tion was in the hands of the government. The government’s deci-
sions to freeze the church construction permit, lock the church gate, 
and then to revoke the permit of 2006, resulted in increasing ten-
sions between the two conflicted parties. Every Sunday, since April 
2010 to December 2012, the groups would clash at the site of the 
church. What was the role of the police?
Policing Activities
The police, as claimed by the head of operations of Bogor police, 
was present at the location of GKI Yasmin conflict not to resolve 
the conflict, but to anticipate its escalation. Police prioritized raising 
awareness in the community, especially among the members of the 
two conflicted groups, rather than applying repressive measures. 
The police always reprimanded both parties not to carry out dis-
ruptive actions. The police focused its efforts on preventing phys-
ical clashes. In this context, the police employed Babinkamtibmas 
of several police units, especially from the West Bogor police and 
Tanah Sareal police, to communicate with the parties to the conflict 
(head of operations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).
In this case, the police knew of the tensions between GKI Yasmin 
and its opponents since the beginnings of the conflict. The police 
intelligence unit, both of the district and sub-district level, record-
ed and reported all information to the leadership. Intelligence also 
helped to identify the supporters of both parties and where they 
came from. These data served as information for the police leader-
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ship in preparation of the pacification/security plans for the weeks 
to follow (intelligence officer, Bogor, interview, 13 March 2013).
The police claimed the intelligence and Babinkamtibmas ap-
proach was relatively successful. Throughout the conflict, the po-
lice did not find anyone from either of the groups to be carrying 
weapons, let alone to use them to injure their opponents. As long 
as tensions were expressed in words and neither of the parties was 
injured, the police would not apply repressive approach. Police ap-
proached both sides through persuasion and dialogue (head of op-
erations, Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).
When both groups faced each other at the scene, the police de-
ployed its personnel in accordance with intelligence reports. The 
troops under the district police included also sub-district officers 
(derived from cross-unit forces, including intelligence, Binmas, Pol-
wan, Reskrim, Dalmas, Raimas), and were supported by the BKO 
unit of the West Java Police (Sabhara), mobile brigade as well as 
officers of municipal police (head of operations, Bogor police, inter-
view, 13 March 2013).
The number of police personnel varied depending on the phase 
of the conflict. Initially, when the GKI Yasmin congregation began 
to pray on the pavement, Bogor police deployed on average 150-200 
officers. This number increased with the conflict escalation to about 
600 officers.17 When tensions reached the peak during the Christmas 
of 2011 and in the early 2012, the police deployed around 1,000 per-
sonnel to anticipate the physical clashes (head of criminal investiga-
tions, West Bogor district police, interview, 25 February 2013).
Whenever pacification took place at the site of the conflict (along 
KH Abdullah bin Nuh street), the police officers were located at 
particular positions around it. Police deployed a team of negotia-
tors which was tasked with approaching the conflicted parties to 
17 “Forum Peduli Kasus Gereja Yasmin Datangi Mabes Polri,” BBC Indonesia, 25 Jan-
uary 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indone- sia/2012/01/120125_
gerejayasminkepolisi.shtml? (accessed 27 May 2013).
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minimize the possibility of physical clashes. The team of negotiators 
worked together with the municipal police. The police officers were 
generally positioned behind the municipal police team, but in some 
instances they opposed the municipal police, for example when the 
police allowed the GKI Yasmin to pray. In the view of the municipal 
police, that was a violation of public order regulations, while for the 
police the worship activities could not be banned on the grounds of 
the constitution.18
When the situation became more tense, the police chose to evac-
uate the weaker party, in this case the GKI Yasmin congregation. The 
police did not apply repressive measures in order to avoid escala-
tion. Repressive measures in sensitive cases such as this one, accord-
ing to the police, would not solve the problem. Both parties claimed 
to be right in terms of law. If the police applied repressive measures 
to either party, the action could be deemed unlawful. A repressive 
action would also complicate the position of the police as negoti-
ators in case of a violent incident (interviews, head of operations, 
Bogor police, 13 March 2013, and head of criminal investigations, 
West Bogor district police, 25 February 2013).
Policing under the leadership of AKBP Wibowo (2010-2011) was 
different from the policing model under AKBP Hilman (2011-2012). 
Both of them were faced by different situations. During the AKBP 
Wibowo’s tenure, the opponents of the church did not carry out 
their protests in front of the GKI Yasmin congregation. In that peri-
od, the GKI opponents were busy investigating the possibility of fal-
sification of signatures and bringing witnesses to the hearings. The 
police remained alert to anticipate all possibilities and they were on 
standby at the location (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor 
district police, interview, 25 February 2013).
GKI Yasmin negatively assessed the performance of the police un-
der AKBP Wibowo. Instead of providing security, the police inhibited 
18“Jemaat GKI Yasmin Beribadah, Polisi Tutup Jalan,” Tempo.co, 16 October 
2011, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/10/16/057361608/Jemaat-GKI-Yas-
min-Ibadah-Polisi-Tutup-Jalan (accessed 24 May 2013).
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worship practices. At that time, the police parked their cars, trucks, and 
watercannon vehicles on the pavement where GKI Yasmin congrega-
tion would pray. As a result, the prayers had to be carried out between 
the police cars (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013). 
Under the leadership of AKBP Wibowo, the police communica-
tion was minimal. It appears so from the incident on Sunday, 15 
February 2011, when the GKI Yasmin congregation prayed in the 
middle of the road, from which cars were removed already on Sat-
urday. Without communication with the GKI, the police opened the 
road for public transportation. The church members had to run to 
the pavements to avoid being hit by cars.
AKBP Hilman became the new police chief when the tensions be-
tween the GKI Yasmin and its opponents culminated. AKBP Hilman 
was sworn in soon after the Bogor municipal government revoked 
the church building permit (11 March 2011). Then the Forkami op-
ponents of GKI Yasmin perceived their church as illegal, and so they 
perceived the prayers in front of it. Whenever the GKI congregation 
prayed, Forkami mobilized the masses with an intent to disperse the 
congregation. In that situation, AKBP Hilman reduced the enforce-
ment team and put forward the team of negotiators. AKBP Hilman 
also, as witnessed by Bona, requested to leave everyone who did not 
belong to the GKI Yasmin. Unfortunately, added Bona, throughout 
the conflict such attitude was shown only once (Bona Sigalingging, 
interview, 12 May 2013).
From the perspective of the police, the policing was already as 
it should be: being present at the site to anticipate possible clashes. 
According to the GKI Yasmin, however, the police was not neutral 
as it did not follow the constitution to protect the citizens’ right to 
worship. Throughout the incident the police tried to accommodate 
the GKI congregation’s worship activities, however, under pressure 
of the opponents the police could only protect the congregation no 
longer than for several minutes. After that, the police would ask the 
GKI to leave for the sake of security (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 
12 May 2013).
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In terms of law enforcement, the police handled only one case 
in a serious manner, the alleged forgery of signatures which was 
brought upon the complaint of Forkami. The case was brought to 
the court. Meanwhile, in other cases such as the beating of H. Ujang 
Sujai in 2009, or the incident of mutual pushing which was reported 
by both the GKI and the municipal police chief, the police did not 
follow up (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).
Police Knowledge
Police knowledge here refers to the following issues: (1) the po-
lice officers’ knowledge and understanding of legal and procedural 
frameworks of policing religious conflicts; (2) the police officers un-
derstanding of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of wor-
ship; (3) the police perception and assessment of the level of threat/
disruption of public order.
The police involved in handling the GKI Yasmin conflict were 
relatively aware of the aspects of human rights. Although they did 
not have in-depth knowledge of it, all police officers have seen and 
read the regulation on the implementation of human rights. The 
police claimed that they were referring to the regulation on hu-
man rights in all of their security plans. The police leaders always 
conveyed the importance of adhering to the principles of human 
rights in carrying out pacification/security activities at the Yasmin 
complex (interviews, head of criminal investigations, West Bogor 
district police, 25 February 2013, and the deputy of the West Bogor 
police chief, 13 March 2013).
According to the police, they never banned citizens, in this case 
the GKI Yasmin, from worship activities. In one incident, for exam-
ple, the municipal police was disappointed with the Bogor police 
chief who allowed the GKI Yasmin congregation to carry out their 
prayers. The police chief argued that they could not ban the citi-
zens from praying. They were present to prevent clashes at the lo-
cation. However, for the sake of security, the police appealed that 
the prayers be held at the Harmoni building, which was provided 
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by the local government. For the police, this appeal did not violate 
human rights. The willingness of the GKI Yasmin to move to the 
Harmoni helped the police security efforts (deputy of the West Bo-
gor police chief, interview, 13 March 2013).
The police knew well enough of the sources of tensions in this 
conflict. Police knew the legal arguments of both parties, the GKI 
Yasmin and the Forkami. GKI Yasmin relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision on the legitimacy of the church construction permit. Mean-
while, Forkami held to the municipal government’s decision on re-
voking the 2006 permit. The police knew that they were not in posi-
tion to resolve the conflict. One of the policemen even said “Now we 
are just waiting for a decision from above (God) and trying to calm 
both sides until the problem is solved” (deputy of the West Bogor 
police chief, interview, 13 March 2013).
Police from the beginning has been mapping the supporters of both 
parties, based on which they knew exactly that many of the opponents 
of the church came from outside of Bogor. The police then approached 
those of them who potentially could cause disorder and immediately 
drove them back (head of criminal investigations, West Bogor district 
police, interview, 25 February 2013). According to the GKI Yasmin, 
however, the opponents from outside the city of Bogor would always 
be present at the scene (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
The legal and procedural framework of policing in this research 
refers to: (1) the legal framework related to issues of religion (reg-
ulation on the places of worship, abuse of religion/blasphemy, and 
the role of the police in the protection of human rights/freedom of 
religion/religious minorities); (2) procedural framework of polic-
ing as outlined in a number of regulations of the police chief and 
fixed procedures which regulate the functions and mechanisms of 
Pulbaket, Dumas, Dalmas, Gankuat, Ganunras, Ganki, etc.); and (3) 
the institutional character of the police as reflected in a number of 
regulations on the organization and administration of the police, at 
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the level of provincial police, district police, and sub-district police.
The police perceived this case as any other social/religious con-
flict. On the grounds of the Act No. 2 of 2002 on the police force 
of the Republic of Indonesia, the police were present at the conflict 
site to anticipate tensions involving masses. According to the police, 
they did not need special rules to deal with the religious conflict 
which, although more sensitive than other conflicts could still be 
handled in accordance with the existing regulations (deputy of the 
West Bogor police chief, interview 13 March 2013).
The police informants from the Bogor police and West Bogor po-
lice knew the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 (on implemen-
tation of the principles and standards of human rights). The officers 
of higher rank knew it more in detail. They knew that worship was 
a citizen’s right guaranteed by the constitution. The lower ranking of-
ficers, however, had only general knowledge of human rights (head of 
criminal investigations, West Bogor district police, 25 February 2013).
In the case of GKI Yasmin, the police has not used the local tradi-
tion-based approach, except for employing the local language, Sun-
danese, which was commonly used by the GKI opponents. Yet the 
customary law was never referred to. All measures undertaken by 
the police had a legal basis. In land disputes the police would often 
refer to the customs, but in the case of GKI Yasmin, the police did 
not act without reference to the existing formal legal frameworks, 
as this was a sensitive issue (head of criminal investigations, West 
Bogor district police, 25 February 2013).
Police Culture
Indonesian constitution guarantees freedom of each resident to 
have and express their opinion in public. The police tried to ensure that 
the difference of opinions was not delivered in a way that violated the 
law or led to criminal acts. Yet the police acted very cautiously.
The police did not take any legal action throughout the GKI Yas-
min conflict. This decision, especially with respect to the Bogor po-
lice, was due to two issues. First, the police wanted to educate the 
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public in peaceful expression of opinions. Second, the police had to 
avoid escalation which could lead to casualties. When the situation 
gets worse, the police evacuates those whose evacuation is the most 
possible. This strategy applies not only to religious conflicts, but to 
other social conflicts as well (head of operations, Bogor police, inter-
view, 13 March 2013). 
In order for the persuasive measures to go well, the police tried 
to establish good relations with both sides. They claimed they were 
close enough with the GKI Yasmin congregation, and that they have 
also established a closer relationship with the GKI’s opponents. This 
approach continued to be applied in the framework of pre-emptive 
action. Communication with both sides also opened the opportu-
nity to identify the strengths of both parties in order to assess the 
ability of the police to handle them in the field (head of operations, 
Bogor police, interview, 13 March 2013).
The police viewed religious conflicts as complicated and sen-
sitive because of their relation to abstract matters. They acknowl-
edged that religious conflicts were more complicated than conflicts 
over land and other social conflicts, since in the religious conflicts 
the police could not solve the core matter of the conflict or of the dis-
pute over the place of worship. The Bogor police realized that they 
were not authorized to decide who was right or wrong. Although 
the conflict over GKI’s place of worship had its clear limits, the po-
lice still could not act to end it, as the settlement of this case was in 
the court, not in the hands of the police (head of operations, Bogor 
police, interview, 13 March 2013).
Local Politics
Was there a link between the conflict over GKI Yasmin’s place of 
worship and the local elections? There is no sufficient evidence of 
such connection. The head of law division of Bogor municipal gov-
ernment claims there was no connection whatsoever. According to 
him, the case of GKI Yasmin was purely a legal matter (Boris Darus-
man, interview, 14 February 2013).
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For the spokesman of GKI Yasmin the connection between the 
conflict and election was not impossible. The freezing of construc-
tion permit was undertaken after a large demonstration was held 
against Ahmadiyya and two churches, HKBP Bincarung and GKI 
Yasmin. According to him, it looked very much as if the mayor sub-
mitted to the whims of the protesters, therefore, it could be suspect-
ed that the relation with the election was existent. In chronological 
order, the construction permit was frozen in 2008, a year before the 
election in which Diani Budiarto, supported by the Islamic far-right 
Prosperous Justice Party (Parkai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), was 
re-elected (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).
Another aspect of the local political dynamics was escalation 
with each response to the conflict from the Bogor government. May-
or’s decisions were often made after crowd pressure. For example, 
in 2008, the mayor froze the church construction permit after the 
mass demonstration demanding its revocation. Upon similar urges 
in 2010, the municipal government also sealed and locked the gates 
of the church. The government once opened the seal and locks, on 
27 August 2010, but only for 24 hours, due to the “unrest” in the 
society.
A few months later, the Supreme Court rejected the appeal filed 
by the Bogor municipal government. On 8 March 2011, the govern-
ment revoked the permit freezing of 2008 to comply with the Su-
preme Court’s decision. However, on 11 March 2011, it permanently 
revoked the church construction permit to maintain the public order 
and security, and also because there were indications of falsification 
of signatures in the process of obtaining the permit.
The municipal government’s policy to revoke the permit 
strengthened the opponents of church construction. The revoca-
tion also became the reason for them to disperse the GKI Yasmin 
congregation who carried out their worship activities. According to 
the head of law division of the Bogor municipal government, the 
government never forbade the worship activities of GKI Yasmin. 
The government insisted it was not true that the permit revocation 
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could be interpreted as forbidding worship. According to him, the 
government appealed to the GKI Yasmin to pray at a more comfort-
able place which has been provided (Boris Darusman, interview, 14 
February 2013).
That appeal was implemented through instructions to the mu-
nicipal police that there should be no activity of the GKI Yasmin on 
KH Abdullah bin Nuh street for the sake of maintaining security 
and public order. Municipal police interpreted these instructions by 
exerting force to disperse the GKI Yasmin congregation who were 
praying on the pavement and by forcing them to move to the Har-
moni building. To the GKI Yasmin, there was no legal force allowing 
to prevent citizens from exercising their right to worship, thus, the 
municipal government has violated their basic right (Bona Sigaling-
ging, interview, 12 May 2013).
Of particular note is the attitude of Diani Budiarto, the mayor 
of Bogor (2008-2013). He stuck with his decision, although the 
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), one of the par-
ties which supported him, objected to his disobedience to the 
Supreme Court’s decision, his ignoring of the Ombudsman’s 
recommendation, and violation of human rights. PDI-P officially 
withdrew its support for Diani. However, the withdrawal of PDI-
P’s support had no influence on the measures Diani took towards 
GKI Yasmin. Diani still had the support of PKS and Golkar in the 
local parliament.
The dynamics of local politics affected the policing action. Es-
calation often took place as a result of the municipal government’s 
policies. For example, after the municipal government sealed and 
locked the gate, tensions increased. GKI Yasmin congregation kept 
on praying on the pavement in front of the gate, while the Forkami 
masses pushed harder against them after the gate was sealed by the 
municipal government. The police then deployed more officers than 
there were previously.
The revocation of the permit resulted in even greater escalation. 
The support for both sides extended in demographic terms. While 
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the GKI Yasmin gained the support of the inter-faith institutions 
in Jakarta and certain members of the Indonesian parliament, the 
Forkami also gained support of organizations from outside of the 
city of Bogor. The police deployed more troops to anticipate the pos-
sibility of physical clashes. The police was also present as a counter-
force to both sides. According to the police, regardless of the policy 
of the Bogor government, they had to ensure there was no physical 
contact between the conflicted citizens.
Public Opinion
The public opinion was divided with regard to the case of GKI 
Yasmin. An official of Nahdlatul Ulama of Bogor, K.H. Asep Zul-
fikor, requested that Forkami complied with the Supreme Court’s 
decision. “If you do not want to,” he said, “just stay in the forest 
[‘get lost’].” Together with other Muslim leaders, through the or-
ganization “Love Peace” of the West Bogor Citizens Forum (Forum 
Masyarakat Bogor Barat Cinta Damai, FMBBCD), K.H. Asep invited 
Forkami to take part in dialogue. However, his efforts were unsuc-
cessful.19 A similar thing was stated by K.H. Said Aqil Sirodj, the 
chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama. He urged that the issue of the GKI 
Yasmin be given a permanent solution and all should comply with 
what was already legally settled.20
Nusron Wahid, the chairman of Ansor Youth Movement (Gera-
kan Pemuda Ansor), expressed similar views. He said that the GKI 
Yasmin already had the legal power to build their place of worship, 
the decision of the Supreme Court which could not be defeated by 
some 100-200 signatures, and which was above all social groups. 
Nusron reminded that the mayor could be ousted because of his 
incompliance with the Supreme Court’s verdict. If the situation was 
19“Rawan Bentrok, Dialog GKI Yasmin batal Digelar,” Tempo.co, 20 November 
2011, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/11/20/083367502/Rawan-Bentrok-
Dialog-GKI-Yasmin-Batal-Digelar (accessed 27 May 2013).
20“Tarik Ulur GKI Yasmin,” Icrp-online.org, 16 November 2011, http://icrp-on-
line.org/112011/post-779.html (accessed 27 May 2013).
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prolonged, Nusron was worried that state authority would decline 
in the eyes of the society.21
Additional support for the GKI Yasmin also came from a number 
of non-governmental organizations advocating religious freedom 
and human rights. Also from individuals. Todung Mulya Lubis, the 
trustee of the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga 
Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI), send a letter to President Yud-
hoyono requesting his help with the construction permit which was 
already granted by the Supreme Court. The President was asked to 
resolve the problem of GKI Yasmin in order to maintain the govern-
ment’s authority and the integrity of the nation. Todung appreciat-
ed the President who led the transition of Indonesia to democracy. 
However, ironically, the President was unable to solve the case of 
GKI Yasmin. The case became a sharp rock in the enforcement of 
human rights in Indonesia.22
Some of the inter-faith institutions from Jakarta accompanied 
GKI Yasmin during prayers. The support came not only from in-
stitutions, also from individuals, among them Sinta Nuriyah Wa-
hid, Todung Mulya Lubis, Eva Kusuma Sundari, and Lily Wahid. 
On several occasions, these organizations and individuals also gave 
speeches for the GKI to keep the spirit and to fight for their right to 
build their church on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision.
Eva Kusuma Sundari, a member of the parliamentary Commis-
sion III from PDI-P, said that the case of GKI Yasmin was not merely 
a fight for their right to build a church. According to Eva, the case 
became the momentum for pointing the misperceptions of some 
people about Islam and the constitution which guaranteed the free-
dom of religion and worship. Eva regretted that some people in the 
21“Nusron Wahid: Negara Kehilangan Wibawa,” NU.or.id, 26 July 2011, http:// 
www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,1-id,33161-lang,id-c,warta-t, Nus-
ron+Wahid++Negara+Kehilangan+Wibawa-.phpx (accessed 27 May 2013).
22 “Bela GKI, Todung Mulya Lubis Surati Presiden,” Tempo.com, 13 November 2011, 
http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2011/11/13/083366314/Bela-GKI-Todung-Mu-
lya-Lubis-Surati-Presiden (accessed 27 May 2013).
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community and some members of the parliament have snatched the 
rights of minorities. She believed that the case was strong enough 
for the President of Indonesia to show his authority in upholding 
human rights.23
Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsudin, stated that this 
was a problem of a country where law was not enforced. According 
to him, the state should be serious about resolving the problem. He 
said that this case was not a problem between Islam and Christian-
ity. He did not want to side with any of the parties, because to him 
the problem was weak law enforcement.24
Meanwhile, Jusuf Kalla expressed readiness to become a media-
tor in resolving the case of GKI Yasmin. However, he reminded the 
mediation could be done only if the Bogor community needed it. 
According to him, the place of worship was the place of peace, thus, 
the place of worship should not be forced on this or that street. If 
the place of worship raised animosities, it should be re-evaluated.25
Ma’ruf Amin, the chairman of the MUI, declared that the revoca-
tion of the GKI Yasmin’s church construction permit was right. He 
referred to the report of the mayor of Bogor and MUI Bogor, which 
mentioned that signatures were falsified to obtain the permit. He 
suggested that the resolution of this case should be based on the 
Joint Ministerial Regulation (PBM) of 2006, which binds all religious 
councils in seeking a common agreement. Ma’ruf urged that the set-
tlement of this issue be returned to the MUI Bogor and the mayor.26
23“Eva Kusuma Sundari: Defending Pluralism,” Thejakartapost.com, 23 April 
2012, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/04/23/eva-kusuma-sundari-de-
fending-pluralism.html (accessed 27 May 2013).
24“Din: Presiden jangan Diam Soal Kasus Yasmin,” Liputan6.com, 12 February 
2012, http://news.liputan6.com/read/376947/din-presiden-jangan-diam-soal-ka-
sus-yasmin (accessed 27 May 2013).
25“JK Siap Mediasi GKI Yasmin,” Kompas.com, 21 February 2012, http:// nasi-
onal.kompas.com/read/2012/02/21/13564381/JK.Siap.Mediasi.GKI. Yasmin (ac-
cessed 27 December 2013).
26“KH Maruf Amin: Tawaran Walikota Bogor Relokasi GKI Yasmin Sudah Te-
pat,” Voa-Islam.com, 20 January 2012, http://m.voa-islam.com/news/ indonesi-
ana/2012/01/20/17473/kh-maruf-amintawaran-walikota-bogor- relokasi-gki-yas-
min-sudah-tepat/ (accessed 27 May 2013).
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The FKUB, according to the FKUB Bogor secretary, Ade Sarmili, 
generally supported the government’s plan to relocate GKI Yasmin. 
According to him, the municipal government was kind enough to 
provide the budget of approximately three billion IDR to cover the 
relocation process. The government was ready to bear all the earlier 
costs related to the construction permit process. The government 
also proposed three alternative locations together with a new con-
struction permit. According to him, the municipal government has 
never in the history of Bogor given such an offer to Muslims. Never-
theless, the FKUB would still rely on the PBM of 2006, before giving 
a recommendation. FKUB would check whether there were no pro-
tests at the new locations (Ade Sarmili, interview, 18 February 2012).
Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict
The police communication with both parties was good. The intel-
ligence units and Babinkamtibmas, as well as the police leadership 
were also relatively close with both sides. When there was a change 
in leadership of Bogor Police, they would hold socialization events, 
especially with the parties to the conflict. Such communication al-
lowed the police to work with both groups on preventing violence 
as means of conflict settlement.
This communication yielded mixed responses. For the GKI Yas-
min, the initially good relations were useful for receiving protection 
during their worship activities in front of the church gate, but later 
they decided to no longer keep the police informed since the out-
come was the same: they were not able to perform worship in front 
of the gate. They also did not trust the police. Each time they in-
formed the police on their worship plans, the opponents also knew 
where it would take place. Instead of providing them protection, 
they felt the police provided intelligence to their opponents (Bona 
Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).
Although disappointed with the pattern of policing in the 
field, the GKI Yasmin still entrusted the legal process and securi-
ty to the police. They had put their trust in AKBP Hilman who in 
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the early days of his leadership provided them safety and acted 
decisively towards the opponents, also by forming a barricade 
with his officers between the praying members of the GKI and 
their opponents.
In the eyes of the GKI Yasmin, the police tended to cooperate with 
the groups who opposed them in order to drive the congregation out 
from the location. One time the police informed them by telephone that 
there were groups from outside Bogor entering the city. “If they wanted 
to avoid escalation, why would the police even escort those groups?” 
asked Bona Sigalingging. He added that, “intelligence of sub-dis-
trict, of district and of National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen 
Nasional, BIN) contacted us, spoke about Pancasila, but they still 
allowed masses to intimidate [GKI members] whenever they wor-
shiped in the field” (Bona Sigalingging, interview, 12 May 2013).
Some of the Forkami groups too expressed disappointment 
with the police. According to them the police did not act decisively 
against GKI Yasmin which was holding illegal religious activities. 
They stated “If the police is unable to do it, just let us disband them 
[the GKI].” They also often questioned the beliefs of the police, “If 
they are Muslims, why do they allow the GKI Yasmin to pray?” 
However, not all of them assessed the police negatively. According 
to one of them, the police was working properly, was always pres-
ent at the location earlier than them, and with full force. According 
to him, the police surely wanted what was the best for Bogor (AS, 
interview, 25 April 2013).
Conclusions
It can be concluded that the police in this case has been perform-
ing their duties in accordance with the existing legal framework. 
The decision to approach both parties and to deploy sufficient forc-
es, discouraged both parties, especially the GKI opponents from 
taking up violent measures in their actions. In general, due to the 
absence of violence in this conflict, the performance of the Bogor 
Police was successful.
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The police have run the pre-emptive measures by deploying in-
telligence and Babinkamtibmas to approach the core groups of both 
parties. The number of officers present in the field was enough in 
comparison to the size of the crowd. The police also succeeded in 
persuading both parties, particularly the GKI’s opponents, not to 
carry, let alone use, any sharp weapons. But the police officers were 
prepared for repressive action if such was necessary. The police also 
followed up on the reports submitted by citizens. With regard to this 
case, we recorded that of several reports of alleged criminal offenc-
es, the police only processed one.
Nevertheless, the role of the police in this case went not without 
a note. In the eyes of the minority, the GKI Yasmin, the police tended 
to accommodate the demands of the masses, their opponents, rather 
than to protect the GKI Yasmin. On many occasions the police re-
quested the congregation not to worship at the church location. In 
the context of existing law, both the constitution and the regulations 
on implementation of human rights, the police were supposed to 
protect the citizens who exercised their right to worship. The police 
indeed did not forbid worship activities, but was unable to protect 
the GKI Yasmin for more than 10 minutes. Besides this, the GKI Yas-
min claimed they neither were able to perform worship at a house 
in the vicinity of the church location.
The policing in GKI Yasmin shows that policing of conflicts over 
places of worship is not as hard as of sectarian conflicts. The first 
reason is that the disputes over places of worship generally, as in the 
case of GKI Yasmin, remain in the realm of legal issues. Both parties 
were aware of their respective position before the law, which helped 
the police in making them aware of the legal sanctions in case an-
yone tried to commit acts of violence. Second, the opponents quite 
clearly distinguished between the issue of the place of worship and 
the religious beliefs. On several occasions the opponents stated that 
they did not hate Christianity. To them the conflict with GKI Yas-
min was purely a matter of law. Although narrations with regard to 
Christianization did occur, they were trying to show in public that 
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they respected other religions. This made it easier for the police to 
convince both parties not to act in an unlawful way.
The police must continue to not underestimate the potential of 
conflicts triggered by the matter of places of worship. Through in-
telligence the police must improve the early warning system. When 
possible, the police should act as mediators to impede the conflicts 
at the very early stage of their emergence, and especially before they 
enter the legal path. Needed therefore, are skills to recognize a reli-
gious conflict and to mediate between the conflicted parties.
In accordance with the regulations, the role of the police in con-
flicts over places of worship is limited. Resolution of conflicts over 
places of worship is in the domain of the government, in this case 
the municipal government. Government’s decisions which are wise 
and in line with the law, allow the police duties to run smoothly. 
Otherwise, the policing tasks become complicated, as it has been in 
the case of GKI Yasmin.***
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THE CASE OF 
NUR MUSAFIR MOSQUE, 
KUPANG
Foreword
The conflict over the mosque construction between the Muslim 
and Protestant residents of Batuplat was a long-term one. Interest-
ingly, despite several incidents of unrest, the conflict did not lead to 
outbreaks of violence. Policing strategy which combined the tactics 
of showing force and applying persuasion, as well the decisiveness 
of the police officers, played a central role in preventing violence in 
Batuplat. The supporting factors of the policing success came from 
the willingness of both parties to the conflict to show restraint, and 
from other parties in who favored peaceful measures.
Presentation and analysis of the conflict in this chapter is divid-
ed into five parts. After the introduction in the first part, the sec-
ond part presents the religio-social data of Batuplat. The third part 
describes the three phases of the conflict: the phase without turbu-
lences (March 2003-September 2008), the phase with lower tensions 
(October 2008-June 2011), and the phase with higher tensions (July 
2011-September 2012). The fourth section discusses the dynamics of 
policing the conflict seen from the policing activities, police knowl-
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edge, legal-procedural framework of policing, institutional charac-
ter of the police, police culture, local politics, public opinion, and the 
interactions between the police and the actors of conflict. Finally, the 
fifth section describes the lessons learnt and presents recommenda-
tions for further improvement of policing activities.
A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Batuplat 
Of all 21 regencies and towns in the province of East Nusa Teng-
gara (Nusa Tenggara Timur, NTT), Kupang is the only one with the 
city status. Its population, as of 2012, was 339,197 inhabitants. Ku-
pang covers 165.3 km2 and is divided to six districts: Kelapa Lima, 
Kota Lama, Alak, Oebobo, Maulafa, and Kota Raja. Batuplat is locat-
ed in Alak district.
The demographic data in terms of religion in Kupang, Alak dis-
trict, and Batuplat village are as follows (BPS Kupang 2012). In Ku-
pang: Protestants, 210,471; Catholics, 73,908; Muslims, 48,547; Hin-
dus, 6,221; and Buddhists, 50 people. In Alak: Protestants, 36,960; 
Muslims, 9,661; Catholics, 4,474; Hindus, 719; Buddhists, 20 people. 
And in Batuplat: Protestants, 2,715; Catholics, 336; Muslims, 210; 
Hindus, 5 people; and no Buddhists.
As indicated by the data above, the number of Christian — Pro-
testant and Catholic — residents of Batuplat is more than the num-
ber of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. This too is reflected by plac-
es of worship. There are three Pentecostal churches, one Catholic 
chapel, and a church of the Rehobot branch of the Evangelical Chris-
tian Church in Timor (Gereja Masehi Injili di Timor, GMIT). There 
are no places of worship of other religions.
Ethnicity-wise, the Batuplat community is mostly Timorese. 
There are some immigrants from outside NTT but not many, and 
most of them derive from Java. Pluralism up to the family level is 
a common thing. Inter-religious and inter-ethnic marriages are en-
trenched in the culture of Batuplat and of the whole NTT.
The inter-religious marriages have proven to create a strong civil 
bond through the so-called “family gatherings”. Residents of Batu-
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plat, whatever their religion, share happiness with and a sense of 
responsibility for their neighbours who all take part in all important 
celebrations (weddings, school graduation, circumcision), and who 
donate some money during those celebrations. Those who receive 
the donations write down the names of donors and the amounts 
they donated. The notebook they keep will in future remind them 
to reward these persons upon the celebrations in their families. This 
practice has been present for years.
The Protestant residents of Batuplat usually choose to work in the 
formal sector, as civil servants in government offices, as police and 
army members, or as bank employees. This type of employment is 
also chosen by the native Muslim population, while the immigrant 
Muslim population would usually work in the informal sector, such 
as building or furniture businesses, or in limited partnership enti-
ties, as wholesalers (pemborong) and as contractors.
Each year native residents hope to get a job as civil servants be-
cause they consider it as a guarantee of a more certain future than 
other kinds of jobs. Consequently, the absorption of natives in the 
informal sector decreases. The civil servants in the municipal gov-
ernment offices are faced with ethnicity-based competition between 
the Rote and Timorese groups, while in the offices in the country-
side they are faced with the competition between Protestants and 
Catholics.
Conflict over the Nur Musafir Mosque1
The description of the conflict can be divided into three phases 
with regard to the intensity of the unrest between the two parties to 
the conflict: the phase without turbulences (March 2003-September 
2008); the phase of lower tensions (October 2008-June 2011); and the 
phase of higher tensions (July 2011-September 2012).
1Based on the chronology drafted by Uran (2013) and the official document titled 
“Kronologi Rencana Pembangunan Masjid di Kelurahan Batuplat” from the Batuplat 
village office.
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First Phase: No Turbulences (March 2003-September 2008)
The first conflict phase, from March 2003 to September 2008, be-
gan with the desire of 30 Muslims of Batuplat to have a place of wor-
ship closer to their homes (Amir Pattiraja, chairman of the mosque 
construction committee, interview, 8 January 2013). Since the exist-
ing mosque was considered no longer adequate given the increase 
in the number of Muslim community and since its location was far 
away from their homes, the temporary place of worship was estab-
lished on a land with a makeshift house of 48 m2 which was used by 
the congregation for taraweh prayers (in the month of Ramadan) and 
then given as endowment by Haryono Susanto (commonly called 
“Mas Ono”) for construction of the place of worship. The need to 
construct a place of worship in RT 08/RW 03, however, was met 
with a protest letter of Batuplat residents who, on 17 May 2003, ad-
dressed it to the Batuplat village chief. They rejected the construc-
tion because they felt its location was too close to the houses where 
pigs were kept, and they also stressed that the construction commit-
tee should meet all the requirements given in the procedures gov-
erning establishment of the places of worship.
Since then, the protest letter, the support for construction from oth-
er parties, as well as the response from the village office to the protest 
letter, all shaped the conflict. Besides the local residents, the Paskha 
Karang Taruna youth organization officially sent a letter, on 7 Febru-
ary 2005, to the village office demanding termination of the construc-
tion process and requesting information with regard to regulations of 
establishment of places of worship. The letter was answered on 2 
March 2005, by the chairman of Golkar in Batuplat village who ex-
pressed his support for the construction of the mosque for the sake 
of inter-religious harmony and compliance with procedures.
Batuplat village chief, Regina Kobi, called the construction com-
mittee chairman for inquiry before finally deciding, on 27 August 
2008, to suspend the construction of the mosque. The meeting be-
tween the village office and the construction committee took place 
after the former received oral and written reports from the residents 
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and the youth organization. Having suspended the construction, 
the village chief sought consultation with the city mayor. Not only 
the village residents appealed for the construction to be suspended, 
but also the Department of City Planning and Landscape Architec-
ture of Kupang.
On 17 September 2008, the mayor along with the representatives 
of Muslims in Batuplat, head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
office in Kupang, head of governance division, head of social af-
fairs, head of Kesbang Linmas, assistant of the Alak district head, 
and Batuplat village chief agreed on the following: the new location 
of the mosque needs to be sought after the present location was con-
sidered inadequate as it was too close to residential houses; conflicts 
should be avoided and there should be mutual respect; the present 
location of the mosque would remain the property of the Muslim 
community and it could be converted into anything but a place of 
worship; Muslims and the government would work together to 
search for the new location of 800-1,000 m2.
Second Phase: Lower Tensions (October 2008-June 2011)
Following the September 2008 agreement, construction commit-
tee was looking for another location, which would be more comfort-
able for everyone, and eventually found it 600 meters away from the 
previous one, precisely in RT 17/RW 07. The land of 1,000 m2 was 
a gift of the municipal government, who previously bought it from 
the owner of the Nur Musafir Foundation, a member of the mosque 
construction committee, Mas Ono. The construction, although ap-
proved by the mayor, and with the recommendation letter from the 
FKUB, as well as the construction permit, was met with protests due 
to alleged violation of the provisions contained in the joint decree 
(SKB) of two ministers issued in 2006.
Alleged violations of the provisions, according to the protest-
ing residents, included the following: some people felt that the 
construction committee did not explain their intention when they 
asked for signatures of support; their signatures were given when 
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the committee was distributing offerings; the signature list was in 
support for the construction in the previous location; some persons 
who signed on the list were already dead at the time when their 
signatures were taken. All these accusations were denied by the con-
struction committee (Mas Ono, interview, 9 January 2013).
In the midst of the protests, there were a number of residents or 
youth activists who welcomed the desire of Muslims to build their 
place of worship. One of them, Johannes Sembulu (interview, 9 Jan-
uary 2013), who happened to be the head of local police post (kapolpos), 
said: “At that time I gave my support as a citizen/neighbour, not as a 
kapolpos. We were asked for support and we were ready to give it. As 
citizens, as I said earlier, we are humans, [we need] mutual tolerance, 
and cooperation. It’s better this way. [...] Moreover, we are neighbours, 
we can’t be otherwise. We need to help each other, right?”
In this period, relations between the two groups were tense, 
though they did not turn into violence which would result in casu-
alties or a large scale destruction of property. The disruptions made 
against the Muslim community included acts of vandalism against 
the mosque property such as erasing of the nameplate on the night 
of 12 May 2009, and its removal on the night of 13 May 2009 night, 
as well as pelting the house of one of the construction committee’s 
member.
In response to the report of the mosque construction committee, 
a meeting was held with various parties to reduce the tensions. On 
13 May 2009, Batuplat village chief met at the village office with the 
head of the Institute for Community Empowerment (Lembaga Pem-
berdayaan Masyarakat, LPM), heads of the RTs 16, 17, 18 and RWs 
07 and 08, as well as the Babinkamtibmas of the police. As a result of 
the meeting, the community leaders were to constantly provide the 
residents with the insight on the importance of religious tolerance 
and to support the construction of the mosque in accordance with 
existing regulations.
On 16 May 2009, the Batuplat chief again held a meeting at the 
village office. The meeting was attended by the heads of RT and RW, 
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the head and secretary of the LPM, community leaders, religious 
leaders, Alak district head, Babinkamtibas of the police, youth rep-
resentatives, and a representative of the Family Welfare Movement 
(Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK). The meeting resulted 
in condemnation of persons who damaged the mosque property, 
advocacy on the importance of living in harmony, support for the 
construction in accordance with regulations, and urging that the 
non-Batuplat residents should not interfere in Batuplat affairs.2
Tensions between the Protestant and Muslim communities in 
Batuplat were unfortunate given the relatively harmonious rela-
tions between the two groups. When both were building their plac-
es of worship (Protestants of the Evangelical Christian Church in 
Timor were building their church and at the same time Muslims 
were working on their mosque in the new location, quite close to the 
church), they have formed a joint committee — Muslims helped to 
build the church and Christians helped to build the mosque. Finally, 
the church building was finished earlier than the mosque and the 
Muslims attended its inauguration. Everything was just fine, only 
that soon the mosque construction was questioned by a number of 
Batuplat residents and some persons from outside Batuplat. This 
damaged the relations between the two groups.
Protests against the construction of the mosque continued until 
the groundbreaking ceremony. Batuplat residents from the GMIT 
congregation, lead by pastor Judith Nunuhitu-Folabessy (pastor 
who serves in the village Manulai II, which is adjacent to Batuplat), 
shared their concerns with the preacher. Doubting whether the 
whole process was in line with procedures, the youth and the pastor 
met to inquire this from the then village chief, the late Adoe Edu. 
Adoe Edu in an unwelcome tone told the pastor that if she wanted 
to she could instead go and inspect all the documents at the mayor’s 
office.
2Information process, results, and a list of those who were present is available in 
the meeting minutes titled “Notulen Rapat untuk Mengantisipasi Gejolak Kamtibmas 
di Kelurahan Batuplat,” dated 16 May 2009.
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When the chairman of the Karang Taruna, Buce Rairutu, met the 
head of the LPM and Batuplat village chief on 2 June 2011, he refused to 
be involved in the security section of mosque construction committee. 
Twelve days later, the youth met with the district head to see the loca-
tion of the mosque. This was followed by a meeting between the dis-
trict head and the village chief. At that time, the youth also expressed 
their desire to meet the mayor. Accompanied by the Alak district head 
and Batuplat village chief, the youth met with the mayor. The meet-
ing resulted in a decision that the timing of the mosque construction 
groundbreaking would remain as originally scheduled.
It should be noted that the mosque construction committee has 
acquired all the important papers needed. Letter of recommenda-
tion from the FKUB was issued on 4 June 2010, and the construction 
permit was finally processed and ready on 15 June 2011. The process 
of obtaining the construction permit was not quite easy because of 
the negative attitudes which emerged in the community, such as the 
feud between the chairman of the local parliament (mosque con-
struction opponent) and the mayor of Kupang (who supported the 
construction), as well as the protests of local residents.
The construction process officially began on 25 June 2011 and was 
attended by the mayor, Muspida Kupang and the police. The cere-
mony was marred by quarrels between the protesters, mostly young 
men, some local residents, and the security forces. Since then, the 
atmosphere has been tense. One of the anticipatory measures taken 
by the Kupang police at that time was ordering the police officers to 
remain on guard at a police station not far from the construction site.
Third Phase: Higher Tensions (July 2011-September 2012)
The tensions were increasing before the mayoral election of 1 
May 2012. For those competing for the mayor’s office, a conflict over 
a place of worship could be instrumental in gaining victory. In Ku-
pang there was a fierce competition between the then mayor, Daniel 
Adoe (2005-2012), and the chairman of the local parliament, Viktor 
Lerik (2009-2011). Since the personal relationship between the two 
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was not good, the competition was not only for the office itself as it 
also involved personal sentiments.
The two politicians had opposing attitudes towards the construc-
tion of the Nur Musafir Mosque. According to the mayor and the lo-
cal government officials under him, the construction of the mosque 
should proceed as all requirements were fulfilled. At the same time, the 
chairman of the local parliament called for the temporary suspension 
of the construction until all construction requirements were fulfilled. 
Throughout July 2011, Viktor Lerik and Daniel Adoe exchanged letters 
on behalf of their institutions, in order to strengthen their respective 
positions.3 When interviewed by the mass media, both showed enmity 
towards each other, and it was not a secret anymore that they were 
fighting. Feeling that these politicians were “diving in murky water,” 
which could aggravate the conflict, the chairman of the local MUI, Ab-
dul Kadir Makarim, gave a signal, during discussion at Timor Express 
office on 27 August 2011, that the construction of the mosque should be 
postponed.4 Election results were beyond belief, however: Daniel Adoe 
was not elected, while Viktor Lerik’s candidacy was void after he was 
removed from Golkar party for violating the code of conduct.
The construction committee and the protesters were threatening 
each other. When earlier, in 2009, the minority groups felt threat-
ened after their property and mosque were targeted, the citizens 
of the majority group experienced similar anxiety in 2011. In July, 
a youth activist of the Indonesian Protestant Students Movement 
(Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia, GMKI) was abducted and 
received death threats from unidentified persons. Unidentified per-
son also entered the house of pastor Judith (Pastor Judith, interview, 
24 September 2009).
3City DPRD’s Letter of Appeal No. DPRD.170/295/KK/2011, dated 25 July 2011, 
containing the answer to the mayor’s decision, dated 12 July 2011; Decision of the 
Mayor Daniel Adoe No. BKBPPM.451.2/213/2011, dated 12 July 2011, containing the 
answer to the appeal of the DPRD, dated 1 July 2011; and City DPRD’s Letter of 
Appeal No. DPRD.170/257/KK/2011, dated 1 July 2011, containing an appeal to the 
mayor to temporarily suspend the mosque construction.
4Timor Express, “MUI Minta Tunda Pembangungan Masjid Batuplat,” 29 August 2011.
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Another situation that indicated that the conflict entered a new 
escalation phase could be seen from the tactics employed by the par-
ties to the conflict. The Protestant Youth of Kupang in masses ap-
proached the mayor’s office on 8 July 2011, to reject the construction 
of the mosque. Their presence was heavily guarded by policemen. 
During the mosque’s groundbreaking ceremony the number of po-
lice troops was also quite significant.
Seeing the situation was turning volatile, the provincial FKUB 
did not remain silent. On 10 August 2011, they invited all parties 
concerned with the mosque construction: Kesbangpol and Linmas 
of the police, municipal government, and the representatives of the 
Regional Intelligence Community (Komunitas Intelijen Daerah, Ko-
minda). The meeting was held at the Kesbangpol and Linmas office. 
A number of important points were agreed during the meeting, in-
cluding temporary halt to the mosque construction process while 
discussions between the government and religious leaders would 
take place to find the best solution.
Tensions in Batuplat apparently attracted the attention of Pres-
ident Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Between 13-14 August 2011, a 
team from the Presidential Advisory Council (Wantimpres) came to 
Batupalat. It was lead by the inter-religious affairs secretary of the 
Wantimpres, Prof. Masykuri Abdillah, and was tasked to find out 
what was really happening. However, the NTT government or the 
administration below it never receive the report of investigations 
carried out during the two-days visit.
Tensions between Christians and Muslims in Batuplat also at-
tracted the attention of the local mass media such as Timor Express 
and Pos Kupang, which were much more balanced in their reportings 
than other media like the online Voice of Al Islam (VoA), which tend-
ed to defend Muslims at the cost of discrediting Christians. The tone 
of VoA was quite provocative. For example, the word “sabotage” 
(menjegal) was used in reference to the Christians protesting against 
the mosque construction. In this way they worsened the problem 
more than they helped to resolve it. 
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In the end, the mosque construction was officially terminated 
by the decree of the new mayor, Jonas Salean, dated 12 September 
2012.5 Following the results of the meeting with the chairman of the 
GMIT Synod, Eben Nuban Timopada, on 8 August 2011, the pre-
vious mayor formed a fact-finding team on 19 August 2011.6 After 
approximately a year of work, the team found some issues that were 
not in accordance with the existing regulations, including the fact 
that 10 of 65 people who supported the mosque construction with-
drew their support, and that the letter of recommendation obtained 
from the chairman of FKUB, Hendrik Malelak, were not issued 
through the FKUB meeting. Thus, the mosque construction had to 
be suspended until the construction committee fulfilled all the re-
quirements.
When the official letter on suspension of the construction was 
issued, Muslims did not give up. They managed to obtain new sig-
natures to substitute those which were withdrawn, in order to allow 
the mosque construction to run, although at a slow pace and with-
out publicity (Mas Ono and Ahmad, the construction committee, 
interview, 21 June 2013). The committee employed local residents 
who worked only on Sundays. On regular days they came to the site 
but were not working. Through this strategy the committee wanted 
the situation to remain safe. There were disturbances in the begin-
ning but they were solved. The residents, including the protesters, 
occasionally exchanged greetings and chats at the construction site, 
on their way to and from the church.
5Decision of the Mayor Jonas Salean No. BKBPPM. 645/038/2012, dated 12 
September 2012, decision on the temporary suspension until the committee fulfils all 
applicable procedures, based on the Nur Musafir Mosque fact-finding team’s report.
6From “Daftar Susunan Keanggotaan Tim Pencari Fakta Permasalahan Pem-
bangunan Masjid Nur Musafir Batuplat Kota Kupang.” The fact-finding team 
consisted of 40 people of different backgrounds with the Kupang police chief as 
its chairman, Kupang attorney as vice-chairman, and the head of Kesbangpol and 
Linmas Kupang as secretary. To find out more about the results of the fact-finding 
team’s work, see the Report of the Nur Musafir Mosque Fact-Finding Team. The 
establishment of fact-finding team was based on the decree of mayor Daniel Adoe 
No. 109/KEP/HK/2011 dated 19 August 2011.
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Dynamics of Policing the Conflict over Batuplat Mosque
Policing Activities
As already mentioned, the conflict over the construction of the 
Nur Musafir Mosque emerged in 2003. Since then, the police fol-
lowed its development and the physical involvement of the police 
has been recorded since 2009. Of the four major policing actions 
(pre-emptive intelligence, prevention upon the occurrence of mass 
mobilization, response/counter measures at the time of the inci-
dent, legal process after clashes), pre-emptive and preventive action 
(although no mass mobilization really took place) were most rele-
vant to the case of policing the conflict over the place of worship in 
Batuplat.
The intelligence officers knew of the Batuplat conflict long be-
fore the groundbreaking ceremony and performed closed securi-
ty activities. They coordinated with Babinkamtibmas officers who 
were quite active in following the meetings of residents or the police 
officers who met with the FKUB. In one of the meetings with the 
FKUB, the police (as a part of the Kominda) was also present.7 The 
meeting was held at the office of Kesbangpol and Linmas on 10 Au-
gust 2011. From Kominda six people were present: one from NTT 
police, two from the district police, two from Korem, and one from 
the BIN. Besides Kominda, present were as well the representatives 
of the local FKUB, Kesbangpol and Linmas, as well as of the munic-
ipal government.
At the meeting, one of the NTT police representatives shared 
three insights. First, that the police was ready to safeguard the situ-
ation during the construction of the mosque, but once the construc-
tion is completed, would the members of the society who reject it 
take no action that could lead to an inter-religious conflict? Second, 
the police could conduct a campaign for diversity so that the com-
munity/grassroots would accept the national diversity as an ad-
vantage for unity and inter-religious harmony. And third, the police 
7See “Notulen Rapat FKUB Propinsi tertanggal 10 Agustus 2011.”
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asked, if the investigation team was formed, what would be done 
with the results of that team’s work?8
It is important to note that in the intelligence unit of Kupang 
police, a few months before the beginning of 2013, there was a lead-
ership change. The new unit head was Samuel Simanjuntak. As he 
said, protests of residents were peaceful, there was no indication of 
possibilities that would lead to criminal offenses. The calculations 
with regard to response to the threats and the impact of the response 
were based on various reports received by intelligence unit, includ-
ing the reports of Pulbaket. He received and followed all informa-
tion on the situation in Batuplat.
In the case of Batuplat, mass rallies at the time of groundbreak-
ing ceremony did not take place although there were verbal argu-
ments between the security officers and protesters, most of whom 
were youth. The police made a series of policing actions to prevent 
the situation from becoming worse. The Sabhara unit guarded the 
mosque which was the object of dispute and security activities were 
also carried out by the police station (Calvin, interview, 11 January 
2013). In addition to coordinating with Dandim, the police chief pre-
pared all that was necessary for pacification.
The police assigned were from the Sabhara unit, intelligence and 
Buser. District and sub-district police deployed the intelligence unit 
to the field for about one month after the groundbreaking ceremony, 
and until the situation was assessed as safe. The three units were on 
guard 24 hours at a post next to the mosque construction site. For three 
years the post has been serving as a police station, previously it housed 
the West Kupang sub-district police. Officers were deployed from the 
sub-district police (Johannes Mbulu, interview, 9 January 2013).
At the time of laying the first stone, the police were already at 
the location before the arguments broke out (Johannes Mbulu, inter-
view, 9 January 2013). They listened to the protesters and reported to 
the leadership. Demonstrators were not taken away; the police only 
8See “Notulen Rapat FKUB Propinsi tertanggal 10 Agustus 2011.”
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asked them what had happened, how many people came to the site, 
who they were, where they came from, etc. After the police showed 
their understanding, the situation became calm. At that time the po-
lice suggested that the protesters should show their dissatisfaction 
to the local parliament or to the mayor, and not express it at the 
mosque construction site.
The police applied the anticipatory measures, which was seen, 
for example, during the groundbreaking ceremony when the po-
lice remained on standby and quickly responded to the calls from 
the minority group. The police were always present. To guard the 
mosque construction site about 60 officers were sent. There were 
also troops from the district military command (Ricky Suciadi, in-
terview, 10 January 2013). All wore uniforms and were armed. 
The presence of security forces gave an impression that the po-
lice was not neutral. When such views were circulating among the 
majority of residents, the Kupang police officers responded: “The 
police risks such suspicions when it carries out pacification. The po-
lice is protecting the minority group, in this case the Muslim com-
munity of Batuplat” (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013).
In conclusion, pre-emptive and preventive actions of Kupang 
police were well coordinated even though they received a negative 
response from the majority group. With the police alertness, the con-
flict over mosque construction did not escalate into violence.
Police Knowledge
The knowledge of Kupang police with regard to the legal and 
procedural rules of policing conflicts over places of worship, like 
the one in Batuplat, was adequate both in terms of quantity and 
quality. However, the police knowledge related to the perception of 
the situation, by which they would determine the threats to security 
and order, was assessed negatively by the majority group and was 
seen as exaggerated.
In the context of conflicts over places of worship, the legal and 
procedural framework is set by PBM No. 8 and 9 of 2006 and Police 
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Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation of the principles 
and standards of human rights in the duties of the National Police, 
and the fixed procedures. The NTT and the Kupang police officers 
knew these frameworks, especially the procedural part which they 
followed in their duties.
The police officer briefly shared the problems they faced in Batu-
plat (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). The Batuplat case, he said, 
derived from the protests of Christians who did not approve the 
construction of a mosque because they thought it violated the exist-
ing procedures. Eventually, the construction process was temporar-
ily suspended until the construction committee fulfilled the require-
ments stipulated in the PBM of 2006. From their answers regarding 
the conflict over the place of worship, it appeared that the police 
understood the problem. The police also knew that their duties and 
responsibilities must be in line with the principles of human rights 
since Indonesia committed itself to become more democratic.
In relation between the understanding of the conflict and the lev-
el of threat, the number of police personnel deployed to the location 
was well correlated with the estimated threat level. The more seri-
ous the conflict, the more personnel would be deployed. The Batu-
plat case, according to the local police, required a serious response. 
According to them, “All problems [must be handled] seriously, es-
pecially when they are SARA issues, so that they do not spread” 
(Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). At that time Kupang was also 
in the phase of local election.
However, police efforts which were intended to anticipate clash-
es, were questioned by the majority. Pastor Judith (interview, 9 Janu-
ary 2013) said there were anomalies in the police approach:
With the problem in Batuplat there was something strange. That is, when we met 
the verification team, I have told the mayor and friends from the judiciary who 
were present, that what I know as a layman is that if military are deployed it is in 
case of clashes, when the police cannot handle [the situation]. There was no such 
problem in Batuplat. So, the impression remains that was deliberately exagger-
ated for unknown reasons. And, suddenly there appeared a group to guard the 
construction site of the mosque. This can’t be accepted.
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This peculiarity was felt by the protesters when the tensions in-
creased. Based on the narration of Pastor Judith, the strange feeling 
was first experienced when after the groundbreaking ceremony, an 
the invitation to hold dialogue arrived. The invitation came from the 
municipal government to a limited number of people, five of whom 
were Pastor Judith’s group (the pastor herself, GMKI, Paskha Ka-
rang Taruna, and some community leaders). The dialogue, as men-
tioned in the invitation letter, was to be held at the district military 
command’s hall. This felt strange, Pastor Judith asked the military 
command why the dialogue was to be held there. Ultimately, the 
meeting was cancelled without any clear explanation.
In summary, the police knowledge of the legal and procedural 
framework of policing religious conflicts and the disputes over Nur 
Musafir Mosque was adequate. They understood the regulations, 
procedures, and the principles of human rights and democracy. The 
information they shared about the chronology of the conflict also 
showed they followed the conflict developments. Although the ma-
jority group questioned the police performance, the police were car-
rying out their duties in accordance with procedures and managed 
to prevent the open conflict and all possible violations.
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
In general, the police who were handling the dispute over 
the mosque in Batuplat knew the legal framework governing the 
construction of places of worship in Indonesia, which is based on 
the Joint Regulation (PBM) of 2006 on the guidelines for heads of 
the regions and their deputies on maintaining religious harmony, 
strengthening the Forum for Religious Harmony (FKUB), and con-
struction of places of worship.9
The local police were working in line with the regulations and 
fixed procedures. There were two kinds of security actions in the 
9We could not obtain much information from the interviews with the police. They 
are not sufficiently open to provide the information which researchers needed.
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Batuplat case based on them (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). 
The first one, covert security (pengamanan tertutup), was conduct-
ed by intelligence unit after the conflict issues surfaced. The sec-
ond one, overt security (pengamanan terbuka), was conducted by 
Sabhara unit in order to protect the physical object (mosque). The 
Sabhara received help from the district police while the intelligence 
unit and Buser from the nearest sub-district police. Babinkamtibmas 
unit was also involved.
To sum up, the Kupang police knew the PBM of 2006, the Police 
Chief Regulation and the fixed procedures. They also carried out 
the main policing activities based on the persuasion and pacification 
approach.
Police Culture
In general, the police culture or the police officers’ perception of 
the issues of democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and toler-
ance was conducive. In the current period of democratic transition, 
they knew these issues could not be disregarded and that the po-
lice needed to adapt to changes in the society which was becoming 
more democratic and open. This is proven by the police adopting 
the principles of democracy and human rights (including religious 
freedom and inter-religious tolerance) in the Police Chief Regula-
tion and fixed procedures. The police was consistently adhering to 
these regulations while dealing with the case of conflict in Batuplat.
However, the support the National Police gives to all written 
rules or uttered ideas mentioned above, is not necessarily manifest-
ed in the way they perceive their own role in Indonesia’s democratic 
society. When faced with “sensitive” problems — usually related to 
human rights and democracy, such as the issue of intolerance to-
wards other religions — they are not as decisive and as they are 
towards criminal cases, including terrorism. The problem of intol-
erance, however, can lead to criminal offences as well by disrupting 
the lives of individuals and of communities, and by possibly being 
a threat to their lives as well.
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In case of the conflict over construction of a mosque in Batuplat, 
it was the opposite. Police knew that the society of Kupang and of 
NTT in general was pluralistic, characterized by mixed marriages 
where family members followed different religions and were able 
to live together (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). Police also un-
derstood that racial issues were sensitive and could be fatal if not 
handled properly. “All problems [must be handled] seriously, es-
pecially when they are SARA issues, so that they do not spread” 
(Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). With such understanding the 
police could act quickly to protect the minority and their mosque. 
The case of policing the conflict in Batuplat is a proof that the police 
response to sensitive issues is not always indecisive.
What was the police’s perception of the actors involved in the 
conflict in Batuplat? The police view was dominated by the fact that 
Muslims in Batuplat were a minority, and a minority must be pro-
tected. “[...] The police protects the minority, in this case the Muslim 
community of Batuplat, because they are small number” (Calvin, 
interview, 11 January 2013).
Was it due to the minority being weak and so vulnerable to 
the threats from the majority? Apparently not, both parties to the 
Batuplat conflict claimed they were threatened or abused. In the 
majority group, for example, the family of Pastor Judith was sev-
eral times intruded by unknown persons and a GMKI activist was 
kidnapped and threatened with death. Of the minority group, on 
the other hand, the house of the mosque construction committee 
member was pelted by neighbors, and he was also insulted by those 
who opposed the construction. The mosque site too was damaged.11 
In this situation, the distinction based on strength with regard to 
10In the case of insults, the police (upon the call of the respondent) arrived and 
helped to confront the persons. In the case of vandalism, the respondent made a 
report to the village office. The village held a meeting with all people concerned 
about the construction of the mosque. Points agreed: participants did not reject the 
construction; the committee must meet the mosque construction procedures; those 
from Batuplat and Manulai II should provide insight to the public about the meaning 
of life and inter-religious harmony.
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majority and minority was irrelevant. Anyone could threat others 
with all the resources at their disposal, no matter whether they were 
from the majority or the minority group. Thus, when both groups 
become perpetrators of violence, both should be dealt with, and vic-
tims from both sides are entitled to police protection.
It can be concluded that the police culture or perception of mat-
ters pertaining to democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and 
tolerance was quite positive. They were serious in their approach to 
the religious/ethnic issues and diversity. That approach was based 
on the view that minorities are vulnerable groups whose safety 
might be threatened at any time.
Local Politics 
The first issue related to the dynamics of local politics in the de-
velopment of the conflict was about the local policies governing the 
construction of places of worship and their adherence to the PBM of 
2006. The PBM became the main reference for those who opposed the 
mosque construction, particularly its Article 14, paragraph 1, 2, and 
3 which regulate the process of establishing a place of worship.12
Based on the information obtained, one of the requirements 
which according to the protesters was not fulfilled was that the 
collection of signatures of the local residents, was allegedly carried 
out in manipulative way. The allegations included the following: 
(1) some of the signatures were for the construction of the small 
11The construction of places of worship requirements are set out in Article 14 
of the Joint Regulation, which reads: (1) Construction of a place of worship must 
meet the administrative and technical requirements. (2) In addition to meeting the 
requirements referred to in clause (1) the establishment of places of worship must 
meet the special requirements include: (a) a list of names and numbers National 
Identity Cards of at least 90 prospective users of the place of worship which is 
authorized by the local authorities in accordance with the borders of the regions as 
referred to in Article 13 clause (3); (b) the letter of support of at least 60 members of the 
local community, authorized by the head/village chief; (c) written recommendation 
from the head of the local office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs; and (d) a written 
recommendation of the local FKUB. (3) In case the requirements referred to in clause 
(2) point a) are met while in point (b) are not met, the local government is obliged to 
facilitate a construction site for the place of worship.
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mosque in the previous location; (2) there were signatures of per-
sons who died before administration process for the construction of 
the mosque in the new location even began; and (3) some claimed 
the committee requested support for the construction of a musala, 
not a mosque.12 The construction committee stated that none of 
the allegations was true (Mas Ono, interview, 9 January 2013). Af-
ter a fact-finding team’s recommendations were out, the committee 
sought to fulfil them and was successful. They obtained replace-
ment of signatures of persons who withdrew theirs (Mas Ono and 
Ahmad, interview, 21 June 2013).
From this case it appears that the PBM of 2006 made both par-
ties powerless. They were equally confined by the rules so that they 
could not do much to resolve the existing problems. Not a few peo-
ple believe that the PBM contradicts the constitution which guaran-
tees and protects the right and freedom to worship of all religions. 
PBM actually restricts this right and freedom and, according to Pas-
tor Judith, needs to be reviewed. According to her, while seeking the 
review of the PBM, the existing rules should be followed and the 
way for dialogue should be found to talk about the problem faced 
by the two groups (Pastor Judith, interview, 9 January 2013). When 
this research was concluded, such dialogue had not yet taken place.
Another issue was the attitude of the local political elites, in this 
case the municipal government and the parliament. To the mosque 
construction committee, the PBM of 2006 was a reference for the 
construction process, which was even reinforced by the mayor’s de-
cree, which was given in the mayor’s (Daniel Adoe) formal written 
reply (BKBPPM.451.2/213/2011 dated 12 July 2011) to the chairman 
of the local parliament, Viktor Lerik who requested temporary sus-
pension of the mosque construction until the committee fulfilled 
all the requirements (DPRD.170/257/KK/2011 dated 1 July 2011). 
The Muslim community asked whether the chairman’s request was 
12Based on interviews; see also “Tanda Tangan Warga Dipalsukan: Untuk Bangun 
Tempat ibadat,” Pos Kupang, 28 July 2011.
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right (Mas Ono and Ahmad, interview, 21 June 2013). The mayor re-
affirmed that the construction process was in accordance with pro-
cedures and was supported by recommendation from the FKUB.13 
The community dispute over the process of mosque construction 
reflected the hostility between the two politicians.
Their attitudes were not only contending views of two officials 
who were competing for the Kupang mayor’s office for the 2012-
2017 period; it was no longer a secret that there was personal an-
imosity between the two. After corruption allegations amounting 
to 13,5 billion IDR were reported against the city authorities with 
regard to mismanagement of the Acceleration of the Regional Infra-
structure Development Fund of 2011 (Dana Percepatan Pembangu-
nan Infrastruktur Daerah 2011), Viktor Lerik was removed from the 
Golkar party (while Daniel Adoe was the head of DPD II from the 
same party) for violating the party rules.14 Without indicating the 
party rules, the deputy head of community development section of 
Golkar party in Kupang, Yohannes Foes said: “Viktor has violated 
the code of ethics and organization discipline of the Golkar party.”15 
Viktor Lerik served as the chairman of the Kupang local parliament 
only until 2011.
In conclusion, tensions at the local political level were rooted in 
PBM of 2006. The mosque construction committee, and their oppo-
nents alike, used the PBM as a reference for their claims. The first 
group felt they had complied with the requirements set, while the 
second group claimed the requirements had not been fulfilled. In 
this case, the PBM of 2006 became the source of conflict between 
majority and minority, injuring the spirit of tolerance between them. 
The impact of local politics was worsened by the conflict between 
two politicians competing for the mayor’s office. The then mayor 
13“Pembangunan Masjid Sesuai Aturan,” Timor Express, 4 July 2011.
14“Walikota Kupang: Pembangunan Masjid NurMusofir Telah Penuhi Persyaratan,” 
Republika, 19 July 2011, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/ nasional/umum/11/07/19/
lokz2k-walikota-kupang-pembangunan-masjid-nur-musofir-telah-penuhi-persyaratan 
(accessed 9 May 2013).
15“Walikota Kupang: Pembangunan Masjid Nur Musofir Telah Penuhi Persyaratan.”
Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship256
of Kupang endorsed the mosque construction as he felt the require-
ments were fulfilled — he sided with the construction committee. 
The chairman of the Kupang parliament, on the other hand, urged 
that the construction should be suspended until the requirements 
were fulfilled — he sided with the protesters.
Public Opinion
The public opinion in the context of the religious conflict refers 
to the views of religious leaders, leaders of religious organizations, 
representatives of the FKUB, youth organizations, media, and so 
forth, on the conflict and on the policing of the conflict. Opinions on 
the construction of Nur Musafir Mosque within the community var-
ied and were not rarely contradictory. Such views we could obtain 
from the statements of the parties in the mass media, interviews, 
or the written data which were gathered during the fieldwork con-
ducted for this research.
Rejection of the mosque construction was predominantly from 
the Protestant group led by Pastor Judith and the head of Karang 
Taruna, Buce Rayrutu. The firmness of their stance to reject the 
mosque was inspired by the bitter experiences of Christians outside 
the NTT who were not able to build their churches. Pastor Judith 
(Human Rights Watch 2013) claimed: “Our Christian brothers and 
sisters in Java have to obey the rules of 2006. We want these rules to 
apply here as well. If we do not want to obey these rules, they also 
should not be applied in other areas of Indonesia.”
This kind of bargaining was present in many interviews (Abdul 
Kadir Makarim, interview, 10 January 2013; Mery Kolimon, inter-
view, 9 January 2013; Pastor Judith, interview, 9 January 2013; Mas 
Ono, interview, 9 January 2013; Ricky Suciadi, interview, 10 January 
2013; Andre Johanes, interview, 10 January 2013). A number of re-
spondents confessed that Christians were no longer visiting Muslim 
neighbors even during Eid, similarly Muslims would not visit their 
Christian neighbors during Christmas. In this way the Batuplat 
community as a whole was on the loser’s position.
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Meanwhile, the attitude of Buce Rayrutu did not change since the 
construction site of the mosque was moved to the new location. He 
would oppose it as long as the administration process deviated from 
the regulations. During the meeting on 16 May 2009, he asserted he would 
reject the mosque construction until the committee fulfilled all the require-
ments (Minutes of the Meeting to Anticipate Disturbances, Kamtibmas 
Batuplat, dated 16 May 2009). The youth who were not in Karang Taru-
na, most of whom were migrants from Ambon long domiciled in Batu-
plat or who moved recently from Batuplat neighborhood, also protested 
against the mosque on the grounds that procedures were violated. What 
surfaced was the anxiety over Islamization and, as mentioned earlier, the 
bargaining logic that the construction of the mosque in Batuplat should 
be rejected since the construction of churches was rejected on Java.
However, based on the latest developments (the research team re-
turned to Batuplat in June 2013), the negative impact of the bargaining 
logic seemed to be fading little by little after the mosque construction 
committee managed to obtain the signatures to substitute those which 
were withdrawn. The construction work continued although slowly. 
Occasionally, the Christian residents who passed by, including those 
who protested earlier, took time to exchange greetings and chat with 
the workers or the construction committee members.
The view that the political disturbances on Java, or outside it, 
has created a chain of political disturbances in NTT was supported 
by the chairman of MUI NTT, Abdul Kadir Makarim. He mentioned 
that the tensions of Ketapang incident16 spread to NTT in November 
1998, places of worship and other buildings were destroyed, and 
so was the kinship between Christians and Muslims. The execution 
of Fabianus Tibo17 also added to mutual mistrust. The most heated 
16This refers to a clash between Muslims and Christians that broke out in 
November 1998 in Ketapang, Jakarta. Thirteen people died during the incident, and 
several churches and Christian-affiliated schools were burned down.
17Fabianus Tibo was an Indonesian Catholic citizen executed on 22 September 
2006 allegedly for leading riots in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 2000 that led to the 
murders of about 200 Muslims. Human Rights activists have expressed their doubts 
that Tibo, or the other men with him, were the masterminds of the riots.
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case was that of the construction of the Nur Musafir Mosque: “There 
may be members of elites who do not want it. Some are saying that 
why on Java it is so hard to build a church. Let those on Java be 
crazy on Java! I once said like this. Why must we be as crazy as they 
are?! We are peaceful, why should we follow madmen?!” said Ab-
dul Kadir Makarim (interview, 8 January 2013).
To avoid worsening of the conflict, he agreed for temporary sus-
pension of the construction and stated that “There are indications of 
political interests. Religion and certain groups of people are utilized 
for private interests, especially as the election in Kupang is near-
ing”.18 This statement was also supported by the chairman of Ansor 
Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda or GP Ansor), Syukur Dapu-
beang: “I agree that [the construction] should be postponed. Do not 
let the harmony that we’ve been building for years be damaged by 
short-term political interests.”19
On a different occasion, Pastor Ishak A. Hendrik of GMIT also 
commented in a positive tone. He stressed that the followers of dif-
ferent religions can live in harmony in NTT due to the good coop-
eration between religious leaders. And also because in NTT many 
families have members of different religions. “So, as long as we are 
talking about harmony or peaceful living in Kupang, I think it [the 
situation] is very conducive here because the cooperation between 
religious leaders is strong and supported by kinship or family fac-
tors” (interview, 10 January 2013). 
Pastor Ishak A. Hendrik, who is also active in the FKUB Kupang, 
added that steps for harmonious relations are still undertaken. He 
said: “In particular in the FKUB, of the province or district, we al-
ways say this from the church pulpits or through public discussions, 
also with the support from the government. [...] What we are saying 
is: first, maintain harmony. We should not be affected by all the is-
sues/information that is used to provoke the public to act against 
18“MUI Minta Tunda Pembangungan Masjid Batuplat.”
19“MUI Minta Tunda Pembangungan Masjid Batuplat.”
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the teachings of religions, especially Christianity. Here the majority 
are Christians” (Interview, 10 January 2013).
Inter-faith youth organizations should not be forgotten. In this 
case, the Peace Maker Community of Kupang (Komunitas Peace 
Maker Kupang, KOMPAK) believes that the community, Muslims 
and Christians of Batuplat included, needs to live in peace without 
looking at identities. Some of their activities include discussions and 
seminars with the themes such as diversity, peace, or non-violence. 
Inter-faith organizations such as this one are quite rare in Kupang 
and NTT.
An opinion which also appeared was that the policing action 
was seen by the Christian majority as excessive for dealing with the 
conflict. Like when a few dozen of GMIT Kupang youth activists, 
and the regional coordinator of Klasis Service, Yance Nayoan, ar-
rived at the mayor’s office, they were intercepted and escorted by 
security officers from Kupang police and eventually allowed to en-
ter the building to be received by first the assistant of the Kupang 
City Secretariat, Jos Rera Beka — at that time the mayor was not at 
the office.20 During the groundbreaking ceremony, not only the po-
lice but also soldiers from the local military command were present, 
and as is known by ordinary people, the soldiers are involved to 
handle riots when the police cannot manage it any longer (Pastor 
Judith, interview, 9 January 2013).
Because the police response was seen by opponents as exagger-
ated, the police itself was perceived as not neutral, and defending 
the party which was building the mosque. The presence of police 
personnel was seen as siding with the Muslim residents. These al-
legations were denied by one of the police officers who was han-
dling the case: “The police risks such suspicions when it carries out 
pacification. The police is protecting the minority group, in this case 
the Muslim community of Batuplat” (Calvin, interview, 11 January 
2013). If the police response was weak, it could actually trigger the 
20“Pemuda Kristen Datangi Kantor Walikota,” Timor Express, 9 August 2011.
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escalation. And, if the police were off guard, it would be impossible 
to achieve the peacefulness which until now has been enjoyed by 
the residents Batuplat.
The local and national mass media generally informed about the 
mosque construction in a balanced way. The news reports included 
not only the statements of the local government and political elites 
but also of religious leaders of each group, residents, and youth or-
ganizations. The exception to this was the news coverage of online 
media such as Voice of Al-Islam (VoA), which reported in favour 
of the Muslim group in Batuplat, and used provocative language 
against Christians.
Contradictory public opinion statements are normal. One cannot 
impose the unity in views. Different attitudes are common for de-
mocracy. It becomes unfair when the media or other parties start to 
intervene through provocations. Although there was a conflict, most 
of the people from the parties to the conflict and third parties, ex-
pected the mosque dispute to be resolved peacefully. Public opinion 
in the Batuplat case was not fuelling the conflict.
Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict 
Police interaction with the parties to the conflict is illustrated 
by the police action and intervention before, during, and after the 
conflict incidents took place. This is important because the police 
cannot be separated from the way they look at society in which they 
serve. In the case of Batuplat, police understood that the Kupang 
was pluralistic in terms of religion and ethnicity, and that people 
were able to live in harmony (Calvin, interview, 11 January 2013). 
To maintain this harmony, the police reaction to the conflict was to 
prevent it and to protect those at risk, especially the minority group.
Police responded to all incidents related to the conflict, proving 
that they cared about the problems faced by the Batuplat communi-
ty. Before the conflict escalation between June and August 2011, the 
police commissioned the Babinkamtibmas staff to socialize with the 
community and collect information about the occurring problems. 
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In the period of higher level of disturbances, for example during the 
groundbreaking ceremony, the police also deployed forces which 
were assisted by soldiers. After the disturbances subsided, a num-
ber of policemen remained on guard around the mosque construc-
tion site.
Members of the mosque construction committee generally felt 
safe, as one of them confessed: “I think both of them [the police and 
military] are very supportive. Any time I called, they arrived. At the 
time when [my house] was pelted at night, they came as well.”
The discipline in police performance could be seen from their 
presence and division of duties among the police officers in every 
phase of the conflict, and the notes/records which were taken for 
future reference and use in the field. These notes were taken pri-
marily from the police interaction with opponents of the mosque 
construction. For them the police involvement made the police seem 
not neutral. “The police are not neutral! And what for are the mili-
tary deployed?! There was no incident of physical contact,” said one 
of the respondents we interviewed.
From the reaction of the majority, as indicated above, it would 
need to be considered whether the action of the police (and mil-
itary) indeed justified the allegations that the amount of security 
forces was excessive. These allegations were deemed untrue by the 
police in charge of the Batuplat case. It should be kept in mind that 
the police applied persuasive measures through involvement of 
Babinkamtibmas, and not repression. It might be so, in this case, 
that the allegations of the lack of neutrality indicate that the policing 
action went well.
It can be concluded that the police reaction to the conflict was 
positive. They were always present before, during, and after a dis-
turbances occurred. Their presence helped to calm down the situ-
ation quickly and to prevent an open conflict. Their reaction to the 
minority group was also positively assessed, although the preven-
tive measures strategy raised concerns among the members of ma-
jority group.
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Conclusions
Policing action in the conflict over construction of Nur Musafir 
Mosque, in which the Muslim minority and the Christian majority 
were involved, was relatively successful. The conflict began with 
the desire of the Muslim community to build a place of worship 
to accommodate the growing number of the community members. 
The attempts to build it at the first location failed, while at the sec-
ond location they were blocked, but after conditions indicated by 
the fact-finding team were fulfilled, the mosque is now under con-
struction. The conflict went through escalations, but the policing 
strategy successfully prevented it from breaking out into violence.
The key to the policing success was in the strategy of combining 
deployment of forces with the persuasive approach. This strategy 
became advantageous in the context of a conflict over a place of 
worship, SARA issues, and the preparations for the Kupang elec-
tion. The police officers carried out their duties based on the consti-
tution and the legal-procedural framework of policing.
The success of this policing strategy was not without taking im-
portant records/notes for strengthening the interventions. The may-
oral election complicated the policing actions. The dispute between 
the then mayor and the chairman of the Kupang parliament heated 
up the situation and caused the local MUI to decide to suspend the 
mosque construction in order to isolate it from the conflicts around 
the election.
Another thing which added to complications was the bargaining 
mechanism used by the majority group: if a church cannot be built 
on Java and in other places, do not expect a mosque to be built in 
Batuplat. The factors which facilitated the policing action was the 
willingness of both parties to the conflict to refrain from violence.
Batuplat success story indicates positive prospects for policing of 
conflicts over places of worship. Such conflicts are a sensitive issue 
which the Indonesian police often fails to handle. As a recommen-
dation, the policing in Batuplat would be strengthened by the skills 
and knowledge of conflict resolution. Knowledge of the aspects of 
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conflicts (contagious effect, phases, etc.) and conflict resolution (ef-
fective communication skills, negotiation, facilitation, problem solv-
ing, ethics, etc.) are very relevant, although not the most important, 
to the duties of the police as the law enforcers.
Another recommendation is that the police cannot and is not sup-
posed to work alone, especially as religious conflicts easily arouse 
anger and mobilize huge crowds. The more extensive networking 
and cooperation, also with the conflicted parties, the easier the tasks 
of the police officers in dealing with the conflicts over places of wor-
ship.***
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THE CASE OF
ABDURRAHMAN MOSQUE, 
ENDE
Foreword
The controversy between Muslims and Catholics over construc-
tion of mosque in Wolobheto hamlet of Wolokoli village, district 
Wolowaru in Ende regency, began in the early 2011.1 The plans of 
Muslims to build a mosque were rejected by the Catholic residents 
on the grounds that they did not yet fulfill the requirements of es-
tablishing a place of worship set by the PBM (Joint Ministerial Reg-
ulation) No. 8 and 9 of 2006. Despite this opposition, the Muslim 
community continued the construction process, which several times 
led to tensions between the two parties.
These tensions peaked in August 2011, when the mosque began 
to be used. To prevent clashes, the government held a meeting be-
tween Muspida, Muspika, residents and the parties to the conflict. 
The meeting took place at the local adat house. During the meeting, 
the police were present and they prevented a confrontation which 
was about to happen. Up till now, despite mutual disappointment 
1Various documents and sources interviewed used the terms “mosque” and 
“musala” interchangeably. For consistency, here we used the term “mosque.”
265
Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship266
and grievances, the two conflicted groups have been able to refrain 
from violence and vigilantism. This was because the society had 
enough power to quench the conflict. Also the police and the local 
government had intervened early enough.
This chapter describes and analyzes the role of the police and re-
lated agencies in handling the above conflict. After giving a general 
overview of Ende regency and Wolokoli village, the first part will 
present briefly the history of the conflict surrounding the mosque 
construction and the factors considered as conflict triggers. The 
second part will show how the police performed amid low level of 
trust bestowed upon them by the public, especially the parties to the 
conflict. The police intervention in this case was generally minimal. 
Violence could be avoided because both sides refrained from it.
A Glimpse at Religious Demography of Ende
Ende regency is located in the middle of the island of Flores, East 
Nusa Tenggara (Nusa Tenggara Timur, NTT) province. It covers the 
area of 2046,59 km2 and has a population of 260,428 (2010 census).2 
The regency is divided into 21 districts, 191 administrative villages 
and 23 villages. According to the 2010 data, 72% of the population 
is Catholic (189,445 people), 23% Muslim (71,769), 4% Protestant 
(5,678), and 1% Hindu (442), Buddhists and Confucianists were al-
together 16 people.3 The number of places of worship in Ende is as 
follows: 101 mosques, 18 musalas, 16 langgars, 254 Catholic churches, 
nine Protestant churches, and three temples.4
As the majority, Catholics occupy many of the political and ad-
ministrative positions. Although there is no such written rule, in the 
government offices there is usually a mixed Catholic and Muslim 
representation. This shows in the example of regent and vice regent 
offices or the chairman and deputy chairman of the FKUB. Interest-
2Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Ende, Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010: Data 
Agregat per Kecamatan (Kabupaten Ende, 2010), p. 14.
3“Rencana Strategis Kementrian Agama Kantor Kabupaten Ende 2010-2014,” p. 
2 and 5.
4“Rencana Strategis Kementrian Agama Kantor Kabupaten Ende 2010-2014,” p. 5.
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ingly, the office of the police chief of Ende is held by a Muslim.
The controversy over mosque construction occurred in Wolokoli 
village of Wolowaru district which consists of 14 villages and one 
administrative village. Based on the 2010 census, the population of 
Wolowaru is 15,943 people5 of whom 1,363 live in Wolokoli.6 The 
distance from Wolokoli to Ende is around 60 km or about two hours 
drive. The road to the village of Wolokoli is full of turns going up 
and down on the side of Mountain Kelimutu, which is a tourist des-
tination. 
The first landmark to be found in the village of Wolokoli is the 
Wolowaru police office. Wolowaru police personnel consists of the 
police chief, deputy police chief and 11 officers, who must handle 
three sub-districts, and 64 villages with about 120 hamlets. Besides 
being responsible for security, they often have additional work in 
overseeing the National Examination (Ujian Nasional) and local elec-
tions in places that are difficult to reach. The distance from the po-
lice station to the location of the Wolobheto Mosque is about 15 to 30 
minutes drive because the roads are not in a good condition.
When we visited the site, the disputed mosque was already 
erected but a few things such as windows and walls, seemed still 
under construction. The building was a simple cube of 10 meters 
side plus a patch of space for the preacher. What distinguishes it 
from other buildings are two small domes on the roof and a loud-
speaker attached to one of the windows. Inside the mosque there is 
a space for woman and a hall for sermons, with a whiteboard and a 
small shelf to store mukena (women praying dress) and the Koran. 
To call for the prayer time, the loudspeakers would be used, but the 
sound is directed into the room.
The mosque is located near the local adat house compound, where 
the chairman of the mosque construction committee, Muhamad Ng-
gori, serves as a musalaki (landlord or a traditional leader). Only a 
small part of the Muslim population lives around the mosque. The 
4Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Ende (2010: 15).
6Penduduk Indonesia menurut Desa Hasil Sensus Penduduk 2010.
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majority of local residents are Catholics. Not far from the location of 
the mosque, in Jopu village adjacent to Wolokoli, stands the church of 
St. Virgin Mary, the centre of Jopu parish which is led by Father Felix Jawa.
Conflict Over the Abdurrahman Mosque
Tensions related to the mosque construction in the village of 
Wolobheto were first visible in the late January of 2011. They peak-
ed in August-September 2011, when the mosque was completed and 
set into use.
The Muslim residents who were then led by Muhamad Nggori 
(later referred to as Nggori) desired to establish a mosque because 
of the considerable distance from the nearest one. According to var-
ious sources, the distance to the nearest mosque, in the village of 
Mbuliloo, was between 500 meters to one kilometer, or about 15-30 
minutes by foot. Nggori felt the distance was difficult for Muslims 
during Friday prayers. The local residents, Muslim and Catholic 
alike, worked together to transport stones and sand in preparation 
for the construction.
The construction committee was formed during a meeting on 24 
January 2011. At the meeting, the Wolokoli village chief, Vincentius 
Gaga, reminded the committee that the construction should fulfil 
the requirements of the establishment of places of worship as stipu-
lated in the PBM No. 8 and No. 9 of 2006. The initiative to familiarize 
the community with the 2006 PBM was made by the village chief 
after consultations with Father Felix Jawa, the leader of Jopu parish.
As a head of the construction committee, Nggori was surprised 
to hear about the regulations delivered by the village chief and said 
the construction would continue. It fact, it should not be difficult for 
the committee to fulfill the PBM 2006 requirements if Catholics were 
already helping them to build the mosque. It seems that as musalaki 
who traditionally ruled over the land, Nggori’s pride would be hurt 
had he submitted to the village chief.7
7The village chief, Vincentius Gaga, is a family member of Muhamad Nggori, 
since he is married to Nggori’s younger sister.
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After the meeting rumors and prejudices were spread by both 
sides. Muslims suspected the village chief, a Catholic, of maneu-
vers to complicate the mosque construction. On the other hand, 
Catholics suspected that Nggori was influenced by Islamic hard-lin-
ers for daring to ignore the government rules. After this incident 
Catholics no longer participated in transporting stones and sand to 
the construction site. Instead of approaching the Catholics, Nggori 
appealed to Muslims from the nearby villages. The local residents 
stopped greeting each other and the tensions were felt by all.
The news about tensions reached the district level, precisely the 
office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ende and the FKUB. On 
1 February 2011, the head of administration of the Ministry in Ende, 
Yosef Nganggo, and the chairman of the FKUB, Father Ambrosius 
Nanga, went to monitor the situation in Wolokoli. Both of them also 
met the village chief and his staff. In their report they concluded that 
“residents still live in harmony despite frictions.” Then the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs in Ende and the FKUB suggested that the PBM 
should be introduced to the entire community and called on the vil-
lage chief and local residents to maintain peace and order.
Based on the written request of the Wolokoli village chief, dated 
5 February 2011, the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office 
in Ende, the chairman and the members of the FKUB, the chairman 
of the MUI Ende, and Muspika Wolowaru, provided explanation 
on how to introduce the PBM, during the meeting at the Wolokoli 
village office on 7 February 2011.8 In the meeting, the chairman of 
the MUI Ende, H. Abdurrahman Aroeboesman, expressed the view 
that the construction of musala could not be implemented because 
the requirements of the PBM were not fulfilled.9 The then Wolowaru 
police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar, was also present and seconded this 
view. 
8“Laporan Khusus” Kantor Kemenag Kab. Ende (Ministry of Religious Affairs 
office Ende) No. Kd. 20.08/1/OT 01.2/298/2011, dated 25 February 2011, to the head 
of Ministry of Religious Affairs office NTT.
9Letter of the Wolokoli village chief to Wolowaru district head No. Pem.140/97/
VIII/DW/2011, dated 1 August 2011, on Kamtibmas.
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After the meeting, two members of the Ende office of the Minis-
try of Religious Affairs staff, H. Pua Ibrahim and A. Wahab, as well 
as the head of the Ministry’s office in Wolowaru, Abu Bakar Rasyid, 
reviewed the construction site. It was apparently interpreted by Ng-
gori as a sign of support to continue the construction of the mosque. 
A few days later, a messenger from the Ministry went back to the 
site to clarify and persuade Nggori to delay construction. Their ef-
forts did not succeed as Nggori did not obey.10
The members of Muspida took part in a meeting on 20 February 
2011, in Wolobheto. At the meeting, the regional secretary of Ende, 
the first assistant to the regent, and the deputy police chief of Ende 
were present together with the chairman of the MUI Ende, the head 
of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Ende, and the Muspika of 
Wolowaru. The meeting was chaired by the Ende secretary, Drs. 
Ansar Rera. The head of the Ministry’s office was the first one to 
introduce the PBM. After him the chairman of the MUI and the Ende 
deputy police chief. The Wolokoli village chief provided an expla-
nation and then Nggori and Father Felix were welcomed to convey 
their aspirations before the dialog session.
The meeting produced a number of agreements, but they were 
not written and not disseminated to the public. The agreements, 
as noted in the documentation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
were as follows:11
•  Construction plans could go on but not for building a place of 
worship (mosque/musala) but a house.
•  The building is to have a shape of an ordinary house. Features 
of a mosque or musala are not allowed. Wolowaru district head, 
Wolokoli village chief and the head of Ministry of Religious Af-
10“Laporan Khusus” Kantor Kemenag Kab. Ende (Ministry of Religious Affairs 
office Ende) No. Kd. 20.08/1/OT01.2/298/2011, dated 25 February 2011, to the head 
of Ministry of Religious Affairs office NTT. See also the Letter of the Wolokoli village 
chief to Wolowaru district head No. Pem.140/97/VIII/DW/2011, dated 1 August 
2011, on Kamtibmas.
11“Laporan Khusus” Kantor Kemenag Kab. Ende (Ministry of Religious Affairs 
office Ende) No. Kd.20.08/1/OT01.2/298/2011, dated 25th February 2011, to the 
head of Ministry of Religious Affairs office NTT.
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fairs office in Wolowaru were to monitor the construction. 
•  When the construction is finished, the Muslim community 
should approach the owner of the house to rent it for use as a 
temporary place of worship.
•  To obtain a temporary permit for the use of the house as a place 
of worship, the initiator must take care of all the requirements 
and apply to the head of the Ministry’s office in Ende and to the 
chairman of the FKUB Ende.
•  If the head of the Ministry’s office in Ende and the chairman 
of the FKUB Ende decide that the building is appropriate for a 
place of worship, they would forward a recommendation to the 
Ende regent.
•  Ende regent has a prerogative to give or not to give permission 
for the place to be used as a temporary place of worship.
•  Only when the regent issues the permit, the place could be used 
as a temporary place of worship.
On the next day, 21 February 2011, Nggori began to build the 
foundations with assistance of Muslims from several villages in-
cluding Mbuliwaralau, Bokasape, Mbuliloo, Rindiwawo and Na-
kambara. This by Catholics was perceived as a provocation, but 
they refrained from reacting after intervention from the government 
and the Jopu parish.
Since then, for several months of the ongoing construction, the 
atmosphere in Wolokoli was relatively peaceful. No meetings of 
Muspida or Muspika were held at that time.
Tensions again emerged at the end of July 2011 (ahead of Rama-
dan 1432) after the building was completed and set into use with a 
complete dome and loudspeakers. On 1 August 2011, Wolokoli vil-
lage chief sent a letter to the Wolowaru district head and forwarded 
it also to various agencies, making reference to the disruption of 
social order in the village Wolokoli. In the letter he reported that the 
disputed mosque was standing complete with a variety of religious 
attributes and had been used since 21 July 2011. The village chief 
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also mentioned that on 31 July 2011, the loudspeakers were used 
in a noisy manner and that the residents of Wolokoli were “feeling 
restless, distracted and deceived.”12
The letter was fiery. Some parts of it were written in capital let-
ters, bold and underlined. The village chief also mentioned that the 
presence of the mosque disturbed the customary ritual sacrifice of 
pigs and dogs during house construction, and that the residents 
worried their pigs and dogs would not be free to roam since there 
was a mosque. He suspected there were hardliners “backing” Ng-
gori since he dared to ignore the PBM of 2006 and all protests. Fi-
nally, the village chief also underlined that the matter was “a time 
bomb ready to explode.”
On 7 August 2011, about 20 Catholic women complained on the 
use of loudspeakers to the Wolowaru district chief and the Wolowa-
ru police chief. In the afternoon, the Wolowaru district chief with 
Kesbangpol Ende sent four officers to the scene to monitor the situ-
ation. They could not do much except for appealing for calm.13
In response to the reports of residents, the local government held 
a coordination meeting on 8 August 2011 in the office of the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs in Ende, which was attended by the first assis-
tant of Setkab Ende, Ende deputy police chief, head of the district 
Kesbangpolinmas Ende, FKUB, and Kasi/Gara of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs office in Ende. It was approved to hold a meeting 
with the residents of Wolokoli. On the same day the group went to 
the location guarded by the mobile brigade and Dalmas of Ende 
police. The meeting was planned in the Wolowaru district office, 
but after the demands from the residents, it was shifted to Wolokoli 
village, to Wolobheto adat house.
The atmosphere in the meeting was tense. Government officials, 
along with leaders of the Catholic group sat on one side, while Ng-
12Letter of the Wolokoli village chief to Wolowaru district head No. Pem.140/97/
VIII/DW/2011, dated 1 August 2011, on Kamtibmas.
13Report of Kamtibmas Wolowaru to the regent No. BKPM.330/745/VIII/2011, 
dated 7 August 2011.
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gori and his family on the other. Around them local residents were 
flocking, and a few armed members of mobile brigade were on 
guard. Both sides were quarrelling and almost clashed but the secu-
rity forces and religious leaders managed to calm them down. After 
having taken into account legal, religious and cultural, approaches, 
the meeting yielded the following resolutions:
•  Muslims who build the mosque (represented by H. Iramsyah 
Muh. Mberu) apologized for violating the rules of the construc-
tion of places of worship and stated that they were willing to 
lower the dome as well as to stop the use of loudspeakers.
•  Those who needed the place of worship were ready to take the 
procedural path to obtain the permit for using the building as a 
temporary place of worship.
After the meeting, the dome was never lowered and the loud-
speakers were off for a few days only. On 12 September 2011, a num-
ber of representatives of the Catholic community of Jopu parish, 
approached the Ende regent, leaders of the local parliament and the 
Ende police chief. They asked about the government’s attitude to-
wards the violations made by Nggori which could result in a con-
flict in the Wolokoli village.
This was followed by Ministry of Religious Affairs sending, on 
17 September 2011, two separate teams to each of the parties to the 
conflict. The first team met the Muslims who were represented by 
Muhamad Nggori and H. Iramsyah M Mberu. Nggori stated he 
would stick to the already existing mosque building and was seek-
ing to receive the permit from the government. He also claimed that 
on 22 August 2011, he had met with the village officials and mem-
bers of Muspika (district head, police chief and Danramil). In that 
meeting it was agreed that the building would be used for worship, 
but the loudspeakers would not be switched on.
Meanwhile, the second team met the Catholic community repre-
sentative, the priest of Jopu parish. The meeting took place in Jopu 
rectory. The Wolobheto Catholic community leader maintained that 
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the places of worship must follow the PBM and that during the 20 
February 2011 meeting, there was an agreement made and it should 
be respected. He felt that they had already went through all the pro-
cesses to submit their objections and sought the settlement from the 
regent and vice regent.
The Ministry of Religious Affairs suggested that the government 
should immediately follow up and hold a meeting outside Wolokoli. 
This was also reported in the Ministry’s meeting with the vice regent 
on 20 September 2011. Since then the Ministry no longer held meetings 
with residents or issued reports on the situation as it did earlier.
The meeting was held again around August 2012. Muhamad Ng-
gori and H. Iramsyah Mberu called to the regent’s office to meet with 
regent and Muspida. In the meeting, were no one from the Catholic 
side was present, the regent said that the mosque could be used for 
worship as long as the loudspeakers were not used excessively.14 
Such message was also delivered by the local government officials 
who came with a visit during Ramadan 1433 H (July-August 2012).
When this report was completed both sides were still disappoint-
ed and holding resentments towards each other. Yet the situation 
seemed safe and under control. There were no clashes or attacks 
that claimed lives or material losses. But anxiety and hostility could 
not be hidden. When the call for prayer was heard, Catholics would 
play loud music. Catholic and Muslim neighbors no longer greeted 
each other as they used to. Rumors and gossips made them suspi-
cious of one another.
Such conflict was something new in the history of Jopu. The ef-
forts to judicialize a natural social process through the PBM, dis-
turbed the harmony between Muslims and Catholics. Earlier, both 
communities would help each other to build a mosque or a church. 
This was stopped after the PBM was introduced to the residents and 
triggered hostility between the two groups.
14See “Pokok-pokok Arahan Bupati Ende Pada Rapat Koordinasi Perumusan 
Kebijakan di Bidang Pemerintahan, Hukum dan Keamanan Ketertiban Masyarakat,” 
Monday, 23 July 2012.
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Dynamics of Policing the Conflict over the Mosque
Policing Activities
Information about tensions in Wolobheto reached the Wolowaru 
police chief in early February 2011. The police took part in the regen-
cy’s efforts to introduce the matter of PBM on 7 February 2011, two 
weeks after the meeting of the village chief with the construction 
committee. But since the police himself did not yet know the con-
tents of PBM, his appeals could only be general, regarding Kamtib-
mas or traffic order.
Upon the insistence from the local residents, the sub-district 
police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar (interview, 20 April 2013), was 
asked by the district head to ban the mosque construction by 
force. He refused. The building foundation was ready and the 
construction process was ongoing so it would be very disturbing 
if it was stopped forcibly. He also claimed to have consulted the 
matter with the district police chief and did not receive orders to 
stop the construction.
The police chief also believed that prohibiting construction of 
places of worship was in the authority of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and the FKUB. He only appealed to Nggori to follow the 
procedures and seek the acceptance of local residents. The deputy 
police chief, Yohanes Fono (interview, 22 April 2013), said that to 
anticipate potential security threats the police officers made daily 
patrols and reports on the situation.
Because the police was reluctant or unable to stop the construc-
tion of the mosque, the Catholic group suspected them of siding 
with the Muslims. Such complaint was made by Catholics to the 
district police chief. There is no official statement from the police 
regarding the truth of these allegations, but the leadership of the 
police Wolowaru had changed several times. Since the emergence 
of tensions in February 2011, and until this report was completed, 
the Wolowaru police chiefs changed four times and represented dif-
ferent religions, from Ali Hasan Mukhtar, (Muslim), Anom Triyatna 
(Hindu), Fidelis (Catholic), and Made Kadek (Hindu).
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Although each of the police chiefs gave attention to the problem 
in Jopu, their handling of the situation was not as good as their pre-
decessors. Each new police chief had to build a relationship with the 
parties to the conflict from zero, which required both the time and ca-
pabilities. Nggori, for example, claimed that the last police chief never 
visited him. Members of the police who followed this conflict since the 
beginning and who were still serving there included the deputy of the 
sub-district police chief and the head of intelligence unit.
Thus far, there has been no information from the police, Kes-
bangpol and Linmas, Ministry of Religious Affairs or the Jopu par-
ish regarding any mass mobilization, except for during the meetings 
involving both parties to the conflict. In each meeting, the police 
was present to guard or to appease. Claims of the mass mobilization 
were made only by Nggori (interview, 23 April 2013) who said that 
he nearly clashed with the Catholic residents who wanted to tear 
down the mosque dome and that he had already prepared weapons 
such as machetes and spears.
Deployment of a considerable number of police personnel took 
place on 8 August 2011. John Philipus, head of Linmas Kesbangpol 
Ende (interview, 19 April 2013), reported that around 30 officers of Dal-
mas and mobile brigade were deployed to escort the officials on their 
way to the meeting in Jopu village. The order to deploy mobile brigade 
officers came directly from the district police chief. Wolowaru sub-dis-
trict police chief (interview, 20 April 2013) confessed that he never re-
quested additional assistance of the mobile brigade personnel. He felt 
confident that he could handle the situation with his own officers.
Besides guarding the meeting, the police were also monitoring 
the situation to anticipate rumors which could disrupt security. As 
narrated by the head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office (in-
terview, 19 April 2013), tensions emerged after rumors that a third 
party was involved in the conflict.15 It is not clear who the third party 
15It is not clear who was meant the third party. But from the testimony of Jopu parish 
priest, there were people from outside Wolobheto who several times came to help in the 
mosque construction and the local residents suspected them to be Islamic hardliners.
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was, but some of the local residents claimed that it was the outsiders 
who often arrived to assist in the mosque construction. The tensions 
were not followed by pelting or clashes; there were merely verbal at-
tacks. In these situations, police and Koramil were busy monitoring.
Deputy district police chief, Yohanes Fono (interview, 22 April 
2013), said that rumors were circulating via texts (SMS) and anony-
mous phone calls. The police arrived to investigate and to calm the 
residents. Then another rumor was spread that war between the two 
parties (“baku potong”) would take place. This reached the regent 
who asked the police for clarification. After the investigation it ap-
peared that the rumors were not true. 
Nggori admitted (interview, 23 April 2013) that it was the police 
chief (Ali Hasan Mukhtar) who calmed him down when he nearly 
clashed with the Catholics who allegedly were going to lower the 
mosque’s dome. Nggori also mentioned that the police and army 
who came in six trucks, were on guard at his home after people re-
quested the dome to be removed.16 Nggori told the opponents that 
he would not hesitate to remove the cross from their church if the 
mosque dome was lowered. He also opposed the police who were 
trying to persuade him to lower the dome.
The police were not taking repressive measures or seeking legal 
proceedings with regard to the conflict in Wolobheto. Since there 
were no clashes or criminal acts, the police considered repressive 
measures as potentially dangerous.
Police Knowledge
From a number of Ende police members we interviewed, only 
the police chief, AKBP Musni Arifin, seemed to know, though not in 
detail, the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on implementation 
of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of the 
16Muhamad Nggori did not mention the exact date but referred to it as the biggest 
of the recent events, around Ramadan 2012. Meanwhile in the Dit Intelkam Polda 
NTT daily report No. R/LHI-22/VIIl/2012/Dit Intelkam, on Sunday, 12 August 
there was “a polemic over Abdurrahman musala construction in Wolobheto, Wolokoli 
village, Wolowaru district, related to the construction permit.”
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National Police. He only complained that its application was not 
easy.
Wolowaru police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar (interview, 20 April 
2013), claimed there was no regulation on human rights. Therefore, 
he only followed the general guidelines of Kamtimbas when deal-
ing with the conflict over a place of worship in Jopu. Despite not 
knowing the regulation, the police chief agreed that everyone had 
a right to choose a religion and to worship in accordance with their 
religion.
According to John Philipus, the head of Linmas Kesbangpol of 
Ende (interview, 19 April 2013), the police should know about hu-
man rights, including the right to worship. According to him, even 
if not provided in regulations, the issues of human rights and re-
ligious tolerance are clearly stipulated in the constitution and are 
taught by one’s own family.
With regard to the PBM of 2006, the sub-district police chief 
(interview, 20 April 2013) confessed he did not know it before the 
whole row and the introduction efforts made by the district officials. 
He learnt about the rule of 90-60 persons’ support and provisions 
on the use of loudspeakers after the Ministry of Religious Affairs 
presented them in February 2011.
Vincentius Gaga, the village chief (interview, 22 April 2013), ad-
mitted he introduced PBM in 2007, but not many people were pres-
ent and his own copy of the PBM was already lost. He obtained the 
new copy of the PBM of 2006 from Father Felix Jawa, and that copy 
he later used at the meeting on 24 January 2011. The village chief 
also confirmed that the police personnel did not know the rules of 
the PBM 2006 until the Ministry and FKUB presented them.
Some believed that the PBM became the trigger of the whole con-
flict. The deputy sub-district police chief, Yohanes Fono (interview, 
22 April 2013), stated that “this is because of regulations. If there 
were no rules, there would be no problem. The village chief was 
also exaggerating. Frictions started, people stopped greeting each 
other.”
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The chairman of the parish council (interview, 22 April 2013) ad-
mitted that before knowing the rules, residents had good relation-
ships: “At first, because we did not know the rules, everything was 
just normal. We helped bringing stones and so on to build it [the 
mosque]. Then came the government team to introduce [the regula-
tions]. Priests and ulama came. And after that we were against [the 
construction].”
This too was recognized by the village chief (interview, 22 April 
2013): “Earlier the community support here was incredible. They 
[Catholics] joined to bring the sandstone. But after I conveyed [the 
PBM rules], they withdrew.”
Meanwhile, according to the Jopu parish priest, Father Felix 
(interview, 22 April 2013), what triggered the conflict was the 
mosque itself; before the plans to build it emerged, the relations 
between residents were very good, especially as Muhamad Ng-
gori is a member of the family of traditional leaders. Father Fe-
lix admitted that he himself told the village chief to suggest that 
Nggori should build a small place of worship for family prayers, 
and without loudspeakers. Since Nggori still wanted to build a 
mosque, he asked the village chief to read the PBM 2006 and to 
introduce it to Nggori.
Father Felix regretted Nggori’s change of attitude. He said: “In 
the past we would normally exchange greetings. I would give a ride 
to his family to the orchard. Muhamad’s wife is a former Catholic 
who converted to Islam. Now we are enemies. I regret his attitude 
suddenly changed so completely.”
For the district police chief, AKBP Musni Arifin (interview, 22 
April 2013), PBM 2006 alone was not the only reason of tensions. Ac-
cording to him, the conflict also arose because of rumors and prov-
ocations: “Problems arose after provocation which made Catholics 
reject the construction. Then emerged the issue of the dome, loud-
speakers, and it all spread. We suspect there was a provocation be-
cause, logically, why in the beginning there were no tensions [there 
was communal work, they together transported stones and sand]?” 
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Evidence of a provocation is hard to find because most likely it was 
a word of mouth behind closed doors.
Chairman of the mosque construction committee, Nggori (inter-
view, 23 April 2013) also complained about unsettling issues which 
disturbed the harmony in his village: “Since the 1990s, we were 
helping in church construction, carrying stones and sand. We know 
tolerance. But lately there’ve been various issues [disrupting soli-
darity]. I also do not know [why]. Catholics do not want to come 
help us anymore [to build the mosque].”
One of the rumors which disturbed the residents was, as nar-
rated by Nggori’s family member (interview, 23 April 2013), that 
Muslims would “throw a bomb.” Although there was no evidence, 
residents of the neighborhood were scared and slept in the orchards. 
When nights fell, the village was dark, no lights were switched on.
Whether or not the terms of establishment of a place of worship 
were fulfilled, is still confusing. Catholics claimed that Muslims 
have not and were unwilling to fulfill the terms of PBM 2006. Mean-
while, Muslims said that they already had the permit from the re-
gent, although not in a written form.
Based on the records of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (inter-
view, 19 April 2013), Muslims in Wolobheto were only about 60 peo-
ple, including minors. Thus, the PBM 2006 provision which required 
90 identity cards (of Muslims) and 60 of supporters (non-Muslims) 
could not be met. The village chief (interview, 22 April 2013) said 
that in 2013 in Wolobheto only 85 inhabitants were Muslim. In 2011, 
when the mosque was built, the number of Muslims, according to 
him, was even less. On the other hand, Nggori (interview, 23 April 
2013) claimed that during a meeting in July 2012, the regent gave a 
permission to use the mosque.17
This confusion became one of the obstacles for the police in car-
rying out their duties. Police also had difficulties in approaching 
17See “Pokok-pokok Arahan Bupati Ende Pada Rapat Koordinasi Perumusan 
Kebijakan di Bidang Pemerintahan, Hukum dan Keamanan Ketertiban Masyarakat,” 
Monday, 23 July 2012.
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both sides because it was often considered as not neutral. When the 
Catholic residents denounced the police attitude, according to the 
village chief (interview, 22 April 2013), the district police chief held 
his badge and swore that it was not as they alleged.
But on the other hand, the police work was much facilitated by oth-
ers who wanted to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence. 
Parish priest was still able to control and appease his people. In addi-
tion, blood relationships (kinship) established many years ago, made 
the warring sides able to refrain. As told by Nggori himself (interview, 
23 April 2013), “[It is possible] only because of kinship. If we made it 
[killed each other], we would lose our own relatives.”
Legal Framework and Characteristics of the Police Institution
The police did not specify the legal basis used for handling the 
conflict over the place of worship in Jopu. But they deployed the 
Dalmas and mobile brigade (Brimob) units on 8 August 2011.
Police AKBP Musni Arifin (interview, 22 April 2013), on various 
occasions often suggested that the government should use cultural 
approach and approach based on family relations in addition to the 
legal means: “The police repeatedly urged the government, in this 
case the Muspida, to quickly resolve this issue and recommended 
cultural approach. PBM and alike should be set aside for a while.”
Similarly, John Philipus, the head of Kesbangpol Ende who is 
also a member of Kominda (interview, 19 April 2013), said that “By 
application of a detached and formal way it would be very hard.” 
But in the conflict over Wolobheto Mosque, the cultural approach, 
according to him, would also be difficult, because the actors of the 
conflict, especially Muhamad Nggori, were the traditional leaders.
When asked why the police sometimes did not act neutrally, John 
Philipus (interview, 19 April 2013) stated that it depended on the 
decisiveness of the leadership and the fact that after all the police 
too were humans: “The police being neutral or not depends on the 
leadership. Indeed, when people join the police, there are rules and 
provisions. But the police are also human beings; there is dynamics 
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and there are differences [which affects neutrality]. And the police 
work is also very tiring.”
Cases involving the matters of religion were viewed by the po-
lice as very sensitive issues which had to be handled carefully. When 
he was asked by the district head to remove the loudspeakers, the 
police chief, Ali Hasan Mukhtar (interview, 20 April 2013) refused to 
“be slammed by fellow believers.” To address religious issues, the 
support for the police action should be really strong, he said. But he 
did not mention the need for special rules or procedures. He only 
said that the police action should be in line with that of the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs and other government agencies.
Police also did not seem to have much experience in dealing with 
disputes over places of worship. Religious issues that are often en-
countered by the Ende police included the matter of Hostia contam-
ination or errors during receiving the holy communion bread at the 
end of the Catholic mass, which is considered desecration. In many 
cases it was done by Protestants or Catholics themselves because 
of lack of knowledge. Yet Hostia contamination could lead to huge 
sanctions: it can be considered as a criminal offence under the law 
on blasphemy and abuse of religion.
Other issues in Ende were inter-tribal conflicts, usually over the 
land. In tribal conflicts that involved criminal acts the police acted 
decisively. Land disputes between musalaki in Nduaria village, for 
example, lead to judicial trial because of knifing incident. Attackers 
from both sides were sentenced to four months in prison. John Phili-
pus (interview, 19 April 2013) said that the police could be decisive 
if the problem was clearly identified. The important thing was to 
know the tribal rules and whether there were any outside influences 
or other causes of frictions. To establish that, he said, intelligence 
action was applied.
Police Culture
Although the majority of the population is Catholic, not a few 
police officers in Ende are Muslims. Police chief, AKBP Musni Arifin 
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(interview, 22 April 2013), stated that the religion of a police chief 
was not an issue or a problem, neither internally in the police in-
stitution nor in the community. The proof was his being the police 
chief in the Catholic-majority Ende. To him, “religion is hablun mi-
nallah [relation between men and God]. While the task of policing is 
in accordance with regulations.” 
Generally, the members of Ende police were changing in their 
tasks of guarding the public worship. On Fridays non-Muslim po-
lice members were guarding the mosque, while on Sundays the 
Muslim or Hindu police officers were guarding the church. Besides 
their main tasks of maintaining security and order, the police offi-
cers were trained to respect diversity. Spiritual activities were regu-
larly held at the police station, and speakers were often invited.
In dealing with the conflict over mosque construction in Wolobheto, 
the sub-district police chief (interview, 20 April 2013) repeatedly assert-
ed that his actions were not influenced by religious sentiments. As a 
Muslim, he admitted, he was more likely to side with Muslims whose 
mosque was questioned. But he always reminded Nggori to follow 
procedures. He felt he had no personal interests in defending Muslims 
in Wolobheto. Nevertheless, the police chief admitted, some people al-
leged he had, just because he is a Muslim himself.
This became a dilemma for the police chief. On the one hand, 
he was accused of siding with Muslims if he approached the party 
represented by Nggori. On the other hand, if the police chief did not 
approach Nggori, persuasion efforts would become more difficult. 
The police chief admitted that while Nggori no longer wanted to 
hear from the government officials, he would still want to listen to 
him and his intelligence staff. The police chief also admitted he was 
never afraid to tell Nggori that he was wrong with regard to per-
missions. But this was not taken seriously by Catholics since Nggori 
kept on going with the construction and did not care about the rules.
Out of the four police chiefs who served in Wolowaru, nei-
ther Muslim, Catholic nor Hindu, dared to expressly prohibit the 
mosque construction or to pull it down. This shows that there were 
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other factors taken into consideration than the police chiefs’ own 
religious sentiments. There were matters of overlapping regulations 
and authority, and the matter of the lack of incentive to act.
The relationships between the Catholic majority and the Muslim 
minority of Wolobheto have their own complexities which cannot 
be reduced to the relationship between the strong and the weak. The 
village chief (interview, 22 April 2013) told that once Nggori said 
to him “who rules Indonesia if not us, Muslims?” Although from a 
minority, Nggori was still a musalaki in the predominantly Catholic 
society.
The police chief himself (interview, 22 April 2013) admitted that 
Nggori was a temperamental person and was unwilling to discuss 
this issue. Nggori did not even bother to behave politely towards 
government officials. According to the police chief, for both sides 
it became a matter of honor, and no longer of seeking a solution. 
Towards the police chief Nggori was also stubborn, despite being 
approached many times, he still insisted to continue the building 
development.
However, amid these disturbances almost all of those who were 
interviewed, including the warring sides, believed that both Mus-
lims and Catholics of Wolobheto could coexist. Relocation was not 
an issue here. Besides being impossible since the position of Nggori 
as musalaki, both sides also secretly longed for unity. In the previ-
ous section it was already mentioned that the Catholic and Muslim 
communities there were still a one extended family, and as it is said 
“blood [kinship] comes first, then religion.”
Nggori himself (interview, 23 April 2013) confessed he knew 
about tolerance. According to him, since the 1990s, Muslims were 
helping in church construction. At the same time, the parish priest, 
Father Felix Jawa (interview, 22 April 2013), denied the allegations 
that he held and anti-Islamic sentiments:
I have visited the Wologawi community (Muslim majority). They said they were 
struggling to finish their mosque ceiling. I said I would call my friends, hope-
fully we could help, if we have resources. Then we gave some help. They are 
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good people. Catholics are a minority there in a Muslim majority village. But 
they [Muslims] and I are like siblings. We visit them during Eid. All in harmony.
Father Felix continued that where the majority are Catholics, 
they must act to protect minorities. At the meeting on 20 February 
2011, which was mentioned earlier, he said directly to Nggori: “Who 
says that Catholics complicate things? We are living in a country 
where we have laws which govern all of us. When the requirements 
are fulfilled, we’ll be the first ones to help you build [the mosque].”
Local Politics
In the conflict over Wolobheto Mosque, the regent did not come 
to address the issue directly, but rather delegated the regional secre-
tary and the first assistant who along Kesbangpol, Linmas, and dep-
uty district police chief took part in the PBM introduction meeting 
on 20 February 2011. During the meeting, the secretary decided that 
Muslims could build a mosque but without the distinctive features 
of a place of worship.
The regent became directly involved in mid-2012, when he called 
Nggori’s party for dialogue with the Muspida. The regent, Drs. Don 
Bosco M. Wangga, gave a directive that the place of worship which 
was already built in Wolobheto, could be used, although it had not 
yet received a permission from the local government as the PBM 
2006 required, but it should be a family place of worship and the 
loudspeakers should not be turned on. During the meeting Nggori 
said he accepted the regent’s directive, but despite that the loud-
speakers were still used, although only for the call to prayer and in 
low volume.
According to Father Felix (interview, 22 April 2013), Nggori’s 
persistence was slightly influenced by local politics. According to 
him, a politician from that constituency “played with fire to gain 
sympathy.” The person he meant was a member of the local par-
liament from the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang) who 
provided assistance with loudspeakers to the Wolobheto Mosque. 
The head of the Ministry of Religious Affairs office and the chair-
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man of the MUI (interviews, 19 and 20 April 2013) confirmed that 
the person concerned indeed intended to provide assistance. Then 
the Catholics protested and the village chief requested the Ministry 
to hold another meeting.
However, given the small number of Muslims, it would be quite 
surprising if the politician sought to win the sympathy of prospec-
tive voters. If he indeed had political interests, he would approach 
the Catholic majority.
The Ministry itself (interview, 19 April 2013) admitted that they 
did not know the motives of the politician. Similarly, the chairman 
of the MUI did not know whether the assistance was requested or 
given because of the need of the heart. He added that the politician 
was surprised that his assistance caused such a fuss.
When asked about this issue, Nggori himself (interview, 23 April 
2013) admitted indifference towards political parties. He said he 
would choose anyone who was from his family or came from his 
region. He also claimed to like Gerindra party for their support to 
farmers. Thus, he said, the benefits the politician could get for his as-
sistance were insignificant. But intentionally or not, his help caused 
unrest among Catholics.
The Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Ende is the govern-
ment institution which from the beginning was actively involved 
in handling the issue of the mosque construction in Wolobheto. 
The head of the office, Yosef Nganggo (interview, 19 April 2013) 
said that the Ministry’s efforts could be seen already at the early 
stage. The Ministry was been engaged in monitoring and report-
ing on the situation as early as on 1 February 2011. With the FKUB 
it also facilitated meetings in Wolokoli on 7 and 20 February 2011. 
There was a misunderstanding due to which the Ministry was 
seen as supporting the construction, but it was cleared. During 
each meeting, the Ministry urged the village residents to main-
tain harmony and order. The results of each meeting were dis-
cussed with the Ministry’s provincial NTT office and agencies 
related.
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When the construction was completed and tensions reoccurred, 
on 8 August 2011, the Ministry coordinated with the Muspida to 
meet the Wolokoli residents. At that meeting it no longer insisted 
on fulfillment of the PBM requirements, but rather that the residents 
should remember to value cultural harmony and their ancestral tra-
ditions, since they all were bonded by kinship.
The district police chief believed (interview, 22 April 2013) that 
the PBM in 2006 was released not to contain the worship rights. 
Only when it was applied in different places and for different peo-
ple various issued emerged. Of similar opinion was the head of the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs office in Ende, Yosef Nganggo, (inter-
view, 19 April 2013) according to whom the PBM could not be ap-
plied rigidly: “[PBM] cannot be effectively applied across the coun-
try because it could destroy the “local ethic” (local tradition). Local 
leaders should have the right to make additional rules.”
According to the FKUB chairman, Father Ambrosius Nanga 
(interview, 19 April 2013), the PBM could become a good regula-
tion. But in practice it made establishment of places of worship 
difficult for minorities. Meanwhile, according to the chairman 
of the MUI, Djamal Humris (interview, 20 April 2013), the PBM 
in 2006 allowed people to negotiate: “PBM is actually good, but 
many people complain that in certain places, [we] can’t build a 
house of worship. It should provide a space for people to negoti-
ate, to be flexible.”
Nggori’s family member (interview, 23 April 2013) admitted he 
questioned the PBM in one of the meetings. He asked for a letter, in 
black and white, if the mosque construction was indeed forbidden, 
but he never received one. He recounted:
They ordered us to have a permission first, to fulfill the requirement of 90 iden-
tity cards of Muslims and 60 of non-Muslims, only then it [the mosque] could 
be built. But we just continued. At that time I asked whether the law narrows or 
broadens people’s right to perform worship in accordance with their respective 
beliefs? I requested a letter in black and white that the place could not be built. 
But they never gave such letter. So we continued with the construction.
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John Philipus, the head of Kesbangpol and Linmas in Ende (in-
terview, 19 April 2013), explained the difficulties which the govern-
ment was facing and asked for the understanding of all parties. He 
stated that government action had its limits, since it could not be 
authoritarian. An authoritarian solution would even a cause a big-
ger commotion. According to him, a detached formal approach was 
unlikely to succeeded.
In the midst of the limitations faced by the government, many 
people were disappointed by the relationship between the regent, 
Don Bosco Wangge, and the vice-regent, Achmad Mochdar, who did 
not get on well before the October 2013 local election in Ende. They 
were not running together in the election but with other candidates 
for vice-regent’s office. In fact, many people expected the regent and 
vice-regent, who were representing the Catholic and Muslim com-
munities, to come together to the conflict site to resolve the issue.
The Ende election was held in two rounds. Achmad Mochdar 
with his partner lost in the first round, while Don Bosco Wangge 
with his partner lost in the run-off.18
Public Opinion
The attitude of the MUI Ende was in line with the government 
policy and it helped to deliver the government’s appeals on various 
occasions. The MUI was always involved in the meetings. Father 
Felix recalled (interview, 22 April 2013) that during the meeting on 
8 August 2011, “The chairman of the MUI, late Abdurrahman, cried 
when he was sitting next to me, said that God knows we do not have 
to use Toa [speaker] to pray, God hears the content of our hearts. 
Lower the dome. We will strive but step by step, [first] follow the 
rules.”
The MUI was also present on the closed meeting at the regent’s 
office between the Muspida and representatives of Jopu Muslims 
18“KPU Tetapkan Marsel-Djafar Sebagai Bupati dan Wakil Bupati Ende.” http://
kupang.tribunnews.com/2013/12/07/kpu-tetapkan-marsel-djafar-sebagai-bupati-
dan-wakil-bupati-ende (accessed 10 December 2013).
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ahead of Ramadan 2012. On that occasion, the new chairman of the 
MUI, Djamal Humris (interview, 20 April 2013), suggested that Ng-
gori should thank the regent for allowing the use of the mosque 
building. He then asked Nggori to respect local residents and to lim-
it the use of loudspeakers.
According to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (interview, 19 
April 2013) the MUI Ende has never issued a controversial fatwa 
like its counterparts in Java. This was admitted by the MUI chair-
man himself (interview, 20 April 2013), “For example the fatwa re-
garding Christmas, we respect it [Christmas], but do not participate 
in the rituals. I join at the greetings part of the event, not during the 
ritual. Participation does not weaken my faith. My relationship with 
the provincial and central MUIs is fine.”
Nggori’s views of the MUI did not seem too good. He admitted 
(interview, 23 April 2013) he was irritated by the MUI which was 
always persuading him to postpone the construction of the mosque 
and asked its dome to be lowered. He even considered the death of 
the previous MUI chairman a karmic result of his request that the 
mosque should not have the dome and pulpit.
When the conflict seemed to have reached a dead end and there 
was no middle way, the parish in his limited ways tried to reduce 
the conflict in order to avoid clashes and violence. The potential of 
violence in Wolobheto was quite high. Father Felix (interview, 22 
April 2013) said: “The community members would tell me ‘Father 
you don’t have to participate, we will solve it on our own.’ These 
were dangerous words. I refused. In church I urged people to use 
legal channels. If there is anything they were not satisfied with, that 
should be reported to me and to the village chief.”
Father Felix also made an effort to appease his people in dia-
logue with the government or when rumors inciting tensions were 
circulated. After the incident when the statue of St. Mary’s and a 
crucifix were broken, a rumor broke out that the perpetrators were 
Muslims. Father Felix urged his people to turn the matter over to the 
police. At the meeting on 8 August 2010, he admitted he was inten-
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tionally wearing the priest robes in order to make his people see him 
present, as he knew there was a potential unrest.
Nggori’s daughter said at that time, “Why a cross is allowed on the church but 
we cannot have a dome?” This caused a commotion. Women from the Catholic 
group stood up. Muhamad Nggori was also standing. But H. Irhamsyah em-
braced him. He said, “Apologies, she [Nggori’s daughter] was carried away by 
emotions.” Mobile brigade already held their weapons. I moved around to calm 
everyone. The woman made men point to each other (“baku tunjuk”). Father 
Ambrosius (FKUB) also stood up to appease others. After 10 minutes the meeting 
continued.
According to Father Felix, such manner was in accordance with 
his mandate from the episcopate. To him in the Catholic tradition 
there was no instance of priests blessing weapons for a fight. Al-
though it was tiring, he chose the path of non-violence. He was 
aware of the potential for violence but fortunately his people were 
still listening to him.
With regard to the construction of churches on Java, which in 
many cases was problematic, Father Felix admitted people often 
complained in closed meetings. “Why on TV it looks like this? If 
we wanted to do like they do (on Java) we can. But I said that was 
impossible.” The same issue, according to Father Ambrosius, was 
often raised in the meetings of the provincial FKUB.
FKUB in Ende has a fairly long history of maintaining harmony. 
A forum of this kind already existed in Ende in 1982. The interfaith 
activities of the forum increased significantly after anti-Chinese ri-
ots in 1998. Since then religious leaders have been devoted to main-
taining harmony.
FKUB Ende was formed in 2006. Father Ambrosius Nanga became 
its chairman and the late Abdurrahman Aroeboesman (chairman of the 
MUI Ende) was his deputy. After the death of Aroeboesman, the MUI 
and FKUB vice-chairman positions were filled by H.A. Djamal Hum-
ris. FKUB Ende has 17 members, 10 representatives of the Catholic 
community, four Muslims, two Protestants, and one Hindu. The FKUB 
member of the Hindu community, Anom Triyatna, had once been the 
Wolowaru police chief, after Ali Hasan Mukhtar.
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Constraints faced by the FKUB were the very insufficient funds 
and a difficult topography of the region. The budget was only 
enough for the meetings and visits to several districts per year, and 
not even all districts could be visited. The vice-regent, serving as the 
FKUB’s advisor also did not give much attention to it.
Recommendations for establishment of places of worship that 
were issued by the FKUB thus far, was a recommendation for 
the use of the Hotel Dwipura building as a place of worship of 
the Protestant church Gereja Sidang Jemaat Allah (GSJA), and a 
recommendation for a mosque in Rukun Lima. The applications 
for recommendation for establishment of places of worship filed 
recently included the establishment of Protestant churches in the 
Catholic majority regions near Kelimutu and in Detusoko. Ac-
cording to the chairman of the FKUB, the number of mosques in 
Ende is actually quite big. The matter of license usually emerges 
in heterogeneous communities. In the homogeneous ones, places 
of worship are just built without the whole process of issuing 
recommendations.
Particularly for the conflict over a place of worship in Wolobhe-
to, the Ministry of Religious Affairs in cooperation with the FKUB 
was monitoring the situation, introducing the PBM rules, and ap-
peasing the public. The FKUB has been involved since 1 February 
2011 and participated in meetings on 7 and 20 February 2011, and on 
8 August 2011. In the last meeting, the chairman of the FKUB, Father 
Ambrosius, urged that there be an action in the district to minimize 
tensions. But it was ignored and the meeting which was held near 
the construction site almost lead to clashes. Father Ambrosius so-
cialized with the community and was not sitting with either of the 
warring parties to ease the tensions. The last attempt of the FKUB 
was a written request to the regent to immediately approach the 
community (27 October 2011).19
19FKUB letter to the regent No. 16/FKUB/E/X/2011, dated 27 October 2011, on 
resolution of the problem with establishment of the place of worship in Wolobheto, 
Wolokoli village, Wolowaru district.
Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship292
Beside the FKUB, there were also interfaith groups initiated 
by the Ministry of Religious Affairs which were managed inde-
pendently. They were formed within interfaith associations such as 
youth groups, women’s groups, ojeg [motorbike taxi] or street ven-
dors communities, who were expected to be agents of harmony who 
by being closer to the grassroots could immediately detect slightest 
threats.
The largest Islamic organization in Ende is Nahdlatul Ulama, with 
its Ansor and Fatayat groups. Most of the NU leaders also serve in the 
MUI and FKUB, and their views are almost in line with those of the 
local government. They seek to bridge Muslims with Catholics. Djamal 
Humris, the MUI chairman who is also the former chairman of the NU 
(interview, 20 April 2013) said, “as the chairman of the NU, I was often 
invited to attend the inter-religious dialogs or Christmas celebrations. 
Muslims have an obligation to respect others.”
There is only one Islamic boarding school in Ende, namely the 
Walisongo school. Unlike in the neighboring province, NTB (Nusa 
Tenggara Barat, West Nusa Tenggara), the radical understanding of 
religion could not develop here because, according to Djamal Hum-
ris, every new understanding would be questioned. Meanwhile, the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs stated (interview, 19 April 2013) that 
during the last 10 years there have been more and more influences 
from outside. But with the local community they have been able to 
block and filter them.
Most of the mass media in Ende belong to Catholics. During 
desktop research we did not find any news in print and electronic 
media covering the tensions in Jopu. According to the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs (interview, 19 April 2013), the news was avoided to 
prevent the spread of tensions. “These events did not get into news-
papers. This is sensitive. I am close with the media, so I appealed to 
them not to disrupt the harmony. Let this be a problem only in one 
village alone.”
In summary, the public opinion in Ende was helpful in easing the 
task of the police in preventing violence. The Catholic community 
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in Wolobheto and Jopu indeed continued to urge the police to take 
action and to stop the mosque construction, but the police refused 
and no one dared to stop the construction on their own. The poten-
tial for violence was quite high but the ulama, priests, and the FKUB, 
have been able to impede it.
Interaction between the Police and the Parties to the Conflict 
As mentioned earlier, tensions occurred several times with a 
pause between February to August 2011. According to the police as-
sessments the tensions were caused by several factors, among them 
existence of a third party (in this case it was the assistance of one 
local politician/legislator and ulama from outside the community), 
and the initial mishandling of the introduction of the PBM rules 
which should have been done much earlier.
Police efforts were limited to appeals, monitoring and guarding. 
Deployment of force was done in order to guard the course of the 
meetings. The conflict could be handled to prevent incidents of vi-
olence. The Muslim side could be appeased by the police and Cath-
olics by the priest. Although today the situation is relatively under 
control, the potential for conflict still exists because of the dead-end 
in communications and because of rumors.
The meeting between the police and community leaders took 
place several times: on 7 February 2011, when Wolowaru police 
chief was present, and on 20 February 2011, when the deputy police 
chief along with his staff were trying to appeal to both sides of the 
conflict. At the meeting on 8 August 2011, the Dalmas and Brimob 
officers were deployed to guard the proceedings.
Meetings and coordination between the police and the local gov-
ernment with regard to conflict resolution took place almost every 
month. According to the district police chief (interview, 22 April 
2013), the matter of the mosque in Wolobheto was always voiced 
by the FKUB, MUI, church and others in the monthly meetings of 
Muspida. For the police, the priority was security and minimization 
of the conflict potential.
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The role of Kesbangpol and Linmas (Kominda) must be high-
lighted here, because aside engaging in almost all meetings of Mus-
pida, the Kesbangpol also cooperated with the police in monitor-
ing the situation. Kesbangpol also had more trust of the Wolokoli 
village chief than the police. The village chief himself helped Kes-
bangpol in monitoring the situation and recorded every person or 
vehicle coming from the outside to see Muhamad Nggori. In their 
recommendation to the regent, Kesbangpol asked Muslim leaders 
of Ende as well as the regent and vice-regent to request the mosque 
committee to halt the construction as well as to lower the dome and 
remove the loudspeakers.20
There were no signs that Nggori was influenced by radical teach-
ings. His religious views were typical of Nahdlatul Ulama. His own 
children did not join the `asr (afternoon) prayer which Nggori and 
his brother held in the mosque. Nggori himself admitted (interview, 
23 April 2013), “in matters of religion, we are only zero comma … 
we know nothing. It is only that we take with us the ulayat heritage 
that we could build a musala.”
Nggori had heard the rumor that the local residents were going 
to remove the dome, but he did not report it to the police. Here the 
police was more active in approaching him. But he admitted that 
the sub-district police chief calmed him and made him ignore the 
rumors. “Had it not been for him, who knows what I’d become. He 
was great,” said Nggori.
Nggori also said that he was in a very good relationship with the 
police. He particularly praised the sub-district police chief, the head 
of Wolowaru intelligence, and the district police chief. Nevertheless, 
Nggori also felt annoyed by the police presence. He said:
Finally, the police and soldiers came in six trucks to guard. At that time people 
asked the dome to be removed. I said, please do it; and if necessary, [please] ask 
the priest to hang a pig’s head on the top [of the dome] … [but] I will chuck out 
the cross. I am a human being … the worst I will get is losing my head. Why 
20Letter (Telaah Staf) of Kesbangpol and Linmas Ende to the regent No. BKPPM.43/
II/01/XI/2011, dated 7 November 2011.
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should I think? It’s a matter of faith. Police also asked me to lower the dome 
temporarily. I said, if a neighboring country lowers our flag, we would go mad. 
So would I. People have faith. If their cross is removed they too would get mad. I 
said to the police and the intelligence, “Enough, all of you go back. I’m not crazy 
yet. If I were, I’d have slashed you with a machete.”
If in other cases the police was more in favor of the majority 
group, in this one the police was seen as siding with the minority. It 
was admitted by Nggori that Catholics suspected that the sub-dis-
trict police chief was an “Islamic police” and so he was transferred, 
even though he was the best person. The police chief himself felt 
that Muhamad Nggori had no issue with police but with the gov-
ernment, including the village chief, because they were those who 
complicated things.
Protests of Catholics were reported by Father Felix Jawa and the 
village chief, Vincent Gaga. The FKUB chairman, Father Ambrosius 
(interview, 19 April 2013) considered the priest’s involvement rea-
sonable because of his position as the leader of the Catholic commu-
nity. Meanwhile, Father Felix denied that the allegations that he was 
a provocateur (interview, 22 April 2013):
There is a statement in the internal circles of the police that the 
Jopu priest is a provocateur. It is said that Catholics actually have 
no problem, it is the priest who is always provoking. But [without 
being provoked] people are disturbed by the noise of toa. Here this 
sound was never present. Especially when we have a ceremony, we 
are praying, and there is this sound. There will be an immediate 
reaction. How should I control the people? I pretend not to hear it. I 
know their reaction but I do not comment. If I commented, later that 
would become a larger issue.
The protests were made in a peaceful and non-confrontational 
manner. As revealed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (inter-
view, 19 April 2013), the objections of residents were reported to 
the village chief who later forwarded them to the district head 
and to the Ministry and FKUB. The leader of the Jopu parish (in-
terview, 22 April 2013) said that he had already approached the 
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police, the regent’s first assistant, and the Ende regional secretar-
iat, but only received promises that the government would soon 
resolve it. 
When the procedural path was unsuccessful, the leader of the 
parish admitted that the local residents thought to act on their own. 
But because there was a leak, their plans failed. His attitude was to 
remain calm. Thus, the acts of resistance from the local residents 
merely took the shape of turning on their music tapes to drown out 
the sound of toa [speaker], but they did not dare to make a direct 
reproach.
Conclusions
Tensions related to the construction of the mosque in Wolobheto 
village, district Wolowaru, began in January 2011, when the mosque 
construction started. They were heightened in August 2011, when 
the mosque was almost completed and put into use.
Construction of the mosque in Wolobheto was met by resistance 
from the Catholic residents because it did not fulfill the requirements 
of the PBM No. 8 and No. 9 of 2006. The number of Muslim resi-
dents did not reach 90 and the construction was not yet approved by 
the non-Muslim neighborhood. Catholics also objected the presence 
of religious attributes such as the dome as well as the loudspeakers 
which were disturbing their peace.
Mediation efforts were early made by the local government but 
Muslims insisted on building the mosque with a complete dome 
and loudspeakers. The commotion was increasing but merely in a 
form of verbal threats which did not lead to clashes, attacks, or de-
struction. Both sides threatened each other that they would, for ex-
ample, remove the dome of the mosque or the cross of the church. To 
protest against the sound of the mosque’s loudspeakers, Catholics 
played loud music.
Tensions peaked in August 2011 when the mosque began to be 
used. To prevent clashes the government held a meeting with Mus-
pdia, Muspika, residents and the parties to the conflict at the local 
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adat house. For security reasons the meeting was also attended by 
the mobile brigade. Confrontation was avoided.
Such disputes were a new thing in the history of Wolobheto. In-
troduction of the PBM rules made Muslims, whose leader happened 
to be the local musalaki, feel challenged. While the Catholics felt they 
had a valid reason to protest. Earlier Muslims and Catholics in sol-
idarity transported stones and sand for construction of the house 
which was intended to become a place of worship. This stopped 
after the PBM was introduced. Hostilities arose when Muslims con-
tinued with the construction and violated the regulations and agree-
ments reached at various meetings.
Until now both sides hold resentment towards each other. Cath-
olics claimed that until now the Muslims have not and have not in-
tended to fulfill the terms of the PBM. Meanwhile, Muslims claimed 
to have received the regent’s permission to use the building. But de-
spite mutual disappointment and aggravation, the two sides were 
still able to refrain from violence and vigilantism.
There are several factors that played a role in preventing the out-
break of violence. First, the Wolokoli community had the capacity to 
reduce the conflict. Kinship as well as the tradition of harmony were 
stronger than the urge to shed blood. In addition, religious leaders 
of each of the parties were sufficiently respected and they could still 
appease their followers.
Second, the police and the local government intervened since the 
very beginning. Police, for example, was already involved in the so-
cialization of PBM, although it was not much involved in resolving 
the dispute. Meanwhile, the district police chief diligently asked for 
support and help of the local governments and officials. Since all 
parties carried out their duties from the beginning, the repressive police 
action — which is highly avoided in case of religious conflicts — 
could be minimized.
It is important to note here the role of the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and of the FKUB, especially with regard to the PBM. Having 
learnt from the experience of introducing the PBM at the village lev-
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el, which instead fuelled the tensions, the Ministry and the FKUB 
spoke less about the technical rules of the establishment of places 
of worship while they were approaching the community. They put 
more emphasis on other aspects of the PBM 2006, that is reminding 
the residents of the value of harmony in their culture and traditions, 
and that they had a common ancestry.
This is worth highlighting because governments elsewhere of-
ten focus only on the matter of regulations and requirements when 
they discuss the PBM, while the technical aspects of the establish-
ment of places of worship are only a small part of the PBM 2006. 
The primary spirit of PBM 2006 which has often been overlooked, 
is the matter of how to build relationships and cooperation between 
religious communities on the basis of mutual understanding and 
mutual respect.
The government needs to review the PBM 2006. It is important 
that the PBM 2006, as well as various decisions and agreements 
made on its basis, should not be misused to hinder the establish-
ment of places of worship, let alone undermine local mechanisms 
that previously were harmoniously working. Political interests such 
as competition in elections should not make the government offi-
cials neglect this issue or utilize it in order to gain votes.
Finally, the government, including the police, can no longer af-
ford to disregard the disputes over places of worship. They should 
be addressed as early as possible so that their impact does not 
spread to other places. Not a few people were pushed against the 
construction of a mosque to take revenge after they saw disputes 
over construction of churches elsewhere. And vice versa. Such way 
of thinking should be reversed: for your relatives not to face difficul-
ties from others somewhere else, do not make it difficult here for the 
relatives of those others.*** 
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LESSONS FROM THE EIGHT CASES: 
SOME CONCLUSION
This research sought to study the policing of religious conflicts 
in the post-New Order Indonesia by answering two questions. 
First, why the policing of religious conflicts was ineffective in 
some cases and why it was effective in some other? And second, 
what explains the variation of success and failure in policing of 
religious conflicts?
By “religious conflict” we understood here “the enmity with 
regard to values, claims, and identities involving religious issues 
or issues wrapped in religious slogans or religious expressions.” 
Religious conflicts are divided into two major categories: inter-
religious conflicts and sectarian (intra-religious) conflicts. In this 
research, inter-religious conflicts were limited to conflicts over 
places of worship, while sectarian conflicts to conflicts between 
Muslim sects.
The “policing of religious conflicts” in this research is defined 
as “actions taken by the police to handle the incidents of religious 
conflicts.” In accordance with the duties and functions of the police 
in maintaining security and order (Act No. 02 of 2002 or Regulation 
No. 8 of 2009 on the implementation of human rights), policing is 
301
Conclusion302
assessed as “effective” if it succeeds to prevent the conflicts from 
spreading and becoming violent.
This research argued that variation in policing of religious 
conflicts is a function of three sets of variables: structural variables, 
knowledge variables, and interaction variables. The structural 
variable consists of legal and procedural frameworks which are 
the legal reference for the to police, the character of the local and 
national police organization, resources, police culture, local politics, 
and the pressure of the public opinion. Police knowledge variable 
is the understanding of the legal and procedural frameworks, 
understanding of the conflict issues, and perceptions of the 
conflict situation. Interaction variable means the relationships and 
interactions between the parties to the conflict themselves, and 
between the parties to the conflict and the police.
Eight cases were studied in this research: four cases of disputes 
over places of worship (HKBP Filadelfia, Bekasi; GKI Yasmin, 
Bogor; Abdurrahman Mosque in Wolobheto, Ende; and Nur Musafir 
Mosque in Kupang, East Nusa Tenggara), and four cases related of 
sectarian conflicts (anti-Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, Pandeglang; anti-
Ahmadiyya in Manis Lor, Kuningan; anti-Shi‘a in Sampang, East 
Java; and anti-Shi‘a in Bangil, Pasuruan). These cases were chosen 
to see variations in policing within each of the categories of religious 
conflicts.
The previous chapters showed the results of this research, case 
by case. This chapter will present the main findings in a comparative 
perspective. First, we will put forward some general conclusions 
about inter-religious conflicts over establishment of places of 
worship and policing thereof. This will be followed by conclusions 
with regard to sectarian conflicts and their policing. Next, we will 
present general conclusions on the matter of policing religious 
conflicts from the perspective of the three variables (structural, 
knowledge, and interaction). Finally, we will discuss several 
important findings beyond the aspects of policing.
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Variation of Success and Failure in Policing – Explanation 
This research shows that policing of religious conflicts in Bekasi, 
Bogor, Kupang, Ende, Kuningan, and Pasuruan proved successful 
in preventing the tensions from escalating into open violence. 
Sometimes, in critical situations, provocations of the warring parties 
could trigger violence, but the policing measures prevented it and 
restored security and order. Sectarian conflicts in Sampang and 
Pandeglang were two cases where policing failed, giving rise to 
widespread violence, fatalities and great damage.
Many of the conflicts studied in this research did not end by 
the time this research was completed. Nevertheless, we have 
collected several important findings which explain the variation 
of success and failure in policing and its impact on the occurrence 
of violence.
Mobilization of the parties to the conflict needs to be taken into 
account as a factor that influences the emergence of violence. For 
example, in the case of Sampang and of Cikeusik, the militant and 
broad mobilization processes occurred among the warring parties, 
involving religious leaders and their followers, and making use 
of doctrines, idioms, and sectarian symbols. Shi‘as in Sampang 
or Ahmadis in Pandeglang were much weaker than their Sunni 
opponents, but mobilization also took place within these two 
communities: they were not victims who did not resist, or who used 
a non-confrontational and non-violent approach when faced by 
differences in religious beliefs and practices.
Moreover, the above mobilization processes continued when 
the context of local politics allowed it and, to some extent sustained 
or even expanded it. The regent of Sampang as well as the village 
chief of Cikeusik participated in creation of the majority perception 
of the Shi‘a and Ahmadiyya communities as enemies and as the 
other. Sectarian conflicts, thus, entered a new and more dangerous 
stage, i.e. when it was also defined who belonged to Sampang or 
Cikeusik and who did not. Such things did not happen in Bangil, 
where mobilization was weaker and the local government, together 
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with religious leaders, did not fuel but instead impeded the militant 
mobilization.
Of course, the mobilization of the warring parties does not 
necessarily lead to open violence. Here the policing, particularly the 
capacity of the police to deter, can impede the occurrence of open 
violence. In this research, the best example of the police capacity to 
deter was the case of policing the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis 
Lor, Cirebon. The policing capacity to deter is, thus, another variable 
explaining the presence or absence of violence in the escalation of 
tensions in sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship. 
In the cases of Sampang and Cikeusik, the geographic location 
which was relatively remote and difficult to access, weakened the 
possibility of deterrence.
In sectarian conflicts, the strategies of warring parties influence 
the role that can be played by the police. In Bangil, the conflicted 
parties gave an opportunity to the police to carry out their duty of 
maintaining security and order. In Sampang, the warring parties, 
their allies and supporters, opposed the involvement of the police, 
except for utilising it to support their own objectives.
Variations of success and failure of the police in managing 
religious conflicts also depends on policing strategies and strategies 
used by the parties to the conflict. Failure in deterring escalation and 
focus on religion (in inter-religious or sectarian terms) as the conflict 
frame and feature have complicated the policing as it triggered 
identity politics. The police in Bangil and in Sampang performed 
policing tasks that were relevant to disturbances of security and 
public order arising from the sectarian conflicts. In Bangil, the police 
could perform their tasks as a force maintaining security and order, 
because it was supported by the local government and religious 
leaders. In Sampang, the police could not perform their tasks as a 
force maintaining security and order, because it had no support, and 
in several incidents, its role was undermined by the government 
and religious leaders who became members of the warring sides.
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Policing Conflicts over Places of Worship
This research shows that conflicts over places of worship do 
not only happen in Muslim-majority communities (with regard 
to the construction of churches), but also where communities 
are predominantly Protestant or Catholic (with regard to the 
construction of mosques). This is visible from the cases of the HKBP 
Filadelfia Church in Bekasi, the GKI Yasmin Church in Bogor, and of 
mosques in Ende and in Kupang.
The issue of support for the plans of construction of places of 
worship, as set out in the regulations on the establishment of places 
of worship (both in the PBM 2006 and in the previous regulations), 
has often been used as a weapon of the warring parties to hamper 
the construction process. This concerned not only churches but 
also mosques. The PBM of 2006 also weakens the traditional 
mechanisms of cooperation in the interfaith communities. This was 
particularly visible in Ende and Kupang, where although people 
were accustomed to helping each other in construction of places of 
worship, they stopped it and even turned to disputes after the PBM 
2006 was introduced.
The intensity of conflicts over construction of places of worship 
has generally been lower than of sectarian conflicts. So far, these 
conflicts have not resulted in fatalities, as has happened in sectarian 
conflicts. The warring sides still managed to restrain themselves, 
although in Bogor, Bekasi and Kupang, low-scale incidents of 
violence did take place. These included pelting, throwing rotten 
eggs and sewage.
Cases of disputes over places of worship studied in this research 
have not been resolved completely. Settlement in some of these cases 
has still been under negotiation, as in the case of the Nur Musafir 
Mosque in Batuplat, Kupang, and the Abdurrahman Mosque in 
Ende. Some other cases have already entered or passed the stage of 
settlement through legal channels but are still pending, especially 
when the government made decisions contrary to the rulings of the 
courts. With regard to the GKI Yasmin, for example, the Supreme 
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Court has decided that its church construction permit was valid. 
However, on the basis of security considerations, public order and 
the alleged forgery of signatures in the licensing process, the Bogor 
municipal government revoked the permit.
Although on different levels, all cases of conflicts over places of 
worship involved the issue of Christianization or Islamization. It 
was apparent from the interviews with leaders of both communities 
and the police. In Bekasi (HKBP Filadelfia) and Bogor (GKI Yasmin), 
the leaders who opposed construction of churches feared Christian 
proselytism. By contrast, the leaders who opposed the construction 
of mosques in Ende and Kupang were alarming of Islamization, and 
particularly the influence of radical Islam.
In specific cases, conflicts over places of worship overlapped 
with certain ethnic sentiments or the status within a particular 
ethnic group of persons involved in the conflict. In Bekasi, 
opposition towards the HKBP Church was associated with the Batak 
ethnic group which was a minority in the predominantly Betawi 
community. Meanwhile, in Ende the conflict was complicated by the 
fact that the mosque construction was initiated by a Muslim who at 
the same time was a musalaki (traditional chief) where the majority 
of residents were Catholics.
There are strong indications that the mass media coverage of the 
Muslim majority’s rejection of church construction on Java (Bekasi 
and Bogor) contributed to the growing opposition of the Protestant 
and Catholic majorities towards the construction of mosques in 
Ende and Kupang. This shows that disputes related to places of 
worship have a contagious effect and that they spread from one 
place to another, as from Bogor and Bekasi to NTT.
In all cases of conflicts over places of worship, the police 
officers were fully engaged in maintaining security and order. The 
level of their involvement depended on the degree of the conflict 
addressed. In case of GKI Yasmin and HKBP Filadelfia, the level of 
involvement was very high, with their presence on every Sunday 
when the congregations carried out their worship practices at the 
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disputed sites. In case of the mosques in Ende and Kupang, the 
police was present in order to mediate between the warring parties, 
and occasionally a number of police officers were also deployed to 
guard important events.
Policing of Sectarian Conflicts 
This research shows that in two cases of sectarian conflicts 
involving Ahmadis, in Manis Lor, Kuningan, and in Cikeusik, 
Pandeglang, the contention was accompanied by differences 
in beliefs and religious practices of the warring parties. These 
differences became the basis for mobilization. However, the main 
strategy employed was aggression; so, the mobilization was also for 
the sake of attack and defence from attacks.
In such context policing became a determining factor. In Manis 
Lor, particularly in the conflict of 2010, the police successfully 
handled it and open sectarian violence – the violence against the 
Ahmadis and of the Ahmadis – could be minimized and avoided. In 
Cikeusik the mass anti-Ahmadiyya mobilization was not anticipated 
by the police and led to violence which engaged both parties to the 
conflict.
In the case of sectarian conflicts involving the groups of Sunnis 
and Shi‘as, in Sampang and Bangil, the differences in religious beliefs 
and practices also existed before the emergence of the conflict. These 
differences were the grounds for mobilization of both parties. Yet 
in Sampang the Sunni opposition group was monolithic and also 
involved the local leadership such as the class of kiais, including 
those associated in the MUI and BASSRA, and the regent. On the 
other hand, the Shi‘a group stood by its convictions and was ready 
to employ violent means, albeit in self-defence.
In a high-level conflict situation as described above, the police 
could not deter the aggression of warring parties and did not have 
a sufficient countervailing power when violence broke in Sampang 
in December 2011 and August 2012. On the contrary, in Bangil, 
not all Sunni Muslims were anti-Shi‘a, and some of the anti-Shi‘a 
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protests and violent incidents were carried out by a small group of 
people who had no majority support. Beside this, the Shi‘a group 
who fought and defended itself was willing to follow softer ways of 
conflict resolution. The local government was neutral and the police 
could still carry out their duties properly.
Intra-Muslim sectarian conflicts are more severe than conflicts 
over places of worship. Three people died in the Cikeusik incident, 
and one in Sampang. This was an important precedent in the history 
of sectarian conflicts and violence in Indonesia. Casualties were 
from the Ahmadi and Shi‘a groups, and resulted from a fight that 
was not equal. Destruction of property was visible from dozens of 
Shi‘a houses burnt in Sampang, and vehicles belonging to Ahmadis 
in Cikeusik. Shi‘as of Sampang were displaced from their homes, 
either because of security reasons or because their houses were 
burned down, or both. Displacement has also become one of the 
effects of sectarian conflicts, while it did not in conflicts over places 
of worship.
Intra-Muslim sectarian conflicts proceed relatively peacefully 
when both parties are able to exercise restraint while the police 
and local government play their role in the process of mitigation 
and counteraction. In Bangil, both Shi‘as and Sunnis could refrain 
from casualties-yielding aggression and excessive property damage 
because religious leaders on both sides sought to control their 
followers. The police coordinated with the local government and 
actively prevented violence. In Manis Lor, the police learnt from 
the shortcomings and weaknesses of policing in previous conflicts, 
especially in 2007, and was able to show stronger determination in 
preventing excessive violence in 2010.
There are two types of violence in the sectarian conflicts, violence 
against the minority committed by the majority, and violence 
committed by the minority. The anti-Shi‘a and anti-Ahmadiyya 
groups carried out violent attacks and their strength was much 
greater because they by far outnumbered the Shi‘as or Ahmadis. 
On the other hand, the Shi‘a and Ahmadi minorities also used 
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violence in order to defend themselves. This resulted in unequal 
confrontations. Behind these confrontations was the willingness 
of the warring parties, both the minority and majority, to exercise 
violence and aggression in the fights which also had unequal results.
Policing Activities
In some of the cases of religious conflicts studied here, the police 
managed to prevent the conflict from escalating into violence, 
while in some other cases it failed. Generally, the police prevented 
violence when they dealt with conflicts over establishment of places 
of worship, as in case of HKBP Filadelfia in Bekasi, GKI Yasmin in 
Bogor, Nur Musafir Mosque in Kupang, and Abdurrahman Mosque 
in Ende. Also when dealing with sectarian conflicts (intra-Muslim), 
the police managed to prevent clashes or violence in case of the 
anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis Lor, Kuningan, and of the anti-
Shi‘a conflict in Bangil. But it failed to prevent violence in case of the 
anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, and of anti-Shi‘a 
conflict in Sampang, East Java.
At the pre-emptive stage, the police have performed the 
intelligence functions adequately. Almost in all cases, intelligence 
officers worked every day and reported the situation to the 
district and sub-district leadership. The police also relied on its 
network of informants within the public. In some of the places, 
the police also made use of information technology to support 
the intelligence tasks, for example in Bekasi, where police 
intelligence officers reported on the case development via the 
BBM (Blackberry Messenger), even though later they were also 
required to submit their reports in print.
With regard to the performance of intelligence officers in the case 
of Ahmadiyya in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, it is worth noting that they 
did not succeed in obtaining accurate information on the potential 
size of the anti-Ahmadiyya mass that planned to reach the house 
belonging to the Ahmadiyya community. The intelligence also 
failed to obtain information on the presence of Ahmadis in that 
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house. Inaccurate information contributed to delays in pacification, 
so that the clashes on 6 February 2011, between dozens of Ahmadis 
and thousands of their opponents, could not be avoided.
In addition to intelligence work, at the pre-emptive stage the 
police also performed the task of community guidance (binmas). By 
meeting with the warring parties they sought to decrease the tensions 
and prevent violent clashes. They also attended the meetings held 
for mediation purposes between the parties to the conflict.
Almost all of the cases of religious conflicts studied here have 
entered the stage of mass mobilization. Mobilization of hundreds or 
even thousands took place, except for the conflict over Nur Musafir 
Mosque in Kupang and Abdurrahman Mosque in Ende. Estimates 
of the masses size were taken into account by the police in deciding 
how many officers should be deployed for pacification. The location 
and accessibility of the sites was another important consideration.
In all cases studied, the police units deployed, both at the stage 
of prevention and pacification, came from the level of sub-district, 
district, up to the national police. In terms of units, they were inter-
unit groups including the intelligence and security unit, binmas, 
criminal investigations unit, traffic control unit, and sabhara. During 
conflict escalation, the police also deployed dalmas, raimas and the 
mobile brigade. In some of the cases, the army was also involved. 
Municipal police was also engaged in cases of conflicts over places 
of worship.
Except for conflicts in Ende and Kupang, where no mass 
mobilization occurred, the number of police officers deployed to 
handle the cases of conflict over places of worship ranged from 400 
to 600. For dealing with sectarian conflicts, the number of police 
officers deployed would reach even thousands.
In all cases of sectarian conflicts, it is important to note the 
difference in the timing of deployment of police officers. In the 
anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Manis Lor and anti-Shi‘a community 
in Bangil, the large numbers of police were deployed during the 
prevention stage, before the mass mobilization. In the case of anti-
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Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, Pandeglang and the anti-Shi‘a 
conflict in Sampang, Madura, the mobilization of security forces 
in adequate numbers took place only after the violent clashes. In 
Cikeusik, the security forces did not manage to obtain accurate 
information on the potential size of the masses, while in Sampang 
the information about the existence of mass mobilization seems to 
have not been used at all. 
In all cases, the police tried to position themselves as a neutral 
party, not favouring any of the warring sides. Nevertheless, the 
parties to the conflict generally did not perceived them as such.
In all cases, the police tried to put forward the persuasive 
measures of policing. In some cases, like in the case HKBP Filadelfia 
Church, the local police leadership adopted a policy of not arming 
their personnel, neither with weapons, nor with batons, shields and 
guns. If there were armed officers, such as those from the mobile 
brigade unit, they were usually placed in the rearmost position, or 
were deployed after the episodes of violence. The most common 
argument of the police to justify the avoidance of repressive actions 
was their unwillingness to exacerbate the tensions or encourage 
further escalation of the conflict. The persuasive measures taken by 
the police were actually seen by some parties as an indication of 
police indecision and weakness in the matter of law enforcement.
In some of the cases the policing actions have reached the stage 
of law enforcement. In the case of HKBP Filadelfia, Bekasi, the police 
processed reports of complaints from both parties to the conflict. In 
the sectarian anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in Cikeusik, the police had to 
process cases of violence which later were brought to the court and 
led to convictions. In the case of the Shi‘a community of Sampang, 
the police also conducted law enforcement measures but they did so 
discriminately. The Shi‘a leader Tajul Muluk was processed by the 
police and brought to the court, and so was the killer of Hamamah, a 
Shi‘a community member who was killed in the Sunni-Shi‘a clashes 
on 26 August 2012.
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Factors beyond Policing
From the in-depth observations and interviews with community 
leaders and the police who were involved in the studied cases of 
religious conflicts, we have reached some important conclusions 
that are not directly related to the aspects of policing. First, 
particularly the local governments, but also the civil society in 
general, the legislature, the courts, and the mass media can mollify 
or exacerbate conflicts. In case of sectarian conflicts, the partisanship 
of local governments has exacerbated the conflicts and complicated 
policing. It was so in the cases of Cikeusik and Manis Lor, where 
the local governments sided with the majority group. The case 
of sectarian conflict in Bangil was an exception where the local 
government acted neutrally and policing became easier.
Second, in line with the conclusions in point (1), in conflicts over 
places of worship the local governments’ siding with the Muslim 
majority (Bekasi and Bogor) or the Muslim minority (Kupang) also 
exacerbated the conflicts and complicated policing. The conflict in 
Ende was an exception, as the local government was neutral. The 
final settlement of the last conflict was not yet reached because of 
the lack of attention or decisiveness of the highest local leadership, 
the then regent (Catholic) and his deputy (Muslim) who were at that 
time competing in election for the regent’s office.
Third, important events related to local politics, especially the 
elections, generally worsened the resolution of both kinds of religious 
conflicts. First, the candidates who participated in the elections, both 
the incumbents and their opponents, generally tended to side with 
the majority groups, which complicated the policing and handling 
of disputes. Second, the local government’s attention to religious 
conflicts was not enough, which shows that religious conflicts were 
not a conclusive issue in the local politics.
Fourth, there are no specific conclusions with regard to gender 
in policing of religious conflicts. However, contrary to the common 
perceptions of women as passive, their role was quite prominent 
in almost all cases (except Cikeusik), where they represented both 
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of the warring parties. In Bekasi and Bogor, women participated 
in protests to show their opposition or support for the church 
construction. Similarly in Ende and Kupang. Highlighted should be 
the leadership of the former Kuningan police chief, AKBP Yoyoh 
Indayah, who effectively managed to prevent the anti-Ahmadiyya 
violence. Although in private she rejects the teachings of Ahmadiyya, 
as the police chief she remained nonpartisan.
And lastly, although most of the religious conflicts studied here 
did not lead to fatalities, except for the anti-Ahmadiyya conflict in 
Cikeusik and the anti-Shi‘a conflict in Sampang, their social and 
economic costs were high. For example, the police in Bekasi on 
average deployed 200 officers each week, while in Bogor on average 
600 officers, also every week and for the last two years. These 
amounts were reduced or increased in certain periods.***
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LEARNING FROM 
GOOD POLICING PRACTICES:
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the description and analysis presented in the previous 
chapters, here we seek to provide a number of recommendations. 
These will be addressed specifically to: (1) the parties to the conflict; 
(2) the police; (3) local governments; (4) civil society organizations 
and the FKUB; and (5) the mass media. Recommendations will be 
divided into two groups with regard to the conflicts type — sectar-
ian ones and ones over places of worship. Some of the recommen-
dations for handling the sectarian conflicts will be similar to the rec-
ommendations for handling conflicts over places of worship. How-
ever, most of them are different, and therefore grouped separately.
Recommendations based on the study of policing of religious 
conflicts are not only addressed to the police. As described in the 
introduction, in this research we have examined several factors or 
variables which influence policing of sectarian conflicts and con-
flicts over places of worship. Apart from describing the incidents 
of these conflicts in the communities where they occurred, this re-
search also sought to examine the influence and the role of local 
politics, relationships between the police and the conflicted parties, 
as well as the role of public opinion in policing activities.
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The recommendations are addressed to several parties who play 
an important role for policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts 
over places of worship. Policing of these conflicts must involve not 
only the police alone but also the local governments, civil society, 
and, most importantly, the warring sides. This is in line with the 
approach of plural policing in which the police is a part of a wider 
group with which it also cooperates.
Recommendations for the Parties to the Conflict 
Addressing Sectarian Conflicts
1. Improve the relationships and social interaction among people of 
different religions and between followers of different denomina-
tions and sects within one religion. Improvement of communica-
tion and interaction can be done in everyday life as well as through 
associations and institutions whose members come from diverse 
religious backgrounds or different denominations within one reli-
gion. Inter-faith and inter-sect relations can become the framework 
to discuss arising issues, including sectarian conflicts. Lack of inter-
action and poor communication among people of different religions 
and sects can make the conflicts escalate quickly and spread farther.
2. Do not only focus on exclusive dogmas and understandings but 
also on ethics of humanism and the sense of nationhood. Dogmas 
divide, humanism, also supported by religions, unites. Imagine 
Indonesian nation as a pluralistic society whose citizens live to-
gether and understand each other, and can handle problems and 
conflicts by peaceful and nonviolent means.
3. Avoid vigilantism when confronted by conflicts or problems of 
sectarian nature which derive from or are related to differences 
in understanding and religious practices. Vigilantism leads to 
violence, fatalities, injuries, or displacement, and also material 
destruction — of houses and other property. Vigilantism also 
causes the conflicts to spread, makes reconciliation difficult, and 
increases the perception that religious communities do not sup-
port peace and democracy.
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4. Carry out internal policing by controlling the followers or orga-
nization and community members, so that they do not commit 
acts of violence and vigilantism. Both majority and minority reli-
gious leaders alike are responsible for educating and disciplining 
their followers to maintain peace and mutual understanding in 
a pluralistic society. Otherwise, allowing and inciting retaliation 
would trigger destruction of relationships within the society. 
Vigilantism of majority groups in one place can be answered by 
vigilantism elsewhere towards members of that majority group 
who there are in minority.
5. Coordinate with the police, either periodically or regularly, dis-
cuss the potential and signs of disharmony between religious 
groups which emerge in the society. Coordination should be in-
tensified when the sectarian tensions increase. If parties to the 
conflict do not coordinate with the police, then the police cannot 
quickly prevent violence and calm them appropriately.
6. Coordinate with the local government, the regents and mayors, 
and related agencies such as Kesbanglinmas and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs. Local governments, along with the police, are 
representatives of the state at the local level and are in charge of 
protecting citizens regardless of their religion, sect, or tribe. If the 
warring parties do not coordinate with the local government, the 
local government cannot take preventive measures to immedi-
ately and appropriately handle the conflict.
7. Coordinate with FKUB and civil society organizations which 
can become a forum for dialogue and meetings in order to foster 
the mutual understanding. Organizations and institutions can 
provide nonpartisan assistance to reduce tensions and to find 
non-confrontational and non-violent solutions.
 
Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship
1. The warring parties need to develop empathy, sensitivity, and 
awareness that other religious communities also need places of 
worship. Religious communities have to improve the sense of 
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solidarity and unity towards one another because all of them 
want and need places of worship. Inter-faith cooperation in 
building places of worship is not uncommon in Indonesia, and 
religious leaders as well as organizations should support this 
noble practice, and not oppose and block it also by the means 
of the Joint Ministerial Decree (PBM) of 2006. Such support is 
increasingly needed in communities which are facing problems 
over places of worship.
2. Build places of worship after or simultaneously with building 
interfaith relations. Many places of worship were built without 
causing conflicts, even people of different religions built them to-
gether. Construction of places of worship reflects social cohesion 
in a pluralistic society. And in such societies it should not only be 
reduced to construction of a building but must be preceded by 
efforts to establish social relations.
3. Prevent and contain conflicts over places of worship in order 
that they do not escalate geographically. Conflicts over places of 
worship must be prevented as early as possible because they can 
spread to other places. The rejection of church construction in 
one place can result in or increase opposition to mosque con-
struction elsewhere. Retaliation of this kind also makes the con-
flicts become increasingly conspicuous, and difficult to handle.
4. Cooperate and coordinate with the police. Coordination with 
the police should be done from the very beginning, not only for 
security reasons when the tensions increase. The police can pro-
vide assistance through counseling, community guidance, and 
socialization of the regulation on the establishment of places of 
worship in a pluralistic society. Police programs such as com-
munity policing and problem-oriented policing can become a 
framework which allows the cooperation and coordination be-
tween the police and the community.
5. Cooperate and coordinate with the local governments, officials 
and related agencies. Local governments have the authority to 
prevent and manage social conflicts, including conflicts over 
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places of worship. This coordination is carried out through the 
forums such as Musrembang, meetings of regional leaders (Mus-
pida) of various levels, and other coordination forums.
6. Coordinate with the FKUB and similar civil society organizations 
because they can provide a forum for dialogue. The FKUB, as per 
Article 1 of the PBM 2006, is concerned with “building relations 
between religious communities, which are based on tolerance, 
mutual understanding, mutual respect, respect for equality in 
religious practice, and cooperation in social and national life of 
the Unitary State of Indonesia, in the light of Pancasila and the 
Constitution of 1945.”
7. Avoid vigilantism when confronted with problems or conflicts 
over places of worship. Vigilante actions lead to violence and de-
struction, and can trigger retaliation because the majority here 
is a minority elsewhere. A vicious circle of vigilantism tarnishes 
national solidarity, the good name of religions and of religious 
denominations which all claim to bring goodness and peace.
Recommendations for the Police
Addressing Sectarian Conflicts
1.  Give more attention to sectarian conflicts which recently have 
been on the rise, and caused loss of life. In particular, the police 
needs to notice the symptoms and sources of tension between 
the sects, learn the ways to approach diverse religious groups, 
and to control the rumors and tensions which emerge in the so-
ciety. Coordinate with conflicted denominations and sects irre-
spective of their religious practices. 
2.  Educate the police officers on how to behave and act when 
faced by differences between sects and religious practices in 
the society, and relationships between the majority and mi-
nority. The police must avoid prejudices against certain reli-
gious groups, even when these prejudices are derived from 
fatwas and regulations. Prejudices interfere with police pro-
fessionalism.
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3.  Improve the professionalism of the police by decisively enforc-
ing the law regardless of personal views on particular religious 
sects, and regardless of pressure from the masses of one of the 
parties to the sectarian conflict. Provide sanctions against police 
officers who do not enforce the law, because the threat of punish-
ment and sanctions will encourage them to act in a decisive and 
professional way. Likewise, award professionalism of the police 
members and leadership.
4. Make the planning and decisions which enable the police to 
quickly mobilize the forces from various units and locations. 
Immediate deployment and presence of police forces in an ad-
equate amount is much more required than the large number of 
officers coming to the scene after the riots. Incidents of sectarian 
conflicts in Indonesia showed that the police could not gain the 
control immediately because it was not accustomed to mobiliz-
ing themselves in order to prevent sectarian violence.
5. Avoid approach and persuasion when there are serious tensions 
which can lead to open sectarian violence. To prevent violence 
required is not flaccid persuasion but credible measures of pre-
vention and deterrence, which show that the police as state ap-
paratus is given the mandate and authority to punish offenders 
with violence and the threat of the use of force. If the police does 
not punish the perpetrators of vigilante actions, the police will 
lose the most important reason of its being needed in a country.
6. Coordinate with local governments in order to prevent and tack-
le sectarian conflicts. Coordination is an imperative because of 
the links between the governance and security in a society. Coor-
dination should be carried out on a regular basis through meet-
ings and discussions with leaders, meetings with the local intel-
ligence communities, formal and informal forums. The alliance 
between the local government and the police will increase the 
credibility of deterrence. The split between them will open up 
the space for militancy, intolerance, vigilantism, and other social 
diseases.
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7. Garner support for policing actions from various parties, both in 
order to provide protection to all citizens and in order to crack 
down on vigilantism and sectarian violence. The support should 
be raised as early as possible from the local government, FKUB, 
Komnas HAM, MUI, KWI, PGI, Parisada Hindu Dharma, Walu-
bi, Matakin, and other relevant organizations, so that the public 
receives the message that there is an alliance against sectarian 
violence and vigilantism.
Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship
1. Understand the fact of religious pluralism in the society and car-
ry out planning based on that understanding. Updates on the 
new settlements, relations between local communities and im-
migrants (especially when the receiving community’s religion is 
different from the religion of the newcomers), should be taken 
into account in gathering information and in community guid-
ance, especially in the communities affected by conflicts over 
places of worship.
2. Reinforce prevention in handling conflicts over places of wor-
ship by approaching the warring parties to subject them to exist-
ing laws, as well as to maintain security and order. Several police 
mechanisms such as negotiation, community guidance, commu-
nity policing and problem-oriented policing can be used for of 
prevention of conflicts over places of worship, not only during 
or after the conflict.
3. In dealing with conflicts over places of worship the police must 
garner as early as possible the support from the local govern-
ment, FKUB, and civil society, so that they would assist the po-
lice in conflict prevention and in intervention if the conflict oc-
curs.
4. The police should deter those who commit acts of vigilantism 
in conflicts over places of worship. This is done by presenting a 
credible threat that the perpetrators of violence and vigilantism 
would be arrested and punished immediately.
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5. Support the lower police units at the level of sub-district police 
and police stations. Police is a hierarchical organization and clear 
directions and support from superiors would improve the mo-
rale of police officers below them. Otherwise, inaction and un-
concerned attitude of the leaders will decrease their team spirit. 
Improve the inter-level communication within the police orga-
nization, so that evaluation of the leadership at lower levels or 
their replacement can be done in order to strengthen the police 
performance.
Recommendations for Local Governments
Addressing Sectarian Conflicts
1. Understand the plurality of denominations and sects in the so-
ciety, despite the fact that the majority of citizens adheres to one 
religion and one of its sects. The executives such as regents and 
mayors receive the support of some citizens, but they lead all of 
them. Local governments must protect all and foster religious 
harmony, as stipulated in laws and regulations such as the PBM 
(Article 5 and 6, clause 1).
2. Act neutrally and impartially in sectarian conflicts to avoid fall-
ing into them and complicating the conflict resolution. Avoid us-
ing sectarian conflicts for political purposes like seeking support 
in elections, as this undermines the autonomy of the state in han-
dling conflicts and makes the state become a part of the problem, 
not a solution.
3. Support fair judicial process and provide due process of law to 
the parties or to one of the parties to the sectarian conflict. Re-
spect the court decision and the Supreme Court, and do not to 
create the space for militant vigilantism because it will become 
the seed of future problems for the government.
4.  Support the police in carrying out their duties of maintaining 
security and order, and law enforcement in sectarian conflicts. 
This support can include engagement and synergy in the joint 
operations (such as joint planning, appearing together in pub-
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lic during interventions, providing funds for the operations to 
restore security and order, etc.). Without this synergy the capac-
ity of the state in providing protection and deterring vigilantism 
will be flaccid.
5. Avoid making excuses and justifying inaction of the government 
in dealing with sectarian conflicts. Reasoning such as “religious 
and sectarian conflicts are a matter for the central government” 
or “local ethic does not desire the local government’s protection 
of the rights of citizens” is a lie and denial of responsibility of 
local governments to protect citizens regardless of their religious 
background and practices.
6.  Do not succumb to the pressure and the fait accompli of the par-
ties to the sectarian conflict in the hope this would appease them. 
Appeasement in sectarian conflicts often leads to escalation of vi-
olence and polarization in the society. Avoid creating regulatory 
actions that destroy diversity, tolerance, and national spirit.
Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship
1. Understand the fact of religious pluralism in the society and the 
need of religious communities to have their places of worship. 
The local governments should be neutral and impartial in con-
flicts over places of worship. Otherwise handling of such con-
flicts will be protracted.
2. Avoid issuing regulations and decrees (governor’s, regent’s, 
mayor’s) which specify and add provisions to the PBM, since 
this regulation can be, and has been, misused to hinder the estab-
lishment of places of worship.
3. Facilitate consensus-building meetings with regard to construc-
tion of places of worship. These meetings should be attended by 
the warring parties, but also by the police and representatives of 
the civil society. Perceive disputes over construction of places of 
worship in the wider context, since these conflicts are always re-
lated to other problems with social change, social cohesion, and 
governance.
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4. Approach the broader public in order to improve the atmosphere 
of mutual trust in the community and between the community 
and the government. Conflicts over places of worship are related 
to feelings of fear and anxiety about the presence of different or 
new communities. Anxiety and fear are linked to efforts to pro-
tect oneself and one’s group. The government must undertake 
serious actions to make these worries disappear and to restore 
the atmosphere of mutual trust, rather than to follow concerns of 
one of the parties to the conflict.
5. Support the police in maintaining security and order and enforc-
ing law in conflicts over places of worship. Such support can be 
in form of engagement in a joint team (joint public appearances, 
joint consultations, providing financial assistance, etc.). Avoid 
the false notion that conflicts over places of worship are solely 
the matter for the police, because the sources of conflicts over 
places of worship are often located in the administration.
6. Do not succumb to the pressure and the fait accompli of the war-
ring parties in the hope that it would calm them. Appeasement 
often leads to inconsistent policies/regulations and polarization 
in the society. Avoid submitting to the pressure and making reg-
ulatory actions that destroy diversity, tolerance, and national 
spirit, or by cancelling the permits (such as construction permits) 
that had been issued earlier.
Recommendations for Civil Society Organizations and the FKUB
Addressing Sectarian Conflicts
1. Handle the sectarian conflicts in the wider social context, do not 
just deal with the technical aspects of the construction of plac-
es of worship. FKUB should facilitate dialogue and cooperation 
among communities that follow different religions and sects. In 
this pluralistic society, the FKUB has to stand for all religious 
groups.
2. Support the police in maintaining security, order and law en-
forcement in conflicts over places of worship. Make the police 
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your major partner. Such support could be in form of involve-
ment in joint operations (public appearances, engaging in joint 
consultations, negotiations, consensus building, etc.). Such sup-
port means a lot to the police for whose duties the public opinion 
is important.
3. Pay attention to peace-building within a society, do not focus on 
the incidents of religious conflicts alone. Civil society, along with 
the local government and the police has to support resolution 
of sectarian conflicts and to endorse interfaith institutions such 
as the FKUB. In cities and districts where the FKUB is weak or 
nonexistent, civil society needs to support its establishment or 
strengthening. Leaders of organizations such as NU and Mu-
hammadiyah must also seek the best ways to prevent sectarian 
conflicts from escalating into violence.
4. Support and pay attention to the local inter- and intra-religious 
youth organizations and networks. The FKUB and civil society 
organizations must begin to support the inter-faith networks of 
young people. Paying more attention to young actors of vigilan-
tism and militancy and ignoring the “non-problematic” youth 
who support peace and social cooperation leaves an impression 
that there are only violent and intolerant young people in the 
public space.
5. Initiate a broader public debate on inter- and intra-religious rela-
tions, where fatwas, sectarian controversies, and truth claims are 
treated as opinions that are faced also by opinions but non-sec-
tarian ones. Views which contain hatred, incitement to violence 
and discrimination, regardless of where they come from, should 
be debated openly in order to defend democratic measures.
6. Supervise the government and the police handling of sectarian 
conflicts in the community.
Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship
1. FKUB’s function, as stipulated by the PBM of 2006 (Article 1, 
clause 1-2, and Article 9, clause 1-5), is more important than 
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merely solving technical aspects with regard to establishment of 
places of worship. FKUB and civil society organizations should 
strengthen the sense of unity and equality within the pluralistic 
society of Indonesia.
2. FKUB needs to strengthen and maintain its internal consolida-
tion and avoid being trapped in the conflicts over construction 
of places of worship.
3. Civil society organizations and institutions should monitor the 
government and the police handling of conflicts and disputes 
over places of worship. Civil society organizations should mon-
itor politicians who exploit these conflicts for political purposes 
such as the local elections.
4. Support and pay attention to the local inter- and intra-religious 
youth organizations and networks, especially in places torn by 
conflicts over places of worship.
5. Support the police in maintaining security, order and law en-
forcement in conflicts over places of worship. This support can 
be in form of sharing information, facilitating dialogues, etc. 
Such support means a lot to the police as the public opinion is 
important for its performance.
6. Leaders of religious organizations such as NU and Muhammad-
iyah should not be silent when faced by conflicts over places of 
worship. They must seek the best ways to prevent the conflict 
from escalating into violence.
Recommendations for the Mass Media
Addressing Sectarian Conflicts
1. Members of mass media should understand the diversity of re-
ligious beliefs and sects in the community and carry out their 
job in accordance with that understanding. The use of labels that 
reflect judgments and religious particularisms, such as “devia-
tionist cults”, should be avoided.
2. Avoid sensationalism in the coverage of sectarian conflicts. In ad-
dition to relying on 5W (what, who, where, when, and why) and 
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1 H (how), the media should pay attention to S (solutions) and C 
(common grounds). Ideas and initiatives with regard to manage-
ment and transformation of conflicts need to be promoted to the 
audience, irrespective of where they come from. Media needs to 
make the priority of reconciliation and conflict resolution in re-
porting sectarian conflicts. The audience is also interested in the 
coverage of conflict resolution.
3. Pay attention to peace and inter- and intra-religious tolerance, 
do not only cover the conflict incidents. Make coverage, in-depth 
reports, and human interest stories about religious groups which 
peacefully coexist in various cities and regions of Indonesia. Cas-
es of peaceful coexistence of Sunnis and Shi‘as or Sunnis and Ah-
madis are more frequent than the cases of violence, but they are 
not broadcasted. Since one of the rules of the media reads “if it 
bleeds, it leads”, the journalists are more interested in reporting 
acts of vigilantism which, in fact, are committed only by a small 
group of the society.
4. Cover the process of law enforcement and emphasize the due 
process of law. Report if the law enforcement process in the crim-
inal justice system was manipulated and harmed one of the par-
ties to the conflict or its victims.
5. Monitor performance of the police and local governments. Create 
investigative reports on the role of local governments, civil bureau-
cracy and the police in handling sectarian conflicts. Report if these 
institutions act in a partisan way, if they do not give sufficient at-
tention to conflict resolution, or if they utilize sectarian conflicts in 
political competition such as, for example, the local elections.
6. Monitor performance of the media themselves, especially the 
media which ignore the independent reporting and plunge into 
sectarian conflicts to the extent that they become a part of these 
conflicts themselves. Also monitored need to be the media which 
tend to air judgmental statements and spread enmity among re-
ligious groups or which create a sensation out of sectarian con-
flicts.
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Addressing Conflicts over Places of Worship
1. Pay attention to cooperation and solidarity in construction of 
places of worship. Make coverage of cases where construction 
of places of worship went without problems, and people who 
worked on it came from different religious backgrounds. If social 
peace and non-violence are not covered, a general impression 
will be that construction of places of worship always leads to 
conflicts and violence.
2. Provide adequate coverage of the role of the police in policing 
of conflicts over places of worship, publish their perspective 
on the conflicts and the ways to resolve them. Also report the 
constraints and limitations faced by the police in handling these 
conflicts — why they avoid law enforcement actions, how they 
coordinate or not coordinate with the local governments, what 
steps and actions are taken by the police towards the warring 
sides, etc.
3. Monitor the performance of the police, local governments, and 
civil servants in handling conflicts over places of worship. Make 
investigative reports on the roles played by the local govern-
ments and civil servants in dealing with construction of places of 
worship, whether they act in a partisan way, or give insufficient 
attention to conflict resolution, or even utilize the conflicts in po-
litical competition such as the local elections.
4. Monitor performance of the media themselves, especially of the 
media which tend to and spread hostility and represent exclu-
sive views of one of the warring sides.*** 
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DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT:
“POLICING RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN INDONESIA”
Description of Incident: 
1.  Date:
2.  Location:
3.  Type of conflict: (places of worship/sectarian)
4.  Issue of the conflict:
5.  Form of the incident: (attack, destruction, etc.)
6.  Trigger event:
7.  Parties involved:
a. First party (attacker/protester):
b. Second party (target/victim):
8.  Tools/weapons used:
9. Impact:
a. Fatalities
b. Injured
c. Disappeared
d. Refugees
e. Material loss (homes, places of worship, vehicles, livestock, public facilities, 
shop/kiosk etc.).
10. Is this a new conflict or recurrence of an old one:
Policing Activities
1. Pre-emptive (for police intelligence officers or others who have information about 
intelligence performance)
a. Did the police intelligence unit obtain information about the tensions before 
the conflict escalated into violence?
b. If yes, how long before the conflict escalated into violence the information was 
obtained?
c. What actions were undertaken after the police received information about 
tensions? Were there any police attempts to prevent tensions from escalating 
into violence? Did the police try to approach and calm the warring parties? 
Did it try to facilitate communication between the warring parties? What was 
done by the Bimmas and Humas units?
d. In the long duration of the conflict, were there any changes/transfers among 
the police officers? Were the new officers briefed about the potential of violent 
escalation?
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2. Prevention (when mass mobilization has occurred)
a. Was the police aware of the mass mobilization before the incident?
b. If yes, did the police obtain the information about the possible escalation into 
violence from one of the parties to the conflict (particularly the party which 
became the target)?
c. What actions were undertaken after the police received information about mass 
mobilization, especially when it was already known that the masses carried 
objects which could be used for violent acts? (allowing; taking persuasive 
measures to prevent; dispelling the masses; repression)
d. Who has the authority to deploy the police officers to prevent mass 
mobilization, of which level (sub-district police, district police, provincial 
police), and under what conditions?
e. If the police takes preventive measures against mass mobilization, which units are 
deployed and of which level (sub-district police, district police, provincial police)?
3. Countermeasures (when the incident takes place)
a. Which unit was deployed? Why?
b. Police officers deployed were from sub-district police, district police, or 
provincial police? Why?
c. How many police officers were deployed? Was the amount adequate to deal 
with the masses (the attackers)?
d. If not, why the number of troops deployed was insufficient? 
e. If the police troops deployed were in an adequate number, were they deployed 
at the right time? If not, why?
f. The types of policing activities: approach; documentation; persuasion; repressive 
actions.
g. What is the reason behind the police unwillingness to consider taking 
repressive measures against the masses who deliberately commit criminal acts 
(assault, vandalism, arson etc.)?
h. Why the police more often chooses to evacuate the victims instead of taking 
repressive measures against the attackers?
4. The legal process and the post-clashes/conflict phase: arrest, detention, 
investigation and inquiry (cooperation with the prosecutor: P21), trial, sentencing 
(see if mass demonstration takes place in the court) – in short: criminal justice 
system.
Police Knowledge
1. Do the police officers know the Police Chief Regulation No. 8 of 2009 on 
implementation of the principles and standards of human rights in the duties of 
the National Police?
2. Do the police officers know that the rights include the following inalienable 
rights?
·	 right to embrace a religion and to worship in accordance with one’s religion;
·	 freedom of belief and the right to express one’s opinions in accordance with 
one’s conscience.
3. Do the police officers know that the following rights belong to the catalogue of 
citizens’ rights which the police has to protect:
·	 the right to personal freedom: everyone is free to choose and have political 
convictions, express their opinion in public, choose any religion, be free from 
enslavement, be not discriminated in their right to citizenship, have freedom 
of movement and the right to move and reside within the territory of the 
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Republic of Indonesia (Regulation No. 8 of 2009, Article 6, clause b);
·	 the right to security: everyone is entitled to protection of their selves, their 
family, honour, dignity, property, and peace as well as protection against the 
fear (Regulation No. 8 of 2009, Article 6, clause c);
·	 special rights of minorities such as ethnic, religious, sexual minorities and the 
disabled (Regulation No. 8 of 2009, Article 6, clause h).
4. [In case of conflicts over places of worship] did the police officers know the 
Joint Ministerial Regulation (PBM) of No. 8 and 9 of 2006 which regulates the 
construction of places of worship? Specifically, did the police officers know the 
requirements and mechanisms for establishment of places of worship?
5. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] according to the police officers, why 
did the conflict occur? Who were the parties involved? Did the parties involved 
have a track record of conflicts at that location or in other locations?
6. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] were the requirements for 
establishment of places of worship fulfilled? Was the construction process in 
accordance with the mechanisms and requirements?
7. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship], if the requirements were fulfilled, 
the mechanisms were appropriate, and the conflict still took place, what, according 
to the police, has caused it?
8. [In case of sectarian conflicts] do the police officers know the Act No. 1/PNPS 
1965 on abuse of religion and/or blasphemy?
9. [In case of sectarian conflicts] what is understood by the police officers as abuse 
of religion and blasphemy? Can sectarian conflicts be seen as cases of abuse of 
religion or blasphemy?
10. [In case of sectarian conflicts] according to the police, why did the conflict take 
place? Who were the parties involved? Did the parties involved have a track 
record of conflicts at that location or in other locations?
11. Are the actions undertaken by the police in dealing with sectarian conflicts and 
conflicts over places of worship appropriate? Does the police comply with the 
formal and legal framework and the existing internal instruments of the police 
institution?
12. What were the supporting factors and what were the obstacles faced by the police 
while dealing with sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?
13. What needs to be done to improve the police performance in handling sectarian 
conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?
Legal and Procedural Framework of Policing and Characteristics 
of the Police Institution
1. Which laws are the main frame of reference for the police in handling sectarian 
conflicts and conflicts over places of worship?
2. Which fixed procedures are used by the police when dealing with sectarian 
conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? The procedures on Pulbaket, 
Dumas, Dalmas, Ganunras, Gankuat, Ganki? 
3. Although the police organization is centralized, why are there variations in 
policing of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? Are they 
related to the institutional structure and resources of the police at the level of sub-
district, district, provincial, and national police?
4. Does the police apply alternative mechanisms in conflict resolution (such as 
traditional law)?
Appendix332
Police Culture
1. What are the police officers’ views on democracy, human rights, religious freedom, 
and tolerance?
2. What are the perceptions of the police officers’ on the role of the police in a 
democratic system, on protecting human rights, religious freedom and tolerance?
3. Do the members of the police perceive the conflicts involving religious issues as 
more sensitive than other kinds of conflicts? Does this make the police feel they 
need to be extra careful in handling religious conflicts? Does this make the police 
rarely employ repressive measures when dealing with violent conflicts over 
religious issues?
4. Do the police members have a religious affiliation with the majority group? Does 
this affiliation affect the policing activities? 
5. What kind of prejudices and stereotypes do the police have about the minority 
religious groups which by the majority are seen as deviationist?
6. According to the police, can the minority religious groups (including groups 
considered as heretical/deviationist) coexist with the majority? Or should they 
remain in their own environment?
7. How does the police respond to the views of religious groups if they are contrary 
to the constitutional guarantees of protection of freedom of religion, belief, and 
worship? Can the police still put forward the principle of protection of religious 
freedom, although this attitude is contrary to the views of the majority?
Local Politics
1. Local governments and parliaments: do the statements of government officials 
and legislators in the local media aggravate or mitigate the conflict? Are the 
incidents of sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship used for 
gaining support in the local political contests?
2. Ministry of Religious Affairs: what has been done, what public statements issued? 
Are there differences between the attitudes of the city/district, province offices of 
the Ministry and its main headquarters?
3. [In case of conflicts over places of worship] according to the police, do the existing 
regulations regarding the establishment of places of worship restrict the rights of 
religious worship as guaranteed by the constitution?
4. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] according to the police, do the local 
governments’ (regents/mayors) policies and attitudes with regard to construction 
permits affect the police protection of citizens’ right to religious practice?
5. [In case of sectarian conflicts] according to the police, are the existing regulations 
regarding the abuse of religion and/or blasphemy in line or contrary to the 
principle of the protection of religious freedom as guaranteed by the constitution?
6. [In case of sectarian conflicts] do the local governments’ (regents/mayors) policies 
on religious groups labelled as deviationist affect the police protection of citizens’ 
right to religious practice, and of the rights of minority groups?
Public Opinion
1. What are the roles and actions of the local MUI and of the main MUI headquarters? 
What is their general role? Is there a difference of attitudes between the local and 
the main MUI?
2. Synod and diocese: Does Synod/Diocese give directions which reduce or which 
exacerbate the conflict? Do the statements of Synod/Diocese leaders increase or 
reduce the polarization in society? Do they take part in bridging communities 
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when conflicts emerge or not? Are there any attempts to create links between the 
local conflict with the wider context (conflicts in the province, in Indonesia, or 
abroad)?
3. FKUB: was the FKUB present in districts/cities in the region where the conflict 
occurred? What was its role? Are there differences between the FKUB of districts/
cities, provinces and main headquarters in addressing the conflict incidents? Are 
there any other interfaith organizations? What is their role and vision?
4. Leaders of Muhammadiyah, NU or similar: do their directions reduce or 
exacerbate conflicts? Do their statements add to polarization in society or reduce 
it? Do they play a bridging role when conflicts occur or they do not? Are there any 
attempts to create links between the local conflict with the wider context (conflicts 
in the province, in Indonesia, or abroad)?
5. Media: What is the role of the media in sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places 
of worship? Do the media side with one party to the conflict - for example, the 
majority party? Do they publish the views of the law enforcement agencies such 
as the police and the courts? Do they become a mouthpiece of one of the warring 
parties or do they provide reports that help in conflict resolution?
6. What is the role of NGOs in each location where the conflicts occurred? 
7. [In case of conflicts of over places of worship] according to the police, do the views 
and attitudes of religious leaders or local religious organizations about permits 
required for establishment of places of worship and their views on particular 
groups’ right to worship, affect the police protection of citizens’ right to religious 
practice, and of the minorities’ rights? 
8. [In case of sectarian conflicts] according to the police, do the views/fatwas of 
religious leaders/organizations on the groups labelled as deviationist/heretical, 
affect the police protection of citizens’ right to religious practice, and of the 
minorities’ rights?
Interaction between the Police and the Actors of Conflict
1. Have there been repeated incidents of sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places 
of worship in your work environment in recent years? Was it a solitary incident?
2. If repeated, why in your opinion, it happened again? 
3. How did the police handle each of the repetitions of this conflict?
4. [For conflicts that could be handled – did not lead to violence], why/how did 
the police manage to handle these particular sectarian conflicts and conflicts over 
places of worship?
5. Were there meetings between the police and community leaders in order to handle 
the sectarian conflicts and conflicts over places of worship? What was the input 
from the community leaders in those meetings?
6. Were there meetings and coordination between the police and local authorities in 
order to handle sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of worship?
7. What is the role of other parties aside those mentioned earlier, for decisions made 
by the police while dealing with sectarian conflicts or conflicts over places of 
worship?
Parties Involved in the Conflict (Targets/Victims) 
1. Did the victims have information that the conflict would escalate into violence?
2. Did the victims report to the police the possibility of the conflict escalating into 
violence? What was the response of the police?
3. When did the victims know about the presence of the police: before, during, or 
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after the conflict escalated into violence?
4. In accordance with the timing of police presence, what actions were carried out by 
the police that were known to the victims (e.g. they were present but allowed the 
attacks, or they were trying to block the attackers but failed, etc.)?
5. According to the assessment by the victims, would the police forces present at the 
scene be able to prevent violence?
6. According to the victims’ assessment, did the police tend to be biased (towards 
the attackers)?
7. According to the victims’ assessment, if the police failed to prevent the outbreak 
of violence, what were the main reasons of failure? Was it connected to the policy 
or attitude of the local government towards the disputed issues? Was it connected 
to the views of the local social/religious leaders?
Parties Involved in the Conflict (Attackers)
1. Who are they in terms of social position? A small/big religious organization? The 
dominant group/minority? Are they related to thuggish circles?
2. Do the attackers have a track record of involvement in earlier conflict incidents?
3. The tactics they use: peaceful or violent? Confrontational or non-confrontational? 
A mix of both?
4. Do the attackers have individual or organizational links with the police?
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ACRONYMS
AKBP : Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi (Police Adjunct Senior Commissioner); 
equivalent to Lieutenant Colonel
Babinkamtibmas : Bintara Pembina Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Development 
Board for Security and Order)
Babinmas : Badan Pembina Masyarakat (Community Guidance Body)
Baintelkam : Bintara Intelijen dan Keamanan (Security Intelligence Officer)
Bakesbangpolinmas : Badan Kesatuan Bangsa, Politik, dan Perlindungan Masyarakat 
(Agency for National Unity, Politics, and Public Protection)
Bakorpakem : Badan Koordinasi Pengawas Aliran dan Kepercayaan Masyarakat 
(Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society) 
BAP : Berita Acara Pemeriksaan (Police Investigation Report)
BASSRA : Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren se-Madura (Consultation Body 
of the Ulama of Madurese Boarding Schools)
Biddokkes : Bidang Kedokteran dan Kesehatan (Medical and Health Section)
Bidropam : Bidang Pertanggungjawaban Profesi dan Pengamanan Internal 
(Profession Accountability and Internal Security Section)
BIN : Badan Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency)
Binmas : Pembinaan Masyarakat (Community Guidance)
Binamitra : Biro Pembinaan Kemitraan (Guidance and Partnership Bureau)
BKO : Bawah Kendali Operasi (Under Operational Control) 
Brimob : Brigade Mobil (Mobile Brigade)
Buser : Buru Sergap (Mobile Detective Unit)
Dandim : Komandan Distrik Militer (District Military Commander)
Dalmas : Pengendali Massa (Crowd Control)
Danramil : Komandan Rayon Militer (Sub-District Military Commander)
Ditintelkam : Direktorat Intelijen dan Keamanan (Intelligence and Security Directorate)
Ditreskrimum : Direktorat Reserse Kriminal Umum (General Criminal Investigations 
Directorate)
Ditsabhara : Direktorat Pengaturan Penjagaan Pengawalan Patroli (Guarding Patrol 
Management Directorate)
DKM : Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (Council of Mosques)
DUHAM : Deklarasi Universal tentang HAM (Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights)
Dumas : Pengaduan Masyarakat (Public Complaints)
FKUB : Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (Interfaith Harmony Forum)1
1FKUB was established through the joint ministerial regulation (Peraturan 
Bersama Menteri, PBM) of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home 
335
Acronyms336
FKUI : Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam (Islamic Community Communication 
Forum)
Forkami : Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Communi-
cation Forum)
Forpimda : Forum Pimpinan Daerah (Regional [Provincial and District] Com-
muni cation Forum)
Gakkum : Penegakan Hukum (Law Enforcement)
Ganki : Penanganan Anarki (Anarchy Countermeasures)
Ganunras : Penanganan Unjuk Rasa (Handling Protests)
GAMAS : Gerakan Anti-Maksiat (Anti-Vice Movement)
GARIS : Gerakan Reformis Islam (Reformist Islam Movement)
GBHN : Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (Broad Outlines of National Policy)
GKI : Gereja Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Church) 
GO : Gelar Operasional (Operation Display)
Harkamtibmas : Pemeliharaan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Maintaining 
Security and Social Order)
HGB : Hak Guna Bangunan (Certificate of Occupancy)
HKBP : Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (Batak Protestant Church)
Humas : Hubungan Masyarakat (Community Relations)
IMB : Izin Mendirikan Bangunan (Construction Permit)
Intelkam : Intelijen dan Keamanan (Intelligence and Security)
IPS : Ikatan Pencak Silat (Pencak Silat Association)2
JAI : Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Ahmadiyya Community of Indonesia)
Kabag Ops : Kepala Bagian Operasional (Head of Operations)
Kades : Kepala Desa (Village Head)
Kamtimbas : Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Security and Social Order)
Kanit : Kepala Unit (Head of Sub-District Level Police Unit)
Karoops : Kepala biro operasi (Head of Operations Bureau)
Kasat : Kepala Satuan (Head of District-Level Police Unit)
Kesbangpol  : Kesatuan Kebangsaan dan Politik (National Unity and Politics)
Kesbang : Kesatuan Kebangsaan (National Unity)
Kejari : Kejaksaan Negeri (Prosecutor Office)
Kodim : Komando Distrik Militer (District Military Command)
Kominda : Komunitas Intelijen Daerah (Regional [provincial and district] Intelligence 
Community)
KUA : Kantor Urusan Agama (Office of Religious Affairs)
KUHAP : Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana (Penal Law)
Lantas : Lalu-Lintas (Traffic)
Linmas : Perlindungan Masyarakat (Community Protection)
MA : Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court)
Matakin : Majelis Tinggi Agama Khonghucu Indonesia (Supreme Council for 
Confucian Religion in Indonesia)
MMI : Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)
MUI : Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council), with national, 
provincial, and local bodies
Affairs No. 9 of 2006 / No. 8 of 2006 on the guidelines for the duties of the heads 
of regions/deputy heads in maintaining religious harmony, empowerment of the 
Forum for Religious Harmony, and the construction of places of worship.
2Pencak Silat is one of Indonesian traditional martial arts.
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Muspida : Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah (Regional [Provincial and District] 
Leaders Consultation)
Muspika : Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan (Sub-District Leaders Consultation)
Musrembang : Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Development Planning 
Consultation)
NU : Nahdlatul Ulama (Ulama Awakening); the largest Muslim 
organization in Indonesia
Pakem : Pengawas Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat (Team to Monitor the 
Mystical Beliefs in the Society)
PBM : Peraturan Bersama Menteri (Joint Ministerial Regulation)3
PC : Pengurus Cabang (Officials at Branch-Level)
PDI-P  : Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle)
Pemda  : Pemerintahan Daerah (Local Government)
Pemkot : Pemerintahan Kota (Municipal Government)
Perkap : Peraturan Kapolri (Police Regulation)
Persis : Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity); one of Indonesian puritan Islamic 
organizations
PGI : Persatuan Guru Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Teachers)
Pilkada : Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Local Election)
PKS : Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
Polda : Kepolisian Daerah (Provincial Police) 
Polresta : Kepolisian Resor Kota (Municipal Police)
Polwan : Polisi Wanita (Policewomen)
Polmas : Pemolisian Masyarakat (Community Policing)
Polres : Kepolisian Resor (District-Level Police)
Polri : Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police)
Polsek : Kepolisian Sektor (Sub-District Police)
Protap : Prosedur Tetap (Fixed Operating Procedures)
PUI : Persatuan Umat Islam (The Unity of Muslims); one of Indonesian 
Islamic organizations
Pulbaket : Pengumpulan Bahan dan Keterangan (Collecting Information)
Raimas : Pengurai Massa (Mass Decomposer)
Renpam : Rencana Pengamanan (Security Plan)
Reskrim : Reserse Kriminal (Criminal Investigation)
RT : Rukun Tetangga (Neighborhood Group).4
RW : Rukun Warga (Community Group)
Sabhara : Pengaturan Penjagaan Pengawalan Patroli (Guarding Patrol)
Samapta : Siap siaga (readiness); field officer
SARA : Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-golongan (Ethnicity, Religion, Race, and 
3Refers to the joint ministerial regulation of the Minister of Religious Affairs and 
the Minister of Home Affairs No. 9 of 2006 / No. 8 of 2006 on the guidelines for 
the duties of the heads of regions/deputy heads in maintaining religious harmony, 
empowerment of the Forum for Religious Harmony, and the construction of houses 
of worship.
4In Indonesia, RT and RW are units below village (desa) or even hamlet (dusun). 
RW is short for rukun warga (community group) and below it is RT or rukun tetangga 
(neighbourhood group).
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Inter-Group [Relations])5 
Satpol PP : Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (Public Order Agency)
Sekdes : Sekretaris Desa (Village Secretary)
SK : Surat Keputusan (Decree)
SKB : Surat Keputusan Bersama (Joint Decree)6
SOP : Standard Operating Procedure
SPKT : Sentra Pelayanan Kepolisian Terpadu (Center for Police Integrated 
Service)
Sprint : Surat Perintah (Letter of Instruction)
SSK : Satuan Setingkat Kompi (Company-Level Unit)
SST : Satuan Setingkat Pleton (Platoon-Level Unit)
THR : Tunjangan Hari Raya (Annual Bonus, in connection to Eid al-Fitr/
Idul Fitri festival)
Tupoksi : Tugas Pokok dan Fungsi (Main Duties and Functions)
Turjawali : Pengaturan, Penjagaan, Pegawalan dan Patroli (Management, 
Protection, Guarding, and Patrol); a police unit
Walubi : Perwakilan Umat Budha Indonesia (Indonesian Buddhists 
Representative)
5The acronym originated in the New Order government, who prohibited discus-
sion on these four topics for being sensitive issues.
6SKB generally refers to the joint decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the 
Attorney General and the Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia 
No. 3.2008, KEP-033/A/JA/6/2008, 199 of 2008 on the warning and commands to 
the followers, members, and/or leaders of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community of 
Indonesia (JAI) and the public. SKB also refers to the joint decree issued by a number 
of local governments. 
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GLOSSARY
Adat From Arabic: tradition, custom
Ahlussunnah wal 
Jama‘ah
From Arabic; lit.: “the people of the traditional way and 
of the congregation of believers”; widely understood as 
Sunnis, in contrast to Shi‘as
Amar ma‘aruf nahi 
munkar
From Arabic: to encourage the good and discourage the 
evil
Carok A Madurese tradition of duelling in which [commonly 
male] combatants use sickles and often fight to the death; 
the fight could expand beyond two combatants to include 
also their family members or groups
Dakwah From Arabic; lit.: “the call”; the term denotes to the efforts 
to convert non-Muslims to the Islamic faith and/or to 
persuade Muslims to become more observant
Fatwa From Arabic: Islamic religious edict
Halal bihalal From Arabic: Muslim gathering, especially after Ramadan 
and the celebration of Eid al-Fitr (Idul Fitri)
Haba’ib See: habib
Habib From Arabic; lit.: “beloved [of God]”; a cognate for 
Indonesians of Arab descent; plural: haba’ib
Haul Annual religious gathering to commemorate and celebrate 
a deceased religious leader
Imam From Arabic: a person who leads a prayer
Istigasah From Arabic: mass prayer to ask God’s help
Jawara Local strongmen
Karang Taruna Neighbourhood youth organization
Khatib From Arabic: someone who gives a sermon
Kiai (or Kiyai) Headmaster and head teacher of an Islamic school, 
particularly Islamic boarding school
Langgar See: musala.
Madrasah Islamic day schools.
Madhab From Arabic; Islamic schools of law such as Hanafi, Maliki, 
Shafi‘i, and Hanbali; the word sometimes is also used to 
denote schools of theology, such as Sunni or Shi‘a
Majlis taklim From Arabic; Islamic study group
Mubalig From Arabic: preacher
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Musala From Arabic: Islamic prayer room found in shopping 
malls, airports, offices and other sites, as well as 
standalone buildings; musala are smaller than mosques; 
as a standalone building, sometimes musala is also called 
langgar.
Mut‘ah From Arabic: temporary marriage
Pengajian Islamic teaching sessions
Pesantren Indonesian Islamic boarding schools
Preman Thug, gangs
Ruko Rumah-toko; shop-house
Salafi From Arabic; lit.: “past”; Salafis seek to return to Islam in 
its traditional, purified forms (roots)
Santri students of a pesantren
Tablig preaching
Tablig akbar From Arabic; lit.: “grand sermon”; religious gathering 
where some preachers make sermons in front of a huge 
crowd
Tazkirah A book written by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of 
Ahmadiyya; many mainstream Muslims and organizations 
like the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) believe the 
Tazkirah is the holy scripture of Ahamadiyya 
Tengkah The high value the Madurese ascribe to matters of self 
worth and pride
Ulama Muslim scholars
Ustad (or Ustaz) From Arabic: teacher
Zina From Arabic: adultery
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“In these eight meticulously researched case studies, 
Rizal Panggabean, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi and their colleagues 
illuminate two critical issues in post-Soeharto Indonesia: 
the prevalence of religious conflict and the institutional 
weaknesses of the police. … The institutes involved in 
this study have developed a formidable reputation for 
work on religious conflict, combining rigorous research 
with practical advocacy, looking for lessons that might be 
learned to manage such conflicts more effectively and 
prevent violence in the future.”
– SIDNEY JONES
Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC)
Some of the developments in the management of religious life in the 
post-New Order Indonesia have been encouraging, some not at all. 
Although often discussed, very rarely this problem has been reviewed 
in terms of policing. This is quite unfortunate because since the 
separation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) 
and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI) in 1999, the police has 
been gradually taking over the major role of maintaining security and 
public order. 
This is what prompted the Center for the Study of Religion and 
Democracy (PUSAD), Paramadina Foundation, to carry out a research 
on the subject of religious conflicts policing. The present book, which 
is based on it, asked two main questions: why the policing of sectarian 
conflicts and conflicts over places of worship has been effective in 
some cases but has not been so in others? What explains the variation 
of policing success and failure in these conflicts? 
This research was driven by an assumption that performance of the 
police in dealing with religious conflicts, as well as with all other matters, 
cannot be treated solely as the police problem. The failure or success 
of policing must be seen in the context of existing political structures of 
opportunities and constraints which influence the policing.
